Macau Business | June 2024

Keith Morrison – Author and educationist

Like many other parts of the world, Macau is experiencing a population change. It is common knowledge that Macau’s population is living longer. In 2013, the proportion of its population aged 65 and above was 8.4 per cent; in 2023 it was 14 per cent, projected to rise to 23.3 per cent in 2034. Further, the number of people in the 25 to 34 age group, i.e. those who might have children, whilst they comprised 16.7 per cent of the population in 2023, is projected to fall to 10.2 per cent in 2034. As graph 1 shows, in the last ten years Macau’s population aged 65 and above grew dramatically, by 85 per cent (rounded), whilst the number of live births fell by half (49.57 per cent) (see graph 2). The younger population (aged 0-4 years) is projected to fall from 4.3 per cent in 2023 to 3.4 per cent in 2034.

The ramifications of these simple figures are already engaging Macau’s government, for example, building accommodation for the increasing elderly population in Macau. Nevertheless, more can be done for elderly health services. Why are there daily queues of elderly patients waiting for treatment in Macau’s hospitals and health centres? What is being done to augment the massively over-stretched and under-provided mental health provision and services in Macau, to promote well-being, and, indeed, not only for the elderly but for all age groups? Despite recent building programmes, there are still insufficient homes for the elderly providing a decent, stimulating, and caring environment, together with a high quality of life rather than endurance and suffering in a socially withering, boring environment.

We hear many, many stories of young adults of child-rearing age in Macau deciding not to have children. It is little surprise that the birth rate is falling in Macau. Why is this? What incentives and provisions are there for bringing children into the world in Macau? Can young Macau couples afford to have children? In other parts of the world, financial help from the government for all parents bringing up children lasts until the children are 18 years of age, regardless of parents’ income, i.e. equality for all. Not so in Macau. This raises an ongoing and massive agenda, regarding affordable accommodation, job security, and sufficient income to raise children, to give them a reasonable, enjoyable childhood and subsequent adulthood. These point to the need for considerable investment in improving health care, education, providing for children, social welfare, ensuring their well-being and a positive and stimulating environment for bringing up children with their families, not only giving individual handouts; it is a system-level as well as an individual-level support matter. No wonder, perhaps, that fewer people in Macau have babies.

It is difficult to reconcile Macau’s huge GDP and steps taken to further its ‘gold business card’, with the need for all its population, young and old, to have a better quality of life. Where is Macau’s government providing sufficient all-round care and support for the elderly and child rearing in Macau? Only with having all these available and accessible services and support will the elderly be able to look forward to retirement without apprehension, fear, and despair, and will the younger, child-bearing population be able to afford to have children and give them a decent life. This places societal welfare at the top of a government agenda, not simply the amassing of wealth, flourishing business, and putting crowded streets of tourists at the topic of the ‘to do’ list.

Source: DSEC (latest annual data)

The four-day Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) ended on July 18, delineating a  comprehensive set of reforms and designating the year 2029 as the timeline of completing these reforms and the year 2035 as a target of achieving “high-quality socialist market economic system.” Overall, stability amid persistent economic and social reforms are the main themes of the Third Plenum.

The Plenum approved an important decision on the Central Committee’s further comprehensive and deepening reforms and on the promotion of Chinese-style modernization. The objectives are to improve the basic system, to realize the modernization of the national governing system and capability, and to achieve a strong socialist modernized nation.

Economically speaking, the decision mentions the need to construct a unified big market in China, improve the market economy, reform the new high-quality productive system, deepen financial/monetary and tax reforms, and lay the foundation of the 15^th five-year plan.

Clearly, the socialist market economy and its permanent reforms remain the pillar of China’s economic modernization with an emphasis on the acceleration of new productive forces and on their related reforms at the level of superstructure (values and institutions).

In terms of risks management, the decision emphasizes the necessity of preventing and solving the debts of the land and property sectors, the local government and small and medium enterprises. Moreover, there is a need of leading public opinion and preventing and solving the risks of ideological development.

What these phrases implied was that the central authorities learnt a lesson from the failure of the Evergrande Group to deliver property projects that led to some public discontent. The conglomerate’s fiasco heightened the crisis consciousness of the central and local authorities who have recently tightened the process of auditing work in the land and property sectors.

With regard to opening the door to the outside world, the decision mentions the need to expand the openness of the economic system in a stable manner, to deepen reforms in external trade, and to persist in managerial reforms to attract foreign investment and improve China’s investment in other countries. In this way, a high-quality Belt and Road system will be established.

Politically, the decision vows to improve and perfect the basic political system, meaning that the national and local legislatures as well as the people’s consultative conferences will continue to be reformed as crucial supervisory mechanisms.

Culturally, the decision emphasizes cultural confidence, pointing to the need for a responsibility system in ideological work, a healthy governing system for cultural development and an effective international media system.

Clearly, persistent ideological and propaganda work remain the cornerstone of reforms in China.

In terms of livelihood improvement, the decision points to the improvements of the distribution system, the policy priority of providing employment and the necessity of deepening medical care and health system reforms.

Obviously, social stability through the betterment of the people’s livelihood is the linchpin of the Third Plenum’s decision.

The decision also elucidates the importance of improving the national security system, the governing mechanism for public safety, the social governance system and the national security mechanism that deals with external relations.

Securitization has actually remained a prominent trend of Chinese reforms since 2012, analytically speaking.

In the area of external relations, the decision says that China participates in and takes the leadership of the global governance system, reform and construction while resolutely protecting national sovereignty, security and developmental interest.

Other crucial aspects of the decision includes the need for reform of state-owned enterprises (injecting more competition into the energy and railroad sectors); the support of civilian enterprises to partake in the nation’s large infrastructure projects; the standardization and integration of high-quality markets in electricity, digital data and rural-urban land use. Moreover, the entity economy and the digital economy have to be integrated further in the process of infrastructure modernization and high-quality development. The local government’s financial difficulties will be tackled through the process of giving the localities more autonomy in expanding their tax revenues and increasing the central government’s proportion of local-level expenditures. Public services will be improved for registered households and low-income and poor households in rural areas, including the supervision of the manufacturing and distribution of food products with proper subsidies.

New economic and social groups will be explored to assist employment with an emphasis on party leadership. Finally, anti-corruption work persists while strengthening a monitoring system to prevent abusing the prosecution process of anti-corruption.

Analytically, the CPC plays the leadership role in all aspects of reforms, ranging from the injection of more competitive elements in the socialist economy to the re-invigoration of social organizations supportive of the government and societal employment.

Basically, strong governance is the focal point of the Third Plenum.

Interestingly, its decision is not only pragmatic but also frank, acknowledging that the demand side of the economy remains weak.

In terms of personnel management, ex-foreign minister Qin Gang resigned from his position in the Central Committee – a more graceful exit than those corrupt military commanders such as former minister Li Shangfu and former rocket force chief Sun Jinming who were dismissed from the party.

The implications for Hong Kong and Macau are obvious: while Hong Kong and Macau practise capitalism under the “one country, two systems,” both cities are expected to persist in all kinds of reforms in the economic, social, cultural and livelihood aspects. If social stability and economic prosperity are the twin foci of permanent reforms in the mainland, the ruling authorities in both Hong Kong and Macau are naturally expected to deliver more in these two crucial dimensions.

In conclusion, the decision of the Third Plenum continues to build China up as a strong nation punctuated by the emphases on persistent economic reforms, systemic improvements, socio-political stability, economic prosperity, the betterment of the people’s livelihood, the permanence of socialist market modernization, and the leadership of the CPC.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

By Jorge Costa Oliveira

Partner and CEO of JCO Consultancy

Well-defined public policies (including significant government incentives – purchase subsidies, tax incentives and favourable licensing plates), good government and business planning in creating an integrated value chain in the electric storage and mobility sectors, and the absence of entropies created by radical environmentalist activism, all these factors converged to make China the largest market in the production (45%) and consumption (60%) of electric vehicles (EV). It should be noted that it is not only Chinese brands (BYD, Great Wall, SAIC, BAIC, Changan, Chery, Geely, XPeng, NIO) that produce EV in China; many foreign brands (Tesla, Ford, GM, BMW, VW, Mercedes, Audi, Renault, Volvo, Jaguar Land Rover, Nissan) also have EV plants within China, producing for the Chinese domestic market, but also for export. Value chain integration – from the refining of critical metals to the production of electric cells, cathodes, anodes, to gigafactories and EV assemblers – low production costs, the abovementioned government incentives and effective competition, have enabled the production of EVs in China to be significantly cheaper than in the US and Europe. According to some  industry experts, production in China can shave up to €10,000 off the cost of an EV. In 2022, electric battery prices were 24% lower in China than in the U.S.

Meanwhile, in the Chinese domestic EV market, demand growth is slowing down (+90% in 2022, +36% in 2023, +22% in 2024) and competition is fierce (with a price war that has lasted for more than a year). Furthermore, several western institutions consider that China’s EV industry is at overcapacity, producing annually an excess of 5 to 10 million EVs beyond domestic demand, forcing China to find new markets to fuel continued growth.

Internationalisation has become an essential facet for all EV producers in China, focused on key potential consumer markets. Thus far, the internationalisation of Chinese EVs has been made mainly via exports. The growth of EV exports was the key factor for China’s reversion of its automotive trade balance; since mid-2022, vehicle exports have continuously outperformed imports. This trend was catalysed by China-produced vehicle exports to Russia amid the retreat of western corporations from this market since Ukraine’s invasion.

Overall, the Association of European Vehicle Logistics (ECG), citing data from the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers (Caam), reports that Chinese [all] vehicle exports rose >1.3m in Q1 2024 (76.8% ICE, 23.2% NEVs), up 33% from Q1 2023, with leading markets being Russia (112,000 units), Mexico (66,000), Belgium (42,000) and the UK (38,000). The main Chinese carmakers exporters were Chery (with 253,000 units), SAIC (206,000), Changan (145,000), Geely (111,000), BYD (99,000), Great Wall (93,000) and Tesla (88,000).

The main destination market for Chinese-produced EVs is Europe, followed by Asia; there is little penetration in the North American and Latin American markets (although growing fast in Brazil). Chinese EV brands avoid exporting to the US, which has a 27.5% tariff on automobiles imported from China (soon to be increased to 100%) and tie EV tax credits to local incorporation requirements. The majority of EVs exported from China are destined for Europe due to high demand in the region, high European per capita income, high local EV prices, low European customs tariffs, and substantial government subsidies for EVs, regardless of its origin.

To understand the competitiveness of Chinese EV brands, a recent report by Rhodium Group gives the example of BYD’s Seal U model that sells for €21,770 in China and €41,990 in the EU. Not only are Chinese automakers rapidly gaining shares of the European EV market (especially in the lower-priced segments), but they are making higher profits in Europe. Elon Musk’s prediction that Chinese carmakers would ‘demolish’ global rivals is coming true in literally every market (hence the 100% tariff imposed by the US government).

According to the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA), China maintained its position as the leading source of new car imports to the EU in terms of value, with a growth of 37.1% and a market share of 17.7%. A significant portion of this growth is due to EVs. According to the European Federation for Transport and Environment (T&E), EVs manufactured in China are expected to account for 25% of total EV sales in Europe in 2024 (+5% compared to 2023).

T&E projections estimate that [among the EVs manufactured in China] Chinese brands will progressively gain bigger market shares – 11% by 2024 and 20% until 2027. However, it is important to clarify what “Chinese brands” means. In 2023, Chinese brands only represented a 2.5% market share of the European market last year, with 72% of that share belonging to MG, a British car brand controlled by the Chinese group SAIC Motor, MG being today a fully Chinese brand from production to design. Without MG, Chinese brands have only a 0.6% market share in Europe. This discrepancy arises from the fact that most vehicles imported from China to Europe are not Chinese brand vehicles but rather vehicles manufactured in China by foreign brands. Tesla alone accounts for 68% of the EVs imported from China and registered in Western Europe.

Following an investigation launched by the European Commission on “unfair subsidization” of China-produced EVs’, the currently low EU customs tariffs (10%) are going to be increased to up to 38% (on BYD: 17,4%; on Geely: 20%; on SAIC: 38,1%; on other BEV producers in China, which cooperated in the investigation but have not been sampled: 21%; on all other BEV producers in China which did not cooperate in the investigation: 38,1%). It is not clear the effect that such an increase will have on European consumers demand for China-produced EVs, but it is likely to slow down the [fast] penetration they were having.

Given the high tariffs already imposed in many relevant markets (e.g., India, Thailand, Brazil) to protect local automobile industries and the high probability that the EU would raise its tariffs (and eventually impose non-tariff obstacles), Chinese EV producers have planned to and are gradually setting up plants in several countries outside China.

Journey to the West – the European Market

The growing decoupling between China and the US has refrained Chinese EV producers from venturing into US-based production. Only Polestar – a luxury EV brand owned by Geely – has an investment in an EV plant, scheduled to start production in South Carolina in 2024 (it is so far the only brand selling in the US China-produced EVs).

The main market where Chinese-branded EV companies plan to set up plants is Europe. BYD will have its first European plant investment in Hungary, and announced it is considering a second European plant in 2025. It is also likely that Great Wall Motors will make its first European plant in Hungary (negotiations concerning government incentives, including tax breaks, to attract foreign investment and for job creation, are under way). These investments are in line with sizable investments (and government incentives) for gigafactories in the country, to be made by South Korean groups SK On and Samsung SDI and Chinese battery giant CATL.

Spain, Europe’s second largest car-making country after Germany, has secured investment from Chery, which will start production in the fourth quarter at a former Nissan facility in Barcelona, via a partnership with Spanish EV Motors. Chery is expected to benefit from Spain’s 3.7 billion-euro programme launched in 2020 to attract EV and battery plants.

China’s Envision Group has already received 300 million euros in incentives under the scheme for a 2.5 billion battery plant creating 3,000 jobs. Spain might also host Stellantis’ planned fourth gigafactory in Europe, with CATL.

Poland will have an EV plant to be made, in Tychy, by a partnership of China’s Leapmotor and Franco-Italian Stellantis.

Chery is mulling over plans to establish a plant in the UK as it begins to launch its Omoda and Jaecoo brands, following in the footsteps of several Chinese-owned gigafactories producing electric batteries in the country.

According to Reuters, Chery plans a second, larger facility in Europe, a source with knowledge of the company’s plans told, and has held talks with governments, including the Italian one, which is keen to attract a second automaker to rival Fiat-maker Stellantis.

Italy can tap its national automotive fund, worth 6 billion euros between 2025 and 2030, for incentives for both car buyers and manufacturers. China’s Dongfeng is among several other automakers that have held investment discussions with Rome.

Still, according to Reuters, SAIC, owner of the MG brand, aims to build two Europe plants. The first, based at an existing facility, could be announced as early as July and would employ a kit-assembly technique, targeting annual production of up to 50,000 vehicles. SAIC’s second European plant would be completely greenfield and produce up to 200,000 vehicles annually. Germany, Italy, Spain and Hungary are reported to be on SAIC’s location shortlist.

BYD, Chery, SAIC and Great Wall are also looking for attractive locations in Eastern Europe and Turkey (its Association Agreement with the EU creates a customs union, and the country has several free trade agreements with non-EU countries) to set up plants for lower-cost vehicles.

Turkey is reported to be in advanced negotiations with BYD and Chery for EV plants investments in the country. The Turkish government says that separate negotiations are also underway with SAIC Motor, which owns MG, and Great Wall Motor.

Overcoming shipping issues

In 2023, prices for car shipping carriers increased by up to 700% compared to 2019; Houthi attacks in the Red Sea further exacerbated them. A perception of shortage of shipping carriers [capacity] and inflated costs stemming from the war in Ukraine led Chinese EV carmakers and associated shipping companies to place orders for a significant number of new car carrier ships. According to the abovementioned report by the Rhodium Group, the combined capacity of these ships will allow the shipment of an estimated 560,000 cars annually to Europe in 2025, based on six trips a year (in 2023 the EU imported 472,000 EVs from China). Said capacity could surge to 1.7 million cars in 2026. “In the unlikely case that all ships were used for transporting cars to Europe, the volumes exported from China would likely be enough to capture 50% of the EU’s EV market”. The decision to purchase rather than lease these car-shipping carriers shows the long-term commitment of Chinese EV producers to export large quantities of cars.

Journey to SE Asia

The other relevant market where Chinese-branded EV companies plan to set up plants is Southeast Asia.

According to a Counterpoint analyst, “over 70% of EV sales in [Southeast Asia] are from Chinese brands, led by BYD”. Thailand is the main destination market in SE Asia, accounting for 79% of ASEAN EV sales. Several major Chinese EV manufacturers have already established or announced plans to invest in Thailand. Great Wall Motors operates an EVs plant in Rayong province that produces its Ora brand. The company also plans to build a battery factory and an R&D centre in Thailand. BYD (in cooperation with Rever Automotive) also has a plant in Rayong that produces EVs and batteries. Chongqing Changan Automobile intends to invest 10 billion baht ($290 million) to set up an EV production facility in Chonburi province. The company expects to start production in 2024 and sell its vehicles under the Kaicene brand. GAC Aion plans to invest 6.2 billion baht ($180 million) to build an EV plant in Chachoengsao province. The company targets to begin production in 2024 and launch its Aion V model in Thailand. Hozon New Energy Automobile (in partnership with a local firm, Yontrakit Group) will start production of its Neta brand of EVs in Thailand in 2024. In 2023, SAIC Motor, in cooperation with Charoen Pokphand Group (CP), opened its first battery plant for EV in Chonburi province. SAIC Motor-CP said it intended to start making MG BEVs in Thailand.

Several Chinese EV brands are also scheduled to be produced in Malaysia. Hozon New Energy Automobile announced investments to produce the Neta brand in Malaysia. Changan Automobile Corporation (in partnership with Fieldman EV Sdn Bhd (FEV)) plans to build the Eado EV460 model in Lipat Kajang, Jasin, Melaka. Chery also plans to produce its EQ1 model in Malaysia. BYD (in partnership with CSH Alliance) will assemble (CKD) the BYD T3 electric van in Tanjung Malim, Perak.

Even in Vietnam, home to the successful VinFast EV carmaker, BYD and Haima announced plans to build plants to produce car parts and plants to assemble EVs.

In Indonesia (by far the most populous SE Asian country, but with a low GDP per capita), PT Neta Auto (a subsidiary of Chinese firm Hozon Auto), in partnership with PT Handal Indonesia Motor (HIM), has started the production of Neta’s latest model, the Neta V-II (on a CKD basis) in Bekasi, West Java. Neta V-II is powered by LFP batteries from Chinese battery maker Gotion High-tech, a battery pack that, according to Neta Auto, has 44% of its components produced in Indonesia. BYD announced in January 2024 that it will make an EV plant in Indonesia, following a previous intention of building an electric bus assembly plant and, eventually, a battery manufacturing factory in Indonesia. Chinese EV maker Aion  announced in April 2024 that plans to make an EV plant in Indonesia (in partnership with Indomobil Group).

Indonesia has also great potential to become a production hub for EV batteries given the abundant nickel ore natural resources in the country. Many EV carmakers, namely from China, are keen to enter upstream in the supply chain for EVs and automotive batteries including the mining and refining of nickel ore, producing precursors and cathode materials.

Journeys to other geographies

Although Europe and ASEAN are the main markets in the internationalization path of Chinese EV carmakers, the main producers are also expanding into other relevant geographies.

In Central Asia, the Kazakhstan government, unveiled (on March 2023) that it reached an agreement [with Chery and ZEEKR] for the construction of EV plants for the production of Exeed and Geely car models, with a planned capacity of 80,000 finished vehicles.

It is noteworthy the sizable investment by BYD [Europe] (in partnership with Uzavtosanoat) in the Jizzakh region, in Uzbekistan, for an EV plant using initially the CKD method. Chinese firm Henan Suda signed a deal with Uzbekistan’s Energy Ministry to build upwards of 50,000 electric vehicle charging stations around the country by 2033.

In Latin America, thus far, Chinese EV carmakers have focused in Brazil and in Mexico. In Brazil, Chinese EV carmakers are already the EV market leaders, and they appear set to capitalize on the rapidly growing market for EVs in the country. EV sales in Brazil were up 145% in the first three months of 2024, according to the Brazilian Electric Vehicle Association, with BYD and Great Wall Motors leading the pack on EV sales in Brazil, the world’s sixth-largest auto market. Like the US and the EU, Brazil has raised tariffs on all imported EVs, which should reach 35% in 2026.

Great Wall and BYD have both pledged to build EV factories in the country. BYD estimates that its Camaçari complex (a former Ford cars plant) will be able to churn out 150,000 vehicles per year once it opens, while Great Wall’s plant in Iracemápolis (a former Mercedes-Benz cars plant) could produce 100,000 vehicles annually. Following its business model in China, BYD is trying to recreate an integrated supply chain in Brazil (and Chile), reportedly holding talks about taking over one of the country’s lithium producers.

BYD committed to make an EV plant in Central Mexico. SAIC also plans to build an EV plant in the country, to produce locally MG-branded vehicles. Jetour (in alliance with the LDR company), another Chinese EV automaker, also announced large investments in Mexico (in Aguascalientes and/or Guanajuato) for a dual assembly plant – it will produce both combustion vehicles (ICE) and EVs. Chery is also mentioned in the media as being engaged in discussions with Mexican authorities over the setting up of EV car assembly plants.

A report from the ‘Alliance for American Manufacturing’, released in February 2024, describes as “alarming” the Chinese focus on building plants in Mexico. “They can access the US by way of the more favourable tariffs [2.5%] under the USMCA. This strategy is, in effect, an effort to gain backdoor access to American consumers by circumventing existing policies that are keeping China’s autos out of the US market.” The Alliance expressed concern that “the introduction of cheap Chinese autos – which are so inexpensive because they are backed with the power and funding of the Chinese government – to the American market could end up being an extinction-level event for the US auto sector”. Reuters reported, on April 2024, that the Mexico’s federal government, under pressure from the US authorities, is keeping Chinese automakers at arm’s length by refusing to offer such incentives as low-cost public land or tax cuts for investment in EV production.

In the Middle East, in 2022 Enovate Motors, a Chinese EV start-up, announced it would make (in partnership with Saudi Sumou Holding) an EV plant in Saudi Arabia. On mid-2023 Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Investment agreed with Chinese EV carmaker Human Horizons a mega-deal of $5.6 billion to collaborate on the development, manufacture and sale of vehicles. These investments in the new plants made by Chinese-based EV automakers in Saudi Arabia are expected to serve the surrounding region.

In India, BYD, which entered the Indian passenger vehicle market in 2021, currently offers two products in its India portfolio – Atto3 SUV and e6 MPV – which are imported and assembled at its plant in Chennai. However, on mid-2023, a proposal by BYD (in partnership with Hyderabad-based Megha Engineering and Infrastructures) to make another EV plant, in Hyderabad (the proposal included a plan to set up charging stations in India and build research and development and training centres) was refused by the Indian government on “security concerns with respect to Chinese investments in India”. More recently, the Indian government changed its approach. On March 2024, the new EV policy approved by Indian government, allows import duty concessions (a limited number of cars costing USD >35,000 will be subject to lower customs/import duty of 15% for five years) to be given to foreign companies setting up manufacturing units in the country with a minimum investment of USD 500 million. Clarifications were made by the Indian government that this new policy also applies to Chinese EV carmakers, but many of these Chinese EV corporations will remain at large given the serious tension arising from regional rivalry and borders conflicts.

Conclusion

Several 2021 Merics analysts’ predictions – that China would become a major automotive export hub, that Europe would be the main market for Chinese EV exporters, that the Chinese government would issue directives, put pressure and support Chinese and China-based foreign carmakers to export, that Chinese manufacturers would move up the EVs value chain, that Chinese companies’ overseas investments and partnerships would make them global [successful] competitors, that government subsidies for China-based manufacturers could distort global markets – became true.

The internationalization of Chinese EVs is global, albeit giving priority to markets with higher income and demand for EVs.

The internationalization of Chinese EVs is subject to political decisions at home and abroad, often influenced by geopolitical concerns.

In several cases, of which BYD is a good example, the integration of upstream stages in the EVs value chain (producing its own EV batteries and its components as well as refining the critical metals needed for EV batteries), creates bigger operating margins that provide greater price elasticity and makes Chinese EVs very competitive.

Internationalization of Chinese EVs will continue to be made on a dual track – via exports of certified models and via investments in local EV plants.

High(er) tariffs on imported EVs to protect domestic automotive industries – as is the case in the US, the EU, Brazil and Thailand – are likely to continue.

The impact of higher tariffs on imported EVs is not clear but it is likely to reduce [the pace of] exports of Chinese EV models of such relevant markets.

Although higher tariffs will make some Chinese EV carmakers (e.g., XPeng) hesitate to go ahead with planned EV plants in said protected markets, such investments likely will be a necessary cost to maintain access to some of those markets, namely in Europe.

In some markets where higher tariffs are but a tool arising from a clear political will of not allowing Chinese EV carmakers to enter the national market – as seems to be the case of the US and India – it is unlikely that Chinese EV will be successful in penetrating such markets; in some cases (US), commitments on investments in local EV plants will probably not be authorized.

Nonetheless, even with the recently announced imposition of US, EU and Brazil higher tariffs on EVs from China (and, in the case of the US, from 2030 also from Southeast Asia), a fast pace for the internationalization of Chinese EV carmakers is inevitable in every relevant market and hard times lie ahead for European, American, Japanese and Korean automakers.

文：Keith Morrison | 作家及教育家

與世界上許多其他地區一樣，澳門正在經歷人口變化。眾所周知，澳門人口的壽命越來越長。2013年，65歲及以上人口比重為8.4%；這一比例於2023年飆升至14%；預計到2034年將進一步上升至23.3%。此外，25至34歲組別的人口數量，例如那些已為人父母的居民，佔澳門2023年人口總數的16.7%，預計到2034年將萎縮至 10.2%。如表1所示，澳門65歲或以上人口數量於過去十年間暴增，增幅高達85%（四捨五入），而活產嬰兒數量卻減少了近一半，跌幅為49.57%（詳見表2）。較年輕的居民人口（0-4歲）數字預計將從2023年的4.3%下跌至2034年的3.4%。 

這些簡單數字將引發一系列後果，並已引起了澳門政府的關注，例如，為本地持續增加的長者建造住房。儘管如此，長者健康服務仍可進一步提升。為何澳門的醫院及健康中心每日都見長者排隊等候治療？為了促進社會福祉，完善澳門嚴重供不應求的心理健康輔導和服務，當局採取了哪些措施？事實上，目標受眾不局限於長者，而是涵蓋所有年齡段的居民。儘管最近推出了新的項目，但澳門仍無法為長者提供足夠的優質且具關懷的環境，更不用說高品質的生活，人們繼續在充滿磨難和痛苦的環境中掙扎。 

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José I. Duarte

Economist, Macau Business Senior Analyst

The debate about the impact of mass tourism is going on in several places around the world. In some, it is very visible and, one might say, vociferous. It is (or will be) possibly everlasting. Tourism impacts local populations’ livelihoods and environment in multiple ways, some more amenable than others. Specific local issues will play out differently in different places, and diverse solutions will be tried – but the core issue is essentially the same. Too many people, either physically or psychologically, probably both, affect conspicuously how the locals go about their daily lives.

Setting such discussions around concepts such as carrying capacities and quotas is almost intuitive and provides a first easily understandable frame of reference. But, as argued here before, the simplicity of the approach may turn out to be too crude to lead to effective policies. It may be a starting point, but hardly an anchor for effective policies.

So, it all starts with increasing numbers of visitors. However, all the visitors are not the same, either in their contribution to the residents’ income or occupation of the physical space. (A short note is justified at this point before we proceed. Published statistics focus on the number of visitors, their length of stay, and their spending profiles. Other relevant matters, relating to their space and time distribution and concentration while in town require systematic information collection that is not readily available, if at all.)

The main distinction, between tourists (those staying overnight, as they are technically defined) and same-day visitors (self-explanatory) provides a good starting point for the discussion. They are associated with different spending profiles – and those differences matter. They impact local activities in diverse (positive and negative) ways.

Available data tell us that the average overnighter spends, gambling aside, four to five times more than same-day visitors. Indeed, part of that difference is directly linked to the fact that overnighters usually pay for lodging, a significant item in their expenditure basket. But even if we set aside that item (important as it is for the local economy’s direct and indirect income and employment), overnighters still typically spend at least twice as much as their single-day counterparts.

Indeed, the bulk of visitors come from mainland China and the overall figures in all types of expenditure are heavily influenced by their spending patterns. But, again, averages hide significant behavioural differences. Unsurprisingly, most visitors come from Guangdong and Fujian provinces, for reasons of geographical proximity and social affinity. The average consumption for all Chinese visitors is, therefore, quite close to the corresponding figures for those two regions. Yet, significant differences are visible, even at this high level of data aggregation.

For instance, visitors on individual visas consistently spend above the global average (by very variable margins, we may note, the reasons for which would be interesting to investigate). That difference seems related to the behaviour of visitors from regions other than the two closest ones seen above. Distance and visit frequency may play a role in them, but we can only guess, at this point – the data is too aggregated for further judgment).  

Indeed, all this conversation needs to go beyond the cold analysis of figures and the things they can (fruitfully) tell us. Yet, a careful examination of patterns, trends, and their evolution, is a needed starting point. It will help us to understand the flow of visitors, their distribution, and their spending profiles – and identify their drivers. It should inform any policies concerning the management of the city as a tourist destination, as well as its promotion.

Jorge A. F. Godinho

Associate Professor, ISMAT, Portugal

Visiting Professor, University of Macau, China

jg.macau@gmail.com

[Macau Business, July 2024]

  The persistent demand for casino games of chance, betting, and lotteries is met by a small number of legalised, regulated, and supervised operators; some have a monopoly. Unfortunately, there is always somebody trying to make money by offering gaming illegally. We know what happens in unlawful gaming operations. They do not need to worry much about the customer. No rules and standards must be observed. The mathematics of the games can be anything.

Underground betting operations and casinos appear regularly, both brick and mortar and online. Illegal sports betting always appears around major international tournaments, such as the football world and European cups. When horse racing existed in Macau, illegal betting was a relatively regular feature. With the internet, the possibilities for unlawful online gaming have multiplied.

The fight against illegal gambling, done by means of criminal law, is an unavoidable and essential component of the overall regulation of gaming. Where legalised gaming exists, the primary criminal policy goal is not to repress gaming as such, but to protect the player and the integrity of the regulated industry.

The current Macau law on gaming crimes, approved in 1996, is being amended by the Legislative Assembly. The first draft keeps classic and important crimes such as the operation of gaming businesses without authorization, fraudulent gaming (cheating), and unlawful loans for gaming (“loansharking”). Other aspects of the 1996 law clearly needed to be reformed or replaced. In doing this, it is necessary to avoid some mistakes and exaggerations. I will highlight a few principles.

First, legal language cannot be a labyrinth. Citizens must be able to understand clearly the border between what is legal and what is not. Criminal laws cannot be vague, obscure, ambiguous, or full of value-based expressions, and therefore unpredictable and impossible to control. Precise concepts, often originating from outside criminal law, must be used. It may be added that when applying the law in court, if a certain gaming law concept has a narrow meaning outside of a criminal law context, it cannot suddenly be extended and gain a much broader meaning inside criminal law for punitive purposes, catching persons by surprise.

Second, not everything should be criminalized. Criminal law is the last resort of social policy and should be used only for major problems, not for petty issues. Minor or merely technical violations should be only administrative law offences, enforced by the regulator and not by the courts.

Third, punishment of not just intentional but also negligent conduct can broaden immensely the scope of any criminal law provisions. This is why there is no crime of negligent money laundering, for example. It should be carefully considered whether negligent conduct should be criminalized and if that even makes any sense.

Fourth, presumptions or assumptions cannot be used in criminal law for incrimination purposes; they directly breach the opposite constitutional rule, the presumption of innocence.

Finally, criminal law in the field of gaming has always been a domestic concern. There are no transnational criminal law efforts against illegal gambling, and this domain continues to be mostly based on domestic laws. This means that international cooperation may be more difficult than in other areas. If the laws are poorly drafted, it gets worse.

Looking forward, I am afraid that there will be a lot more criminal law problems related to gaming in the future. This is due to various factors, including the said expansion of the law on gaming crimes, the current regulatory environment, and the new restrictions on credit for gaming that will start to apply from August.

The Washington Summit Declaration made by the NATO Council on July 11 can be seen as not only a response to the perceived Russian “expansionism” but also an inception of a new Cold War dividing the world into two blocs – one led by the US and its allies and the other composed of Russia and China and their allies.

Celebrating the 75^th anniversary of NATO, the Washington Summit Declaration covers the following main points:

First, it vows to be a “defensive alliance” against all threats and to protect the “three core tasks of deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security.” The shared values of NATO nations are individual liberty, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.”

Second, it welcomes the accession of Finland and Sweden that makes the alliance stronger.

Third, it denounced Russia’s “full-scale invasion of Ukraine” as shattering peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area and undermining global security.

Fourth, it criticises China for harbouring “ambitions and (having) coercive policies” that challenge NATO’s interests, security, and values. Specifically, “the deepening strategic partnership between Russia and the People’s Republic of China and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut and reshape the rules-based international order are a cause for profound concern.”

Fifth, it strengthens the deterrence and defence of Ukraine while welcoming the leaders of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea to join NATO as partners.

Sixth, it appeals to member nations to invest more in NATO operations and to increase their contributions.

Seventh, NATO’s deterrence and defence against all threats will be consolidated with high readiness forces, large-scale training, urgent actions, effective command, resilient logistics, and the integration of space and undersea infrastructure into its planning, exercises, and operations.

Eighth, the integrated air and missile defence of NATO is to be updated and enhanced.

Ninth, NATO declares that nuclear deterrence is its cornerstone of alliance security.

Tenth, NATO will enhance transatlantic defence and industrial cooperation, collective resilience, and the defence against aggressive hybrid action from state and non-state actors.

The Declaration is very critical of Russia, whose “aggression” against Ukraine is “a blatant violation of international law.” It calls for Russia to withdraw military forces from the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, while maintaining communication with Moscow to mitigate risks and prevent the escalation of war. NATO denounces Russia’s strategy of nuclear weapons in Belarus and its usage of chemical weapons in the Ukraine war.

The Declaration also criticises North Korea and Iran for “fueling Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine by providing direct military support to Russia.”

Most importantly, the NATO Declaration accuses China of being “a decisive enabler” of Russia’s Ukraine war and of forming a “no-limits” partnership with Moscow. It appeals to China to “cease all material and political support to Russia’s war effort,” such as the transfer of dual-use materials like weapons and raw materials for Russia’s defence sector.

China’s response to NATO Declaration was swift, saying that it is “unreasonable with sinister motives” and asking the alliance not to bring about “chaos” in Asia. The Chinese Foreign Ministry added that China’s trade with Russia is based on the rules of World Trade Organization. China also supports Russia’s argument that NATO’s expansion poses a security threat to Russia, whose military move into Ukraine has brought about NATO’s strong Declaration.

The NATO Declaration coincided with the joint Chinese military exercise in Belarus, whose border with NATO member Poland appeared to arouse NATO’s geopolitical and security sensitivity. Belarus is Russia’s ally.

Analytically speaking, NATO’s Declaration was a response to not only Russia’s war in Ukraine, but also Vladimir Putin’s remarks at the SCO. In the SCO meeting in Kazakhstan, Putin demanded that Ukraine should withdraw its troops from those territories occupied by Russia, while China’s recent peace proposal has not really touched on the fate and return of any Ukrainian territory to Ukraine. In the recent SCO meeting, Putin added that Ukraine should not take advantage of any ceasefire to replenish its army through military mobilisation.

Russia has already turned down an offer by Turkey to mediate between Moscow and Kyiv. Putin’s emphasis that Kyiv should cede control over the disputed Ukrainian provinces to Moscow was a provocation to NATO whose Declaration was arguably understandable.

NATO’s Declaration coincided with Putin’s remarks at the recent BRICS Summit where he called for a multipolar world in which BRICS will play a key role. Such a call challenges the ideal of an unipolar world envisage and dominated by the US after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. The recent emergence of a Greater Russia, through its annexation of Crimea and its occupation of Ukrainian territories, has posed a serious security threat to NATO.

One of the BRICS members, India, has sought a peaceful resolution to the Ukrainian crisis. Prime Minister Narendra Modi talked to Putin, saying that wars cause the death of innocent children – a humanitarian remark that, however, did not appear to raise a concern from Putin. Perhaps as a nation whose ideologies of western-style democracy and independent foreign policy are acceptable to the bloc led by the US and that jointly led by Russia and China, India can ponder deeply further over the content of a peace proposal to resolve the Ukrainian crisis.

The NATO Declaration can also be seen as the emergence of a new Cold War in international politics. Its content points to the roles of China, North Korea, Iran, and Belarus in their support of Russia – a sign of two ideological and military blocs confronting each other from now onwards. The 32-member NATO Declaration appears to provide the “legitimacy” for some western nations, especially the US, to impose sanctions on those Chinese companies that are deemed to be providing dual-use materials for the Russian military arsenals.

Prior to the NATO Declaration, Hungary, as an EU member, asserted that it does not want NATO to become “an anti-China” bloc and that it will not support NATO’s moves. The Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has recently met Chinese President Xi Jinping to discuss a potential peace plan to tackle the Ukrainian conflicts. Hungary believes that Ukraine’s participation in NATO would create a real risk of open conflicts between Russia and NATO—indeed, a very dangerous scenario that would perhaps trigger a Third World War.

As such, it remains to be seen how NATO and its Western allies will handle Ukraine’s attempt at joining NATO. To Greater Russia, Ukraine has to be either a buffer state or a satellite state independent from NATO influence—a scenario rejected currently by Ukraine and NATO indeed.

NATO secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg said the alliance’s support for Kyiv will not make NATO a party to the Ukrainian conflicts. Rather, NATO’s support would help Ukraine uphold its right to self-defence. This argument, however, is rejected by Russia, which sees NATO members’ weapons provision to Ukraine as already a sign of NATO “expansionism.”

What provokes China in NATO’s Declaration is that NATO will discuss with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea security cooperation—a move that is seen by China and North Korea as another sign of NATO “expansionism” into the East Asian security dynamics.

Clearly, two ideological, geopolitical, and military blocs of the world are taking shape, one including NATO, EU members (although Hungary is seen as “pro-China” and “pro-Russia”), Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea, while the other side embraces Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, Belarus, and SCO members.

The NATO Declaration can perhaps be viewed as a phenomenon showing an ongoing, difficult transition and persistent national power struggles from a previously unipolar world led by the US shortly after the collapse of the former Soviet Union to a new multipolar world consisting of many rapidly rising economic-military powers, notably Russia, China, Iran, and even North Korea.

If NATO’s closer cooperation with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea is perceived negatively by China and North Korea, the East Asian region will likely encounter the risks of sudden military conflicts. The Philippines has already become more pro-US amid its disputes with China over the sovereignty of remote islands and reefs in the South China Sea. Manila’s improved military relations with Japan have also raised the eyebrows of Beijing.

Given the recent consolidation of military relations between North Korea and Russia, and given Japan’s military rearmament with US support in response to perceived military threats from China and North Korea, the security circumstances in East Asia are destined to become more volatile, unstable, and militarily unpredictable. Compounding the unstable circumstances is the Sino-US disputes over the question of Taiwan, whose future has triggered military and security concerns from Japan.

The mutual perceptions of nations on their “expansionist moves” here and there in the world has become a crucial factor leading to the looming new Cold War. If China is labelled unsophisticatedly as part of the Russia-led bloc, its potential and capability as a mediator in the Ukrainian conflicts are already curbed, unless China adopts a very unlikely scenario of distancing itself economically from Russia.

Fortunately, perhaps, shortly after the NATO Declaration, the military and defence leaders from the US and Russia have met to discuss their issues of common concerns. Perhaps the military diplomacy of all nations in the world should be maintained and enhanced to minimise, contain, or pre-empt any major military conflicts in different parts of the world.

In conclusion, the NATO Declaration has already set the stage for a looming new Cold War in the world. The lack of effective diplomacy conducted by national and military leaders can and will be extremely costly to the world if the Ukrainian crisis becomes a harbinger of an unnecessary Third World War that would involve different nations in rapidly confrontational and increasingly solidifying military blocs. Let us hope that political and military leaders of the two blocs will develop their stronger political will in the quest for diplomatic solutions to resolve territorial disputes, especially the Ukraine war,  in the coming years.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

《商訊》2024年 7月 | 主編前言 – Mandy Kuok

近兩月中央政府推出了多項惠澳措施，包括增加八個內地城市自由行客來澳；將澳門進入內地居民旅客攜帶行物品免稅額度至12,000人民幣；外籍港澳永久居民可辦理有效期五年的“通行證”，持證外籍人士在有效期內可多次來往內地，甚至可辦理自助過關。 

這些措施對澳門肯定是有利措施，增加自由行來澳城市，來澳旅客量定會有所增加，但按這兩年來澳旅客量雖未完全恢復至疫情前近4,000萬人次的旅客量，但亦已恢復至八成，現在增加自由行城市，旅客量重回疫情前盛況指日可待。只是追求旅客數量真的好嗎？ 

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《商訊》2024年7月 | 總監之言 – 馬天龍

常言道：魚與熊掌不可兼得。區域整合確實是一條雙向大道，或者更恰當地說，這是一條多入口林蔭大道。正如全球化透過增加人員、商品、服務和資本流動性，創造更廣闊的經濟和社會利益一樣。區域整合同樣有成敗之分。成功的整合取決於漸進的方法，輔以能有效緩解其副作用的舉措。 

最近，內地政府推行了多項措施，致力解決區域整合過程中出現的不平衡。當中包括延長持赴港澳商務簽注的內地居民在特區的可停留時間、為參加“琴澳旅遊團”的内地居民提供多次往返澳門的簽注、批准增加內地8個省會城市赴港澳“個人遊”，以及提高由港澳入境居民免稅額度。 

為進一步刺激北向流動性，内地政府向非中國籍港澳永久性居民發放5年多次入境旅遊的許可證。此舉廣受好評。 

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Macau Business magazine l July 2024

By José Carlos Matias – Director

We often hear the saying: you can’t have your cake and eat it too. Regional integration is indeed a two-way street, or perhaps more aptly, a multiple-entry boulevard. Just as globalization brings broader economic and societal benefits through the increased mobility of people, goods, services, and capital, it also creates winners and losers. Successful integration hinges on a gradual approach, supported by measures to cushion its side effects.

In recent weeks, mainland authorities have implemented several measures to address this balance. These include extending the stay for mainland Chinese individuals holding business visas for Macau, introducing a new multiple-entry visa arrangement for package tours between Macau and Hengqin, adding eight mainland cities to the individual visit scheme for the SARs, and increasing the duty-free allowance for arrivals from Hong Kong and Macau.

In a further step towards enhanced northbound mobility, non-Chinese permanent residents of Macau and Hong Kong will now enjoy a multi-entry travel permit of up to five years for mainland entry—a much-welcome development.

While these gifts from the central government are significant steps to support the city’s business development, is the SAR government doing enough locally to counter the impact of domestic consumption outflows and address the socio-economic challenges faced by numerous SMEs?

Some measures have been adopted. For instance, in mid-June, the SAR announced an extension of the repayment period for interest-free financial assistance provided to local small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and young entrepreneurs. This was an absolutely necessary move.

However, the lifeline needs to be extended further for these companies. Despite encouraging tourism and gaming figures (though the latter have seen some recent slowdown), data, business surveys, and naked-eye observation are crystal clear: you can’t sweep it under the rug. Food and beverage establishments, especially those outside integrated resorts and tourist hotspots, various types of retailers, particularly supermarkets, and watch-clock-and-jewellery shops, have seen year-on-year double-digit declines, sometimes by as much as one-third. A number of these businesses are being left with no option other than closing for good.

Local consumers have cited as significant advantages the better value for money and superior customer service obtainable across the border, which may seal the fate of many small businesses here. Who can blame them?

A handful of pressing questions arise: How do we cope with this? How can we increase competitiveness? How do we lower fixed costs, such as commercial property rentals and labour, and improve service quality to stem the outflow of local consumption and attract visitors, especially to residential areas?

Any suggestions? How about rolling out an e-consumption voucher scheme modelled on those used during the pandemic? Or perhaps, even bolder, consider transferring part of the cash handout to a local consumption voucher plan? True, giving a man a fish will feed him for a day, while teaching him to fish feeds him for a lifetime, but the clock is ticking, and there is a need to do both at the same time at this stage.

We often hear the Government say: there’s only so much we can do. Is that really the case? Besides policymaking, is there a deeper issue—one related to the mindset in the local business sphere?

In any case, it seems clear that while a number of local companies and businesspeople are venturing into Hengqin or other areas of the Greater Bay Area, encouraged by existing incentives, there is a need to ensure that the small businesses remaining local—the lifeblood of the city’s way of life—have a future, one that younger generations can feel confident about.

One hopes the current and the incoming government (and socio-economic actors) will have the ability, determination, and conditions to effectively make the cake bigger and more inclusive, ensuring that SMEs aren’t left to live on crumbs. And, by the way, it would be wise to ensure that the lion’s share is not seized by the entrenched interests that hinder our city’s modernization.

The recent opening of the Shenzhen-Zhongshan Link, together with the operation of the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau Bridge, and the deepening cooperation between Macau and Hengqin are pointing to a new and significant direction in South China: the inevitability of territorial integration between Hong Kong and Shenzhen’s borderland areas and between Macau and Hengqin around 2047 and 2049 respectively, with significant implications for Xiamen’s future relations with Kinmen.

The most recent opening of the Shenzhen-Zhongshan Link has geopolitical and socio-economic significance for South China. The 24-kilometer passage not only starts at the strategic Shenzhen airport interchange and connects with Ma’anshan Island in Zhongshan across the Pearl River, but also reduces the travel time between Zhongshan and Shenzhen from two hours to only 30 minutes. The megaproject has one underwater tunnel, two bridges and two artificial islands, becoming a key transportation connector located just 30 kilometres north of the famous Humen Bridge and 31 kilometres south of another megaproject, namely  the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau Bridge. These three transportation networks can be seen as the most important hallmark of infrastructure integration in the Pearl River Estuary. As Deng Xiaohua, the head of Guangdong Provincial Communications Group, said, these bridges provide the “cross-sea and cross River passages in the Greater Bay Area (GBA), boosting connectivity of the city cluster.” 

In short, all the main cities in the GBA are now more conveniently interconnected, providing a solid foundation of deeper territorial integration in South China. All these cities are expected and required to interact more intensively in economic cooperation, bringing about an economic powerhouse collectively in South China in the coming years.

If territorial integration is defined as a combined process of geographical, social and economic reengineering that makes the regional boundaries more fluid, porous and flexible with the ease of entry and exit of regional residents and even foreigners, then the recent and ongoing infrastructure transformations in the Pearl River Estuary are very geopolitically significant,  including a recent mainland policy of allowing non-Chinese residents of Hong Kong and Macau to apply for mainland visit permits.

Hong Kong is now connected easily with the mainland through the High-Speed West Rail, the Hong Kong-Macau-Zhuhai Bridge and the nearby Qianhai Cooperation Zone, which is expected to forge closer collaboration with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) in their service, financial and information technology sectors in the coming years.

Macau’s metamorphosis is even much faster than Hong Kong. With the deepening and raid process of economic and social integration with Hengqin, more Macau people are moving to live in the new Macau Neighborhood in Hengqin. Macau has also been empowered by the central government in Beijing to possess more territorial waters and even to absorb 3,700-square-metre plot of land from Zhuhai to build the eastern line of the Light Rail Transit system. As of March 2024. Macau’s total land area was expanded to 33.3 square kilometres. Macau’s physical space has been expanded and will be augmented further sooner or later if the first line of Hengqin, where goods from Macau are tax-exempted, will quite likely be territorially absorbed into Macau perhaps around or after 2049.

The economic and governing implications for Hong Kong and Macau are obvious. While Hong Kong has to reposition itself as an indispensable part of Shenzhen’s rapid development, including Qianhai where start-up companies have mushroomed and unleashed the innovative potential of youths from the mainland and Hong Kong, the development of the Northern Metropolis has to be accelerated so that Hong Kong’s borderland with Shenzhen will become increasingly populated and more economically prosperous, with its higher education, information technology and research hubs being constructed as soon as possible. Otherwise, without a much faster timeline, Hong Kong would likely lag behind the very rapid pace of territorial integration in South China, especially in contrast with the speed in which Macau has been increasingly socially and economically integrated with Hengqin.

The implication for the Hong Kong authorities is that they must design and formulate plans of, say, building a bridge or a tunnel linking Shenzhen with San Tin area, which according to the Northern Metropolis Action Agenda in 2023 will have a projected population of 147,000 to 159,000 by 2033. The Hong Kong SAR government must also speed up all the action plans from now to 2033 if territorial integration is actually a long-term developmental plan in South China in the psyche of central authorities.

Similarly, Hong Kong must accelerate and deepen the collaboration of high-end professional services and logistics supply chains with the Qianhai Cooperation Zone, including an earlier construction of the Hong Kong-Shenzhen Western Rail Link connecting Hung Shui Kiu in Yuen Long with Qianhai. The Hong Kong Island West-Hung Shui Kiu Rail Link should ideally be speeded up if the Hong Kong authorities sense the inevitability of territorial integration between Hong Kong and Shenzhen. The Northern Metropolis Highway should also be a priority of infrastructure development in the New Territories. Otherwise, any delay in infrastructure development and completion may point to a gap in territorial integration, whereby Macau’s territorial integration with Hengqin will likely be much faster than Hong Kong’s full integration with Shenzhen’s borderland.

Positively, the Hong Kong Mass Transit Railway (MTR) is planning to build 12 railway lines and some 30 new stations, reducing the travel time within Hong Kong and improving its interconnectedness with Shenzhen. These lines include the Hong Kong Island, Lantau Island. Northern Metropolis and the New Territories. In fact, the new stations in Northern Metropolis and New Territories must be accelerated toward the inevitable thrust of territorial integration.

Overall, Shenzhen is well positioned to become perhaps the politically reliable and indeed the most important economic locomotive in South China, assisted by Hong Kong’s strong financial and monetary centre and Macau’s unique tourism hub. Shenzhen, with its strong GDP growth rate of 5.5 percent, is expected by the central authorities to be a strategic, high- ended, technologically innovative megacity that offers high-quality services, model public health and high environmental standards with sustainability. The central authorities have been eager to shape Shenzhen, with immense efforts from its local officials, into a national information technology centre, attracting talents from Hong Kong and elsewhere and becoming an influential consumption centre and foreign investment magnet. 

As such, the division of labour in South China is becoming more prominent than ever before: Hong Kong is to strengthen its international financial and monetary centre with its solid common-law system attracting foreign investment while retaining its role as a superconnector; Macau is to transform itself into an economically diversified economy away from casino capitalism while consolidating its platform function for China to enhance economic and diplomatic relations with Portuguese-speaking countries; and Shenzhen is to continue using Qianhai as a bridgehead to accelerate the process of internationalizing Renminbi and to build up its GBA insurance service centre.

Under these circumstances, Hong Kong and Macau must accelerate their infrastructure projects, maintain socio-political stability (which explains why national security is extremely important to both SARs), govern their regions with demonstrated capability to tackle livelihood issues (housing, social welfare, poverty alleviation sustainable development), and quickly reposition their strategic roles amid the motherland’s developmental blueprint.

The other important but perhaps neglected implication for territorial integration in South China is that the central authorities appear to adopt a similar strategy of utilizing infrastructure development in dealing with a small part of Taiwan, notably Kinmen where a bridge on the Xiamen side connecting Kinmen has already begun. Although the bridge has expectedly aroused political debate in Taiwan, it seems that a silent process of stage-by-stage integration between parts of Fujian (Xiamen) and a small part of Taiwan (Kinmen) would likely take place sooner or later, with the shadows mirroring the models of Macau-Hengqin cooperation and Hong Kong-Shenzhen collaboration.

In conclusion, territorial integration in the Pearl River Estuary, including Hong Kong’s cooperation with Shenzhen’s borderland and Macau’s integration with Hengqin, is clearly emerging. A formal process of territorial integration, specifically absorbing parts of the territories from one region to another place, will quite likely occur between the Macau SAR and Hengqin around 2049, and it would also perhaps take place between the Hong Kong SAR and Shenzhen’s selected borderland (like Qianhai) around or after 2047. Macau’s territorial integration with Hengqin appears to proceed in a much faster pace, judging from the currently rapid pace and smaller but targeted scope of co-development with Hengqin due to geographical proximity and an immediate implementation of physical integration and focused residential migration. The long-term geopolitical and economic implications of the Macau and Hong Kong models of integration with the mainland for a possible Xiamen-Kinmen integration cannot be neglected. The reason is that a similar pattern of infrastructure development preceding human interactions and economic cooperation is beginning with the construction of the Xiamen side of the bridge linking Xiamen with Kinmen. If this analysis is accurate, then this new bridge will likely be part of a stage-by-stage process of socio-economic integration between the mainland and Taiwan in the coming years. What is unique in the model of Hong Kong/Macau integration with the mainland is that their political reunification with the motherland in 1997 and 1999, respectively, preceded infrastructure expansion and integration. In the case of mainland China’s attempt at integration with Taiwan, it appears that infrastructure development is now an important inception leading to perhaps closer economic cooperation and more human interactions, followed hopefully and ideally by a stage-by-stage but difficult process of political dialogue, negotiations and perhaps integration and reunification.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

Sara woke up at 6 AM, her headphones still on from the music playlist she fell asleep to. Groggy but determined, she queued up her exercise routine soundtrack as the first order of the day. Anna Calvi’s gritty vocals screamed “I don’t belong here…” from the speakers as Sara laced up her running shoes, the relentless beat driving her out the door before sunrise.

The morning ritual continued with a mindfully curated yoga playlist streaming through her headphones during her meditation practice. Sara’s every move was choreographed to the cadence of her personalised audio realm, a world she could control and inhabit entirely on her own terms.

Dressing quickly, headphones forever tethered, she skipped breakfast to ensure she caught the morning news broadcast on her preferred channel. At the office, Sara’s headphones remained a steadfast companion, allowing her to summon her “deep focus” playlist and mentally disengage from her surroundings before the workday began.

Lunchtime brought a seamless transaction – a meal ordered, delivered, and paid for online, consumed in solitary silence with her earbuds providing the only company. As the day drew to a close, Sara’s headphones guided her journey to the gym, her auditory refuge never faltering.

The cycle repeated itself day after day, week after week, with Sara’s existence becoming an intricate dance between her and the music, a choreography designed to minimise human interaction and maximise personal seclusion.

In those fleeting moments when she had to remove her headphones, an overwhelming sense of emptiness and isolation would wash over her, prompting an instinctive reach for her audio sanctuary once more.

The Pervasive use of headphones: A cautionary tale

The scene is all too familiar: a young person, headphones firmly planted, oblivious to their surroundings, lost in their own private soundscape. This behaviour, once considered a temporary escape, has become a way of life for many, raising concerns about the long-term implications for industries that thrive on human interaction, such as hospitality.

Sara, the fictional character depicted in the opening narrative, exemplifies this phenomenon. Her day is a seamless sequence of activities, meticulously choreographed to the beat of her curated playlists, with minimal human contact. From her morning exercise routine to her commute, workplace, gym, and even her home, Sara’s world is a hermetically sealed audio bubble, her headphones acting as a barrier against the intrusion of external stimuli.

The blurring lines of reality

This trend towards audio isolation is not merely a passing fad; it is symptomatic of a deeper shift in how we perceive and engage with reality. Andy Clark, a prominent philosopher and cognitive scientist, sheds light on this phenomenon through his groundbreaking work, “The Experience Machine.” Clark challenges the traditional view of cognition as a purely internal process, proposing instead that our cognitive abilities are intrinsically linked to the tools and technologies we use.

In the case of headphones, these unassuming devices have become extensions of our cognitive processes, shaping our perception of reality and influencing our behavior. As Clark postulates, our interactions with the external world are not passive but active and reciprocal. We shape our reality by engaging with our environment and using external tools to extend our cognitive abilities.

The lure of escapism

But what drives this desire for audio seclusion? The answer may lie in the concept of “escapism,” a construct that has garnered significant attention from researchers. Escapism, as defined by these scholars, is a compensatory consumption strategy where individuals distract themselves from self-discrepancy or unfulfilled needs by temporarily retreating into a more desirable reality. It is a form of avoidant coping, offering momentary relief but failing to address the root cause of distress.

In the context of youngsters and their headphone habits, escapism manifests as a desire to detach from the pressures and complexities of the real world, seeking solace in the virtual realms of music and audio entertainment. This escapist behaviour, while providing temporary respite, may inadvertently foster social anxiety, loneliness, and a diminished capacity for authentic human connection—qualities that are paramount in the hospitality industry.

The hospitality conundrum

For executives in the hospitality sector, this trend towards social deafness poses a significant challenge. How can an industry built upon the bedrock of human interaction and exceptional service thrive when its future workforce is conditioned to exist in a state of perpetual audio isolation?

The implications are far-reaching, from the difficulty in recruiting and retaining staff who possess the requisite interpersonal skills to the potential erosion of the guest experience, as socially disconnected employees struggle to connect with patrons on a meaningful level.

Addressing the challenge

To navigate this uncharted territory, hospitality leaders must adopt a multifaceted approach, one that acknowledges the complexities of the issue while actively seeking solutions.

First and foremost, there is a need for a deeper understanding of the underlying drivers of escapism among youngsters. By identifying the root causes of this behaviour, whether it be unfulfilled psychological needs, societal pressures, or other factors, hospitality organisations can develop targeted interventions and support systems to address these issues proactively.

Secondly, hospitality companies must reevaluate their recruitment and training strategies, placing a heightened emphasis on cultivating and nurturing interpersonal skills. This may involve incorporating immersive, hands-on training modules that simulate real-world guest interactions, encouraging employees to step out of their audio cocoons and engage with others in a meaningful way.

Furthermore, hospitality leaders should explore the potential of augmented and virtual reality technologies, not as escapist tools but as platforms for fostering empathy, emotional intelligence, and a deeper understanding of the human experience. By leveraging these technologies in a thoughtful and purposeful manner, hospitality organisations can bridge the gap between the virtual and the real, equipping their workforce with the skills necessary to thrive in a world that demands authentic human connection.

Conclusion

As the hospitality industry navigates the uncharted waters of social deafness, it is imperative to approach this challenge with a mindset of innovation and adaptability. By embracing the insights offered by thinkers like Andy Clark and researchers delving into the realms of escapism, hospitality leaders can develop strategies that not only address immediate concerns but also pave the way for a future workforce that is adept at navigating the ever-blurring lines between the virtual and the real.

Ultimately, the true essence of hospitality lies in our ability to forge genuine connections, to create experiences that transcend the physical and resonate on a deeply human level. It is through this unwavering commitment to human interaction that the hospitality industry will remain resilient, relevant, and indispensable in a world that seems increasingly disconnected.

Shixiang You

Member

Macau Institute for Corporate Social Responsibility in Greater China (MICSRGC)

Macau adopts the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) Standards (the 2015 version) as its financial reporting standards. IFRS is the most widely adopted accounting standard worldwide. In June 2023, the IFRS Foundation issued IFRS S1: General Requirements for Disclosure of Sustainability-related Financial Information and IFRS S2: Climate-related Disclosures. IFRS S1 requires a company to disclose sustainability-related risks and opportunities that may affect the company’s cash flows, financial access, and cost of capital in the short, medium, or long term. At the same time, IFRS S2 particularly reinforces the disclosure of climate-related risks and opportunities.

Adopting the latest version of IFRS Standards can help Macau align with the international financial reporting trends and allow Macau’s businesses to engage in globalization more proactively. However, some companies, particularly small and medium enterprises (SMEs), may find it challenging to evaluate what kind of sustainability-related risks and opportunities exist in their business operations or what type of climate risks and opportunities will significantly impact financial performance. For example, some managers may think climate-related risks, such as global warming, are too far away for an average SME among many companies. Some companies only prioritize risks and opportunities related to product responsibilities, as customers are their major stakeholder group.

Generally, sustainability reporting requires companies to disclose their environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance. Sometimes companies disclose ESG information as much as possible to show their determination to promote sustainable development and maintain a socially responsible image. However, excessive ESG information will dilute the effectiveness of sustainability reports by mixing many unnecessary disclosures. Stakeholders will likely miss the point. Besides, misjudging or overlooking significant ESG risks damages the balanced relationships with various stakeholder groups. Some investors may make biased investment decisions when they do not find the expected sustainability information in sustainability reports or annual reports.

The decision on the necessary ESG performance to be disclosed remains a question. Using the materiality principle in sustainability reports is one way to help companies accurately evaluate ESG risks and opportunities. Materiality has been applied in both financial and non-financial reporting. It sets a threshold for the omission or misstatement of information that can impact stakeholders. In short, companies should disclose sustainability information that is truly important to stakeholders based on thorough communication with all stakeholder groups. Materiality is not just ticking boxes on a report; it shows the relationship between sustainability, responsibility, and resilience.

Since materiality in sustainability reporting does not have a standard definition, companies can define the benchmark of materiality by themselves. Senior managers can consider ESG risks and opportunities from financial and non-financial perspectives. For example, cutting energy consumption may significantly impact a company’s revenue or expenses (financial performance) and long-term sustainability. Thus, the company chooses to disclose energy consumption performance in the sustainability report due to its financial materiality.

Following international reporting standards and applying materiality principles can benefit companies in many ways. First, companies can enhance their responsible reputation and credibility among various stakeholders, such as investors, customers, and the community. Since material ESG information is what the stakeholders expect, companies can maintain a stable relationship among stakeholders. Second, proper ESG disclosure can help gain more accessible access to capital. Companies may attract a broader range of institutional investors as sustainable investing is gaining popularity. Third, business organizations can improve risk management and mitigate potential threats by considering sustainability risks and opportunities, such as climate change, procurement corruption, and modern slavery. Fourth, companies presenting sustainability efforts will likely gain competitive advantages in the market since consumers have increasingly focused on sustainable development. Finally, disclosing material ESG information helps create long-term value. Integrating sustainability considerations in reporting practice and business operations can foster business innovation and adapt to changing market trends.

Both mainland China and Hong Kong promote or implement materiality in sustainability reporting. In Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEX) has already mandated listed companies to disclose ESG information based on the materiality principle. In mainland China, the proposed sustainability reporting regulation of the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE), Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), and Beijing Stock Exchange (BSE) also adopt the double materiality principle under the supervision of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Since Macau follows the IFRS accounting standards and has substantial economic connections to mainland China and Hong Kong, it is almost inevitable that sustainability reports will be issued based on the materiality principle. Thus, we encourage companies in Macau to disclose material ESG information based on the latest IFRS Standards to enhance transparency and accountability of sustainability performance.

IN PARTNERSHIP WITH:

The Canadian government is launching a public consultation to see whether Canada should follow the US and EU to adopt tariffs on Chinese-made Electric Vehicles (EVs). However, this trend of Canadian protectionism not only reflects a widespread Western perception of the rising Chinese “economic threat,” but also raises a question of how the influx of Japanese automobiles was eventually  tackled in Canada during the 1970s and 1980s.

Finance Minister Chrystia Freeland has announced that the Canadian government on July 2 would trigger a 30-day consultation on the proposed tariffs to protect Canada’s auto workers in their developing EVs industry. There would likely be a surtax on the imports of Chinese EVs under Section 53 of the Customs Tariff Act. The Canadian government will seek public views on the protection of Canada’s national interests and on related Chinese labour and environmental standards.

In recent years, China has become the largest manufacturer and exporter of EVs. The US will raise tariffs on the Chinese EVs from 25 percent to 100 percent in 2024, while the EU will impose tariffs of up to 38 percent on Chinese-made EVs on July 4. China is now negotiating with the EU on the matter of tariffs.

Canadian Finance Minister Freeland said the proposed measures would prevent Canada from becoming “a dumping ground for Chinese oversupply.” Ontario provincial premier Douglas Ford said he hoped the federal government in Ottawa would match or even exceed US tariffs for the sake of protecting jobs in the automobile sector, while Freeland criticised China for flooding the global markets under the policy direction and subsidies of the Chinese government.

The immediate reaction of Canada’s unionists and auto sector is that they support the Canadian government plan due to self-protectionism.

The US, EU, and Canada are all concerned that their own car manufacturers cannot compete with the relatively much cheaper prices of Chinese EVs makers, especially BYD Company Ltd.

The Chinese government said that foreign accusations of Chinese “overcapacity” in EVs is “totally groundless,” and that the Canadian tariff plan would “violate World Trade Organization rules” and “harm Sino-Canadian bilateral economic and trade cooperation.”

In fact, Canada has recently subsidised its own EVs industry. Ottawa, Ontario and Quebec have promised Canadian $50 billion subsidies to encourage foreign auto makers, such as Volkswagen and Honda, to build EVs plants in the country. Imports of EVs were reportedly about Canadian $2.2 billion in 2023 compared with Canadian $84 million in 2022, but actually most EVs imported to Canada are from US auto maker Telsa. The Chinese EVs are making up a growing proportion of the EVs market in Canada.

Some critics of the Canadian plan argue that high tariffs would raise prizes for Canadian customers, and that it should be accompanied by positive policy measures helping local automakers catch up with China and produce their budget-friendly and quality EVs rather than just delaying the transition from gasoline cars to EVs.

Other critics say that the entry of Chinese EVs into Canada is inevitable and that Canada should learn from how it dealt with the rapid increase in the imports of Japanese-made Toyotas, Datsuns and Hondas from 4 percent of the North American market in 1970 to 20 percent in 1980. In 1981, the US and Canada negotiated with Japan on a ceiling of the number of imported Japanese vehicles from each individual company. Most importantly, the Japanese automobile makers were encouraged to open their manufacturing factories in Canada, accelerating the metamorphosis of the Canadian automobile industry and creating a win-win situation.

Other critics have commented that tariffs alone would likely shift the Chinese EVs manufacturing bases to other places, like Mexico and Brazil, where more auto workers will be employed. In other words, the Canadian government should adopt a more proactive and positive approach to making compromises with China. Having a BYD assembly plant in Canada, for example, would generate local employment and also provide more choices to Canadian customers who are interested in buying EVs.

The Canadian tariff plan on Chinese EVs can be attributable to several factors: the tendency of the Canadian government to follow the examples of US and EU in protecting their EVs industry; the self-protective nature of Canadian stakeholders with their own vested interests; the fear of the ruling Liberal Party of losing more votes under the currently unfavourable public opinion and media against the government; and the common trend of perceiving China as an “economic threat” in the eyes of the developed Western world.

In conclusion, the Canadian government’s tariff plan on Chinese EVs has secured the initial support of local stakeholders in the automobile industry amid a general Western perception of the Chinese “economic threat.” Nevertheless, a win-win scenario would be a compromise between Canada and China, allowing perhaps a few Chinese EVs companies to open assembly plants in Canada where local auto workers will be the beneficiaries, where local car customers will have greater freedom of choice, and where the transition from gasoline cars to EVs for the public interest of achieving sustainable development will even be accelerated. It remains to be seen whether such a win-win situation will become a reality.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

José Luís de Sales Marques

Economist

May is Europe’s month in Macau, bringing back to the limelight a cooperative relationship that has historical meaning and high economic value. This year, Macau properly celebrated Europe Day on May 16, as was traditional before the COVID-19 outbreak and subsequent restrictions on public gatherings, with a cocktail reception and official representations from the EU and the Macau SAR Government. Europe Day is celebrated every year on May 9 to mark the anniversary of the Schuman Declaration, which symbolises the beginning of the European integration process. Additionally, on May 10th, the Macau European Chamber of Commerce (MECC) held its annual Gala Dinner, gathering all European business chambers and associated organisations and individuals. This event showcased the dynamism of European businesses in the region and their ambitions for the future, namely the expectation of extending their actions to the Greater Bay Area and, in particular, the In-depth Cooperation Zone in Hengqin. The recent focus on Macau and EU relations was also highlighted during the recent week-long visit to the region by Xia Baolong, the Director of the Office of the State Council for Hong Kong and Macau, who referred to the need for the region to strengthen relations with the EU in the context of its internationalisation.

In both of these EU-connected gatherings, what caught the eyes and ears of many was the announcement that imports of goods from the EU continued to reign in Macau for the fourth consecutive year and were still doing so up to the first quarter of 2024, surpassing those from the Chinese Mainland, the traditional number one supplier of Macau in almost every category of basic and household goods. These results are even more surprising considering that, through e-commerce, much more has been bought directly by Macau consumers from Mainland suppliers and the recent introduction of high-value-added Chinese e-vehicles in the local market. The valuable question here is whether these trends will remain and why they have happened at all.

This discussion will lead us to explore the features of consumer demand in this region for goods originating from Mainland China and the EU, and whether the segmentation of the market into two major clusters, one satisfying local needs and the other tourists’ appetite for luxury goods, is overly simplified. For this purpose, we will look at Macau’s imports of goods from both Mainland China and the EU over the last five years, using 2019 as a starting point, going through the years of restrictive policies and measures tied with the COVID crisis, and the recovery initiated in 2023 up to the latest available data on this subject.

EU trade with Macau

The EU has a longstanding economic partnership with Macau, dating back to the early days of its industrial takeoff in the second half of the twentieth century. Favourable trade policies established by the former European Economic Community contributed to Macau’s growth and development as a manufacturing-exporting economy, with Europe and the United States serving as its main markets. However, as this region’s economy transformed into a tourist and gaming powerhouse under the Macau SAR, the EU became a major exporter of goods to the region, supplying what its luxury industries know best: fashion, cosmetics, and powerful cars, while enjoying a trade surplus with this region. Only Mainland China, with its provision of all-around consumer and industrial goods, had a bigger stake in fulfilling this region’s domestic demand.

The COVID-19 crisis and its dramatic impact on the region’s economy induced significant changes in consumer behaviour and market structure, with implications for the composition and origin of imports. The economy was already in trouble in 2019, with GDP contracting by -2.2%, and all major components such as private and public investment, internal demand, and export of services also in decline. As restrictive policies were introduced in 2020 locally, nationally, and elsewhere to limit the widespread transmission of the virus and its variants into this region, including successive lockdowns, air travel restrictions, and the closing of public spaces, including restaurants, hotels, and even, occasionally, casinos, the economic impact was severe, with GDP falling by -54.2% in 2020, recovering by +19.3% in 2021, and falling again by -26.8% in 2022, all in real terms. With domestic demand falling, imports from Mainland China followed the trend, decreasing by -9.9% in 2020.

Table 1- Macau imports of goods from Mainland China and EU (2019-2023) in Million MOP

Source: DSEC-various publications

However, this is where logic stops, and the story begins to get interesting! Paradoxically, imports to Macau from Mainland China and the EU in 2021 and 2022 were much higher than the average of preceding years, jumping to unprecedented levels (Table 1) in an overall environment where global supply chains were severely disrupted, and cargo planes were a rarity anywhere in the world. The COVID-19 pandemic had a twisted evolution throughout those terrible years and played tricks on learned economists, analysts, politicians, as well as eager consumers and businesses. Unfulfilled expectations of rapid recovery, commercial contracts to guarantee enough supply for a fashion season, and revenge spending for all those who had not had the chance to travel or just indulged themselves in luxury—whatever the causes, the fact is that EU imports into Macau reached unprecedented levels during the pandemic years, surpassing those from Mainland China, the region’s traditional number one supplier.

It is well-known that Macau has two very different economic realities: one associated with gaming, tourism, and related industries and services, and the other constituted by a majority of micro and small enterprises serving the local population and, eventually, tourists. Goods imported into Macau are also demanded as inputs for industries such as construction, for government consumption, and re-export. More than 85% of Macau’s exports are actually re-exports, which account for approximately eight to ten percent of total imports.

The EU’s most popular export to Macau is liquid, but it’s not wine!

France and Italy dominate as the top European suppliers to Macau, holding a combined market share of 89% of total EU imports into the region. Most of the growth in EU imports can be attributed to three categories of goods: essential oils, perfume and skin products, travel goods and handbags, and apparel and clothing. During the COVID years (2020-2022), the value and volume of goods imported under these categories from the EU to Macau were overwhelming (Table 2).

Table 2- Combined value of imports of 3 categories of goods from France and Italy and their respective weight in total EU import in the same period (2020-2022) in Million MOP

Source: DSEC-Various publications/author’s calculations

The crucial question for businesses is whether EU exports to Macau will be able to maintain this momentum post-COVID and with recovery firmly in place. How well did sales perform, and what are the expectations for the future? Was demand sufficient for such a surge in supply? The answers to these questions are not easy to find and will likely remain trade secrets for a long time.

Based on observation, a significant number of cosmetic shops are mushrooming throughout the city, suggesting they must be doing good business to sustain operations. Some fashion brands have disappeared, but the most resilient and popular ones have refurbished their flagship stores, while others have had to resize or reduce their presence.

The EU started to lose its position as the main supplier to Macau in August 2023, being overtaken by imports from Mainland China. However, it maintained overall dominance for the year and into the first quarter of 2024. Will it hold that position until the end of this year? More importantly, the trade level with the region is still very strong in absolute terms, with great potential for future growth, particularly in sectors beyond luxury goods. As Macau and the Greater Bay Area continue to develop into an international trade, modern finance, high-end technology, and tourism hub with unique characteristics and transregional mobility, Macau and the EU have vast room to further deepen their successful cooperative relationship.

Macau-EU relations

Macau and the European Economic Community (EEC)/EU established a framework Agreement for Trade and Cooperation signed in 1992. Under this agreement, Macau and the EU holds regular Joint Committee meetings, taking place alternatively in Macau and Brussels, to review matters of mutual interest and explore new areas for cooperation. There is already an extensive list of successfully implemented cooperations programs extending from areas such as academia, legal training, language and translation, cooperation on immigration, technology, advanced tourism studies and European Studies. The inception of the Institute of European Studies of Macau (IEEM) in 1995, is a lasting example of successful cooperation between the two parties, as well as,  the Jean Monnet programs at the University of Macau and the founding of the  Macau European Chamber of Commerce (MECC).

By Alan Yung

In today’s rapidly evolving world, it is more important than ever for students to receive a well-rounded education encompassing a variety of subjects.

While STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) education is crucial for technological advancement, it is equally important for students to have a strong foundation in the humanities and social sciences. This is where SHAPE education becomes essential.

What is SHAPE?

SHAPE is an acronym for Sociology, History, Art, Politics and Economics. It was coined to employ SHAPE in education. SHAPE is theoretically an indispensable piece of the puzzle and a complement to STEM

There is no doubt about the role of STEM in the advancement of civilization, especially technological advancement leading to better living standards, fast production, effective communication, prolonging human life, and the advancement of civilization in most aspects. In recent years, there has been a growing emphasis on the importance of STEM education in preparing students for the future. Science, technology, engineering, and mathematics are undoubtedly crucial subjects that provide students with valuable skills and knowledge in areas such as problem-solving, critical thinking, and innovation. However, it is essential to recognise that STEM is just one aspect of a well-rounded education.

Why is SHAPE needed?

This is where the concept of SHAPE education comes into play. SHAPE education is designed to complement STEM by providing students with a broader understanding of the world around them. While STEM focuses on technical skills and scientific knowledge, SHAPE subjects offer a more holistic view of society, culture, and politics.

Sociology is a key component of SHAPE education, offering insights into society and social relationships. It helps students understand the complexities of human behaviour and social structures.  By studying sociology, students learn about the various social structures, institutions, and systems that shape human behavior. This knowledge is essential for students to navigate the complexities of society and understand the impact of social issues on individuals and communities. Effectively Sociology covers issues related to humans.

History provides insights into the past and how it has shaped the present. 
History is another important aspect of SHAPE education as it helps students develop a deeper appreciation for the past and a better understanding of how historical events have shaped the world we live in today. History told us electric cars were already appearing in the 19th century, but they were not popular until this decade.  By studying history, students can learn from the successes and failures of the past and gain valuable insights into the complexities of human nature and society.

Art is an essential component of SHAPE education, as it allows students to express themselves creatively and explore different forms of artistic expression. By studying art, students can develop their creativity, critical thinking skills, and cultural awareness. Art also plays a crucial role in shaping our understanding of the world and reflecting the diversity of human experiences in different forms other than word and text.

Politics is a vital aspect of SHAPE education as it helps students understand the workings of government, democracy, power dynamics, and how global relations shape our lives. By studying politics, students can gain a better understanding of how political decisions are made, how governments operate, and how policies are implemented. This knowledge is essential for students to become informed and active citizens who can participate in the democratic process, not to mention understand issues happening globally that affect multiple millions, if not billions, of people’s well-being. 

Economics is a fundamental aspect of SHAPE education as it helps students understand the principles of economics, markets, financial systems, and the global economy. By studying economics, students can gain valuable insights into how resources are allocated, how businesses operate, and how economic policies impact different levels of society. This knowledge is essential for students to make informed decisions about their finances, career choices, and contributions to the economy.

This not only enhances their critical thinking and analytical skills but also fosters empathy, cultural awareness, and a sense of social responsibility.
In today’s rapidly changing world, where technological advancements are reshaping industries and societies, it is more important than ever for students to have a comprehensive education that goes beyond just STEM.

By Integrating SHAPE into the educational framework, we can ensure that students are equipped with the knowledge and skills they need to navigate an increasingly complex and interconnected global landscape.STEM will always be at the forefront of innovation and progress, but SHAPE is what gives STEM its context and relevance in the larger scheme of things, and goes beyond the planet earth or deep into any nano or quantum arena. SHAPE education is essential in preparing students to become well-rounded individuals who are not only capable of solving complex problems but also understand the broader implications of their actions on society as a whole. It is through a balanced education that we can empower the next generation to make a positive impact on the world. By integrating sociology, history, art, politics, and economics into the curriculum, students can develop a broad range of skills and knowledge that will serve them well in the future. As we continue to face new challenges and opportunities in the 21st century, SHAPE education will play a crucial role in preparing students to become informed, engaged, and responsible global citizens.

*The writer has an academic background in Sociology, Politics, Business, Law, and Global Studies, and works in traditional and new media, IT, human resources, games, trading, and sports

By José Luís de Sales Marques, 

The European Parliament elections that took place in all 27 member states of the European Union (EU), between June 6 and 9 didn’t bring dramatic changes to  the political spectrum of the 720 strong European Parliament (EP).

However, it opens the door for significant personnel changes in the horse trading process that follows leading to the composition of EU institutions, such as the president and commissioners of the EU Commission,  the supranational body that acts as the executive arm of the Union, the presidency of the EU Council that coordinates  and leads the intergovernmental structure that is responsible for most of the political decisions at the EU level, the presidency of the European Parliament, the only directly elected EU  body which has gained increased importance and visibility over the last decade and, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the coordinator of foreign and security policies at the EU level. Most importantly, these elections will influence the shaping of policies that those bodies will adapt, with major consequences for the EU and the world in the following five years or more.

Let us start first by looking into the political trends in Europe and the impact of those electoral results on the formation of the new European Parliament (2024–2029). The most important conclusion will be that right-wing parties continued to gain ground in  most  countries  although their electoral outcomes were less than predicted, however, with some significant  exceptions, such as: in France, where Marine Le Pen far-right National Rally 31.3% of the vote smashed Macron’s Renaissance Party by a large margin, prompting the current French president to call for snap elections; in Italy, where Georgia Meloni and her party Brothers of Italy confirmed that the  Italian prime minister is becoming a strong leader in Europe, someone whose voice is being heard far beyond the boundaries of her arch-conservative political families; and, in Germany where Alternative for Germany (AfD) the far-right party considered too radical by its own European peers  has beaten up Chancellor Olof Scholz Social Democratic Party (SDP) to become the second party in the country.

Nonetheless, overall, the Parliament’s composition will not suffer a shocking far-right majority for the time being, with  pro-EU  coalitions of the Group of European People’s Party (EPP), Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), and Renew Europe Group (RE) holding 403 seats, 56% of the whole Parliament’s composition. Far-right MPs also have major differences among themselves, and, therefore, they are divided in two main groups: The European Conservatives and Reformist Group (ECR) with 83 seats and Identity and Democracy (ID) with 58 seats. Together, they have gained 23 seats, while the current majority lost 11 seats. It seems plausible that some of the far-right gains came from the Greens, who suffered the biggest setback, losing 20 seats in comparison with their results in the last 2019 elections, when they got a record-breaking 71 seats at the height of environmental militancy in Europe and elsewhere.  The success of the far-right is been attributed to the fact that their polarising messages – focusing on strong critique of pro-environmental policies and migration- are reaching new sectors of society, namely women, urban workers, professionals, and young voters, when, in the past, they had been traditionally linked to rural voters, de-franchised industrial “rust belts,” and marginalised urban dwellers. Far-right is gaining ground as Europeans feel they are becoming less well-off resulting from low to stagnated economic growth, high inflation, a technological deficit vis-à-vis the US and China reflected in low productivity growth, and the cost of an ongoing war with ever-increasing spending on defence.  

Before moving forward, it is important to underline that these European elections are a sum of twenty seven country level elections, each with its own set of political forces, agendas and mostly taken up by internal political debates rather than European level issues. Therefore, the reason why Macron, for instance, suffered such a big blow has much more to do with opposition to his policies in France rather than whatever he has advocated for the EU or in regard to the war in Ukraine. Moreover, each of the groups at the European Parliament is comprised of very different parties, whose agendas can actually differ significantly, except in general principles.  Decisions at the EP are not automatically guaranteed by the number of parliamentarians sitting with each coalition, but by the majorities that will eventually be constituted to deliberate on each agenda- issue. An example of this principle could  be applied in the election or confirmation at the EP of the principal officials of the EU, namely the President of the European Commission, the President of the Council as well as the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The President of the Parliament is formally elected by peers, candidates to be nominated by coalitions. It seems certain that Roberta Mesola will get a new two-and-a half-year term. It is no secret that the incumbent Ursula Van Der Leyen has been strongly  campaigning to get a second term, and the EPP is working to have  a majority supporting her re-election.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen (European Union/Handout via Xinhua)

Over the years, Van Der Leyen style of governing the Commission and her political alignment with Biden over major international issues have generated quite an opposition, even within her own commissioners and political family. However, she has collected support from other important EU leaders, including the above mentioned Meloni, who, in my opinion, was the main winner of these European elections, even a deal-maker. Her presidency of the G7, which met recently in Italy, has shown her increasing influence in European politics.  She has declared her support to Van Der Leyen and  is trowing her weight to demand a much bigger role for Italy as well as her ECR group for important portfolios in the new college of EU commissioners.

Although she had not floated the name of Mario Draghi, her predecessor as Italian prime-minister  and political opponent, to replace Charles Michel as the  president of the EU Council, the highest position at EU level, she made no secrets in supporting the conclusions of the Draghi report, commissioned by Ursula Van den Leyden, about the future of European competitiveness , considered to be the key to addressing the EU’s structural economic woes. Draghi, as head of the European Central Bank (ECB), made history when, at the height of the 2008 financial crisis, he declared, against tradition and the Bundesbank, that the ECB would support the Euro at all costs, making it almost a lender of last resort and saving the European currency from collapsing. Draghi’s vision for the EU is that the bloc must reduce the gap in research and innovation it has with the US and China in some areas, particularly in artificial intelligence and digitization, in a new geopolitical environment where the old liberal order is clearly in decline. To achieve those goals, the EU must resort to public investment, subsidies, and tariffs to overcome systemic deficits and inefficiencies, and to protect and rebuild European industries in critical areas against competition, mainly coming from China, in support of the twin green and digital transition.

This reminds Macron’s positions regarding European industrial policies, but it goes even further, than the call by the French since it is a political blueprint for measures that the EU will incorporate into policy packages. Although Draghi’s name was not presented during the first round of negotiations that started in Brussels on June 16th, and it is said that he is not interested in the position, he might come out later as an EPP candidate for the Council presidency, particularly if the bloc’s proposal of limiting socialist António Costa, the former Portuguese prime minister and strongest candidate to the post supported by S&D and a number of heads of government with other political colours, to a single two and a half-year term instead of the traditional two automatically renewed consecutive terms. Beside upsetting Costa’s candidacy, this change would also be controversial because, historically, the EU has avoided too much power concentration in a certain group by spreading the main positions among the major pro-EU political families. Von Der Leyen and Mesola are EPP; Kallas is the proposed High Representative; Kallas is from RE; and having Costa at the presidency of the EU Council would guarantee that kind of balance. However, changes are still possible, and new names might come out until the final decision is reached at the EU Council on June 27. 

However, beyond all this horse trading regarding who will do what for the next two and a half or five years, it is unquestionable that the policies will be changing in the direction of a more protective Europe in security as well as in the economic and trade dimensions. It will have a foreign economic policy designed to strengthen its resilience in regard to external shocks, and it will not shy away from taking measures similar to those that partners and competitors have taken to protect their own industries, even if those measures translate into government subsidies and tariffs on imports as well as control over inward and outward foreign direct investment. The future doesn’t look too bright for an open and rules-based multilateral trade order and economic governance!

José I. Duarte

Economist, Macau Business Senior Analyst

As the economy recovers, one hears renewed complaints about tourism overcrowding. Nobody indeed longs for COVID or any similar experience. Still, one cannot fail to recognise that many felt the aftermath of the pandemic gave the city back to the locals for a period. For many residents, the rising tide of tourism flows has brought back concerns about livability and well-being as areas of the city become visibly overcrowded and transit congestion intensifies. 

Consequently, demands for some sort of limitation on the number of visitors returned to the public agenda. The issue is not new, and neither is the main remedy suggested. Maybe it is time we had a fuller discussion about these issues, one from which a policy can be drawn that addresses those legitimate concerns without undue or avoidable costs that will also affect the citizens’ welfare. 

Macau has a population approaching 600,000 people while receiving more than three million monthly visitors at times. The stress on the urban space and infrastructure, not to mention the daily routines of residents, is undeniable and, at times, painful. 

So, the problem is real, but a solution, if there is one, must ponder and balance the various aspects and interests at stake, upholding tourism’s benefits while lessening the inconveniences locals and visitors feel. Other cities worldwide are grappling with similar problems and discussing or trying ways of dealing with them. 

Setting a maximum number of visitors has been proposed at times, and it seems like a simple and intuitive approach. Yet, it risks being rather crude as a measure and may entail needless side effects. Not all visitors are alike; not all pose the same challenges and impose the same costs. Simple solutions based on single quotas are unlikely to provide the necessary answers. 

Using the readily available figures published by the government, we can distinguish two broad types of visitors: same-day and overnight. Even at such a general level of distinction, it is clear they contribute in very different ways to the local economy and impose very different levels of stress on the urban and social fabric. Any policy bent on limiting visitors’ impact must start by clearly distinguishing these situations and their predictable implications. They are likely to call for different approaches and incentives if they are to deliver the desired results and lessen undesired effects. 

On average, same-day visitors stay in Macau for less than five hours. During those limited periods, they concentrate mainly on a very limited area of the city and impose the severest constraints on vehicle and person circulation. Their presence and expenses are indeed meaningful for a limited but not trivial number of local businesses. Overall, however, they represent comparatively little in terms of income and a lot in terms of congestion.

In recent years, overnight visitors spent significantly more — at least five times more per capita. They spend on a broader spectrum of activities and businesses, distribute themselves more evenly in space and time, and bear much less pressure on the city and its residents’ lives. 

Different types of visitors produce diverse impacts that justify diverse measures. A one-size-fits-all tool will be too blunt. Any policy setting visitors’ quotas (or alternative measures with similar purpose) should start by acknowledging and clearly distinguishing those situations and dealing with them differently. 

We should go further. That is a very general classification; careful and detailed profiling of the visitors to Macau, beyond these two categories, should be a necessary antecedent to any tourism management policy – a “know thy customer’ of sorts, allowing for a calibrated intervention, if or when it is required.

經濟學家  麥健智（José Luís de Sales Marques） 

五月是澳門的歐洲月，令一項具歷史意義的高經濟價值合作關係再次成為人們關注的焦點。重拾疫情爆發前的傳統，澳門於今年5月16日舉行雞尾酒會，作為慶祝歐洲日活動，歐盟和澳門特別行政區政府亦派出代表出席。5月9日被定為“歐洲日”，以紀念《舒曼宣言》的簽署，也是歐洲一體化進程開始的紀念日。此外，澳門歐洲商會於5月10日舉行年度晚宴，匯聚了一眾商會會員、組織和個人。是次盛宴展現了歐洲商界在澳門的活力及對未來進軍粵港澳大灣區的雄心，尤其是橫琴深度合作區。國務院港澳事務辦公室主任夏寶龍在最近的澳門考察中，也強調了澳門和歐盟之間的關係。他認為，在提升澳門國際影響力的背景下，應拓寬與歐的聯繫。

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By Rui Lourido

China’s rapid economic recovery post-COVID has prevented a European recession. Recognizing this, European leaders are increasingly visiting China to deepen economic cooperation, even as the U.S. pushes anti-China policies.

China was the European Union’s largest partner in goods imports (20.5% of total imports) and the third-largest partner in goods exports (8.8% of total exports) in 2023, according to Eurostat data.

However, the anti-China rhetoric of the U.S., EU, and U.K. governments worsened in 2023 and early 2024 due to China’s neutrality in the Ukraine crisis and its condemnation of Israel’s actions in the Gaza Strip.

The European Commission and some European governments have been uncritically mimicking the U.S.’s anti-China rhetoric, which aims to neutralize China as a commercial and economic competitor through unilateral sanctions, violating World Trade Organization rules.

This strategic myopia of the European political elite in power goes against the interests of the business community and most European citizens, who desire a climate of peace and non-militarization of their economies and intend to remain optimistic and interested in increasing investments in their respective markets together with Chinese companies.

On the other hand, despite the strain caused by the U.S. economic and diplomatic war against China, the China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, established in 2003, has gained greater relevance in the current international context.  

At the same time, China’s role in the supply chains of G7 economies has grown. For example, between 2018 and 2022, China’s share of total intermediate goods imports increased from 11.1% to 15.9% in Germany and from 10.3% to 15.1% in the U.K.

Germany takes the lead in revitalizing economic relations with China

Despite the complexities, there has been an increase in visits by important European political and business leaders to China. The most recent and significant visit took place in mid-April when German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, representative of the main European economy, visited China for three days, accompanied by major German exporters, such as BMW and Volkswagen. It was Scholz’s second visit to China (the first being in November 2022), making him the first European head of state to personally visit President Xi Jinping twice in two years.

As in the first visit, Scholz was here to focus on deepening economic relations with China. The German Chancellor visited industrial centers such as Chongqing, where he toured a factory of a German company dedicated to the production of sustainable hydrogen propellants, and financial centers such as Shanghai, where he also visited a German plastics company that works with green and sustainable technologies.

In Beijing, Scholz was accompanied by the minister of agriculture, Cem Özdemir; the minister of the environment, Steffi Lemke; and the minister of transport and digital media, Volker Wissing. They were received by President Xi and Prime Minister Li Qiang. Another German leader, Markus Soeder, minister-president of Bavaria, visited China on March 23 of this year.

In view of the EU’s “de-risking” orientation toward China, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that President Xi told Chancellor Scholz: “Mutually beneficial cooperation between China and Germany is not a ‘risk,’ but the guarantee for a stable bilateral relationship and an opportunity for the future. There is huge potential to be tapped for pursuing win-win cooperation in both traditional sectors such as machinery and automobile, and new areas such as green transition, digitization and artificial intelligence.”

The Chinese president also said: “It is important for the two countries to stay vigilant against the rise of protectionism, adopt an objective and dialectical view on the issue of capacity through a market and global perspective…China is committed to the basic national policy of opening up, and hopes that the German side can provide a fair, transparent, open and non-discriminatory business environment for Chinese enterprises in Germany.”

The Chinese leader further stated that ties between China and Germany have an important impact on Eurasia and the entire world, so the two countries must develop their ties from a strategic and long-term perspective in order to inject more stability and certainty into the world.

Scholz stated that “Germany is willing to work with China to further strengthen bilateral relations, deepen dialogue and cooperation in various fields,” and that “Germany opposes protectionism and supports free trade. Germany is willing to strengthen communication and coordination with China to jointly respond to global challenges.”

The German car industry was a key focus of the negotiations. The extensive collaboration between Xiaopeng, a rising Chinese car maker, and Volkswagen showcases a growing agreement on the importance of electric mobility and the need for Chinese and European automakers to share the expanding electric vehicle (EV) market. 

This cooperation is part of the long history of intense collaboration between Chinese and European car manufacturers. In today’s automotive industry, there are countless opportunities for mutual benefit. China’s expertise in production efficiency and market adaptation, combined with Europe’s tradition of engineering excellence and innovation, creates fertile ground for cooperation.

France is keen on expanding ties with China

As Germany has taken a more prominent role, France has aimed to assert its own geopolitical interests, expressing a desire for greater influence in Europe and on the international stage, especially given the drastic decline of France’s influence in Africa. In April 2023, French President Emmanuel Macron visited China and held talks with President Xi. On April 1, 2024, French Minister of Foreign Affairs Stephane Sejourne made a trip to China.

In response to these visits and the French invitation, President Xi paid a state visit to France from May 5 to 7.

During President Xi’s visit to the country, the two sides issued four joint statements on the situation in the Middle East, on AI and global governance, on biodiversity and oceans, and on agricultural exchanges and cooperation. And close to 20 bilateral cooperation documents were signed in such areas as green development, aviation, agrifood, commerce and people-to-people exchanges.

French President Macron told his Chinese guests that France would like to have closer economic ties and multilateral communication and collaboration with China, and work for more outcomes in the France-China strategic partnership. France hopes to export more agricultural products to China. At the same time, it will continue to open its market to China, and will not adopt discriminatory policies against Chinese companies. France welcomes investment and cooperation by more Chinese companies, including high-tech firms.

The example of European multinational Airbus is significant. It is building a larger factory in Tianjin, China, to assemble A320 aircraft. The factory is estimated to come into operation in 2025. The aviation industry is deeply integrated between China and Europe, encompassing everything from projects to the production and assembly of components, and from delivery to aircraft dismantling and recycling.

US interference

In response to the decline of its global hegemony, the U.S. has increased unilateralism on international trade in violation of WTO rules. It is also trying to revive the Cold War mentality, fueling conflicts and wars between old geopolitical blocs. The U.S. has disrupted supply chains for its allies and attempted, unsuccessfully, to isolate Russia and China. As Columbia University Professor Jeffrey Sachs points out, the so-called “Western world,” comprising no more than 12% of the global population, has provided uncritical, though not unconditional, support for the hegemony of the U.S., which accounts for around 4% of the world’s population, over other countries that make up 84% of the global population. Additionally, some nations clearly back the confrontation between blocs, such as NATO versus Russia, as well as the Israeli occupation, bombing, and starvation of the Palestinian people.

In other words, the U.S. has become a serious distraction or even hindrance in normal ties between China and the EU members.

Response from China and the EU

Faced with the current global turmoil, China has been actively and responsibly proposing several initiatives to the entire international community, not just the Global South. These proposals, including the concept of a global community of shared future, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the Global Development Initiative, aim to promote global economic development and stability.

While China and the EU do not share the same views on all matters and often have divergent approaches to issues, partly due to their distinct civilizations, historical trajectories, and cultural traditions, China has made effort to emphasize shared elements and values in its relationship with the EU, downplaying antagonistic factors. Despite their differences, China has actively sought to highlight commonalities and areas of alignment with the EU.

With a history spanning more than 5,000 years, China appreciates the rich histories and cultures of European nations. Both Chinese and European civilizations share values such as the pursuit of peace, the search for freedom and resistance to violence, the notion of mutual respect in human relationships and democracy, as well as the recognition of the importance of modernizing societies through education, economic development, and technological innovation.

These common values, together with the awareness of the need to work together to face today’s biggest challenges, create a stable and conducive basis for deepening the current China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, namely, in the urgent fight against climate change; in defense of multilateralism; in increasing democracy in international relations; in valuing the role of the United Nations; in maintaining world peace and stability; in combating international terrorism; and in promoting sustainable development and making efforts to eradicate poverty.

These common interests and values have created conditions for maintaining bridges and, whenever possible, increasing economic relations between China and European countries. According to Eurostat data, in 2023, the EU’s trade deficit with China stood at 291 billion euros, having reduced by more than a quarter compared with 2022. The most imported products from China by the EU are products with high incorporated value, resulting from accelerated Chinese modernization based on human resources training, innovation, and technological development. 

According to statistics, the bilateral investment stock between China and the EU exceeded $250 billion at the end of 2023. EU investment in China in 2023 was $10.6 billion, marking a 5.5% increase and exceeding $10 billion for the second consecutive year. In the same period, China’s investment in the EU was $8.2 billion, an increase of 17.4%. 

According to the 2023 Business Confidence Survey released by the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, more than 90% of European companies surveyed plan to make China their investment destination, and 59% consider China one of their top three investment destinations. 

A survey of 288 German companies in China conducted by the German Chamber of Commerce in China shows that 55% of these German companies plan to increase their investments in China in the next two years. Meanwhile, the 2023 Annual Report by the China Chamber of Commerce for the EU shows that more than 80% of Chinese companies surveyed plan to enhance their business in Europe.

Despite the West’s efforts to “stop” globalization, the world economy is interconnected and interdependent. China’s rapid economic recovery post-COVID has ensured that the world economy does not enter a recession. The lack of global development cooperation, not the rise of China, poses the greatest security risk.

The economies of China and the EU are complementary, and their economic relations are mutually beneficial. The West, particularly Europe, must view China as a partner rather than a threat and refrain from the effort to interrupt the rise of the Asian giant, as China’s economic growth is fundamental to Europe’s socioeconomic development.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen told Chinese President in Paris a few days ago that it is important that the EU maintains good relations with China, and the EU wishes to strengthen cooperation with China.

China’s openness is proven by its initiatives open to everyone’s participation, to promote peace and economic and social development, which allows stability and improved lives. President Xi’s state visits to several European countries, namely France, Serbia and Hungary, present an opportunity for Europeans. These visits are a good chance to strengthen bridges. Through dialogue, these engagements can contribute to building a global community of shared future. 

Just as President Xi Jinping suggested during his visit to Hungary, China and the European countries should be committed to solidarity and collaboration, champion humanity’s common values, and practice true multilateralism. They should also advocate an equal and orderly multipolar world and a universally beneficial and inclusive economic globalization, and inject more positive energy into safeguarding world peace and promoting common development.

《商訊》2024年6月號 | 文：甄慶悅 – 資深傳媒人

闊別澳門五年的VNL世界女排聯賽，五月底六月頭再臨澳門，今屆賽事來到銀河娛樂的銀河綜藝館，煥然一新，場地之豪華與過去的綜藝館不可同日而語，觀賽體驗極佳。據體育局長透露，一連六日賽事，有超過三萬二千人次入場，當中近七成為外地球迷，形容效果超過預期，賽事對體育旅遊有促進作用。表面看，三萬二千人次乃不俗數字，但若以十六場賽事計，平均每場只約二千人入場，當中還不知多少是真正買票者，因為今次也有派票、出動學校學生的舉動，且不要忘記，據銀河官網顯示，銀河綜藝館有一萬六千座位。事實說明，儘管有世界一流場地、世界最頂級球隊，也非收視保證，更沒穩賺這回事，體育旅遊或者盛事經濟，一點不容易。 

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文：Keith Morrison | 作家及教育家

您可能看過美國達人秀、英國達人秀、澳洲達人秀。 事實上，許多國家都有自己的真人秀節目。暫且不談這些，將目光轉移至澳門：澳門達人秀。的確如此！撇除那些令人耳目一新的華麗歌手、可愛的小孩子、舞者、魔術師和喜劇雜技演員。澳門能夠做得更好；我們的確擁有人才。據了解，澳門擅長科學、工程和技術。除此之外，我們仍需更多具高科技、電腦科學與應用、大健康、金融等專業知識的人才。 

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Macau Business | June 2024

Keith Morrison – Author and educationist

You may have watched America’s Got Talent, Britain’s Got Talent, Australia’s Got Talent. In fact, many countries have their own similar reality shows. But put those aside, because now Macau’s got talent. It’s true. Not the ear-splitting glitzy singers, endearing little children, dancers, magicians, and comedic acrobats. No, Macau can do better than these; Macau’s got real talent. Reportedly, Macau is good at science, engineering, and technology. On top of this, it needs even more people with expertise in high-tech, computer science and applications, big health, and finance.

The Macau government is reported to be offering a financial incentive to local ‘high-end talents’ to stay in Macau, along with attracting international experts. As the Secretary for Social affairs and Culture was reported to have said recently: ‘We welcome scientific and technological talent from around the world to come to Macau to set up businesses and facilitate development’. Add to this, bursting with life and excitement, is Macau’s Talents Development Committee’s alluring comment that its ‘website provides high-paying job vacancies in five major occupational categories, including: corporate executives, professionals, highly skilled talents and applied talents. The salary of the vacancies is not lower than the median of the relevant occupational categories announced by the Bureau of Statistics.’ Yawn.

Maybe the Talents Development Committee is disappointed that it has not recruited anyone who meets its eligibility criterion of having a Nobel prize, the Fields medal, the Turing Award, or the Shaw prize. So, Macau is turning to its own talents, paying them to stay, though reportedly offering them only ‘slightly more’ cash. Such incentives overlook the elephant in the room, even though several hundred applications are reported to have been received. And what is that elephant? Read on.

Whilst the endeavours of the Macau government are clearly well intentioned, the lack of suitably qualified and experienced workers in the identified key areas of need raises several questions. For example, how is it that the thousands of local students who graduate each year from Macau’s higher education institutions with Master’s and doctorate, and undergraduate degrees in the areas of need, are unsuitable for meeting the local needs, or who decide to work outside Macau, or to work in other employment? Why do local, highly talented people leave Macau or do not return from overseas? Why are suitably experienced international workers not only difficult to recruit but also difficult to retain? Why don’t they want to come to, or stay in, Macau?

In conducting a situational analysis of work opportunities, it is important to look at not only the upside of Macau, but also its downside. On the one hand, Macau is a safe city, most of its residents are delightful, it has some interesting sites, its low tax rate is attractive, and, for senior staff, it pays well. On the other hand, and this is the elephant in the room: (i) career development prospects are very limited in terms of promotion and diversity, with narrow fields of employment; (ii) many of its work cultures are over-hierarchical and over-authoritarian, with handed-down instructions for workers to obey compliantly; (iii) the labyrinthine bureaucracy of visas, work permits, and residency status is forbidding; (iv) government intrusion into private enterprises is oppressive; (v) Macau is monstrously overcrowded with both residents and tourists; (vi) it is a noisy, light-polluted, concrete jungle that lacks countryside and a nature-friendly environment, and its back streets are filthy and congested; (vii) accommodation is expensive; (viii) job security of international workers is fragile (they can be fired at the drop of a hat, as happened when thousands were kicked out at two weeks’ notice in the Covid-19 pandemic); (ix) with only a few exceptions, its mass schooling is like turning back the clock 50+ years; (x) health services are suspect (people go outside Macau for diagnosis and treatment); (xi) Macau has become more geared to tourists than to its locals; (xii) Macau’s residents have few societal and community benefits from the massive gaming income.

The point here is that offering people cash to stay in Macau or to come to it for work pales into relative insignificance when balanced with quality of life, i.e. things that cash cannot buy. Macau seems to have talent in offering disincentives.

The recent visit of Chinese Premier Li Qiang to New Zealand is now followed by his visits to Australia, with implications for China’s trade diplomacy and geopolitics.

On June 14, Li Qiang delivered a speech at a welcoming gala dinner at Auckland, emphasising the friendly and 52 years of diplomatic relations between China and New Zealand and their comprehensive strategic partnership. He added that China has remained New Zealand’s largest trading partner and biggest export market.

Li Qiang tactfully stressed the cooperative areas between the two countries, including environmental protection, agricultural development, ecological sustainability, low-carbon transition, and green technology. Then he shifted to emphasise the multicultural diversity of the two countries, which both value free trade, innovation, creativity, and the protection of intellectual property rights.

He stressed that both countries attach great importance to peace, dialogue, and cooperation rather than confrontation and conflict. Such cooperation includes areas like biomedicine, agriculture, food, the digital economy, tourism, educational exchange, cultural interactions, information technology, and energy.

Furthermore, bilateral cooperation can be forged through the support of UN-led international order and law, and the practice of multilateralism.

Li elucidated that the Chinese economy remains growth-oriented and resilient, leading to more opportunities for countries to share the fruits of common economic development.

The Chinese Premier also added that China requires the import of high-quality diary, beef and lamb products from New Zealand. He visited the New Zealand Institute for Plant and Food Research in Auckland, meeting and dining with businesspeople, academics, and officials.

China is now the largest trade partner of New Zealand with bilateral trade totalling NZ$38 billion.

Analysing Li’s speech and remarks, China has adopted an economically pragmatic trade policy to secure closer support from New Zealand. Although New Zealand is part of the AUKUS and a member of the US-led military and security alliance in Asia, Li Qiang skilfully avoided mentioning the sensitive issues in public but pragmatically focused on the cooperative areas of low politics with high economic values.

In recent years, the perception of the China “threat” has gained currency in New Zealand and Australia, which are worrying about China’s closer relations with some Pacific islands like the Solomon Islands. The territorial disputes between China and the Philippines over some reefs in the South China Sea have also alarmed Australia and New Zealand. Some politicians in Australia and New Zealand have appeared to overstate the Chinese “threats” by raising their concerns about Chinese united front work in their society and community.

As such, Li Qiang’s depoliticisation approach to dealing with New Zealand is a wise one, focusing on productive and economic areas with common consensus, while steering away from politically controversial terrains. The expansion in bilateral trade, further marketization, the improvement of high quality products and services, and the enhancement of mutual investments have become the hallmarks of Li Qiang’s visit to New Zealand.

Li’s pragmatic and depoliticising approach to emphasising trade diplomacy is likely to be revealed and repeated in his next visits to Australia and Malaysia. Australia’s relations with China have slightly improved recently after China scrapped its tariffs on Australian wine. China is expected to give two new pandas to the Adelaide Zoo, combining its panda diplomacy with trade diplomacy. Malaysia remains an important neighbour to China due to Kuala Lumpur’s relatively independent attitude towards Sino-US tensions. Hence, it can be expected that Li Qiang’s trade diplomacy and depoliticising but pragmatic approach will persist in his visits to Australia and Malaysia.

Li Qiang’s visit to New Zealand could also be seen as a follow-up action after Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Wellington in March 2024. Wang succeeded in upgrading the China-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement and launching negotiations on the negative list of trade in services. Li deepened China’s economic relations with New Zealand further, demonstrating perhaps a new pattern of Beijing’s go-south neighbourly diplomacy.

In conclusion, Li Qiang’s visit to New Zealand was not only a follow-up action after Wang Yi’s visit to Wellington, but also a new go-south good neighbourly diplomacy combining the focus on trade with the emphasis on productive and other common areas of cooperation. Li’s trade diplomacy towards New Zealand was carefully orchestrated, while such diplomacy is intermingled with panda diplomacy in his next visit to Australia. His final stop in Malaysia will be an important one showing China’s eagerness to reach out to countries that are relatively independent from the ongoing Sino-US rivalries in the Asia-Pacific region.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

《商訊》2024年 6月 | 主編前言 – Mandy Kuok

現今社會若隨便問一個人有關環保的問題，相信被問者或多或少都能回答一二， 這與過去數十年環保人士、專家及政府在提高人們環保意識這方面的努力有關。但問題是經過這樣長時間的努力，在環保工作上只是提高了人們對環保的認識，真正實踐綠色生活的人卻不多，即使澳門這個小城，全面實施環保政策都困難重重，鄰埠香港計劃多年的垃圾徵費亦在全面實施前剎停，為何推動環保如此困難？ 

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《商訊》2024年6月 | 總監之言 – 馬天龍

負責港澳特區事務的中央高級官員夏寶龍到澳門展開了為期七天的考察調研，這是非一般“考察”。與鄰埠類似，此為夏主任一年來的第二次來訪。與2023年5月相比，今次調研工作的基調、實質和背景已截然不同。 

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By Paulo A. Azevedo

Founder of Macau Business

Chairman of Project Asia Corporation

During the process of casino gaming concession renewals, the government created press releases and compelled operators to send them as if they were their own. The initial shock and even the attempts to refuse by some, considering it an absolute absurdity to have their responsibilities overtaken and to see the government entering the exclusive sphere of activity of private companies listed internationally on the stock exchange, were eventually appeased by the respective teams.

 All in the name of a renewal that only lasted ten years, far below the initial expectations given the volume of investments made over the last two decades. However, despite everything, it turned out to be ‘better’ than some people had thought. Years of uncertainty regarding the removal of one operator or another to open the door to others, from the region or even from the SAR, made those who felt most attacked reluctantly accept the situation.

This all-hands-on-deck example of Ho Iat Seng’s apparent leadership strategy extends to other sectors as well. Construction is also suffering, with investors complaining that they win a project but then cannot choose the subcontractors or companies they turn to for services and are presented with ‘suggestions’ for partners.

The most generous individuals could turn a blind eye to the very fine line between morality and procedural legality, confirming the veracity of the complaints made by several involved parties.  If, by any chance, absolutely unquestionable values were at stake, such as national honour and national security—the usual reasons of state invoked whenever a leader wants to create exceptional cases, bypassing the scrutiny of the law, both in its letter and spirit. But the truth is that nothing in Macau justifies a government autocracy. Even worse, when it exists, the tendency is always to think that authoritarianism is present to prevent anyone from seeking the true reasons behind such an intense effort, so that no one questions it to avoid being excluded. As the saying goes: “There is no smoke without fire.”

As Macau is not, and will never be, in a phase of dissonance with Beijing, despite there sometimes being different interpretations of matters under consideration, it would be appropriate for the government to allow investors to continue investing in the development of their businesses transparently. Yes, regulation is necessary, but it should be guided by legislative norms and not by whims or decisions that are difficult to explain in light of the rule of law.

By Jorge A. F. Godinho

The success of the Macau experience after the 2001/02 major reforms and public tender caused a revolution around Asia. In the last two decades, a normalisation of casino gaming has taken place. This was done with a specific twist: games of chance must be offered within integrated resorts. Singapore and the Philippines followed Macau and developed large gaming industries. Japan has moved ahead, but only one integrated resort is being built; it will open in 2030. Thailand is also going to legalise casino gaming, apparently. Other second-tier markets have appeared.

The gaming industry in Macau grew enormously from 2004 to its peak in 2013/14. Since then, it started to move sideways, in a bumpy ride that became a free-fall with the pandemic of 2020/22. It is now recognised that some of the Macau developments in the last two decades were a bit excessive: too many satellite casinos have opened, too many junkets were active, too much credit for gaming was being granted, too much money was moving out of China by illegal means. And there were not enough non-gaming offers. During the 2002-2022 concessions, diversification efforts were not exactly a failure, such as on MICE, but overall they were not a massive success either.

The major regulatory reforms of recent years have been designed to correct past excesses and set a more sustainable path. Many satellite casinos have closed. Junkets can no longer grant credit. Money movements are tightly controlled. Limits on the number of tables were already imposed back in 2010. The turn to an industry oriented to the mass market and much less to the VIP sector, and a more diversified one, has been gathering steam. The accelerated development of non-gaming offers in Macau is happening, following the new six concession contracts signed in 2022. It is too early to tell whether the non-gaming benchmarks, plans and commitments made were overly ambitious and will have to be restructured after the dust settles, like it happened in the past, or will work well. The exact details of diversification are inherently complex, to be followed up all the way to 2032.

The massive news in the last year or so is the prospect of the Kingdom of Thailand legalising gaming by having several large integrated resorts around the country, one in each region or area, much like the Portuguese casino landscape. Details are not yet clear, or even if it will happen at all, and there are political risks that may deter the largest investors. The opportunity is, of course, almost unparalleled: Thailand is already one of the top tourism destinations in the world, and it is not an extremely expensive country like Singapore has become. It is also quite close to China and has good infrastructure.

If Thailand can pass proper regulation and have rule of law and transparency in the functioning of the system, in the context of broad political support, large operators may be attracted. Good regulation helps the industry and the government and promotes the acceptability of the projects among the population. In 2024, there is no reason to make mistakes and not learn from what other jurisdictions have done right or wrong. If everything goes ahead and works well, in a few years from now Thailand may be generating significant competition for Macau.

*Associate Professor, ISMAT, Portugal and Visiting Professor, University of Macau, China

António Lobo Vilela is a lawyer based in Macau

and the author of the Macau Gaming Law Book

(www.macaugaminglaw.com)

Although not original, the idea of ‘incentivising’ Macau’s casino gaming concessionaires to attract international gamblers is interesting.

This idea was introduced in the 2022 amendments to Macau’s gaming laws, emphasising the need for concessionaires to broaden the base of foreign customers, understood as those who “enter the Macau SAR for tourism and commercial purposes and who hold a travel document issued by a country or region outside the People’s Republic of China.” The “descriptive memo” outlining the plans for the “expansion of foreign customer markets” has become a criterion in selecting and evaluating proposals for awarding concessions to operate casino games of chance. In addition, the “origin of international visitors” was deemed of public interest and listed in the Investment Plans attached to the concession contracts as the first of the nine areas to be covered by the investment projects. Furthermore, a clause on the “expansion of foreign customer markets” is now mandatory in concession contracts. The one included requires concessionaires to implement these plans per the content and criteria of the awarding proposals submitted.

Unlike the tax exemption on the profits from operating casino games of chance (and their distribution to shareholders), which was granted by the Chief Executive without any (known) consideration to support the “expansion of foreign customer markets,” concessionaires can benefit from a reduction or exemption of up to 5 per cent of gross gaming revenues (which corresponded to USD 1.14 billion in 2023).

The implementation of plans for the “expansion of foreign customer markets” began on January 1, 2023, but has not been successful thus far. Official figures show that in 2023, only 5.17 per cent of total arrivals (approximately 1.46 million people) were foreign passport holders, representing 48 per cent of the number of foreign visitors that Macau had in 2019, before the pandemic.

Several reasons can be cited for this failure.

Firstly, the inertia of the concessionaires derived from the lack of need to expand their existing player base, especially when the number of gamblers from mainland China is on an upward curve. Secondly, the (natural) lack of ability of concessionaires to promote casino games of chance on a large scale, a role previously carried out by gaming promoters replaced by the so-called “money changers” who simply ‘make funds available’ to gamblers in Macau while snaking around casinos. Thirdly, after a cost-benefit analysis, some concessionaires may not see the justification in the “expansion of foreign customers markets,” even if they use the (generous) percentage of the investment obligation totalling MOP 142.65 billion for the ten years of the concessions (the execution of which is not yet known) earmarked for ‘operating expenses.’

The adoption of the same idea had a different fate in Singapore. When the city-state decided to legalise gambling, it did so with the main political objective of establishing itself as a true tourist destination. It used the excess Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) and the profits generated by a quasi-monopolistic casino industry as a driving force to reinforce its status as a tourist destination for visitors from afar, rather than as a destination for overnight stays or a casino market for locals.

Creating barriers to market entry, especially in the case of monopolies or quasi-monopolies, allows a jurisdiction to charge a higher economic rent. Singapore, however, has opted for a different approach, preferring the long-term economic benefits of attracting tourists from far and wide. Despite only allowing two licences to operate casino gaming, Singapore’s current tiered gaming tax rate structure is 8 or 12% for VIP gaming and 18 or 22% for non-VIP gaming. This differentiation aims to incentivise Singaporean casino operators to focus on attracting VIP gamblers while also creating a competitive advantage for their casinos over other jurisdictions, particularly Macau, where the overall tax rate on gaming is five times higher than the lowest rate applied in Singapore.

To this extent, it is not surprising that, for example, Venetian, which also operates in Singapore, is not primarily motivated to implement any plan to attract international gamblers to Macau in exchange for a tax reduction or exemption of up to 5 per cent of the 40 per cent overall tax rate on gaming, when in Singapore it only pays 8 or 12 per cent. The same applies to Melco about the jurisdictions where it operates and where the gaming tax is significantly lower. The same is true for MGM and Wynn, which also operate in Nevada, where the tax rate is 6.75 per cent.

On the other hand, international gamblers generally have a less gambling-centred attitude than gamblers from mainland China. They are also less likely to participate in excursions and let people decide when and where to gamble. This means that a concessionaire may incur costs to bring players to Macau who end up (also) playing in competing casinos, perhaps looking for the hustle and bustle that can’t be found in the isolated foreigner-only gaming rooms.

In addition, the introduction of chips and gaming tables with radio frequency identification (RFID) functionality may, for privacy reasons, not be conducive to attracting international gamblers, who prefer to remain anonymous during their forays into casinos.

Finally, emerging new gaming jurisdictions in Southeast Asia, notably Thailand, could be another factor in international gamblers’ deviation.

All that remains for Macau is to eventually shuffle the cards and use pragmatism to recognise that the bet was international, but the result is regional.

Moreover, the bet was not just lost on the “expansion of foreign customer markets.” The same can be said for Air Macau, Macau Airport, the University of Macau, Macau Union Hospital, Macau Jockey Club, taxis, Uber, outdoor seating areas, ‘modern finance’… and, most recently, the Macau Grand Prix Formula 3, replaced by a simple ‘Macau Prix’ Formula Regional.

Macau Business magazine l June 2024

By José Carlos Matias – Director

The recent seven-day visit of Xia Baolong, Beijing’s top official in charge of the SARs, was no ordinary “inspection”.

It was the second tour of its kind in one year, mirroring Xia’s visits to the neighbouring Hong Kong SAR. And for Macau it carried a different tone, substance and context compared to the one in May 2023. A key takeaway was the focus on “polishing the golden business card of Macau as an international metropolis”. While those less enthusiastic might suggest this sounds like “old wine in new bottles”, we believe that Xia’s message, with such emphasis at this juncture, carries special significance.

It brings to light unfinished tasks and serves as a mobilising and encouraging factor in the drive to meet targets and swiftly implement policies. Government and key economic and social actors are required to rise to the challenge. We need to get this right. The city’s “internationalisation” bar has just been raised by the central authorities – a much-welcome development.

As suggested by the Director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, leveraging the SAR’s advantages is of paramount importance. These advantages are closely intertwined with Macau’s distinctive features, which can be turned into a maximised competitive edge. This may sound self-evident, but some in the local elite need to be constantly reminded of the fact.

It’s all about making up for lost time, speeding up and improving ongoing initiatives, and stopping the dragging of feet in key areas. At the risk of sounding like a “broken record”, we reiterate: bold measures are more advisable than a piecemeal approach.

A polished international metropolis implies stronger efforts in welcoming more highly skilled professionals from around the world. That metropolis should have the ambition to compete with peer hubs such as Singapore, Hong Kong and Dubai in attracting top-notch talent in designated areas. The talent attraction scheme, launched last year, was presented as the missing tool to level up the city’s attractiveness. It was certainly a key step, but is it yielding results quickly and broadly enough given the intense competition from metropolises in Greater China and the Asia-Pacific region? The case for recalibrating and expanding this mechanism is growing stronger.

On the visitation front, while tourism recovery gains steam, there remains a gap between the pace of recovery of overall visitors and that of foreign arrivals. As we move forward, one expects that gap to gradually close, hopefully as a result of the intense promotional roadshows recently held in Southeast and Northeast Asia. Additional moves are expected in this respect. Here, the expansion of multilingual customer service surfaces as a key direction, which also implies further opening the imported labour door, in addition to better equipping the local workforce.

An issue – a rather embarrassing one – that has been plaguing visitor experience and annoying locals is the same old taxi woes. Old habits die hard, right? The long-awaited additional 500 licences to be awarded may be a step forward, but it’s likely to be too little, too late. Tackling the taxi lobby’s vested interests head-on is a must, as is implementing thoughtful arrangements allowing ride-sharing services and platforms, which are tested and well-functioning elsewhere (starting in the neighbouring Greater Bay Area cities).

All this can leverage the important “tourism+” strategy, which emerges as a key pillar in polishing Macau’s international allure. This is reflected in the “City of Performing Arts” and “City of Sports Events” directions. While there has been much focus on developing the city’s concert economy – more international acts are highly desirable in this respect – sports events are also a key direction, as elaborated in this issue’s special report. As we are one year away from being one of the host cities of the National Games, this is, as we point out, “an opportunity that cannot be missed” for Macau, nearly two decades after the SAR was home to the East Asian Games, the first of three multisport international events held between 2005 and 2007.

All in all, with the bar raised and higher stakes, it’s time to jump higher and shift gears.

By Jorge Costa Oliveira

Partner and CEO of JCO Consultancy

As the war on Ukraine raged on, China re-affirmed its “neutrality”, albeit adopting a de facto stance of “collaborative [pro-Russian] neutrality” towards Russia. The reasons for this stance are evident – China has much to gain and little to lose from it. Thus, until recently, it was arguable whether China was interested in a quick end to the Ukraine war. In fact, it looked as if it was interested in its continuity (as the US, although for different reasons). Trade between Russia and China grew tremendously after the beginning of the war (Feb 2022) having reached in 2023 a record number of 240 billion US dollars (the number gets much higher if one adds the increase in indirect trade, via Central Asia).

On the other hand, the progressive isolation from Western markets is making Russia and its companies dependent on Chinese firms or China’s authorities. Russia sells (often at discount prices) oil, natural gas, critical metals, agrifoods to Chinese companies, and buys from China cars, machinery and critical components for its defense industry (e.g., drone and missile engines, semiconductors). The growing interdependence between the two countries has provided good business deals for Chinese companies (the top six foreign car brands sold in Russia are now all Chinese, Xiaomi and Tecno have eclipsed Apple and Samsung, the same in home appliances and other everyday items). This dependence has even led to Russian strategic companies relocating to China part of the value chain of relevant products, such as the Norilsk Nickel smelters. In recent months, Russia is boosting China’s military capability by providing Beijing with advanced aerospace technology, as well as advanced air defense systems and technology used in China’s new silent submarines. It is true that, within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and other agreements, Moscow and Beijing already had a good cooperation in the areas of security and defense. However, only in recent months has Russia made advanced military and aerospace technology available.

On the other hand, China maintains a good relationship with many Western countries (mostly European) whose rich markets are the destination of a sizable part of China’s exports and from which advanced technology and investment comes to China. China clearly intends to maintain this situation, as well as avoid financial sanctions that have been imposed on Russia.

Whilst combating an international order dominated by the main Western powers remains the long-term goal of China, an openly confrontational path with the West – as Russia did – is dangerous and entails significant costs, especially in terms of financial sanctions. China stance thus far shows its leadership fully understands this, yet does not want Russia to become too weak from the war effort.

However, the recent escalation of the war effort on both the Russian and the Ukrainian sides, the increased pro-Ukrainian commitment of Western countries, in particular the European ones, and the non-veiled threats by the US governments as regards the supply to Russia of dual use goods, seem to have provoked a change in the Chinese stance as regards the continuity of the war.

It is not in China’s interest to have Russia significantly weakened. However, the war has claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of Russians, the replacement of military capability is severely jeopardized and the economy of Russia is being transformed into a war economy with progressive allocation of resources for military and defense purposes. Furthermore, on top of the American pressure for Europe to decouple from China (thus far unsuccessfully), several opinion polls show that the image of China in Europe is being eroded at a fast pace. That is creating already significant hurdles and difficulties for Chinese companies in Europe. Moreover, China’s international image is also being damaged, and the dominance of Western media and entertainment globally does not bode well for China’s willingness to reinforce its soft power with developing countries, including as a potential peacemaker of international conflicts.

The Russian leadership, behind the mask of a hardline speech, seems to be aware of its country’s growing fragility. And both the Russian leadership and elites are fearful of this situation of growing dependence from and reliance on China. It is not surprising that Putin keeps reiterating his readiness for a peace agreement in Ukraine. Moreover, the timing for peace talks is good for Russia given the current military situation on the battle fields.

The Beijing leadership, although certainly pleased by Russia’s growing reliance on China, seems to have brought into the equation other relevant concerns of China. It is in this light that the statements made by Chinese officials before and on the occasion of the 16-17 May visit to Beijing by the “lao pengyou” (old friend) Putin should be analyzed.

A month before the visit, Feng Yujun – one of China’s leading Russia experts and a professor at Beijing University’s School of International Studies – published in The Economist an article whose title is: “Russia is sure to lose in Ukraine”. It is hardly credible that such an article in a high profile international magazine was published without the express consent of the Chinese authorities, rather it is likely that it was written upon request. Feng Yujun lists 4 reasons why he thinks the Russian Federation will lose to Ukraine: (i) the extraordinary level of resistance and national unity shown by Ukrainians; (ii) the international support for Ukraine, which, though recently falling short of the country’s expectations, remains broad; (iii) the nature of modern warfare, a contest that turns on a combination of industrial might and command, control, communications and intelligence systems; (iv) information as a key factor in decision-making; Putin and his national-security team lack access to accurate intelligence and the system they operate lacks an efficient mechanism for correcting errors, while their Ukrainian counterparts are more flexible and effective. Prof. Feng’s conclusions are also very interesting: (i) Russia will be forced to withdraw from all occupied Ukrainian territories, including Crimea; (ii) Russia’s nuclear capability is no guarantee of success (he gives the example of the US, which left Vietnam, Korea, and Afghanistan with no less nuclear potential); (iii) Kyiv has proven that Moscow is not invincible, so a Korean-type armistice is ruled out; (iv) the war is a turning-point for Russia; it has consigned Putin’s regime to broad international isolation and forced it to deal with difficult domestic political undercurrents – from the rebellion of the Wagner Group to other pockets of the military to ethnic tensions in several Russian regions and the recent terrorist attack in Moscow; all these show that political risk in Russia is very high; (v) after the war, Ukraine will have the chance to join both the EU and NATO, while Russia will be further away from the former Soviet republics because they see Putin’s aggression in Ukraine as a threat to their sovereignty and territorial integrity; (vi) the war has made Europe wake up to the enormous threat that Russia’s military aggression poses to the continent’s security and the international order, bringing post-cold-war EU-Russia détente to an end.

As Prof. Feng points out, the war has highlighted that “China and Russia are very different countries” with increasingly differing objectives in their foreign affairs. “Russia is seeking to subvert the existing international and regional order by means of war,” he writes. “Whereas China wants to resolve disputes peacefully” and without exacerbating the current tensions between China and the West. In the words of Prof. Feng Yujun, “shrewd observers note that China’s stance towards Russia has reverted from the ‘no limits’ stance of early 2022, before the war, to the traditional principles of ‘non-alignment, non-confrontation and non-targeting of third parties’”. And he adds that “no one should doubt China’s desire to end this cruel war through negotiations.” This wish, Prof. Feng says, “shows that China and Russia are very different countries. Russia is seeking to subvert the existing international and regional order by means of war, whereas China wants to resolve disputes peacefully.”

Putin’s recent visit to Beijing was a way for the leaders of China and Russia to show a united front and reiterate their “comprehensive strategic partnership”. Nonetheless, it is especially important to pay attention to a “restrictive meeting” of Xi and Putin in Zhongnanhai (the new Forbidden City, in Beijing), “during which they had in-depth exchanges on strategic issues of common concern”, as written in a statement by China’s state agency Xinhua, posted on the Chinese government’s website. In this “restrictive meeting”, Xinhua reported, “Xi said China supports the convening of an international peace conference recognized by Russia and Ukraine at an appropriate time with equal participation and fair discussion of all options, so as to push for an early political settlement of the Ukraine issue” and that “China stands ready to continue to play a constructive role in this regard.”

The warnings in Prof. Feng Yujun’s article, and the demand for “an early political settlement of the Ukraine issue” constitute an evolution of China’s stance. Europe should use this window of opportunity to join efforts with China to actively promote a ceasefire and realistic peace negotiations, i.e., with both sides at the table.

The most recent trilateral summit held between the Chinese Premier Li Qiang, the South Korean President Yoon Yeok-seol and the Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in Seoul on May 26 was a testimony to the persistence of economic pragmatism in Northeast Asia – a phenomenon pointing to a cautiously optimistic future despite its geopolitical and military tensions involving the power politics of North Korea and the US.

The summit in Seoul was held for the first time after December 2019, which was then followed by the onslaught of Covid-19 and its variants in the entire world. The trilateral summit on May 26 reached some important consensus, one of which is the acceleration of the second stage of the negotiation over Sino-Korean free grade agreement and the other is the continuation of the trilateral dialogue between the three East Asian nations on trade, economic issues and human interactions.

Li Qiang hoped China and South Korea would respect the core interests and concerns of both countries, while being good neighbours at the same time. Moreover, Li added that the logistical supply chains of the two nations can be mutually beneficial and integrated, that economic and trade cooperation can be deepened and broadened, that the Sino-Korean Changchun International Cooperation Demonstration Zone will have its construction process accelerated, and that mutual cooperation in high-end production, new energy, Artificial Intelligence and biochemical and pharmaceutical areas can have stronger collaboration than ever.

President Yoon appealed to Li Qiang for China’s active function in dealing with the nuclear weapons issue on the Korean Peninsula and the North Korean-Russian military cooperation – a point that was clearly far more geopolitical in gesture than having any response from Li Qiang.

Yoon also said that South Korea and China should maintain close cooperation and promote their national development, thereby contributing to world peace and prosperity. South Korea, to Yoon, maintains the one-China principle and is willing to deepen the mutual interests of both countries in the areas of bilateral trade and human interactions.

The South Korean president added that both South Korea and China should initiate talks between their deputy foreign ministers on a whole range of issues, promoting youth and cultural exchanges.

Li Qiang met Samsung Electronics Chairman Lee Jae-yong – their first meeting in 19 years as Li visited Samsung in 2005 when he was an official under party-secretary Xi Jinping in Zhejiang province. During the May 26^th meeting, Lee expressed his gratitude to China’s assistance to Samsung during the COVID-19 period as Beijing at that time allowed charter flights for Samsung employees to travel to China and prevented production termination at Samsung’s semiconductor plant in Xian during the lockdown in the mainland.

Li Qiang told Lee that Samsung’s cooperation with China is an indication of Sino-Korean economic collaboration. Li hoped Samsung would collaborate with the mainland Chinese enterprises in high-end production, digital economy, and Artificial Intelligence, apart from his encouragement of Samsung to deepen and broaden its investment in China.

On the other hand, China and Japan agree to enhance their communications at all levels. Li Qiang told the Japanese side that China expects Japan to deal with the matter of history and the question of Taiwan appropriately so that Sino-Japanese relations can and will be stabilised constructively. On the question of the polluted waters resulting from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, Li Qiang appealed to the Japanese side that it should fulfil its responsibilities and obligations, because the release of the wastewater bears on the health of the humanity.

In fact, Kishida and the Chinese President, Xi Jinping, had already agreed in November last year to resolve the treated water dispute through consultative dialogue.

In his meeting with Li Qiang, Kishida appealed to the Chinese side to lift an import ban that China imposed on the Japanese marine products starting from August 2023.

Kishida added that a constructive and stable relationship is beneficial to not only both Japan and China but also the world. He expressed his hope that both sides should conduct high-level dialogue over economic and trade issues as well as cultural and human interactions.

Yoon and Kishida discussed how South Korea and Japan can and will deepen cooperation in 2025, which will mark the 60^th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Both nations perceive North Korea as a military threat, trying to resist and check against Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons study and development. South Korea and Japan have a common interest in witnessing the process of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. They expressed their common concern about the support of Russia, and China, for North Korea. Japan remains unhappy with how North Korea handles the allegedly kidnapped Japanese. Both Yoon and Kishida agreed with the necessity of cooperating with the US.

In early May, Kishida reiterated his hope that a summit with North Korea could and would be held, with the support of the international community, including the US. Yet, Pyongyang turned down the proposal, saying that North Korea “has nothing to solve as regards the ‘abduction issue’ insisted by Japan.” In 2002, North Korea reportedly admitted that it had sent agents to abduct 13 Japanese in the 1970s and 1980s. The Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi paid a visit to Pyongyang in 2002 and met Kim Jong-il at that time, followed by the release and return of five Japanese from North Korea. But diplomatic deadlock returned to the two countries after Tokyo criticised Pyongyang for not coming clean about the abducted victims.

Analytically speaking, the trilateral summit is beneficial to the peaceful relations between China, South Korea and Japan, particularly as the three nations are adopting the ideology of economic pragmatism while putting aside their different political interests and agendas.

Still, political differences remain an obstacle to a closer relationship between the three nations. While Japan and South Korea are necessarily pro-US, China remains defiant in the face of its perceived US hegemony. As such, the question of North Korea comes in; Pyongyang is perceived as a military threat by both South Korea and Japan, which then have to rely on the US to check and balance North Korea. Recently, it has been reported that a large batch of Russian engineers went to Pyongyang to assist North Korea in dealing with the launch of the detection satellites. In November 2023, North Korea launched the first military detection satellite into space, and it is planning to launch three more in the year 2024.

The China-Japan-South Korea Free Trade Agreement negotiations are perhaps the most important breakthrough in the trilateral summit on May 26. In their Joint Declaration, the three countries emphasised the importance of ensuring transparent, smooth, and effective implementation of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership as a foundation element for the China-Japan-South Korea free trade agreement. They are also committed to continuing discussions on how negotiations can be speeded up so that the free trade agreement would be free, fair, high-level, reciprocal, and uniquely valuable.

According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, the industrial chains of China, Japan and South Korea are highly interconnected, and as such, a free trade agreement between the three countries will expand market openness, reduce trade barriers, enhance trade and investment, and optimise the business environment. At a time when China has been emphasising the liberalisation of the economic and trade atmosphere in the world, and at a time when the US has become fa more self-protective than ever before, any free trade agreement between Beijing, Tokyo and Seoul would likely become a challenge to the US economic influence in Northeast Asia.

Most importantly, any free trade agreement between China, Japan and South Korea will likely be beneficial to the liberalization of the economy and society in North Korea. In this connection, China’s role as a middleman will remain crucial, especially as South Korea expects China to play a more active and assertive role in convincing and influencing North Korea toward the directions of denuclearization and economic liberalisation.

In conclusion, economic pragmatism prevails in the trilateral economic summit between China, Japan, and South Korea. Although China has different political positions and interests compared with Japan and South Korea, the summit was productive, healthy, and constructive, as they all focused on the need to deepen economic cooperation and human interactions – a precondition for peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia. Most importantly, their intention of deepening and accelerating the discussion of a free trade agreement is a significant move – a direction of persistent economic pragmatism amid geopolitical tensions and a shrewd move in the liberalisation of Northeast Asian regional political economy that will perhaps hopefully and slowly open up North Korea and propel Pyongyang to the path of further economic liberalisation, if not necessarily denuclearization.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

The most spoken language in the southern hemisphere? Portuguese. The most spoken language in the northern hemisphere? Chinese. Where do these two languages meet? Macau.

What to make of this? First, Macau is an interface. It is a mirror in which we touch and break on through to the other side. Second, Macau should be also a meeting ground. That is to say, it cannot simply be a commuter’s hall or a site of passage. In order to be a force multiplier, Macau must be a convergent place offering positive and endogenous reasons to stay. Third, and above all, Macau must be Macau. For Macau to work for its citizens, to serve China and to be useful for the Portuguese-speaking community it must preserve its distinct features. 

Indeed, those that speak or understand the Chinese and Portuguese languages amount to 20% of the world’s population. Theres is a clear-cut implication: in a complex and dynamic world, the relations between these two worlds do matter. These relations must nurtured and productively managed. 

The Forum for Economic and Trade Co-operation between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries, also known as Macau Forum, is now over its 20^th anniversary. On China’s initiative, this is the organisational vehicle to establish Macau as an effective platform for the mutual benefit of 10 countries and the networks they project in other geographies.

In 2016, the time in which the previous inter-ministerial meeting was held (the one for 2019 was delayed, only to be blocked by Covid), there were a number of ideas in the air, mostly having to do with tourism and cultural interchanges. But the recent wind is fresher. 

In late 2023, on the occasion of the high-level seminar celebrating the Forum’s existence, there were a number of interesting statements. First, Ji Xianzheng, the Secretary-General of the Forum, underlined that the Forum is even more important in turbulent times in which historical turns are happening very fast. Second, Fan Shijie, the Director-General of the Department of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau Affairs, emphasised the need to take full advantage of the administrative region for goals of common development. Third, Rodrigo Brum, which in the meantime would become the head of the Portuguese-Speaking Countries Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Greater-Bay Area (GBA), would hint that cooperation must now effectively become fruitful for business and techno-economic added-value activities.

In fact, there is a case to be made that Macau is a unique combination of tangible and intangible assets. Yes, it’s location and heritage are outstanding physical tokens. But, it is even more compelling for the future to note that Macau motivates many meetings of minds since it is an interesting and inspirational place for many flows of peoples and ideas. And now the In-depth Co-operation Zone in Hengqin (Ilha da Montanha) seems for now the promise of a new vortex for innovation at the epicentre of it all.

The author is coordinator of the course “Research, Innovation and Global Trends” course in the Masters on Innovation and Research for Sustainability, ISEG/University of Lisbon

經濟學家   José Luís de Sales Marques 

備受期待的中國—葡語國家經貿合作論壇（澳門）第六屆部長級會議於4月21-23日在澳門召開，匯聚了來自十個成員國的政要代表和業界重量級人物。中共中央政治局委員、全國人大常委會副委員長李鴻忠和國家商務部部長王文濤出席了會議。王部長在開幕致辭時表示，中葡論壇已經發展至新階段，其取得的一系列豐碩成果將為未來合作謀劃新思路、作出新規劃；論壇以語言文化為紐帶，以經貿合作為主題，以共同發展為目標，將開啓新的時代。 

本屆部長級會議主要活動包括《經貿合作行動綱領（2024—2027）》（下稱《行動綱領》）簽署儀式和中國—葡語國家企業家大會等。新的三年《行動綱領》經部長級會議多邊決策機制審批通過並由中葡論壇（澳門）常設秘書處秘書長季先峥宣佈。文件提出了涵蓋六大方面共20條舉措，旨在深化中葡經貿合作。結合響應聯合國可持續發展目標的宗旨、推進中國與葡語國家建立藍色夥伴關係，《行動綱領》還提出了多個合作新亮點，例如數字經濟、氣候變化和能源轉型、亞非發展等。 

澳門的平台角色亦得到了鞏固和提升，論壇全體成員重申支持特區作為大灣區中心城市的地位，推進中國與葡語國家經貿關係發展。 

然而，《行動綱領》涉及中小企業的具體内容仍非常少，僅籠統地表示透過論壇機制吸引並為這些企業架設橋梁，當中以孵化、合作和促進葡語新創企業為重點。值得留意的是，葡萄牙駐論壇代表、葡萄牙經濟部部長佩德羅．雷斯（Pedro Reis）和巴西創業、微型企業和小型企業部常務副部長塔德烏．阿倫卡爾（Francisco Tadeu Barbosa de Alencar）均認爲，論壇應更加關注那些佔經濟產業結構95%、佔GDP增加值50%以上的企業。這些也是工商界重要人士關心的問題，事實上，文件提出的內容未有對論壇現行框架和與中小企業的關係提供太大的助力。 

儘管如此，對於一般企業而言，新《行動綱領》創造了更廣泛的機會。根據其實施情況，中小企也能從中獲得發展機遇。在很大程度上，中小企的成長依賴有利的商業環境，因這些環境讓企業能夠更自在地向前推進且能最大限度地降低交易成本，從而取得成功。在恰當時機建立關係、得以輕鬆地獲取資訊，均發揮至關重要的作用。官僚機構必須精簡至其根本，中葡論壇和貿促局提供的市場准入、關稅減免、商業法規、投資機會和法律事務的線上和線下資訊和諮詢服務可謂缺一不可，培訓項目亦然。中葡合作发展基金必須滿足中小企需求，擔保基金則必須為中小企提供保障。出席論壇的葡語國家代表亦借此機會到訪大灣區，他們一致呼籲當局在出入境方面推行免簽等便利政策，並為企業進駐澳門提供協助。 

總而言之，中葡論壇未來三年的《行動綱領》包含了與聯合國可持續發展目標一致的強而有力的發展議程。新措施允許廣大企業、特別是中小企業，作為更強大的持份者參與這項倡議，期望此舉將創造更令人滿意的成果，並將該倡議定位為多邊合作的新範式。 

郭逸熙 

MdME律師事務所合夥人  

helena.kok@mdme.com  

在現代社會，工人成立工會已是司空見慣。多項研究發現，工會在經濟中扮演重要角色，因為其能促進僱員和僱主之間的和諧討論，改善工作條件，提高僱員福祉和生產力，從而積極提高社會整體經濟的充足性。 

不管您是否同意，澳門在落實公民結社自由方面剛剛邁出了一步。 

保護工人自由結社權被國際勞工組織認定為工作的基本原則和權利之一，過去20年來這話題一直是澳門立法會爭論的焦點。早前，第6/2024號法律獲立法會通過，成爲本地第一部《工會法》。該法規範了工會的組成、活動，以及其權利與義務。 

該法將於2025年3月31日全面生效，部分關於過渡安排的規定則於2025年1月1 日生效。以下是澳門《工會法》的若干要點：

會員 

根據該法，工會會員必須年滿十六歲，且須為受僱於澳門特別行政區的僱主實體。 後者的例外情況應由勞工事務局以特別許可。 

工會會員人數最少為7人。對於加入工會後不再具備上述僱員身份的會員，可繼續保留其會員資格，但不享有投票權，也不能擔任任何工會職務。 

職權 

根據該法，工會具有下列職權： 

• 代表會員處理和協商其個人勞資糾紛或爭議事宜，但屬法律另有規定者除外； 
• 就勞動條件和職業安全健康等事宜代表會員向僱主發表意見； 
• 就勞動範疇的立法事宜發表意見； 
• 提供促進就業的輔助措施； 
• 舉辦職業培訓； 
• 提供社會服務； 
• 行使依法獲賦予的其他職權。 

加入澳門特別行政區以外設立的組織或團體 

為落實澳門《基本法》規定的結社自由權，工會可加入與澳門特區以外的組織。然而，若該組織不具備勞工事務性質時，須事先取得行政長官許可才可加入。 

工會活動之限制 

工會在執行職能和開展活動時，不得危害澳門特別行政區的公共秩序及衛生，亦不得影響社會基本運作所需的公共服務，以及其他不可缺少的緊急服務的持續和有效運作。 

保障 

該法明確禁止任何人妨礙或限制他人加入或退出工會，又或參加或不參加工會活動，禁止僱主因僱員與工會的關係而作出解僱、降職、調職、降低報酬或其他損害僱員的行為。此外，任何僱主亦不得以求職者加入或退出工會，又或參加工會活動與否作為聘用條件或給予優惠的條件。 

違反有關規定者，就案件中每一人士計算，可被處以澳門幣 20,000 至 50,000元的罰款。 

除了《澳門勞動關係法》所列之合理缺勤之外，僱員作為工會機關據位人因從事領導活動而缺勤，視為合理缺勤，且每曆年最多六個工作日，並以每月缺勤最多一個工作日為限。僱員須至少提前三日通知僱主有關合理缺勤並提交證明。 

工會聯合會 

考慮到澳門現有的社團結構和組成，該法規定至少兩個已登記的工會或工會聯合會可組成“工會聯合會”。 

作為賦予工會聯合會的特殊權限，行政長官得委任工會聯合會的代表擔任勞動方代表參與公共勞工政策的諮詢會議和討論。 

法律地位和過渡性規定 

工會及工會聯合會向勞工事務局申請並獲登記後即取得法律人格。 

該法頒布之前成立的現有組織，即根據第2/99/M號法律《結社權規範》成立的協會，經會員大會通過決議並滿足相關要求後，可依法申請轉為工會或工會聯合會。有關申請必須在2025年1月1日至2027年12月31日期間向勞工事務局提出。 

該法還欠缺了什麼？ 

當有部分人為著勝利歡呼喝彩時；也有人意識到自己未免歡欣過早，誤把還未孵化的小鷄認定為囊中物。《工會法》似乎仍有未盡事宜，集體談判權無影；罷工權無蹤。只要翻看法案的首份諮詢文件，人們不難發現集體談判這項其實是被妥妥地納入公衆咨詢範圍的；而罷工權是明顯的“缺席”狀態。 

對於罷工權，我本人同意這是一個社會敏感話題，因此需要專門的貴賓級待遇，但是我認爲集體談判權卻是能夠在該法律中得到更妥善的處理。所謂在“個人”勞工糾紛中代表“個別”僱員“的職權，實際上與“集體”談判相去甚遠。請留意該法並沒有授權工會在勞資糾紛案中作出決定或處罰違反勞動法的的權力，對於像我這樣熟悉正常程序的人來説，這點並不出奇，。如果勞工事務局的“權限”不變，還不時在勞資糾紛中擔任調解人角色，那麽工會被賦予代表個別僱員的“職權”便意味著僱主方現在必須與多一層中間人打交道。但現狀是，這個代表任務可以由現有的勞工協會擔起（這些協會甚至可以根據《勞動訴訟法》在法庭上代表集體利益！）； 或執業律師；甚至是任何擁有有效授權書的人。當然我願意相信，工會在代表個別僱員處理或談判與勞動相關的糾紛和問題方面較現狀更具優勢，否則，對我來說，這種職權更多地是賦予工會的一項任務，以減輕勞工事務局的工作量，而他們一直以來也把工作做得很好！ 

歸根結底，這部法律是社會共識的成果，是經過公眾諮詢、議員、政府和多個代表社會利益的職能委員會深入討論才達成，是自2021年以來努力的成果。 

如果立法機制的代表性不容置疑，那麽對於“未孵化的小鷄”這個謎團，我給出的唯一解釋，就是我們的社會承受力就這麽多，只能量力而爲。結束長達20年的分歧已然是一項重大成就，就讓我們放慢腳步，享受這份成就，並期待未來的發展。 

文：Keith Morrison | 作家及教育家

澳門住宅價格指數（RPI，即住宅價格變動的概括指標）的年度跌幅幾乎沒有減弱的跡象。疫情爆發前樓價暴漲的日子已一去不復返了。2022年11月至2023年1月，整體RPI按年萎縮7.4%；2023年11月至2024年1月的年度跌幅為5.6%（在編寫本報告時的最新數據）。與此同時，澳門半島錄得的跌幅分別為7.7%及5.2%； 路氹跌幅分別為 6.3% 及 7.4%。整體數據呈顯著下降。人們或會認為這對置業人士來說屬利好消息，然而，事實真的如此嗎？ 

事實非如此。對於澳門成千上萬的潛在業主而言，這依然無法令人感到安心。為什麼？ 因為樓價之高仍令人望而卻步。在確實買不起的情況下，無論這個單位是600萬，還是1,600萬，其實都不存在，加上這兩個價格都超出了許多本地居民的承受能力。澳門 2024 年 3 月的房價收入比被全球大型資料庫網站Numbeo評為“非常高”。 

解決方案不僅僅是增加住宅單位的供應量。相反，對住宅物業階梯上的新手們來說，可負擔、可用，且在適當的價格範圍內才是重中之重。解決辦法亦不複雜，經濟學101：供給與需求。推出人們可負擔物業的問題將繼續困擾住宅市場。如本文圖片所示，澳門人口的持續增長繼續超過空置單位的數量。 

過去十年的城市人口數字與空置單位之間的相關性甚微（統計專家們認為該數據為32%），當中還涉及其他諸多因素，例如為澳門居民尋找合適的住宅物業。然而，28歲至 34歲年齡層（115,000 人）、正舉步踏上住宅物業階梯的居民仍受困其中，不得解脫。他們似乎無望實現購置物業的夢想，只能一年又一年地支付屋租，滿足出租人無休止的慾望。這個年齡層的承租人無力籌集到足夠的資金支付購置物業所需的首期，除非和其他地方的年輕人一樣，向家庭成員（通常是父母）索取。 

這麼說吧：如果你擔任高級職位（行政人員、經理或專業人士）、或技術人員，即佔就業居民人口34％的那一群，那麼你的月入中位數（澳門幣27,000元或以上）則有機會進入住宅市場，開啟物業進階旅程。但25歲至34歲的組別當中（目前有75,000人，即本地就業人口的26%）有多少人擁有這樣的工作和薪酬呢？在澳門，共有187,800人（佔本地就業人口的66%）的月入中位數低於20,000元；他們怎麼會有足夠的錢財購置住宅物業？答案是：他們沒有。 

對廉價、可負擔的住宅需求是巨大的。儘管心懷善意的澳門政府正透過推行一系列措施，致力解決這一問題，但28歲至34歲組別的居民仍然覺得負擔不起。RPI的下跌對低收入者來說幾乎是無關痛癢，業主和出租人繼續貪婪地從他們手中搜刮金錢，不願降低價格。本地低收入階層負擔得起且經濟實惠的空置單位在何處？ 

為何市場上的可負擔住宅單位供應仍不足以滿足數量龐大的本地就業人口購買？仍無法讓他們安居樂業？對於一座自詡重視安全的城市而言，有何安居保障？也許這裡所談的保障更偏向人們無能為力的，而不是在澳門能夠做到的。 

資料來源：澳門統計暨普查局（最新可用數據） 

《商訊》2024年5月號 | 文：甄慶悅 – 資深傳媒人

特區政府擬五月調整第二階段人才引進計劃，讓在澳門高校就讀的非本地學生精英留澳，消息引來不少討論 ，不少人質疑計劃的目的、目標及成效。事實執筆時，特區政府仍未公佈詳情，不知政府想點？ 

「搶人才」這口號近一兩年突然在港澳社會響起，人才流失的香港更快馬加鞭，港府去年10月成立香港人才服務辦公室，又新推「高才通」等引才計劃，截至2023年12月底，各項人才輸入計劃收過22.4萬宗申請，接近2022年的四倍，當中逾九萬人已抵港，遠超港府每年至少引入3.5萬名人才的目標，儘管大部份為内地同胞 。澳門特區政府有著差不多動作，幾年前已成立「人才辦」，但2023年下半年才能推出人才引進計劃，按官方公佈，截至2024年4月8日，共收到1,137宗有效申請，包括頂尖產業領軍人物、科學院和工程院院士、國內外知名企業的核心管理人員和創辦人，以及本地高校和重點產業的專業人員等。至今獲納入建議引進人才名單的共有282人，包括高端人才21名、優秀人才65名及高級專業人才196名；隨行家團方面，共有429人，其中124名配偶擁碩士或以上學位。隨著審批程序推進，2023年計劃的引進人數將陸續增加，最終獲批數據於審批程序結束後公佈。 

澳門特區政府說，滿意首階段的招才計劃成績，但只一千多宗申請比筆者以至社會的預期要少得多，間接說明澳門沒太大吸引力，這點只要稍為熟悉澳門社經發展者應心中有數，故對政府擬推出的新引入計劃甚有保留，問題多籮籮，第一法律問題，《人才引進法律制度》入門級的「高級專業人才」是「能支持重點產業發展，且屬緊缺並具專業經驗及技術能力的人士」試問一個剛畢業的大學生，何來具專業經驗及技術能力？還是繞過法律，另闢一條路給他們？第二是，就讀與「１＋４」產業發展相關的二十多個學系到底是什麼學系？第三，平均學分績點（GPA）至少達3.6以上是什麼理據？第四，政府初步評估每年合資格的非本地優秀學生不超過二百人是否真實、低估？以上特區政府一直沒詳細說明，公眾無信心在情理之中。何況傳統智慧告訴我們，讀書叻只是讀書叻，讀書叻不一定是人才，讀書叻不一定能成功，澳門的高等院校實力更非世界一流，GPA超過3.6又如何？若是真人才，澳門企業要留住他有法定途徑。 

澳門並非排斥外地人才，也不能故歩自封，或將全部資源押在博彩、旅遊之上，拓展其他産業是必行之路，而真人才從來是稀缺品，每個國家、城市都想要，競爭相當大，但從來人才匯聚的地方，都能予人有更好的發展機會及更好的生活，至少也得有憧憬，而不是一張身份證，衝著這而來的好打有限；若然是真人才，人來了卻缺乏産業基礎以及發揮機會，得人無所用，也是徒然。澳門地方少，無天然資源，産業單一，圈子甚窄難以突破，自身的先天局限已經夠大，若想開拓發展空間必須從制度及人民質素方面著手，可惜特區政府至今的思維依然保守，視野差跟不上時代，政策制定能力及行政效率均低，營商環境十年如一日，什麼「1＋4」基礎薄弱兼紙上談兵。更甚者，特區政府還「夾硬」要求財雄勢大的博企插足舊區活化，大搞體育、演藝等非博彩元素，博企應酬式難有效果，又間接排除其他公司的入場機會，人為製造壟斷，點搞？ 

而更深層次的問題在於，澳門一直是個折磨叻人的地方，不尊重人才尤其自己人，至近年才在建築、醫療、社工等少數領域，建立了專業認證等相關制度，其他大部份領域則欠奉；而就算有制度，時而也會百般刁難。總之在澳門，越有主見、越有想法，越是有志不能伸。相反，唯唯諾諾、埋堆擦鞋更容易上位，在事事唯上、政治正確、不鼓勵不同意見及創新文化之下，連出外讀書的澳門學生都不願回澳，想吸引外地人更難。 

馬斯克帶Tesla到上海開廠，繼而帶動全國電動車的事，這種機遇難再，也難望在澳門發生，特區政府及社會不應有無謂的幻想，特區政府現在要做的是腳踏實地，制訂産業政策並加以推動，建立不同領域的專業資格制度，以提升澳門人的專業能力，提升公共行政效率，修改過時法律，做好營商環境，令産業更有條件形成，始終有産業才能有人才、人才才能發揮作用，否則派了身份證，人家來不來都成問題。 

By José Pinto

Assistant Professor, City University of Macau

What if visitors to Macau had a way to truly immerse themselves in the diverse local culture beyond just seeing the major tourist attractions? How could they gain an authentic window into the city’s rich traditions, vibrant neighbourhoods, and genuine lifestyles?

How might a programme that facilitates one-on-one interactions with local residents help address overcrowding issues at iconic sites?

And what benefits could it provide in terms of sustainable tourism practices and an image of authenticity?

Beyond just economic impacts, what potential societal benefits could a “rent-a-local” model provide for Macau residents themselves?

How could it create purpose, income opportunities, and avenues to celebrate local cultural identities?

With global travel becoming increasingly experiential, how could enabling these types of hyper-personalised, transformative cultural exchanges position Macau to capitalise on rising demands for authentic travel, namely, increasing their stay in Macau?

One potential concept that has emerged is the “rent-a-local” trend.

The hypothetical idea allows visitors to hire temporary local friends, family members, or guides to serve as personal cultural ambassadors during their stay.

This facilitates one-on-one interactions that could not only provide authentic cultural immersion but also help address overcrowding at iconic sites by dispersing visitors into other residential areas. Rather than relying on static tours, these personal human connections allow curiosity to flow both ways, creating opportunities for mutual learning and understanding (and co-creating).

Such a model could provide significant benefits beyond just economic impacts. For destinations like Macau, it presents potential solutions to pressing societal challenges. Retirees, many of whom face boredom and lack of purpose in their golden years, could find newfound value and engagement by sharing their lifetime of cultural wisdom as guides. This increased sense of usefulness can provide mental and emotional reinvigoration. 

Consider Mrs. Lai, a warm and spritely 70-year-old retired school teacher born and raised in Macau. After decades spent educating generations of children, her retirement initially felt aimless. The structure and sense of purpose she derived from shaping young minds was gone. Though financially stable, Mrs. Lai struggled with boredom and a lack of meaningful engagement as the days felt increasingly long and empty.

However, through Macau’s rent-a-local programme, Mrs. Lai found a rewarding new purpose in sharing her lifetime of cultural wisdom and personal anecdotes with visiting families. Suddenly, her unparalleled knowledge of Macau’s traditions, historic neighbourhoods, and childhood games became a valuable asset again. Tourists clamoured for her services as the archetypal “rented auntie” to provide cultural context and oversee immersive, memorable experiences.

On any given day, Mrs. Lai could be found leading multigenerational families around the winding alleyways of the Inner Harbour district. She delighted in sharing the significance of neighborhood temples, introducing visitors to her favorite past bakeries still making iconic Portuguese egg tarts, and teaching young visitors traditional children’s rhymes in Cantonese. Her eyes danced with youthful joy as she observed kids learning cultural nuances firsthand.

The meaningful work provided Mrs. Lai with independence, engagement, and a renewed zest for life. Imparting her cultural expertise and seeing it enrich others’ travels filled her with immense pride and satisfaction. The reasonable supplemental income was welcome, but it was the sense of usefulness and community connection that truly reinvigorated her golden years.

From a woman at risk of festering loneliness, Mrs. Lai experienced an incredible mental and emotional uplift. Her days now brimmed with social fulfilment as an honoured custodian of Macau’s intangible cultural heritage. The rent-a-local programme provided an invaluable outlet to apply her wealth of knowledge, combat isolation, and find new purpose sharing the city’s treasures she held so dear.

Additionally, underemployed individuals or those struggling to make ends meet could monetize their inherent local knowledge as a supplemental income stream through the rent-a-local program. The flexible earning opportunities allow residents to derive income from their city familiarity without the constraints of rigid schedules. 

Miguel was a 28-year-old artist and part-time barista struggling to make ends meet in Macau. Despite his passion for the local arts and culture scene, he found himself working long hours slinging coffee just to afford the city’s high cost of living. Miguel’s true callings – creating vibrant graphic art pieces and immersing himself in Macau’s underground creative communities – constantly took a backseat to the grind of making rent.

That’s when he discovered the rent-a-local programme and its flexible earning potential. Miguel’s deep-rooted familiarity with Macau’s cutting-edge street art, music venues, galleries, and trendy enclaves meant he could monetize that indigenous knowledge flexibly on his own terms. He signed up to provide personalized tours catering to overty millennials, students, and culture enthusiasts seeking an authentic taste of the city’s gritty artistic underbelly.

On days off from the cafe or after evening shifts, Miguel would guide small groups from all over the world through Macau’s kaleidoscope of creative subcultures. One day, you might find him taking visitors to an edgy live music haunt or explaining the symbolic meanings behind bold new murals in the street art district. Next, he could be sneaker shopping at a prized vintage boutique or sampling daring fusion fare from an up-and-coming foodie hotspot.

Miguel’s unparalleled street cred as an embedded creative made him a sought-after rent-a-local guide. Visitors relished his passion, insights, and behind-the-scenes access into Macau’s boundary-pushing arts movements. They walked away feeling like they experienced slices of the city most tourists never see.

The supplemental income stream from tours allowed Miguel to pursue his creative endeavours with greater financial freedom. The flexible schedule meant he could monetize his expertise around his unpredictable day job rather than adhere to rigid shifts that risked stunting his artistic growth.

What had previously felt like a striving struggle soon blossomed into sustainable self-actualization thanks to rent-a-local. Miguel gained not just financial stability from sharing his cultural know-how but a profound sense of pride and urbanity – all without sacrificing his artistic identity. The program unlocked his inherent real-world knowledge as a modern-day resource.

This creates new pathways towards financial stability and entrepreneurship. Even working professionals in Macau may find the ability to earn disposable income by sharing their city passions on a flexible schedule to be an attractive prospect. The extra income could improve standards of living and work-life balance. Ultimately, by incentivizing residents across ages and socioeconomic levels to celebrate their multifaceted cultural identities as ambassadors, the programme fosters civic pride.

With global travel becoming increasingly experience-driven and demanding authenticity, enabling these types of hyper-personalised, transformative cultural exchanges through a “rent-a-local” programme could position Macau to capitalise on rising demands. It offers a distinct advantage over conventional tours by unlocking the true soul of the destination through meaningful person-to-person encounters, as one hypothetical resident observes.

Pioneering such a hyper-customised model would allow Macau to simultaneously mitigate over-tourism while enriching visitor experiences and addressing key societal needs – making travel more impactful and sustainable on both sides. This directly aligns with recent central government directives for Macau to diversify beyond its longtime gaming focus and develop as a world-class tourism and leisure destination, highlighting its East-meets-West cultural heritage.

By dispersing visitors into local neighbourhoods, reducing mobility stresses on iconic areas, and incentivizing residents’ roles as cultural ambassadors, the rent-a-local concept could reduce over-tourism strains. It celebrates Macau’s unique multicultural identity, born from its history as a European colonial outpost in China – the exact blend the central government aims to showcase.

Deepa Alex Mora

Member

Macau Institute for Corporate Social Responsibility in Greater China (MICSRGC)

As Macau gears up to welcome over 39 million visitors in 2024, its thriving tourism industry faces a hidden challenge: a mounting waste problem. In 2019 alone, the city generated a staggering 550,249 tons of waste. But what if this wasn’t just a burden, but a hidden treasure trove waiting to be unlocked? Waste upcycling presents a significant opportunity for Macau to redefine its commitment to sustainability and innovation, transforming its waste into valuable resources and creating significant economic opportunities, while aligning with global initiatives like the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and promoting a circular economy.

Waste Upcycling: Breathing New Life into Discarded Materials

Imagine a future where the 37% of Macau’s waste stream, composed of food scraps, is reborn as clean energy, bioplastic, or high-value bioproducts, while textile waste from hotels is upcycled into stylish, eco-friendly fashion accessories and home decor, reflecting the unique blend of cultures that define Macau. Discarded playing cards from casinos, emblematic of Macau’s vibrancy, can be reinvented as sustainable construction materials, and used cooking oil from restaurants is transformed into biodiesel for energy, or biosurfactant for use in eco-friendly cleaning solutions. This isn’t science fiction; it’s the transformative power of upcycling, turning waste into valuable resources and minimizing environmental impact, all while showcasing Macau’s creativity and innovation.

Cities like Amsterdam and San Francisco are paving the way for a circular economy. Boasting a staggering 53% waste diversion rate, Amsterdam utilizes innovative sorting and upcycling facilities that breathe new life into everyday waste, transforming it into valuable resources like bioplastics, textiles, and even furniture. San Francisco takes a different but equally effective approach, actively promoting upcycling through collaborations with local artists, designers, and businesses. With its unique infrastructure and unwavering focus on innovation, Macau has the potential to become a frontrunner in waste upcycling innovation.

Macau’s Compact Catalyst: A Springboard for Upcycling Innovation

Unlike sprawling cities with vast landfills or land-rich areas that rely on composting, Macau faces a unique challenge. Its limited land area restricts traditional waste management methods like large-scale composting. But here’s the beauty: this very limitation presents a remarkable opportunity to become a global leader in waste upcycling innovation. With the waste export ban to mainland China and the anticipated tourist surge, Macau needs creative solutions.

Macau’s compactness presents a unique catalyst for upcycling. Envision waste traveling short distances for innovative processing, minimizing transportation emissions and maximizing resource recovery. Macau’s concentrated infrastructure can foster close collaboration between stakeholders, accelerating upcycling research, development, and implementation. This compact environment becomes a breeding ground for ground-breaking solutions, propelling Macau to the forefront of the global upcycling movement.

Macau’s government holds the key to unlocking the full potential of its waste stream through accelerated upcycling innovation. Grant programs dedicated to upcycling research and development would be a powerful driver. Imagine research grants fueling projects that transform Macau’s abundant seafood waste into bioplastics, offering a sustainable alternative to traditional packaging, or the development of innovative construction materials made from single-use plastic waste. Cutting-edge advancements in biotechnology, synthetic biology, material engineering, artificial intelligence, and sustainable technologies hold immense promise for upcycling waste into valuable resources.

Biotechnology and synthetic biology, in particular, offer promising avenues for transforming waste into biofuels, biodegradable packaging, value-added consumer products, eco-friendly construction materials, and even precious metals from electronic waste. By harnessing the power of microorganisms and engineering biological systems, we unlock the potential of waste, turning it from a burden into a source of innovation and value creation.

Macau’s universities, with their emphasis on science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) subjects, provide a strong foundation for upcycling innovation. This focus equips graduates with the skills to develop solutions for transforming waste into valuable resources. Picture bustling labs where young minds develop methods to transform used cooking oils into biofuels, or crafting biodegradable IoT sensors from upcycled materials! Entrepreneurs are the catalysts, fostering economic diversification by developing innovative “waste-to-product” solutions.

Collaboration between all stakeholders creates a robust ecosystem for upcycling innovation. By embracing upcycling, Macau can not only tackle its waste challenge but also create a thriving green economy, positioning itself as a sustainable tourism leader on the world stage.

A Sustainable Legacy: Integrating CSR and Upcycling for Macau’s Future

Upcycling creates a ripple effect of positive benefits for Macau. Upcycling initiatives naturally raise public awareness about responsible waste management, contributing to a cultural shift towards a more sustainable future. When young people are involved in upcycling projects, they gain valuable skills for building a greener future. Upcycling fosters an environment where creativity flourishes, empowering entrepreneurs to develop innovative “waste-to-product” solutions and build sustainable businesses.

Many Integrated Resorts (IRs) in Macau have already taken significant steps towards responsible waste management, focusing on practices such as reduction and reuse, which underscore their ongoing commitment to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). However, as they continue to pursue sustainability goals, there’s an exciting opportunity for these resorts to further distinguish themselves as leaders in CSR through upcycling. Consider the possibilities: discarded carpets from routine refurbishments, cardboard packaging, and even playing cards repurposed into innovative construction elements for future projects. By embracing upcycling initiatives, these resorts can significantly contribute to Macau’s reputation for sustainable tourism practices. Such initiatives are likely to resonate with environmentally conscious travelers seeking destinations that prioritize sustainability. Moreover, upcycling initiatives addressing the IRs’ specific waste challenges hold immense potential for uncovering innovative solutions, benefiting both the resorts and the broader goal of advancing sustainability across the region.

Macau’s journey towards a sustainable future hinges on innovation, collaboration, and a commitment to environmental responsibility. As the city embarks on this path, a fascinating question emerges: What potential lies hidden within Macau’s waste streams?  Upcycling initiatives offer a glimpse into a future where these discarded materials are no longer a burden, but a source of endless possibilities.

Judging from the remarks made by the newly sworn-in Taiwan leader William Lai Ching-te on May 20, he touched on the political red lines of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), thereby leading to not only the severe criticisms from mainland authorities but also a two-day military exercise conducted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The ongoing cross-strait tensions remain to be observed carefully, partly because the PLA military exercise sent important warning signals and partly because Taiwan’s legislative politics are pointing in the direction of more political turbulence – signs that will question whether the mainland’s anti-secession law would eventually be invoked in cross-strait relations and politics.

The inaugural speech made by William Lai, who was sworn in as the 16^th “president” of Taiwan carried several characteristics that dangerously touched on the political red lines of the mainland.

His speech first emphasised Taiwan’s third rotation of political parties in power in 2024, with the first rotation taking place in 1996, when Taiwan had the first directly elected president. Yet Lai boasted that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) broke the so-called “illusionary spell” of changing the party in power after eight years of its governance. What he meant was that the DPP succeeded in continuing to govern Taiwan even after eight years of Tsai Ing-wen’s DPP leadership. In a sense, Lai was provocative to the mainland, which has been seeing the DPP regime as not only ignoring the 1992 consensus but also being far more pro-US than the Kuomintang and ignoring the Taiwan model of “one country, two systems.”

Lai then stressed Taiwan as not just “democratic” but also “a bright spot in the world of democracies,” adding that the island is the first Asian “state” allowing for same-sex marriage and that it succeeded in using “democracy” against the onslaught of COVID-19 and its variants.

His boast of Western-style democracy, as opposed to “Chinese democracy” that has been emphasised in the mainland, and his exaggeration of how Taiwan succeeded in repelling the attacks from COVID-19 became another provocative thorn to the mainland.

Lai turned to Taiwan’s strategic positioning in the “first chain of islands,” explicitly saying that Taiwan belongs to a strategic area under the US military protective umbrella—again, a huge provocation to the mainland authorities. Even worse, Lai stressed that the international “consensus” is that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is an “indispensable factor” in global security—a remark putting Taiwan under the rubric of “internationalisation” as opposed to the mainland’s emphasis that the Taiwan issue should not be “internationalised.”

Lai swiftly turned to the US legislation on the provision of military support for Taiwan—again, a clear provocation to the mainland side. He appealed to the PRC for “stopping literary attacks and military intimidation” and “shouldering the global responsibility together with Taiwan” – a double-edged sword that criticised the mainland on the one hand and elevated Taiwan’s status on par with the mainland globally on the other. This move of touching on, and perhaps exceeding, the mainland’s political red lines means that it is not surprising to witness the two-day military exercise of the PLA shortly after Lai delivered his speech.

The rest of Lai’s speech was about how the mainland side should “respect the choice of the Taiwan people,” how the mainland should “replace dialogue with confrontation” (while the mainland has been saying Taiwan should abandon confrontation by accepting the 1992 consensus), and how the mainland and Taiwan can and will become co-prosperous through allowing mainland students to study in Taiwan and through the allowance of “bilateral tourism.” Yet, the PRC has long maintained that the acceptance of the 1992 consensus as a precondition for the relaxation of mutual human exchange and interactions.

Even worse, Lai talked about Taiwan’s attempt at entering the CPTPP and its “united” efforts of protecting “sovereignty” with “non-subservient” relations between the island and the mainland – again a clear provocation to the mainland’s political bottom line.

Some observers have pointed to the fact that William Lam used the term Taiwan 79 times, the Republic of China (ROC) 9 times, and the ROC on Taiwan 3 times, while utilising the name, China, to refer to the mainland 7 times.

The mainland’s State Council Taiwan Affairs Office immediately criticised Lai as “a worker of Taiwan independence,” while Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated that the one-China principle remains the key one stabilizing the future directions of cross-strait relations.

The US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken congratulated William Lai for becoming the Taiwan leader, and he even appealed to the Congress to extend its “invitation” to Lai and deputy Hsiao Bi-khim to visit Washington – a remark provoking the Chinese Foreign Ministry to issue a rebuttal at once, saying that the US side “seriously violating the one-China principle” and the three Sino-US communiques on Taiwan. The Chinese Foreign Ministry added that the Blinken remarks “sent seriously wrong signals” to the Taiwan separatists.

The verbal exchanges between the US side and China clearly demonstrated that Washington has backed up Taiwan’s efforts at “internationalisation” and that the mainland Chinese authorities have regarded such joint US-Taiwan moves as politically unacceptable from the perspective of megaphone diplomacy.

Three days after Lai delivered his speech, the PLA conducted a military exercise, namely Joint Sword-2024A, surrounding the island of Taiwan, mobilising the navy, the air force, and the rocket force. The Eastern Theatre Command led the military exercise in the Taiwan Strait, including Taiwan’s northern, southern, and eastern parts, the Mazu island, Wuqiu, and Dongyin.

For the first time in the mainland’s military exercises, Taiwan’s outlying islands were included. The locations this time were different from the locations of the PLA’s live-fire drills in August 2022, following Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. Altogether, these locations of the mainland military exercises constitute a broad geo-military chain encircling Taiwan, meaning that the mainland military has the capability to impose an economic blockade easily on Taiwan and that it will have the ability to “take back” Taiwan strategically. As Zhang Chi, a professor at the National Defence University in Beijing, said that the PLA could “occupy main passages” and that “there is no longer a so-called blind spot” for PLA strikes from the eastern part of Taiwan. The implication is that Taiwan’s eastern logistical supply routes can be easily blocked by the mainland military.

In response to the mainland military exercise, the Taiwan presidential office expressed its regret, and the US Indo-Pacific Command deputy commander Stephen Sklenka regarded such exercise as “expected.” He appealed to the neighbours of Taiwan to “condemn” the mainland exercise.

Some mainland military strategists observed that the PLA military exercise had three characteristics: (1) the mainland marine police vessels went into the Taiwan waters while the mainland warships and fighter airplanes went near Taiwan to “squeeze” the Taiwan military defence space; (2) the PLA could encircle Taiwan’s outlying islands in the west and demonstrate its striking capability in the eastern part of Taiwan; and (3) the PLA could damage the northern Taiwanese military targets, blockade the naval outlet of Kaohsiung, and cut the external (air and water) supply lines of Taiwan’s Hualien.

The Eastern Theatre Command released a map and posters of six PLA weapons that were deployed in the military exercise, namely J-20 and J-16 fighter aircraft, Type 052D destroyer, Type 071 amphibious transport dock, a Dongfeng series ballistic missile, and PHL-16 Multiple Rocket Launch System (MRLS). A video was released, showing that frigate CNS Nantong was participating in the military drills.

Interestingly, the Eastern Theatre Command issued 3D virtual animations, showing that the PLA missiles could hit three places in Taiwan, namely Taipei, Kaohsiung, and Hualien – a gesture pointing to the ability of the mainland missiles to strike at these Taiwan targets.

In Hualien, ten F16 fighter aircrafts were on high alert with their weapons ready to deal with any possible emergency. At the same time, the US aircraft carrier USS Ronald Regan (CVN-76) was operating in the Philippine Sea when China launched the two-day military exercise encircling Taiwan. The US Navy also conducted bilateral military operations with the Royal Netherlands Navy in the South China Sea – a gesture perhaps coincidentally in response to the Chinese military exercise. The US and Dutch operations involved combat ship USS Mobile (LCS-26), dry cargo ship USNS Wally Schirra (T-AKE-8) and Royal Netherlands Navy frigate HNLMS Tromp (F803).

Amid cross-strait tensions, Taiwan’s legislative politics have gone increasingly contentious. The Kuomintang and the People Party attempted to amend a legislation to allow legislators to summon private individuals and government officials to face legislators’ questions and to penalise them for any “contempt of the legislature” for up to three years in prison. The DPP and critics have argued that the move “violates” the constitutional arrangements, making the legislature a place of “authoritarianism.” Thousands of demonstrators gathered outside the Legislative Assembly on May 21, a situation recalling the so-called Sunflower Movement in 2014, when a free trade agreement between the KMT and the mainland triggered a month-long occupation of the legislature by political opponents and DPP supporters.

The implication here is that Taiwan’s domestic political turbulence is now exacerbated by partisan politics and struggles within the Legislative Assembly – a situation that can be seen as potentially dangerous in cross-strait relations. According to the mainland’s anti-secession law, which was ratified in March 2005, two important provisions could provide the justifications for the PRC intervention in Taiwan’s political turbulence and chaos. Article 8 says that the mainland Chinese state shall use non-peaceful and other necessary means to deal with Taiwan under the condition of Taiwan’s separatist forces “accomplishing the fact” of such “separation,” or of a main event occurring in Taiwan that leads to its “separation” from mainland China, or of a scenario in which all the possibilities of peaceful reunification are lost. Article 9 says that the mainland Chinese state must act to protect the persons and properties of Taiwan’s civilians and foreigners for the sake of minimising their losses. The ambiguous wordings in Articles 8 and 9 can arguably provide for the PLA military intervention in Taiwan if the island has worsening internal political struggles, disturbances, and turbulences.

In conclusion, the ongoing cross-strait tensions illustrate that the highly political, rhetorical and provocative speech made by William Lai not only alienated the mainland authorities but also triggered the PLA military exercise, which unprecedentedly mobilized the marine police to go into the waters near the Taiwan outlying islands, and which demonstrated the PLA capabilities of blockading Taiwan, striking the essential targets and cutting off Taiwan’s external supply lines. Perhaps the megaphone diplomacy conducted simultaneously by the US side triggered the corresponding response from the mainland Chinese side. However, Taiwan’s ongoing internal political struggles inside and outside the Legislative Assembly are showing some signs of deterioration in the coming years, leading to a possible scenario that the 2005 Anti-Secession Law may eventually be applied by the mainland. If so, political rhetoric, megaphone diplomacy, military muscle-flexing actions, and domestic political struggles have become a new chain of political development that heightened the highly unpredictable, oscillating, and unstable cross-strait relations.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

Macau Business | May 2024

Keith Morrison – Author and educationist

The year-on-year drop in Macau’s residential property index (RPI) (a measure of the change in the average price paid by households for residential properties) shows little sign of abating. Gone are the pre-pandemic days of massive residential price increases. From November 2022 to January 2023 the overall RPI fell by 7.4 per cent year on year; from November 2023 to January 2024 it fell by 5.6 per cent year on year (latest figures at the time of writing). For the Macao peninsula, the fall for the same periods was 7.7 per cent and 5.2 per cent respectively; for Taipa/Coloane it was 6.3 per cent and 7.4 per cent respectively. These are significant falls. One would have thought that this was good news for residential property buyers, but is it?

Not much. This is little solace for thousands of would-be residential property owners in Macau. And why? Because such property is still unaffordable for very many people. Whether a property is 6 million MOP or 16 million MOP makes little difference if you cannot afford either, and both are beyond the reach of many of Macau’s citizens. Macau’s property price-to-income ratio for March 2024 was rated as ‘very high’ by Numbeo, one of the world’s largest cost-of-living databases.

The solution is not simply to provide more residential properties. Rather, it depends on what is affordable, available, and in the appropriate price bracket for new starters on the property ladder. It is not rocket science to work this out; Economics 101: supply and demand. Providing affordable residential property for purchase is a problem that will not go away, since, as the graph shows, the ongoing rise in Macau’s population continues to outstrip the number of vacant residential units.

There is only a small correlation between population and vacant residential units in the last ten years (32 per cent for statistics geeks), there being many other factors involved in finding residential property for Macau’s citizens. However, this does little to ease the plight of those in the 28-34 age group (115,000 people), i.e. those seeking to start on the property ladder. They appear to have no hope of ever being able to buy their own property. Rather, they are condemned to paying rent for years with nothing to show for it, whilst filling the pockets of lessors who raise the rent at will. Lessees in this age group are unable to amass sufficient money to pay for the initial deposit on a property, unless, as one sees in other parts of the world, the family members, typically the parents, are the bank.

Put it this way: if you are in a senior position at work (administrator, manager, or professional), or a technician, i.e. 34 per cent of the employed resident population, then your median salary (27,000 MOP and higher) might let you start on the residential property ladder. But how many of those in the 25-34 age group (currently 75,000, i.e. 26 per cent of the resident workforce) are at this level of job and salary? In Macau, 187,800 people (66 per cent of the resident workforce) earn a median monthly salary below 20,000 MOP; how will they ever have enough money to buy their own residential property? Answer: they won’t.

The press for cheap, affordable residential property is immense. Even though the well-intentioned Macau government is taking steps to address this, those in the 28-34 age bracket still find it unaffordable. The drop in the residential property index offers little comfort to those who are on low incomes, so property owners and rentiers continue to leech money from the low paid, greedily reluctant to bring down their prices. Where is the affordable vacant residential property for purchase by the low-paid in Macau?

Why does there continue to be insufficient affordable residential accommodation for so many of Macau’s employed resident population to purchase and, thereby, to live in the security of their own home? What security of accommodation is there in a territory that purports to place such significance on security? Maybe security here is about what you cannot do rather than what you can do in Macau.

Source: DSEC (latest figures available)

José I. Duarte

Economist, Macau Business Senior Analyst

China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) recently (at the end of 2023) published a significant document concerning the development of Hengqin Island. To my knowledge, the document “Hengqin Guangdong-Macau In-Depth Cooperation Zone General Development Plan” is only available in Chinese. 

Hopefully, an official translation will be made available in other languages, as it is of obvious relevance to the many residents in the region who do not master written Chinese, not to mention international businesses that may be interested in the region’s development plans. That issue aside, let us focus on the document’s contents, especially some of the targets (or forecasts?) set therein.

As it is well known, Hengqin Island is one of the critical areas for the development of the designated Greater Bay Area (GBA) and a central element in the policy orientations and actions relating to Macau’s future development. That document quantifies some important targets concerning the number of Macau residents expected to settle or work in Hengqin in the next decade, the subject we will focus on here. 

The population and workforce targets follow a broad calendar that would bring the total number of Macau residents living in Hengqin to 120,000 and the number of workers to 80,000 by 2035. Bearing in mind the average size of families in Macau and the activity rates prevailing in the region, these numbers also imply significant flows of workers shuttling between Macau and Hengqin. However, the basis or rationale for these numbers is not set forward, limiting our ability to comment on their foundations.

Note, however, that in 2022, those two figures stood at 1,300 and 5,400 persons, respectively. In the current year, their numbers should reach five and nine thousand. The figures entail an increase of roughly 6,800 workers and 10,000 residents per year, on average, until 2035. 

The report provides some intermediate targets for 2024 and 2029, chosen for their symbolic nature, as they corresponded to the 25th and 30th anniversary of the Macau SAR. They fit broadly with the average figures indicated above, which suggest an expectation of steady and regular growth in the coming years. 

Let us remove the non-residents from the local population and labour market figures, as they raise separate issues and are indeed not the ‘target’ population expected to move to Hengqin. Then, the people expected to live and work in Hengqin represent no less than 20 percent of the current local population and 25 percent of the corresponding labour force.  Should we consider the growth trends and the age structure of the population and the labour force, the percentages indicated could be even higher.

These numbers are bound to affect Macau’s demography and labour force, if not its social and economic fabric, more generally. This side of the regional development equation has been seldom tackled. 

Notwithstanding the income that the Hengqin island activities may provide to the residents or part of them, such flows are likely to strongly impact most other sectors of activity, namely those that depend mostly on the expenditures of the locals. 

For example, several local small retail businesses (including restaurants and providers of leisure and personal services) are already under stress from the competition brought by external suppliers and the ease with which locals may shop and spend their leisure time across the border. They may find themselves under increased pressure. Also, the housing market will inevitably be affected, as the emigration to Hengqin, in the numbers foreseen, will affect over 40,000 housing units. Even the public purse will not be immune to the tide. 

These issues alone suggest it is probably time to take a broader view of this process in all its dimensions and likely ramifications.

隨著港澳與內地日益融合，近年中央對兩個特區的關注明顯加重，中央派員到兩地考察的次數亦見頻繁，例如中央港澳工作辦公室主任、國務院港澳事務辦公室主任夏寶龍到澳門考察，期間亦傳達了中央對澳門未來發展的期望。 

《商訊》2024年 5月 | 主編前言 – Mandy Kuok

夏寶龍在考察期間指出了澳門的優勢所在，包括“一國兩制”、充足的發展空間、國際化程度高的營商環境、實力雄厚的經濟基礎、中西文化薈萃的人文優勢、愛國愛澳的傳統情感優勢等，這些優勢離不開中央對澳門的大力支持，尤其是發展空間方面，中央多次批准澳門填海造地，明確澳門的海域面積，透過合作區等方式利用橫琴擴大澳門的發展空間，協助解決澳門受地少造成的限制問題。 

夏寶龍亦提出希望澳門在四方面多作貢獻，包括加快推動經濟適度多元發展規劃落地見效；在融入國家發展大局上多作貢獻主動對接粵港澳大灣區、高質量共建“一帶一路”等國家戰略，積極支持特區政府做好橫琴開發；在提升澳門國際影響力多作貢獻，拓寬與歐盟、東南亞國家等聯繫，特別是著力提升中葡商貿合作服務平台的功能，推動中國與葡語國家開展更廣泛更深層次的務實合作；在弘揚愛國愛澳優良傳統上多作貢獻。 

他還提出大家要全力支持行政長官和特區政府依法施政，更好發揮澳門獨特地位和優勢，推動經濟社會高質量發展，齊心協力把澳門國際大都市“金名片”擦得更亮。 

夏寶龍對澳門的期望是符合澳門現狀和未來發展趨勢，其中亦帶著中央對澳門未來發展的規劃，但澳門真的當得起“國際大都市‘金名片’”這個名頭嗎？澳門確是國際城市，但離“大都市”還有不少距離，可以說，除了旅遊業外，澳門要真的成為國際大都市還需要在很多方面努力。 

一直以來，為了推動澳門更好的發展，中央給澳門下達了許多政策措施，問題只是澳門有沒有足夠的能力接好這些政策措施，發揮其帶來的優勢和作用，這便需要澳門具備良好的法制和社會基礎。澳門法制不算完善，尤其世界發展迅速，很多法律都未能與國際接軌，雖然政府及立法會近年已不斷努力修訂或制訂各項法律，但要填補之前的缺失之處，還需再加把勁。 

此外，城市發展離不開“人”，除了專業人才外，為官者的工作能力和態度亦是關鍵。政府政策是依靠主管及領導的決策，亦要依靠各級公務員執行力，各級主管及領導的決策能力是否符合其職位要求？這些官員制訂的政策是否符合社會實際情況？從近年政府不少政策遭人垢病便可見一斑。因此，要擦亮澳門的“金名片”，還需要很大的努力，改變能力不配位，遏止官僚主義，斬斷政績工程，積極招攬專業人才，這張“金名片”才有機會閃亮。 

引用Tomasi de Lampedusa的一句名言：為了有所改變，我們必須讓一切保持原狀。 

《商訊》2024年5月 | 總監之言 – 馬天龍

藉Project Asia Corp.和《Macau Business》迎來20週年之際，我們在本期專題報道中整理了與小城一同見證的20項基本特徵保持不變的變化（要列出另外20項亦非難事）。 

早在2004年5月，《Macau Business》創刊號就已明確指出：“時機已到”，因為我們“正站在經濟革命的大門前”。數天後，即同年同月，澳門博彩業開放後的首家娛樂場——澳門金沙娛樂場開門迎客，昭示著即將發生的變革。儘管如此，這座受博彩業驅動的城市在接下來的數年裡經歷超出所有人預期的飛躍式成長；曾被貶義地形容為“沉睡飛地”的城市變身為金碧輝煌的“亞洲拉斯維加斯”。驚人的發展帶來了巨額收入、良好的就業機會和發展，但同時也衍生了一些副作用，當中仍有揮之不去、尚待解決的問題。這種銳不可擋的勢頭一直持續到新冠肺炎疫情來襲為止。現在我們正著手重組，希望以嶄新的姿態重新奪回陣地。 

回望過去二十載，絕非易事。從某種意義上說，澳門就是小說家João Aguiar筆下的“煙龍”：一個不斷變化的現實，往事無法重溫。然而，保存集體記憶至關重要，新聞僅“記錄歷史的初稿”。在《Macau Business》至今出版的241期雜誌中，我們把握了“時代精神”，表達了我們的聲音，為廣泛的觀點提供了平台，堅持獨立編輯，珍視透明度和社會責任。這就是我們存在的理由。我們相信，這座城市需要多元化的環境並將從中獲益良多，批評的力量才不會薄弱。 

在這本雜誌中，我們始終堅持深入探究和分析事實、數據和官方言論背後的真正問題，審視公共政策，將普羅大眾的故事帶到最前線。 

繼疫情風暴後，澳門是時候滿足人民、經濟參與者及中央當局的期望了。這十年至關重要，但時鐘已走過了將近一半。 

我們活力充沛，以國際化視野縱觀世界，繼續專注地描繪這座獨一無二的城市和大灣區的未來。 

這是一段引人入勝的旅程。始於20年前，本刊的創始人兼集團主席，也是澳門特區英語出版領域先驅，Paulo A. Azevedo邁出的一小步。正是這一小步，為我們掀開了新的篇章。在這位關鍵人物的帶領下，一眾辛勤工作的團隊成員、忠實的讀者及在這二十年旅途中加入的寶貴合作夥伴、供應商和客戶，成就了非凡的成就。 

我們期待下一個、下下一個20年。匯聚各方力量、擁抱世界幻變、保持最初的自我。 

雅士度（Paulo A. Azevedo） 

Macau Business 創辦人 

創辦人及董事： 

 Project Asia Corporation  

De Ficção – Multimedia Projects 

Macau Business | Business Intelligence 

Macaubusiness.com | Macau News Agency | MB.tv 

二十載風雨兼程，改變的不僅僅是澳門。我們改變了，世界也改變了。二十年前，澳門正沉醉於博彩市場開放初期帶來的興奮，這一決定最終成功將小城打造成世界頂尖的博彩中心，投注量及營運商和政府收入均領先行業。亦正是此時，身處這座仍只有中文和葡文報章、雜誌的小城，我決定創辦首家英文媒體。人們對過去二十年的輪廓早已了然在心，我們攀過高山，越過低谷，收穫了成就，也經歷了挫敗。在時光流逝中，社會經濟結構和政治心態的變化卻令人感到沮喪。返祖保守主義，即公務員的返祖主義，只關心保全自己的飯碗和取悅直接上級，將首要責任拋諸腦後，令人痛心的是這已變得根深蒂固。這在民間社會本身、主要博彩業者和大型企業中引起了連鎖反應。 

這座城市變得更加灰暗，更加冷漠，新冠肺炎引發的多年封閉亦無濟於事。甚少看到能夠擺脫固定思維、大膽創新的項目。人們謹慎行事，往往需要更長時間方能作出決策，有人甚至乾脆利落地聳聳肩，不再給予回應，擺出一副聽天由命的姿態。 

在這個有點瘋狂的世界中，許多領導人的存在只是因為無知和恐懼——同樣的冷漠也席捲了澳門。即便如此，人們仍可看到新的希望。萬物已邁出了復甦的腳步，也許這群麻木的領導人不會毀掉一切。如果世界不會因區域爭端惡化爆發另一場經濟危機，並引發大國集團之間的對抗，這座城市仍有潛力在世界舞台上綻放耀眼光芒。城市的規模、行政管理的便利性及人均收入的重要性均成為了優勢。由於缺乏聰明才智和中世紀權力傳統的持續存在，那些佔據顯要地位的明顯次要參與者也離開了。何其幸運！ 

我們必須為新時代做好準備，鼓勵它們衝出水面。永恆的變革時代，卻有揭穿神話、打破迷信的勇氣。 

澳門擁有成功所需的一切，就如同小城一樣，這個精緻的媒體集團亦然。 

無論過去，還是現在，我們旗下新聞雜誌和全天候線上新聞中心始終堅定不移地為讀者炮製高品質的新聞報道。面對持續的財務限制，我們不曾放棄過對創新和創造驚喜的追求。正如我們一再重申的那樣，困難不會打垮我們，只會讓我們變得更強大。 

因此，與新時代一同崛起！讓我們攜手度過另一個二十年，讓這個媒體集團能夠繼續為更具洞察力的資訊傳播作出貢獻。知識創造教育。我們本身具備的通透和誠信是社會財富的堅實基礎。 

能夠陪伴您們至今，這令我感到欣慰。如果您讓我們繼續陪伴左右，成為您日常生活的一部分，無論是印刷版還是線上版、電腦版，或手機版，我們將不勝感激。 

明智的決定是成功一半！ 

José Pinto

Assistant Professor, City University of Macau

The quest for critical minerals essential for clean energy technologies has intensified global interest in deep sea mining – the process of extracting valuable deposits from the ocean floor at depths beyond 200 meters. Among the most promising areas is the Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ) in the Pacific, estimated to hold a staggering 21.1 billion dry tonnes of polymetallic nodules rich in manganese, nickel, copper, and cobalt.

As the International Seabed Authority (ISA) aims to establish a regulatory framework for commercial deep sea mining by 2025, the role of financial centres like Macau could become pivotal. Given its low-tax regime and position as a major international finance hub, Macau could facilitate investments into ISA-approved deep sea mining projects, particularly in areas of global interest like the CCZ.

Companies based in Macau or international firms seeking tax-efficient jurisdictions may look to establish holding companies, financing vehicles, or intellectual property subsidiaries in the region. These entities could then invest in or receive income from deep sea mining contracts and operations governed by the ISA frameworks, leveraging Macau’s favourable tax policies and double tax avoidance agreements.

Macau, as a Special Administrative Region of China and a host city of the Permanent Secretariat of the Forum for Economic and Trade Co-operation between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries (Macau Forum), could leverage its unique position to attract investments from entities involved in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as well as companies from the Portuguese-speaking nations.

The BRI aims to strengthen infrastructure, trade, and investment links between China and other countries across Asia, Africa, Europe, and beyond. Given the global interest in securing critical mineral supply chains, deep sea mining projects governed by the ISA could potentially align with the BRI’s goals of resource cooperation and enhancing maritime connectivity.

Macau’s role as an offshore renminbi centre and its experience in cross-border financing could attract Chinese companies looking to invest in ISA-approved deep sea mining operations. Similarly, Macau’s historical ties with Portuguese-speaking economies such as Brazil and Angola, both of which have significant mining sectors, could open avenues for joint initiatives or tech transfers related to deep sea extraction endeavors overseen by the ISA framework.

While Macau’s direct involvement in deep sea mining remains limited as of 2024, its ability to serve as a nexus between China, the Lusophone world, and the global deep sea mining industry landscape warrants close observation in the coming years.

Moreover, China itself could play a vital role in assisting nations participating in the BRI, as well as Portuguese-speaking countries with large exclusive economic zones (EEZs), in exploring their seabed resources within their maritime territories.

As a major economy with advanced deep-sea capabilities, China is well-positioned to provide technical assistance, funding, and resource support to partner nations interested in deep seabed exploration and mining.

This could include sharing expertise through training programmes, technology transfers, and joint research initiatives, offering concessional loans or investment funds to finance exploration and mining activities, and leveraging its experience in conducting resource assessments and environmental impact studies.

Chinese institutions could also provide capacity-building initiatives, training programmes, and knowledge-sharing platforms to help build the human resource capacity of these nations in areas such as marine geology, environmental monitoring, and deep-sea mining operations.

Additionally, Chinese companies with deep-sea mining interests could form joint ventures or partnerships with local firms, bringing together financial resources, technical know-how, and access to maritime territories for mutual benefit.

Countries like Brazil, Angola, Mozambique, and several Pacific Island nations have significant EEZs with potential deep seabed mineral resources. Collaborating with China through the BRI framework or Lusophone connections could provide them with the necessary support to explore and potentially exploit these resources sustainably.

However, any such collaborations must prioritise environmental safeguards, transparent governance, and equitable benefit-sharing mechanisms to ensure the long-term sustainability of deep seabed mining activities and protect the interests of coastal communities reliant on marine ecosystems.

As the world grapples with the complex challenges posed by deep sea mining, China’s willingness to assist partner nations and Macau’s potential role as a financial and investment hub could shape the future of this emerging industry and the quest for critical minerals vital for a sustainable future.

Judging from the content of Xia Baolong’s ongoing 7-day visit to Macau from May 13 to 19, and analyzing his recent remarks on both Hong Kong and Macau, it appears that the central authorities have been adopting a proactive approach to managing the two special administrative regions, with economically and politically significant similarities.

First, the 7-day inspection study of Xia’s visit to Macau began with his tour of the Hong Kong-Macau Zhuhai Bridge and the fourth bridge linking the Macau Peninsula with Taipa Island. This visit was politically significant because, during his February 2024 visit to Hong Kong, Xia went first to inspect the international airport at Chek Lap Kok. The significant similarity between his visits to Hong Kong and Macau was that infrastructure projects and development are economically important to both Special Administrative Regions (SARs). Infrastructure projects are extremely important for the mainland to integrate the two cities into the Greater Bay Area (GBA) – a similar pattern that can also be seen in the ongoing bridge construction linking Fujian province with Kinmen in the coming years. In other words, infrastructure projects are the indispensable tool for mainland China to facilitate the process of socio-economic and political integration between Hong Kong and Macau, as well as Taiwan, and the mainland.

Second, Xia’s first day of his visit was characterised by his meeting with the core members of the Macau Executive Council, Legislative Assembly, and Judiciary. These moves were parallel to his visit to Hong Kong, where he also met the elites of the Executive Council, Legislative Council, and judiciary. In a sense, his meetings with the core political and judicial elites brought out a message in how the central authorities see the three branches of the government of Macau and Hong Kong, namely, that the three powers of executive, legislature, and judiciary are well positioned, together with an executive-led government and the phenomenon of judicial independence, whereas the executive and legislative branches are working with each other while having some degree of mutual checks and balances. It does not mean, however, that Macau and Hong Kong have a western style of separation of powers; the two cities have their own special “one country, two systems” arrangement in which the executive-led nature of the government is checked by the judiciary and the legislature, while the legislature is expected to work with the executive harmoniously instead of confrontationally.

Third, while Xia’s visit to Hong Kong met the business elites and international businesspeople, his inspection study in Macau also met the business elites and entrepreneurs. He delivered a speech to the Macau Chinese Chamber of Commerce that was significant in several aspects. He said that the central government fully supports the Chief Executive and the Macau SAG government to lead society, that Macau enjoys socio-economic stability with economic diversification, and that Macau is an international city. The message he gave was clear: Macau, as with Hong Kong, should project itself as a unique international city, utilising the advantages of the central government’s support of “one country, two systems.” After Xia’s recent visit to Hong Kong, the central government has increased the scope of mainland tourists from fifty-one cities to fifty-nine cities for the sake of boosting the economies of Macau and Hong Kong. Both Macau and Hong Kong have been suffering from a huge outpour of locals to Zhuhai and Shenzhen during weekends, and because of having more mainland tourists, it is hoped that the economies of Macau and Hong Kong can be rescued and will take a turn for the better. The good intentions of the central government are consistent in the cases of both Macau and Hong Kong.

Fourth, Xia’s visit to Macau lasted for seven days – the same situation could be seen in his last visit to Hong Kong, implying that the central authorities treat both SARs equally without perpetuating the old image of any “big Hong Kong, small Macau.” From now on, both Macau and Hong Kong are treated equally with their unique divisions of labour, with Macau focusing on its role as a “para-diplomatic” platform for mainland China to enhance its relations with Portuguese-speaking countries and countries in the European Union and Southeast Asia. Hong Kong remains an international financial and monetary centre with its global connections and common law system, playing its role as a “super-connector” in terms of economic and trade relations with other countries in the world.

Fifth, Xia’s speech delivered during his meeting with the business elites in Macau pointed to a critical issue of how the central authorities augmented the physical space of Macau. He said that when Macau was administratively returned by Portugal to China in 1999, its area was only 21.45 square kilometres, but Macau’s area has recently increased further after the central government has allowed 33.3 square kilometres of land reclamation, conferred 85 square kilometres of waters to Macau, and integrated 224.76 square kilometres of Hengqin with Macau. As a result, Macau’s physical space has expanded tremendously, creating more space for socio-economic development—an unprecedented experiment, even unrivalled in Hong Kong.

Sixth, Xia pointed to the autonomy of Macau, which has trade relations with some 120 countries, and enjoys visa-free entry for its residents to 145 countries and places. In a sense, both Macau and Hong Kong enjoy some degree of external autonomy allowed by the central authorities in Beijing—another distinctive feature of the “one country, two systems” in the two SAPRs.

Seventh, Xia paid attention to the youths in both Macau and Hong Kong, appealing to them to integrate with the mainland, develop their patriotic sentiment, and help the SARs develop innovation and technology. Xia’s visits to the University of Macau and the Macau University of Science and Technology were significant, as the two universities have risen prominently in international ranking and research productivity.

Eighth, Xia’s visit to the Macau New Neighbourhood in Hengqin was accompanied by his inspection to women associations, kaifong associations, labour unions, overseas Chinese associations, and the Macau Medical Centre of Beijing Union Medical College Hospital. All these visits were carefully arranged, illustrating the profound sense of the central authorities interest in improving the livelihood and well-being of the Macau people at the grassroots level. His visit to Hong Kong was also characterised by visits to the grassroot-level residents, demonstrating the emphasis of the central authorities on the basic needs of ordinary citizens. If capitalism in Macau and Hong Kong persists, it has to be benign and take into consideration the protection of the interests of lower-income citizens.

Ninth, Xia’s remarks that the central government supports what the Macau Chief Executive and SAR government have done are signalling that it backs up Ho Iat Seng, if he wishes, to run for the Chief Executive election in October. The timing of Xia’s visit to Macau was remarkably interesting, just before the election of the members of the Election Committee in August and prior to the decision of Ho Iat Seng to run in the Chief Executive election or not. Regardless of the final decision of Ho, Xia’s visit and remarks appeared to inject a strong element of confidence into Ho, if he decides to run for another term.

Tenth, Xia’s comments on Macau’s development appear to be more positive than his recent comments on Hong Kong. During a recent meeting in Beijing between Xia and Kevin Yeung, the Hong Kong Secretary for Culture, Sports and Tourism, the former appealed to the latter for making every place in Hong Kong SAR a tourist spot. This comment reflected Xia’s concern about Hong Kong’s ways of managing tourism. The mega-sports events, as recently emphasised by the Hong Kong authorities, have turned out to encounter public criticisms. Xia’s comment on the need for Hong Kong to make every place in the city a tourist spot was an implicit criticism of the ways in which Hong Kong tourist authorities have been managing tourism – a remark that should prompt them to reflect self-critically and innovatively. Xia’s meetings with some Hong Kong secretaries in Beijing, and his visits to Macau, also point to the proactive way central authorities are now managing the development of Hong Kong and Hong Kong – a reflection of the center’s “comprehensive jurisdiction” over the two SARs.

In conclusion, Xia’s visit to Macau had significant similarities with his previous visit to Hong Kong, demonstrating how the Beijing authorities have been adopting central pro-activity on the development of both Macau and Hong Kong. Such central proactivity embraces inspection study visits, open comments, public remarks on the two cities, and direct and explicit policy advice given to the high-level officials of Macau and Hong Kong. Xia’s comments on Macau also paved the way for Ho Iat Seng – if he is willing – to run for the second term in the upcoming Chief Executive election in Macau. The two SARs are portrayed as unique in their models of “one country, two systems,” with Hong Kong being an international financial and monetary centre and Macau as an international tourism hub where deeper economic integration with Hengqin is fostered and where obvious economic diversification from its previously over-reliance on casino-propelled capitalism is accelerated. The two SARs are expected to look after the interests and well-being of residents at the grassroots level, while their three branches of government are characterised by the executive-led nature of the administration and accompanied by judicial independence and harmonious partnerships between the executive and the legislature. Infrastructure projects and development remain the pillar of socio-economic integration between Macau and Hong Kong on the one hand and the mainland on the other, while the cultures of the East meeting the West are retained as a unique feature of the “one country, two systems” in the two capitalist enclaves.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

By Helena Kok


Partner, MdME


helena.kok@mdme.com 

Unionization of workers is very common in modern society. Some studies found that labour unions play an important role in economy because they can promote harmonious discussion between employees and employers, improve working conditions, enhance employees’ well-being and productivity, and thereby positively increase overall economic sufficiency in the society.

Whether you agree with this or not, Macau has just taken a step forward, in implementing Macau citizens’ freedom to association.

Declared by ILO (The International Labour Organization) as one of the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, protection for workers’ right to association had been the bone of contention in the Macau Legislative Assembly in the last 20 years. Last week, the very first Law of Labour Unions, under Law no. 6/2024 (the “Law”), was finally passed in that forum. It regulates the formation, activities, competences and obligations of Labour Unions in Macau.

The Law shall become fully effective on 31 March 2025, while some provisions of the Law on transitional arrangements shall come into effect on 1 January 2025. Here are some key takeaways of the Law:

Membership

Under the Law, members of Labour Union must be over 16 years old and be employees of employers based in Macau. Exception to the latter shall be granted by the Labour Department through a special authorization.

The minimum number of members for setting up a Labour Union is 7.

Employees who do not satisfy this requirement after joining a Labour Union may remain a member, but do not have voting rights and cannot take up any role in the governance body.

Competences

Under the Law, Labour Unions shall have the following competences:

• Representing their members in handling and negotiating in labour disputes. Such representation power shall cease upon request by the member. 
• Expressing opinions to employers on behalf of their members in regard to workplace health and safety issues.
• Expressing opinions in labour related legislations;
• Providing aiding and promoting measures for employment;
• Organizing professional trainings;
• Providing social services; and
• Any other competences granted by the laws.

Association with labour organizations outside of Macau

In upholding the right to freedom of association under Macau Basic Law, Labour Unions may associate with organizations based outside of Macau. However, when such an organization does not pertain to labour matters, the association is subject to prior approval from the Chief Executive.

Limitations of Labour Unions activities

Labour Unions, in carrying out its functions and conducting their activities, may not pose threats to the social order and public health; nor affect the basic needs of the society guaranteed by public services, other indispensable and urgent services

Guarantees

The Law expressly prohibits any person from restricting engagement with/ or disengagement from Labour Unions or participation in activities organized by Labour Unions. Particularly, no employer should dismiss, demote, reduce salary of, employees, due to their relationship with Labour Unions. Further, no employer should hire or benefit job candidates, on the condition of their status in Labour Unions.

Breach of these prohibitions is punishable with a fine between MOP20,000 and MOP50,000, per person involved in a case.

On top of the justifiable absence already set out in Macau Labour Relations Law, the Law provides for one more justifiable absence, applicable to employees who belong to the governance body of a Labour Union, if such absence from work is due to the employee’s leadership role in a Labour Union. However, the employee may not apply for this justified absence more than 1 day per month; or 6 days per year. Employee must provide a minimum of 3 day prior notice to employer, aside from evidence of this justification.

Federation of Labour Unions

Having taken into consideration the existing structure and composition of associations in Macau, the Law provides for the possibility of forming “Federation of Labour Unions,” with members who are registered Labour Unions or Federations of Labour Unions. The minimum number of members required for setting up this kind of Federations is 2.

As special competence granted to Federation of Labour Unions, representative of Federation of Labour Unions shall be appointed by the Chief Executive to participate in consultation meetings and discussion on public labour policies.

Legal standing and transitional provisions

Both Labour Unions and Federation of Labour Unions obtain their legal standing upon registration with Macau Labour Department.

Existing associations incorporated before the enactment of the Law, that is, those incorporated under Law no. 2/99/M, may apply for conversion into Labour Union or Federation of Labour Unions under the Law, upon passing of resolutions by the general assembly and meeting the respective requirements. The application must be filed with Labour Department from 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2027.  They may also choose to remain as such without losing their legal standing as an association.

What is missing from the Law?

While some are cheering for the victory; some just realized that they had counted the chickens too soon. Apparently, some chickens are missing. Where is the right to collective bargaining? And where is the right to strike? By looking at the first consultation paper of the Law, one would notice that collective bargaining was nicely placed under consultation; whereas the right to strike was a blatant “no show”.   

While I agree that the right to strike is such a socially sensitive topic that deserves personalized VIP treatment, the right to collective bargaining could have been properly dealt with in the Law. The so-called competence to represent “individual” employee, in “individual” labour claim, is a far cry from “collective” bargaining. People like me who are familiar with the due process would not be surprised that the Law does not empower Labour Unions to make decisions on employees claims or lay down penalties for breach of labour laws. If Labour Department continues to be “the” authority and many times, the mediator between the two parties in a labour dispute, the “competence” to represent individual employees granted to Labour Unions means that employers now have to deal with one more layer of middlemen. But the status quo is that this representation task can be performed by the existing labour associations (these can even represent collective interests in courts under the Labour Procedure Code!); or employment lawyers; or even anyone with a valid power of attorney. I would like to believe that Labour Unions have edges over the status quo, in handling or negotiating labour related disputes and issues on behalf of – individual – employees, Otherwise, this competence, to me, is more an assignment given to Labour Unions in easing the workload of Labour Department, who has been doing very well the work!

Back to the basics, the Law is said to be the outcome of social consensus, reached by way of public consultation followed by in depth discussions among lawmakers, government, and multiple functional committees representing a broad spectrum of social interests – fruits of a diligent process that dates back to 2021.

If the representativeness of legislative machinery should not come into question, my only explanation to the mystery of missing chickens is that our society can only swallow that much in one bite. Ending a two-decade-long agreement to disagree is already a significant achievement. Let us slow down, enjoy this achievement, and see what the future brings.

José Luís de Sales Marques

Economist

The highly anticipated Forum Macau 6th Ministerial Conference took place in the SAR between April 21 and 23, convening in Macau high-ranking delegates of governments and industry from its ten member states. China’s top representatives were Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), and Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, Mr Li Hongzhong and the Minister of Commerce Wang Wentao, who supervises the Forum. In its opening remarks, minister Wang signalled that the Forum has reached a point where previous achievements are enabling the development of new ideas and new plans for future cooperation. With language and culture as the link, economic and trade cooperation as the theme, and common development as the goal, the Forum will be entering a new era, stressed the Chinese minister.

The gathering’s agenda included the signing ceremony of the Strategic Plan for Economic and Trade Cooperation (2024-2027) and the China-Portuguese Speaking Countries (PSC) Entrepreneurs Conference. The new three-year plan, which was approved by the multilateral decision-making mechanism of the Forum and announced by its Secretary-General Ji Xainzheng, presented twenty new initiatives covering six areas, to deepen economic and trade cooperation between China and the Portuguese-speaking countries. Fresh highlights were emerging in terms of cooperation in areas such as the digital economy, climate change and energy transition, and the development of Africa and Asia, with the PSC aligned with the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals and the blue economy, with the establishment of the Blue Partnership between China and the PSC.  

The role of Macau as a platform was also given a boost, with all Forum members reaffirming their support for the SAR’s position as a central city of the Greater Bay Area for the promotion of economic and trade ties between China and the PSC.

However, specific references in the plan to SME’s remained very thin, with only general references on engaging and connecting those enterprises through and with the Forum’s mechanisms, particularly those dedicated to incubation, partnership, and promotion of startups of the PSC. It is worth remembering that both the Portuguese representative to the Forum Minister of Economy, Pedro Reis, and the Executive Secretary of the Ministry for Entrepreneurship, Micro and Small Enterprises of the Brazilian government, Francisco Tadeu Barbosa de Alencar voiced the need of the Forum to pay more attention to those enterprises, which represent 95% of the industrial fabric of their economies and over 50% of added value to their GDP.  These are also the concerns of significant sectors of the business community, and in fact, what was announced didn’t add much to the existing framework and relations of the Forum with SME.

Nonetheless, for businesses in general, the new action plan encompasses a wider array of opportunities, and depending on its implementation, some of these will also be accessible to SMEs. Small and medium-sized enterprises rely heavily on conducive business environments that exhale familiarity and minimize transaction costs to succeed. Timely networking and easy access to information are essential. Bureaucracy must be streamlined to its essentials. Both online and offline information and consultancy services provided by the Macau Forum and IPIM on market access, tariff reduction, business regulations, investment opportunities, and legal matters are of paramount importance, as are training programs. The CPD Fund must accommodate the needs of SMEs, and the Guarantee Fund must be prepared to provide coverage for small and medium businesses. Calls for easier access to the Greater Bay Area, preferably without a visa requirement, and facilitation of establishment in Macau were common among representatives of Portuguese-speaking countries who visited the region for the Forum.

In conclusion, it is fair to say that the Forum Macau’s Action Plan for the coming years contains a robust developmental agenda aligned with the major objectives of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals. Hopefully, new measures to involve businesses in general, and particularly SMEs, as stronger stakeholders in this initiative will yield better results and position this initiative as a new paradigm in multilateral cooperation.

The visit of the Chinese President Xi Jinping to France, Serbia and Hungary could be seen as a new move by China to implement its foreign policy of pushing the world to multipolarity rather than a unipolar world under the US dominance and hegemony. Nevertheless, the current world arguably remains unipolar as the US military spending is the top among all countries. The drive to multipolarity will likely propel the world toward uncertainties and instability unless diplomacy is extensively deployed to minimize the ideological differences and mutual misperceptions among various countries.

In September 2023, when the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Moscow, Wang said that China and Russia adhered to independent foreign policies and that they do not target third parties. Wang added that both countries should uphold “genuine multilateralism,” promote “multipolarity” in the world, and improve global governance in a more fair and equitable way (Global Times, September 19, 2023). He elaborated that, in the face of unilateralism, hegemonism and confrontational blocs, both China and Russia should show their roles as “major powers” with international obligations.

Obviously, Wang was referring to the US hegemony and the US-led allies in the world, emphasizing how China and Russia can and will be major powers in the multipolar world with at least three main powers balancing each other and leading the world.

On December 27 and 28, 2023, the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs was held in Beijing, according to an article by the Chinese Ambassador to Kenya, Zhou Pingjian (see the website of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, www.mfa.gov.cn, January 5, 2024). He said that President Xi had delivered a speech in the conference, and that the president mentioned the need for China to build a community with a shared future for the mankind in the era of turbulence and transformation. Most importantly, an equal and a multipolar world would bring about mutual progress, stability, peace, and democracy in international politics.

In January 2024, the People’s Daily published a speech delivered by the Chinese President Xi Jinping on multipolarity (Xinhua, January 19, 2024). The article referred to President Xi’s speech in 2017 in Switzerland, emphasizing the importance of being tolerant in the process of economic globalization, the significance of China’s Belt and Road Initiative that encourages socio-economic, cultural and technological exchanges among countries at all levels, and the necessity of creating a multipolar world where “countries, regardless of their size, strength, rich or poor, should be fair members of the society with equal rights to participate in decision making and to implement their obligations.”

As a country in the Global South, China advocates the need for all developing nations to share their destiny, to protect their interests and to have representative roles and voice in global affairs. What China advocates, according to President Xi, is a fair and multipolar world in which “hegemonism and authoritarian politics are opposed” while the “democratization of international relations” is propelled forward.

In February 2024, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met the French Foreign Minister Stephane Sejourne during the Munich Security Conference, and he said that both countries should join hands to build a multipolar world, apart from the need to strengthen strategic dialogue, mutual cooperation and people-to-people exchange (China Daily, February 18, 2024).

During the most recent trip of President Xi to France on May 7, he said that both China and France should avoid the resurgence of a new Cold War while strengthening cooperation at all levels, including climate change, Artificial Intelligence governance, monetary and financial reforms, the Middle East crises, green development, biodiversity and ocean governance, and agricultural development. Some twenty agreements were reached between China and France.

When President Xi met the French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, he appealed to the need for China and Europe to contribute to peace and security in a world that is moving toward multipolarity. President Xi also refuted the argument that China had “excessive industrial capacity” – an implication that the US had produced such a “misperception” in the world and Europe. 

Given France’s traditionally independent foreign policy, China clearly hopes to woo the support of France away from the US-led alliance, while conducting united front work on other more independent countries like Serbia and Hungary to make the European Union more “independent” of the influence from US and its allies.

President Xi’s trip to Serbia had important symbolic and substantial significance, diplomatically speaking. Symbolically, Serbia was a country where NATO bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, but President Xi this time deliberately skipped the visit to the site of the 1999 NATO bombing. If Chinese politics attach great importance to the question of face, President Xi’s move was to give face to NATO without stimulating the psyche of the US and its allies – a gesture of goodwill and Chinese generosity even though many Western countries see China as a “threat.”

Serbia was historically symbolic of the successful resistance and guerrilla war against fascism, for its former Yugoslavia under Tito was characterized by socialism and non-alignment movement – a historical development comparable to Communist China where its guerillas succeeded in resisting the Japanese imperial forces. Ideologically speaking, Serbia and China had much in common in their historical experiences. The six-point agreement reached between China and Serbia during President Xi’s visit – free trade, Serbia’s 2027 EXPO collaboration with China, Serbian exports to China, scientific exchanges, youth exchanges, and aviation cooperation as well as air links – is a breakthrough in Sino-Serbian relations.

During President Xi’s last stop in Hungary, he met Prime Minister Viktor Orban who is reputable for his tough stance on the NATO and the European Union, although Hungary is a member of both organizations. Clearly, President Xi’s visit to Hungary was both symbolic and substantial, symbolic of the fact that Hungary adopts a relatively independent foreign policy and substantial in that both China and Hungary reach eighteen agreements.

In December 2023, Hungary announced that China’s BYD would open its first European Electronic Vehicles (EVs) production factory in the southern region – a move that marked the important inroads made by BYD in China’s automobile development. Unlike the European Union that imposes duties on EVs from China, Hungary is far more receptive to the Chinese EVs. Interestingly, top executives at BMW and Volkswagen warned against EU imposition of duties on Chinese EVs, because they said the move would be detrimental to automakers that import cars made in China (Reuters, May 8, 2024).

Overall, China’s diplomatic quest for multipolarity has a major motive. It aims at countering the US hegemony at a time when the US and its allies are not only seeing China as a real “military” and “economic” threat, but also regarding China’s ally, namely Russia, as a country that must be either “contained” or “checked.” A new Cold War mentality does persist in the world, and as such, creating a multipolar world carries the ideology of resisting hegemonism and generating a world of socialist equality characterized by “the common destiny of the mankind.” 

The Chinese diplomacy of building up a multipolar world is characterized by building up bilateral and multilateral relations with various countries, including Russia and the Global South, to check the US hegemonism. The Belt and Road Initiative has become a means by which China pursues the diplomacy of multipolarity, trying to achieve a win-win situation in terms of socio-economic and technological development.

However, the current world is still dominated by the US, militarily speaking. The US military spending tops all the countries in the world, followed by China. Even though the Chinese military has been improving its hardware and increasing its spending, their capabilities remain relatively untested because the People’s Liberation Army has not fought a war since the Sino-Vietnamese war in 1979. The increases in military expenditure alone cannot easily China up to the superpower status as with the US, from a critical perspective.

Although US succession politics have been adopting democratic mechanisms and showing contentious tendencies, as shown in Donald Trump’s political emergence and recent resurgence, succession politics in China remains to be characterized by a high degree of uncertainties. Indeed, China’s economy and infrastructure development have been expanding tremendously. Still, it is debatable whether the world at present is already multipolar. If the current world remains unipolar dominated by the US militarily, then the Chinese drive toward a multipolar world is likely generating more uncertainties and challenges to the international world.

The drive toward multipolarity means, as the Chinese have officially argued, the “democratization of international relations.” Such democratization means that the US is finding it more difficult than before to control and shape the foreign policies of many countries in the world, like the current situation in which anti-US sentiment is running high among many countries in the Global South, especially in view of the US support of Israel in the Middle East crises. “Democratization” in international relations also means that more countries in the world are challenging the US and its allies, while forming coalitions among themselves, thereby propelling the world toward the path of more uncertainties, instability, and tensions. 

Democratization of international relation is fostering a strong sense of the perception of the “China threat,” because the Chinese actions are seen as a menace to some countries. The recent tensions between China and the Philippines over the islands in the South China Sea is a good example showing this perception. While the Philippines has been drifting closer to the US than ever before, its nationalist stance over the sovereignty dispute is pitting Manila against Beijing dangerously. From a critical perspective, the ruling elites in the Philippines have failed to conduct a risk assessment of a possible conflict with China, for the sizable Filipino workers in the South China region, including Hong Kong and Macau, would be affected as they are now remitting their earnings back to their relatives in the Philippines. In other words, any military conflict with China over the islands in the South China Sea would likely bring about unanticipated and immense economic costs to the Philippines.

A multipolar world is also mixing up internal political development with external foreign policies in a cyclical manner. While the US is internally pluralistic and democratic but externally hegemonic, China is domestic paternalistic but externally more “democratic,” as Beijing has emphasized the “democratization” of international relations.

The contradictions between domestic and external policies between China and the US are deepening their perceptions and misperceptions, mutual distrust, political antagonism, ideological confrontations, and cross-border interactions. The US support of Taiwan is seen by China as politically unacceptable, while Washington and its allies see Taiwan as a democracy whose security, survival and stability must be defended. The recent US criticism of China’s handling of Hong Kong has also been regarded by Beijing as an interference with its domestic affairs. If domestic politics and external foreign policies are increasingly intertwined in the multipolar world, then international relations will increasingly be controversial and vulnerable to confrontations and conflicts.

In conclusion, China’s recent quest for a multipolar world can be interpreted as a sign of its socialist and egalitarian drive toward the creation of a fair world without hegemonism and unilateralism, but a world characterized by peace, security, order, prosperity, and multilateralism. Yet, the democratization of international relations has already challenged the economic, military, ideo-political interests of the US and its allies, thereby creating a backlash of reactive alliance-building and a deepening “misperception” of “the China threat.” Despite the good intention of creating a world of peace, security and stability, theoretically and practically the democratization of international relations is generating more political uncertainties, more economic and territorial disputes, and more vulnerabilities to military conflicts in the world, mainly because the intertwined nature of domestic political development and foreign policies is increasingly prominent, ideologically contentious, economically conflict-ridden and diplomatically demanding. Perhaps only diplomatic dialogue and finesse constitute an indispensable ingredient that can and will bring about calmness, rationality, stability, and peace in the world of ceaseless power struggles among various countries.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China