The four-day Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) ended on July 18, delineating a  comprehensive set of reforms and designating the year 2029 as the timeline of completing these reforms and the year 2035 as a target of achieving “high-quality socialist market economic system.” Overall, stability amid persistent economic and social reforms are the main themes of the Third Plenum.

The Plenum approved an important decision on the Central Committee’s further comprehensive and deepening reforms and on the promotion of Chinese-style modernization. The objectives are to improve the basic system, to realize the modernization of the national governing system and capability, and to achieve a strong socialist modernized nation.

Economically speaking, the decision mentions the need to construct a unified big market in China, improve the market economy, reform the new high-quality productive system, deepen financial/monetary and tax reforms, and lay the foundation of the 15^th five-year plan.

Clearly, the socialist market economy and its permanent reforms remain the pillar of China’s economic modernization with an emphasis on the acceleration of new productive forces and on their related reforms at the level of superstructure (values and institutions).

In terms of risks management, the decision emphasizes the necessity of preventing and solving the debts of the land and property sectors, the local government and small and medium enterprises. Moreover, there is a need of leading public opinion and preventing and solving the risks of ideological development.

What these phrases implied was that the central authorities learnt a lesson from the failure of the Evergrande Group to deliver property projects that led to some public discontent. The conglomerate’s fiasco heightened the crisis consciousness of the central and local authorities who have recently tightened the process of auditing work in the land and property sectors.

With regard to opening the door to the outside world, the decision mentions the need to expand the openness of the economic system in a stable manner, to deepen reforms in external trade, and to persist in managerial reforms to attract foreign investment and improve China’s investment in other countries. In this way, a high-quality Belt and Road system will be established.

Politically, the decision vows to improve and perfect the basic political system, meaning that the national and local legislatures as well as the people’s consultative conferences will continue to be reformed as crucial supervisory mechanisms.

Culturally, the decision emphasizes cultural confidence, pointing to the need for a responsibility system in ideological work, a healthy governing system for cultural development and an effective international media system.

Clearly, persistent ideological and propaganda work remain the cornerstone of reforms in China.

In terms of livelihood improvement, the decision points to the improvements of the distribution system, the policy priority of providing employment and the necessity of deepening medical care and health system reforms.

Obviously, social stability through the betterment of the people’s livelihood is the linchpin of the Third Plenum’s decision.

The decision also elucidates the importance of improving the national security system, the governing mechanism for public safety, the social governance system and the national security mechanism that deals with external relations.

Securitization has actually remained a prominent trend of Chinese reforms since 2012, analytically speaking.

In the area of external relations, the decision says that China participates in and takes the leadership of the global governance system, reform and construction while resolutely protecting national sovereignty, security and developmental interest.

Other crucial aspects of the decision includes the need for reform of state-owned enterprises (injecting more competition into the energy and railroad sectors); the support of civilian enterprises to partake in the nation’s large infrastructure projects; the standardization and integration of high-quality markets in electricity, digital data and rural-urban land use. Moreover, the entity economy and the digital economy have to be integrated further in the process of infrastructure modernization and high-quality development. The local government’s financial difficulties will be tackled through the process of giving the localities more autonomy in expanding their tax revenues and increasing the central government’s proportion of local-level expenditures. Public services will be improved for registered households and low-income and poor households in rural areas, including the supervision of the manufacturing and distribution of food products with proper subsidies.

New economic and social groups will be explored to assist employment with an emphasis on party leadership. Finally, anti-corruption work persists while strengthening a monitoring system to prevent abusing the prosecution process of anti-corruption.

Analytically, the CPC plays the leadership role in all aspects of reforms, ranging from the injection of more competitive elements in the socialist economy to the re-invigoration of social organizations supportive of the government and societal employment.

Basically, strong governance is the focal point of the Third Plenum.

Interestingly, its decision is not only pragmatic but also frank, acknowledging that the demand side of the economy remains weak.

In terms of personnel management, ex-foreign minister Qin Gang resigned from his position in the Central Committee – a more graceful exit than those corrupt military commanders such as former minister Li Shangfu and former rocket force chief Sun Jinming who were dismissed from the party.

The implications for Hong Kong and Macau are obvious: while Hong Kong and Macau practise capitalism under the “one country, two systems,” both cities are expected to persist in all kinds of reforms in the economic, social, cultural and livelihood aspects. If social stability and economic prosperity are the twin foci of permanent reforms in the mainland, the ruling authorities in both Hong Kong and Macau are naturally expected to deliver more in these two crucial dimensions.

In conclusion, the decision of the Third Plenum continues to build China up as a strong nation punctuated by the emphases on persistent economic reforms, systemic improvements, socio-political stability, economic prosperity, the betterment of the people’s livelihood, the permanence of socialist market modernization, and the leadership of the CPC.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

The Washington Summit Declaration made by the NATO Council on July 11 can be seen as not only a response to the perceived Russian “expansionism” but also an inception of a new Cold War dividing the world into two blocs – one led by the US and its allies and the other composed of Russia and China and their allies.

Celebrating the 75^th anniversary of NATO, the Washington Summit Declaration covers the following main points:

First, it vows to be a “defensive alliance” against all threats and to protect the “three core tasks of deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security.” The shared values of NATO nations are individual liberty, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.”

Second, it welcomes the accession of Finland and Sweden that makes the alliance stronger.

Third, it denounced Russia’s “full-scale invasion of Ukraine” as shattering peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area and undermining global security.

Fourth, it criticises China for harbouring “ambitions and (having) coercive policies” that challenge NATO’s interests, security, and values. Specifically, “the deepening strategic partnership between Russia and the People’s Republic of China and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut and reshape the rules-based international order are a cause for profound concern.”

Fifth, it strengthens the deterrence and defence of Ukraine while welcoming the leaders of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea to join NATO as partners.

Sixth, it appeals to member nations to invest more in NATO operations and to increase their contributions.

Seventh, NATO’s deterrence and defence against all threats will be consolidated with high readiness forces, large-scale training, urgent actions, effective command, resilient logistics, and the integration of space and undersea infrastructure into its planning, exercises, and operations.

Eighth, the integrated air and missile defence of NATO is to be updated and enhanced.

Ninth, NATO declares that nuclear deterrence is its cornerstone of alliance security.

Tenth, NATO will enhance transatlantic defence and industrial cooperation, collective resilience, and the defence against aggressive hybrid action from state and non-state actors.

The Declaration is very critical of Russia, whose “aggression” against Ukraine is “a blatant violation of international law.” It calls for Russia to withdraw military forces from the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, while maintaining communication with Moscow to mitigate risks and prevent the escalation of war. NATO denounces Russia’s strategy of nuclear weapons in Belarus and its usage of chemical weapons in the Ukraine war.

The Declaration also criticises North Korea and Iran for “fueling Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine by providing direct military support to Russia.”

Most importantly, the NATO Declaration accuses China of being “a decisive enabler” of Russia’s Ukraine war and of forming a “no-limits” partnership with Moscow. It appeals to China to “cease all material and political support to Russia’s war effort,” such as the transfer of dual-use materials like weapons and raw materials for Russia’s defence sector.

China’s response to NATO Declaration was swift, saying that it is “unreasonable with sinister motives” and asking the alliance not to bring about “chaos” in Asia. The Chinese Foreign Ministry added that China’s trade with Russia is based on the rules of World Trade Organization. China also supports Russia’s argument that NATO’s expansion poses a security threat to Russia, whose military move into Ukraine has brought about NATO’s strong Declaration.

The NATO Declaration coincided with the joint Chinese military exercise in Belarus, whose border with NATO member Poland appeared to arouse NATO’s geopolitical and security sensitivity. Belarus is Russia’s ally.

Analytically speaking, NATO’s Declaration was a response to not only Russia’s war in Ukraine, but also Vladimir Putin’s remarks at the SCO. In the SCO meeting in Kazakhstan, Putin demanded that Ukraine should withdraw its troops from those territories occupied by Russia, while China’s recent peace proposal has not really touched on the fate and return of any Ukrainian territory to Ukraine. In the recent SCO meeting, Putin added that Ukraine should not take advantage of any ceasefire to replenish its army through military mobilisation.

Russia has already turned down an offer by Turkey to mediate between Moscow and Kyiv. Putin’s emphasis that Kyiv should cede control over the disputed Ukrainian provinces to Moscow was a provocation to NATO whose Declaration was arguably understandable.

NATO’s Declaration coincided with Putin’s remarks at the recent BRICS Summit where he called for a multipolar world in which BRICS will play a key role. Such a call challenges the ideal of an unipolar world envisage and dominated by the US after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. The recent emergence of a Greater Russia, through its annexation of Crimea and its occupation of Ukrainian territories, has posed a serious security threat to NATO.

One of the BRICS members, India, has sought a peaceful resolution to the Ukrainian crisis. Prime Minister Narendra Modi talked to Putin, saying that wars cause the death of innocent children – a humanitarian remark that, however, did not appear to raise a concern from Putin. Perhaps as a nation whose ideologies of western-style democracy and independent foreign policy are acceptable to the bloc led by the US and that jointly led by Russia and China, India can ponder deeply further over the content of a peace proposal to resolve the Ukrainian crisis.

The NATO Declaration can also be seen as the emergence of a new Cold War in international politics. Its content points to the roles of China, North Korea, Iran, and Belarus in their support of Russia – a sign of two ideological and military blocs confronting each other from now onwards. The 32-member NATO Declaration appears to provide the “legitimacy” for some western nations, especially the US, to impose sanctions on those Chinese companies that are deemed to be providing dual-use materials for the Russian military arsenals.

Prior to the NATO Declaration, Hungary, as an EU member, asserted that it does not want NATO to become “an anti-China” bloc and that it will not support NATO’s moves. The Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has recently met Chinese President Xi Jinping to discuss a potential peace plan to tackle the Ukrainian conflicts. Hungary believes that Ukraine’s participation in NATO would create a real risk of open conflicts between Russia and NATO—indeed, a very dangerous scenario that would perhaps trigger a Third World War.

As such, it remains to be seen how NATO and its Western allies will handle Ukraine’s attempt at joining NATO. To Greater Russia, Ukraine has to be either a buffer state or a satellite state independent from NATO influence—a scenario rejected currently by Ukraine and NATO indeed.

NATO secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg said the alliance’s support for Kyiv will not make NATO a party to the Ukrainian conflicts. Rather, NATO’s support would help Ukraine uphold its right to self-defence. This argument, however, is rejected by Russia, which sees NATO members’ weapons provision to Ukraine as already a sign of NATO “expansionism.”

What provokes China in NATO’s Declaration is that NATO will discuss with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea security cooperation—a move that is seen by China and North Korea as another sign of NATO “expansionism” into the East Asian security dynamics.

Clearly, two ideological, geopolitical, and military blocs of the world are taking shape, one including NATO, EU members (although Hungary is seen as “pro-China” and “pro-Russia”), Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea, while the other side embraces Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, Belarus, and SCO members.

The NATO Declaration can perhaps be viewed as a phenomenon showing an ongoing, difficult transition and persistent national power struggles from a previously unipolar world led by the US shortly after the collapse of the former Soviet Union to a new multipolar world consisting of many rapidly rising economic-military powers, notably Russia, China, Iran, and even North Korea.

If NATO’s closer cooperation with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea is perceived negatively by China and North Korea, the East Asian region will likely encounter the risks of sudden military conflicts. The Philippines has already become more pro-US amid its disputes with China over the sovereignty of remote islands and reefs in the South China Sea. Manila’s improved military relations with Japan have also raised the eyebrows of Beijing.

Given the recent consolidation of military relations between North Korea and Russia, and given Japan’s military rearmament with US support in response to perceived military threats from China and North Korea, the security circumstances in East Asia are destined to become more volatile, unstable, and militarily unpredictable. Compounding the unstable circumstances is the Sino-US disputes over the question of Taiwan, whose future has triggered military and security concerns from Japan.

The mutual perceptions of nations on their “expansionist moves” here and there in the world has become a crucial factor leading to the looming new Cold War. If China is labelled unsophisticatedly as part of the Russia-led bloc, its potential and capability as a mediator in the Ukrainian conflicts are already curbed, unless China adopts a very unlikely scenario of distancing itself economically from Russia.

Fortunately, perhaps, shortly after the NATO Declaration, the military and defence leaders from the US and Russia have met to discuss their issues of common concerns. Perhaps the military diplomacy of all nations in the world should be maintained and enhanced to minimise, contain, or pre-empt any major military conflicts in different parts of the world.

In conclusion, the NATO Declaration has already set the stage for a looming new Cold War in the world. The lack of effective diplomacy conducted by national and military leaders can and will be extremely costly to the world if the Ukrainian crisis becomes a harbinger of an unnecessary Third World War that would involve different nations in rapidly confrontational and increasingly solidifying military blocs. Let us hope that political and military leaders of the two blocs will develop their stronger political will in the quest for diplomatic solutions to resolve territorial disputes, especially the Ukraine war,  in the coming years.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

The recent opening of the Shenzhen-Zhongshan Link, together with the operation of the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau Bridge, and the deepening cooperation between Macau and Hengqin are pointing to a new and significant direction in South China: the inevitability of territorial integration between Hong Kong and Shenzhen’s borderland areas and between Macau and Hengqin around 2047 and 2049 respectively, with significant implications for Xiamen’s future relations with Kinmen.

The most recent opening of the Shenzhen-Zhongshan Link has geopolitical and socio-economic significance for South China. The 24-kilometer passage not only starts at the strategic Shenzhen airport interchange and connects with Ma’anshan Island in Zhongshan across the Pearl River, but also reduces the travel time between Zhongshan and Shenzhen from two hours to only 30 minutes. The megaproject has one underwater tunnel, two bridges and two artificial islands, becoming a key transportation connector located just 30 kilometres north of the famous Humen Bridge and 31 kilometres south of another megaproject, namely  the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau Bridge. These three transportation networks can be seen as the most important hallmark of infrastructure integration in the Pearl River Estuary. As Deng Xiaohua, the head of Guangdong Provincial Communications Group, said, these bridges provide the “cross-sea and cross River passages in the Greater Bay Area (GBA), boosting connectivity of the city cluster.” 

In short, all the main cities in the GBA are now more conveniently interconnected, providing a solid foundation of deeper territorial integration in South China. All these cities are expected and required to interact more intensively in economic cooperation, bringing about an economic powerhouse collectively in South China in the coming years.

If territorial integration is defined as a combined process of geographical, social and economic reengineering that makes the regional boundaries more fluid, porous and flexible with the ease of entry and exit of regional residents and even foreigners, then the recent and ongoing infrastructure transformations in the Pearl River Estuary are very geopolitically significant,  including a recent mainland policy of allowing non-Chinese residents of Hong Kong and Macau to apply for mainland visit permits.

Hong Kong is now connected easily with the mainland through the High-Speed West Rail, the Hong Kong-Macau-Zhuhai Bridge and the nearby Qianhai Cooperation Zone, which is expected to forge closer collaboration with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) in their service, financial and information technology sectors in the coming years.

Macau’s metamorphosis is even much faster than Hong Kong. With the deepening and raid process of economic and social integration with Hengqin, more Macau people are moving to live in the new Macau Neighborhood in Hengqin. Macau has also been empowered by the central government in Beijing to possess more territorial waters and even to absorb 3,700-square-metre plot of land from Zhuhai to build the eastern line of the Light Rail Transit system. As of March 2024. Macau’s total land area was expanded to 33.3 square kilometres. Macau’s physical space has been expanded and will be augmented further sooner or later if the first line of Hengqin, where goods from Macau are tax-exempted, will quite likely be territorially absorbed into Macau perhaps around or after 2049.

The economic and governing implications for Hong Kong and Macau are obvious. While Hong Kong has to reposition itself as an indispensable part of Shenzhen’s rapid development, including Qianhai where start-up companies have mushroomed and unleashed the innovative potential of youths from the mainland and Hong Kong, the development of the Northern Metropolis has to be accelerated so that Hong Kong’s borderland with Shenzhen will become increasingly populated and more economically prosperous, with its higher education, information technology and research hubs being constructed as soon as possible. Otherwise, without a much faster timeline, Hong Kong would likely lag behind the very rapid pace of territorial integration in South China, especially in contrast with the speed in which Macau has been increasingly socially and economically integrated with Hengqin.

The implication for the Hong Kong authorities is that they must design and formulate plans of, say, building a bridge or a tunnel linking Shenzhen with San Tin area, which according to the Northern Metropolis Action Agenda in 2023 will have a projected population of 147,000 to 159,000 by 2033. The Hong Kong SAR government must also speed up all the action plans from now to 2033 if territorial integration is actually a long-term developmental plan in South China in the psyche of central authorities.

Similarly, Hong Kong must accelerate and deepen the collaboration of high-end professional services and logistics supply chains with the Qianhai Cooperation Zone, including an earlier construction of the Hong Kong-Shenzhen Western Rail Link connecting Hung Shui Kiu in Yuen Long with Qianhai. The Hong Kong Island West-Hung Shui Kiu Rail Link should ideally be speeded up if the Hong Kong authorities sense the inevitability of territorial integration between Hong Kong and Shenzhen. The Northern Metropolis Highway should also be a priority of infrastructure development in the New Territories. Otherwise, any delay in infrastructure development and completion may point to a gap in territorial integration, whereby Macau’s territorial integration with Hengqin will likely be much faster than Hong Kong’s full integration with Shenzhen’s borderland.

Positively, the Hong Kong Mass Transit Railway (MTR) is planning to build 12 railway lines and some 30 new stations, reducing the travel time within Hong Kong and improving its interconnectedness with Shenzhen. These lines include the Hong Kong Island, Lantau Island. Northern Metropolis and the New Territories. In fact, the new stations in Northern Metropolis and New Territories must be accelerated toward the inevitable thrust of territorial integration.

Overall, Shenzhen is well positioned to become perhaps the politically reliable and indeed the most important economic locomotive in South China, assisted by Hong Kong’s strong financial and monetary centre and Macau’s unique tourism hub. Shenzhen, with its strong GDP growth rate of 5.5 percent, is expected by the central authorities to be a strategic, high- ended, technologically innovative megacity that offers high-quality services, model public health and high environmental standards with sustainability. The central authorities have been eager to shape Shenzhen, with immense efforts from its local officials, into a national information technology centre, attracting talents from Hong Kong and elsewhere and becoming an influential consumption centre and foreign investment magnet. 

As such, the division of labour in South China is becoming more prominent than ever before: Hong Kong is to strengthen its international financial and monetary centre with its solid common-law system attracting foreign investment while retaining its role as a superconnector; Macau is to transform itself into an economically diversified economy away from casino capitalism while consolidating its platform function for China to enhance economic and diplomatic relations with Portuguese-speaking countries; and Shenzhen is to continue using Qianhai as a bridgehead to accelerate the process of internationalizing Renminbi and to build up its GBA insurance service centre.

Under these circumstances, Hong Kong and Macau must accelerate their infrastructure projects, maintain socio-political stability (which explains why national security is extremely important to both SARs), govern their regions with demonstrated capability to tackle livelihood issues (housing, social welfare, poverty alleviation sustainable development), and quickly reposition their strategic roles amid the motherland’s developmental blueprint.

The other important but perhaps neglected implication for territorial integration in South China is that the central authorities appear to adopt a similar strategy of utilizing infrastructure development in dealing with a small part of Taiwan, notably Kinmen where a bridge on the Xiamen side connecting Kinmen has already begun. Although the bridge has expectedly aroused political debate in Taiwan, it seems that a silent process of stage-by-stage integration between parts of Fujian (Xiamen) and a small part of Taiwan (Kinmen) would likely take place sooner or later, with the shadows mirroring the models of Macau-Hengqin cooperation and Hong Kong-Shenzhen collaboration.

In conclusion, territorial integration in the Pearl River Estuary, including Hong Kong’s cooperation with Shenzhen’s borderland and Macau’s integration with Hengqin, is clearly emerging. A formal process of territorial integration, specifically absorbing parts of the territories from one region to another place, will quite likely occur between the Macau SAR and Hengqin around 2049, and it would also perhaps take place between the Hong Kong SAR and Shenzhen’s selected borderland (like Qianhai) around or after 2047. Macau’s territorial integration with Hengqin appears to proceed in a much faster pace, judging from the currently rapid pace and smaller but targeted scope of co-development with Hengqin due to geographical proximity and an immediate implementation of physical integration and focused residential migration. The long-term geopolitical and economic implications of the Macau and Hong Kong models of integration with the mainland for a possible Xiamen-Kinmen integration cannot be neglected. The reason is that a similar pattern of infrastructure development preceding human interactions and economic cooperation is beginning with the construction of the Xiamen side of the bridge linking Xiamen with Kinmen. If this analysis is accurate, then this new bridge will likely be part of a stage-by-stage process of socio-economic integration between the mainland and Taiwan in the coming years. What is unique in the model of Hong Kong/Macau integration with the mainland is that their political reunification with the motherland in 1997 and 1999, respectively, preceded infrastructure expansion and integration. In the case of mainland China’s attempt at integration with Taiwan, it appears that infrastructure development is now an important inception leading to perhaps closer economic cooperation and more human interactions, followed hopefully and ideally by a stage-by-stage but difficult process of political dialogue, negotiations and perhaps integration and reunification.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

The Canadian government is launching a public consultation to see whether Canada should follow the US and EU to adopt tariffs on Chinese-made Electric Vehicles (EVs). However, this trend of Canadian protectionism not only reflects a widespread Western perception of the rising Chinese “economic threat,” but also raises a question of how the influx of Japanese automobiles was eventually  tackled in Canada during the 1970s and 1980s.

Finance Minister Chrystia Freeland has announced that the Canadian government on July 2 would trigger a 30-day consultation on the proposed tariffs to protect Canada’s auto workers in their developing EVs industry. There would likely be a surtax on the imports of Chinese EVs under Section 53 of the Customs Tariff Act. The Canadian government will seek public views on the protection of Canada’s national interests and on related Chinese labour and environmental standards.

In recent years, China has become the largest manufacturer and exporter of EVs. The US will raise tariffs on the Chinese EVs from 25 percent to 100 percent in 2024, while the EU will impose tariffs of up to 38 percent on Chinese-made EVs on July 4. China is now negotiating with the EU on the matter of tariffs.

Canadian Finance Minister Freeland said the proposed measures would prevent Canada from becoming “a dumping ground for Chinese oversupply.” Ontario provincial premier Douglas Ford said he hoped the federal government in Ottawa would match or even exceed US tariffs for the sake of protecting jobs in the automobile sector, while Freeland criticised China for flooding the global markets under the policy direction and subsidies of the Chinese government.

The immediate reaction of Canada’s unionists and auto sector is that they support the Canadian government plan due to self-protectionism.

The US, EU, and Canada are all concerned that their own car manufacturers cannot compete with the relatively much cheaper prices of Chinese EVs makers, especially BYD Company Ltd.

The Chinese government said that foreign accusations of Chinese “overcapacity” in EVs is “totally groundless,” and that the Canadian tariff plan would “violate World Trade Organization rules” and “harm Sino-Canadian bilateral economic and trade cooperation.”

In fact, Canada has recently subsidised its own EVs industry. Ottawa, Ontario and Quebec have promised Canadian $50 billion subsidies to encourage foreign auto makers, such as Volkswagen and Honda, to build EVs plants in the country. Imports of EVs were reportedly about Canadian $2.2 billion in 2023 compared with Canadian $84 million in 2022, but actually most EVs imported to Canada are from US auto maker Telsa. The Chinese EVs are making up a growing proportion of the EVs market in Canada.

Some critics of the Canadian plan argue that high tariffs would raise prizes for Canadian customers, and that it should be accompanied by positive policy measures helping local automakers catch up with China and produce their budget-friendly and quality EVs rather than just delaying the transition from gasoline cars to EVs.

Other critics say that the entry of Chinese EVs into Canada is inevitable and that Canada should learn from how it dealt with the rapid increase in the imports of Japanese-made Toyotas, Datsuns and Hondas from 4 percent of the North American market in 1970 to 20 percent in 1980. In 1981, the US and Canada negotiated with Japan on a ceiling of the number of imported Japanese vehicles from each individual company. Most importantly, the Japanese automobile makers were encouraged to open their manufacturing factories in Canada, accelerating the metamorphosis of the Canadian automobile industry and creating a win-win situation.

Other critics have commented that tariffs alone would likely shift the Chinese EVs manufacturing bases to other places, like Mexico and Brazil, where more auto workers will be employed. In other words, the Canadian government should adopt a more proactive and positive approach to making compromises with China. Having a BYD assembly plant in Canada, for example, would generate local employment and also provide more choices to Canadian customers who are interested in buying EVs.

The Canadian tariff plan on Chinese EVs can be attributable to several factors: the tendency of the Canadian government to follow the examples of US and EU in protecting their EVs industry; the self-protective nature of Canadian stakeholders with their own vested interests; the fear of the ruling Liberal Party of losing more votes under the currently unfavourable public opinion and media against the government; and the common trend of perceiving China as an “economic threat” in the eyes of the developed Western world.

In conclusion, the Canadian government’s tariff plan on Chinese EVs has secured the initial support of local stakeholders in the automobile industry amid a general Western perception of the Chinese “economic threat.” Nevertheless, a win-win scenario would be a compromise between Canada and China, allowing perhaps a few Chinese EVs companies to open assembly plants in Canada where local auto workers will be the beneficiaries, where local car customers will have greater freedom of choice, and where the transition from gasoline cars to EVs for the public interest of achieving sustainable development will even be accelerated. It remains to be seen whether such a win-win situation will become a reality.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

The recent defence pact signed between Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean President Kim Jong-un is geopolitically significant in not only producing a military alliance between Moscow and Pyongyang but also in generating immediate concerns about the prospects of security and peace in Northeast Asia.

Both Putin and Kim met for two hours after Putin’s first visit to North Korea 24 years ago. Kim said that Russia plays a crucial role in maintaining strategic balance in the world, that North Korea unconditionally supports Russian military action in Ukraine for the sake of protecting Moscow’s sovereignty, security and territorial integrity, and that Pyongyang is keen to strengthen strategic collaboration with Russia. Kim’s remarks could be seen as a triumph of Putin’s visit to secure solid political support from his neighbouring country, while sharing their common ground of opposing the US.

The comprehensive strategic partnership agreement signed between Putin and Kim has 23 articles, but the most significant one is Article 4, which says that any signatory side that is invaded by another country or a group of countries will trigger the military aid of another signatory by all means. Such an act will be in conformity with Article 51 of the UN Charter which states that any member state under armed attack has the right of self-defence, individually or collectively.

This defence pact has immediate geopolitical implications.

First and foremost, while Russia has recently hardened its stance on the Ukrainian conflict by reiterating that it is willing to negotiate with Ukraine only if Kyiv abandons those territories militarily occupied by Moscow and only if Kyiv does not join NATO, the military pact between Moscow and Pyongyang can back up the Russian bargaining position further. In other words, if Russia were attacked by NATO forces, North Korea would join Russia as a military ally.

Under these circumstances, Ukraine is and will be under tremendous pressure to revert to a buffer state without explicitly siding with NATO and yet being forced to concede at least some territories to Russia – a position that is so far rejected by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Yet, strategically, Putin and his advisers are keen to neutralise and minimise the military influence of NATO by creating Ukraine as a buffer state while swallowing the already occupied territories in Ukraine and Crimea. For NATO and Ukraine, Putin’s demands are unacceptable, and as such, the military and political impasse in the Ukrainian conflicts will persist without a viable solution, at least in the short run.

Secondly, given that North Korea has already provided weapons and logistical supplies to Russia in the Ukrainian war, as many news reports have said, the North Korean weapons will continue to be exported to the Russian arsenals. In September 2023, it was reported that North Korea had already exported 10,000 containers of ammunition to Russia. The South Korea news have recently reported that a large number of containers ships have left North Korea for Russia. Weapons transactions mean lucrative business to North Korea even though the media reported that the quality of some North Korean weapons was questionable. Yet, the Russian aid to North Korea can and will improve the quality and capabilities of Pyongyang’s weaponry in the near future.

On the other hand, during Kim Jong-un’s recent visit to Russia, he expressed his interest in the Russian missile technology. Obviously, Russia continues to supply rocket, missile, and space technology to North Korea – a win-win situation to both sides.

As such, the improving military technology and intelligence of North Korea, with the full support of Russia, is posing a serious military threat to the military alliance between the US, Japan and South Korea. While South Korea immediately protested against the defence pact between Moscow and Pyongyang, Tokyo also expresses its displeasure especially as the North Korean ballistic missile development has posed a security threat to Japan. If Russia is going to strengthen North Korea’s nuclear submarine technology, their military pact will certainly pose a greater threat to the Washington-Tokyo-Seoul military alliance in the coming years.

Sandwiched between the Moscow-Pyongyang military pact and the triple alliance of the US-Japan-South Korea, China’s position is diplomatically difficult. The recent trade summit between China, South Korea and Japan, which also called for denuclearization in the Korean Peninsula, was not received positively by Pyongyang. Although North Korea sees China as a socialist brother, it has viewed Beijing’s gestures of friendships to Tokyo and Seoul with suspicious eyes. Trust-building between China and North Korea remains not easy as Kim Jong-un and his military generals are sticking to the military first policy rather than seeing pragmatic economic modernization and trade liberalization as the solutions to Pyongyang’s economic predicament. With the continuous sale of North Korean weapons to Russia, it can and will provide the necessary revenues to sustain the North Korean economy and to legitimize the Kim regime. In short, Pyongyang prefers a policy of militarization, and it sees weapons transactions as economically lucrative with the impact of maintaining domestic stability and political order.

The military alliance between Russia and North Korea is going to curb the role of China as a potential peacemaker in the Ukrainian conflicts and a potential mediator in the relations between the two Koreas. If the Russian military pact with North Korea consolidates the hardline position of Moscow on the Ukrainian conflicts, the space for China to mediate in the Ukrainian war is perhaps much narrower than before. Similarly, if South Korea and Japan see the defence pact between Moscow and Pyongyang as a move “violating” the UN sanctions against Pyongyang, it is increasingly difficult for China to intervene as a mediator trying to persuade and lobby North Korea towards the path of denuclearization.

In recent days, North Korean soldiers have been erecting military barriers in the border areas with South Korea – a sign of increased tensions amid the usage of cross-border balloons from both sides as perhaps the tools of political propaganda. These activities followed a move by North Korea to declare the end of a military agreement with South Korea in November 2023, re-stationing heavy military weapons along the border areas. In December 2023 and January 2024, the North Korean Workers Party proclaimed that the relations with South Korea are “hostile” and “belligerent” instead of being “the same race and the same quality.” It seems that North Korea has seen the persistent US military alliance and exercises with South Korea as militarily provocative and politically unacceptable.

Putin was politically shrewd by visiting Vietnam after his path-breaking trip to North Korea. Under the bamboo diplomacy that emphasizes the finesse of flexibility, Vietnam has reached agreements with Russia on natural gas, energy, industrial cooperation, investment, mining, digital technology, nuclear technology and anti-terrorism. Vietnam has been adopting a skilful diplomacy of the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region by maintaining friendly socialist brotherhood and peaceful relationship with China, by improving comprehensive cooperative partnership with the US since 2013, and by balancing the US through its bamboo diplomacy of enhancing bilateral relations with Russia.

North Korea has stood out as the beneficiary of the defence pact with Russia. Putin’s red-carpet treatment in North Korea was a testimony to how Kim Jong-un perceived Russia’s military, technological, energy, trade and strategic importance to North Korea. Putin gave the luxurious Aurus car – the Russian Rolls-Royce – to Kim, thereby elevating bilateral relations to a new apex.

In response to South Korea’s comment that Seoul may provide military aid to Ukraine after the completion of the defence pact between Moscow and Pyongyang, Putin has warned Seoul against doing so because Russia would take “corresponding action.” Such a tit-for-tat approach is perhaps a warning signal to peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula.

Putin has added that if the Western nations provide military weapons to Ukraine, Russia will also provide military aid to North Korea and other countries. His strategy of utilizing military aid to support the adversaries of the Western countries means that a new Cold War is taking shape, perhaps having the unintended consequences of widening the likelihood of military conflicts from Ukraine to northeast Asia and other parts of the world.

The defence pact between Moscow and Pyongyang could be timed deliberately and strategically before the US presidential elections, which may see a political comeback of Donald Trump. Given Trump’s positive relations with Kim Jong-un in 2018, when they met to achieve peace in northeast Asia, the defence pact between Russia and North Korea could strategically test US foreign policy after the presidential elections, particularly if Trump were to return to power. It is now unknown whether US foreign policy would change in the cases of Ukraine and North Korea, especially if Trump may be an unpredictable political leader with highly unpredictable directions in international politics and diplomacy.

In conclusion, the defence pact between Putin and Kim was a victory to both Russia and North Korea at a time when Moscow needs more countries to support its hardline stance on the Ukrainian conflict, and at a time Pyongyang sees weapons transactions as a means to perpetuate its military first policy, to improve its missile and rocket technology and to sustain its economy. However, the unintended consequence is to perhaps weaken China’s role as a mediator in both the Ukrainian conflict and the northeast Asian security challenges. Perhaps the alliance between Moscow and Pyongyang is timed to test a possible change in US diplomacy after the forthcoming presidential elections.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

The recent visit of Chinese Premier Li Qiang to New Zealand is now followed by his visits to Australia, with implications for China’s trade diplomacy and geopolitics.

On June 14, Li Qiang delivered a speech at a welcoming gala dinner at Auckland, emphasising the friendly and 52 years of diplomatic relations between China and New Zealand and their comprehensive strategic partnership. He added that China has remained New Zealand’s largest trading partner and biggest export market.

Li Qiang tactfully stressed the cooperative areas between the two countries, including environmental protection, agricultural development, ecological sustainability, low-carbon transition, and green technology. Then he shifted to emphasise the multicultural diversity of the two countries, which both value free trade, innovation, creativity, and the protection of intellectual property rights.

He stressed that both countries attach great importance to peace, dialogue, and cooperation rather than confrontation and conflict. Such cooperation includes areas like biomedicine, agriculture, food, the digital economy, tourism, educational exchange, cultural interactions, information technology, and energy.

Furthermore, bilateral cooperation can be forged through the support of UN-led international order and law, and the practice of multilateralism.

Li elucidated that the Chinese economy remains growth-oriented and resilient, leading to more opportunities for countries to share the fruits of common economic development.

The Chinese Premier also added that China requires the import of high-quality diary, beef and lamb products from New Zealand. He visited the New Zealand Institute for Plant and Food Research in Auckland, meeting and dining with businesspeople, academics, and officials.

China is now the largest trade partner of New Zealand with bilateral trade totalling NZ$38 billion.

Analysing Li’s speech and remarks, China has adopted an economically pragmatic trade policy to secure closer support from New Zealand. Although New Zealand is part of the AUKUS and a member of the US-led military and security alliance in Asia, Li Qiang skilfully avoided mentioning the sensitive issues in public but pragmatically focused on the cooperative areas of low politics with high economic values.

In recent years, the perception of the China “threat” has gained currency in New Zealand and Australia, which are worrying about China’s closer relations with some Pacific islands like the Solomon Islands. The territorial disputes between China and the Philippines over some reefs in the South China Sea have also alarmed Australia and New Zealand. Some politicians in Australia and New Zealand have appeared to overstate the Chinese “threats” by raising their concerns about Chinese united front work in their society and community.

As such, Li Qiang’s depoliticisation approach to dealing with New Zealand is a wise one, focusing on productive and economic areas with common consensus, while steering away from politically controversial terrains. The expansion in bilateral trade, further marketization, the improvement of high quality products and services, and the enhancement of mutual investments have become the hallmarks of Li Qiang’s visit to New Zealand.

Li’s pragmatic and depoliticising approach to emphasising trade diplomacy is likely to be revealed and repeated in his next visits to Australia and Malaysia. Australia’s relations with China have slightly improved recently after China scrapped its tariffs on Australian wine. China is expected to give two new pandas to the Adelaide Zoo, combining its panda diplomacy with trade diplomacy. Malaysia remains an important neighbour to China due to Kuala Lumpur’s relatively independent attitude towards Sino-US tensions. Hence, it can be expected that Li Qiang’s trade diplomacy and depoliticising but pragmatic approach will persist in his visits to Australia and Malaysia.

Li Qiang’s visit to New Zealand could also be seen as a follow-up action after Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Wellington in March 2024. Wang succeeded in upgrading the China-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement and launching negotiations on the negative list of trade in services. Li deepened China’s economic relations with New Zealand further, demonstrating perhaps a new pattern of Beijing’s go-south neighbourly diplomacy.

In conclusion, Li Qiang’s visit to New Zealand was not only a follow-up action after Wang Yi’s visit to Wellington, but also a new go-south good neighbourly diplomacy combining the focus on trade with the emphasis on productive and other common areas of cooperation. Li’s trade diplomacy towards New Zealand was carefully orchestrated, while such diplomacy is intermingled with panda diplomacy in his next visit to Australia. His final stop in Malaysia will be an important one showing China’s eagerness to reach out to countries that are relatively independent from the ongoing Sino-US rivalries in the Asia-Pacific region.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

A recent proposal prepared by China and Brazil on the settlement of the Ukrainian crisis can be regarded as a positive step forward in the diplomacy of conflict resolution; nevertheless, due to the fact that Ukraine has perceived China as more pro-Russian than politically neutral, there remain some challenges to achieving a breakthrough in the well-intentioned Sino-Brazilian proposal. 

On May 23, 2024, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Celso Amorim, the Chief Advisor to the Brazilian President, in Beijing. The two sides had in-depth discussions on how to resolve the Ukrainian crisis, and they produced a six-point proposal. 

First, the two sides call on all the related parties to observe three principles of deescalating the situation, namely no expansion of the battlefield, no escalation of fighting, and no provocation by any party. 

Second, the two sides believe that dialogue and negotiation are the only viable solution to the Ukrainian crisis. All parties should create the conditions for the resumption of direct dialogue and push for the de-escalation of the situation until a comprehensive ceasefire is achieved. China and Brazil support an international peace conference held at a proper time when it is recognised by both Russia and Ukraine, with the equal participation of all parties and the discussion of all the peace plans concerned. 

Third, efforts are necessary to increase humanitarian assistance to relevant regions and to prevent a humanitarian crisis on a large scale. Attacks on civilians or civilian facilities must be avoided, while civilians, including women and children, as well as prisoners of war, must be protected. The two sides support the exchange of prisoners of war between the parties concerned in the conflict. 

Fourth, the use of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, and chemical and biological weapons, must be opposed. All efforts must be made to prevent nuclear proliferation and to avoid a nuclear crisis. 

Fifth, any attacks on nuclear power plants and other peaceful nuclear facilities must be opposed. All parties should comply with international law, including the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and they should resolutely prevent any human-caused nuclear accidents. 

Sixth, dividing the world into isolated political or economic groups should be opposed. The two sides call for efforts of enhancing international cooperation in energy, currency, finance, trade, food security, and the security of critical infrastructure, including oil and gas pipelines, undersea optical cables, electricity and energy facilities, and fibre-optic networks, to protect the stability of global industrial and supply chains. 

Finally, China and Brazil welcome members of the international community to support and endorse the previously mentioned common understandings and to jointly play a constructive role in de-escalating the situation and promoting peace discussions. 

The proposal reached between China and Brazil is well-intentioned and should be commended as an incredibly positive step towards the resolution of the Ukrainian conflicts. Within a week, 45 countries responded positively to the six common understandings. 

However, from the perspective of realpolitik, there remain some challenges ahead so that the proposal would be perfected for the sake of galvanising the support of more countries and achieving a genuine diplomatic breakthrough. 

First and foremost, Ukraine has recently perceived China as diplomatically “unsupportive” amid the criticism levelled by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy that China has been “working hard” to prevent some countries from participating in a peace summit in Switzerland next month. The Chinese side denied this, but certainly Ukraine’s perception of China remains an obstacle to any breakthrough in the Sino-Brazilian proposal for peace. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Mao Ning, said even if China does not attend the Switzerland peace summit, it does not mean that Beijing does not support peace. Moreover, China insists that an international peace conference should be endorsed by both Russia and Ukraine, with the equal participation of all parties, so that the peace proposal would be discussed in a fair and equal manner. In short, China believes that the conditions for a peace summit have not been met. 

It is reported that 80 countries have confirmed their attendance at the Switzerland summit. 

Second, Ukraine has perceived China as politically pro-Russian, a perception exacerbated by the criticism made by the US that China has appeared to provide equipment and logistical support for the Russian military. The Chinese side denied such an act. 

It is reported that China has been supplying Russia with dual-use goods with civilian and military applications. These goods include machine tools, microelectronics, and optical parts of military weapons like tanks, armoured vehicles, drones, cruise missiles, and other equipment. The Chinese side refuted the criticism from the US and some European countries, saying that its trade with Russia is legitimate.  

In response to a reporter’s question that China has been exporting dual-use materials, such as nitrocellulose, to help the Russian production of ammunition and rocket propellants, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin on May 16, 2024, said: “China always handles the export of military products in a prudent and responsible way, and strictly controls the export of dual-use articles, including drones for civilian use. The US makes false accusations against China’s normal trade with Russia, just as it continues to pour unprecedented military aid into Ukraine. This is typically double-standard.” 

Third, the rivalries between Ukraine and Russia have directly affected how both sides may see the Sino-Brazilian proposal. As mentioned before, Ukraine sees China as being “pro-Russian.” Russia has perceived the Switzerland summit as a platform for Ukraine to galvanise a group of countries to support the Ukrainian demand for a total Russian withdrawal from Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin has expressed his backing for China to initiate a peaceful settlement of the Ukrainian crisis.  

As such, the politics of distrust remain an obstacle to any proposal made by any group of countries, including the six-point proposal from China and Brazil, to resolve the Ukrainian crisis.  

While Switzerland is perceived as pro-western in its forthcoming summit, the Sino-Brazilian proposal is perceived as relatively pro-Russian. As such, neither side can break the diplomatic deadlock. 

Fourth, Ukraine is eager to witness a proposal that can deal with territorial disputes right away, but the Sino-Brazilian proposal appears to be one that lays out the preconditions for a next-stage negotiation over territorial issues.  

In May 2023, when the Chinese peace envoy Li Hui visited Ukraine and Europe, he was reportedly promoting a ceasefire that would leave Russia occupying parts of Ukraine – a move unacceptable to Ukraine.  

The current six-point proposal initiated by China and Brazil also avoids the discussion of territorial issues. As such, unless Ukraine changes its position and becomes more patient in the process of trust-building that would lead to detailed negotiations, the Sino-Brazilian proposal may need more fine-tuning to make it acceptable to Ukraine. 

Fifth, the sixth point in the Sino-Brazilian proposal, namely the call for a world divided into isolated political or economic groups, appears to be an implicit criticism of the western bloc, although the call for international cooperation on energy supply and other economic areas is a positive step that should be commended. If so, the sixth point in the proposal may arouse some distrust from some western countries rather than soliciting their immediate political support of the proposal. It may have to be rephrased in an even more cautious tone to seek the wider support of the western countries. 

The six-point proposal from China and Brazil is more focused and much narrower than the 12-point position of China on the political settlement of the Ukrainian crisis in February 2023. At that time, the 12 points include (1) respecting the sovereignty of all countries; (2) abandoning the Cold War mentality; (3) ceasing hostilities; (4) resuming peace talks; (5) resolving the humanitarian crisis; (6) protecting civilians and prisoners of war; (7) keeping nuclear power plants safe; (8) reducing strategic risks; (9) facilitating grain exports; (10) stopping unilateral sanctions; (11) keeping industrial and supply chains stable; and (12) promoting post-conflict reconstruction. The Sino-Brazilian six-point proposal tends to extract the elements of points (3), (5), (6), (7) and (8) from the earlier 12-point position adopted by China. 

In conclusion, the six-point proposal initiated by China and Brazil is a positive and commendable step forward in the exceedingly difficult path of resolving the Ukrainian conflict. Nevertheless, due to Ukraine’s perceptions of China, the distrust between Ukraine and Russia, the eagerness of Ukraine to witness a proposal that tackles territorial issues the right way, and the sensitivity of the western economic bloc versus Russia, the six-point proposal initiated by China and Brazil with the good intention and laudable motivation of achieving peace is going to encounter some challenges, which call for more efforts and more thoughts in refining its content further. Every dark cloud has a silver lining; countries in the world are still hoping for the best and working diligently in the endless quest for a peaceful solution in the Ukrainian crisis. 

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

The most recent trilateral summit held between the Chinese Premier Li Qiang, the South Korean President Yoon Yeok-seol and the Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in Seoul on May 26 was a testimony to the persistence of economic pragmatism in Northeast Asia – a phenomenon pointing to a cautiously optimistic future despite its geopolitical and military tensions involving the power politics of North Korea and the US.

The summit in Seoul was held for the first time after December 2019, which was then followed by the onslaught of Covid-19 and its variants in the entire world. The trilateral summit on May 26 reached some important consensus, one of which is the acceleration of the second stage of the negotiation over Sino-Korean free grade agreement and the other is the continuation of the trilateral dialogue between the three East Asian nations on trade, economic issues and human interactions.

Li Qiang hoped China and South Korea would respect the core interests and concerns of both countries, while being good neighbours at the same time. Moreover, Li added that the logistical supply chains of the two nations can be mutually beneficial and integrated, that economic and trade cooperation can be deepened and broadened, that the Sino-Korean Changchun International Cooperation Demonstration Zone will have its construction process accelerated, and that mutual cooperation in high-end production, new energy, Artificial Intelligence and biochemical and pharmaceutical areas can have stronger collaboration than ever.

President Yoon appealed to Li Qiang for China’s active function in dealing with the nuclear weapons issue on the Korean Peninsula and the North Korean-Russian military cooperation – a point that was clearly far more geopolitical in gesture than having any response from Li Qiang.

Yoon also said that South Korea and China should maintain close cooperation and promote their national development, thereby contributing to world peace and prosperity. South Korea, to Yoon, maintains the one-China principle and is willing to deepen the mutual interests of both countries in the areas of bilateral trade and human interactions.

The South Korean president added that both South Korea and China should initiate talks between their deputy foreign ministers on a whole range of issues, promoting youth and cultural exchanges.

Li Qiang met Samsung Electronics Chairman Lee Jae-yong – their first meeting in 19 years as Li visited Samsung in 2005 when he was an official under party-secretary Xi Jinping in Zhejiang province. During the May 26^th meeting, Lee expressed his gratitude to China’s assistance to Samsung during the COVID-19 period as Beijing at that time allowed charter flights for Samsung employees to travel to China and prevented production termination at Samsung’s semiconductor plant in Xian during the lockdown in the mainland.

Li Qiang told Lee that Samsung’s cooperation with China is an indication of Sino-Korean economic collaboration. Li hoped Samsung would collaborate with the mainland Chinese enterprises in high-end production, digital economy, and Artificial Intelligence, apart from his encouragement of Samsung to deepen and broaden its investment in China.

On the other hand, China and Japan agree to enhance their communications at all levels. Li Qiang told the Japanese side that China expects Japan to deal with the matter of history and the question of Taiwan appropriately so that Sino-Japanese relations can and will be stabilised constructively. On the question of the polluted waters resulting from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, Li Qiang appealed to the Japanese side that it should fulfil its responsibilities and obligations, because the release of the wastewater bears on the health of the humanity.

In fact, Kishida and the Chinese President, Xi Jinping, had already agreed in November last year to resolve the treated water dispute through consultative dialogue.

In his meeting with Li Qiang, Kishida appealed to the Chinese side to lift an import ban that China imposed on the Japanese marine products starting from August 2023.

Kishida added that a constructive and stable relationship is beneficial to not only both Japan and China but also the world. He expressed his hope that both sides should conduct high-level dialogue over economic and trade issues as well as cultural and human interactions.

Yoon and Kishida discussed how South Korea and Japan can and will deepen cooperation in 2025, which will mark the 60^th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Both nations perceive North Korea as a military threat, trying to resist and check against Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons study and development. South Korea and Japan have a common interest in witnessing the process of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. They expressed their common concern about the support of Russia, and China, for North Korea. Japan remains unhappy with how North Korea handles the allegedly kidnapped Japanese. Both Yoon and Kishida agreed with the necessity of cooperating with the US.

In early May, Kishida reiterated his hope that a summit with North Korea could and would be held, with the support of the international community, including the US. Yet, Pyongyang turned down the proposal, saying that North Korea “has nothing to solve as regards the ‘abduction issue’ insisted by Japan.” In 2002, North Korea reportedly admitted that it had sent agents to abduct 13 Japanese in the 1970s and 1980s. The Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi paid a visit to Pyongyang in 2002 and met Kim Jong-il at that time, followed by the release and return of five Japanese from North Korea. But diplomatic deadlock returned to the two countries after Tokyo criticised Pyongyang for not coming clean about the abducted victims.

Analytically speaking, the trilateral summit is beneficial to the peaceful relations between China, South Korea and Japan, particularly as the three nations are adopting the ideology of economic pragmatism while putting aside their different political interests and agendas.

Still, political differences remain an obstacle to a closer relationship between the three nations. While Japan and South Korea are necessarily pro-US, China remains defiant in the face of its perceived US hegemony. As such, the question of North Korea comes in; Pyongyang is perceived as a military threat by both South Korea and Japan, which then have to rely on the US to check and balance North Korea. Recently, it has been reported that a large batch of Russian engineers went to Pyongyang to assist North Korea in dealing with the launch of the detection satellites. In November 2023, North Korea launched the first military detection satellite into space, and it is planning to launch three more in the year 2024.

The China-Japan-South Korea Free Trade Agreement negotiations are perhaps the most important breakthrough in the trilateral summit on May 26. In their Joint Declaration, the three countries emphasised the importance of ensuring transparent, smooth, and effective implementation of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership as a foundation element for the China-Japan-South Korea free trade agreement. They are also committed to continuing discussions on how negotiations can be speeded up so that the free trade agreement would be free, fair, high-level, reciprocal, and uniquely valuable.

According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, the industrial chains of China, Japan and South Korea are highly interconnected, and as such, a free trade agreement between the three countries will expand market openness, reduce trade barriers, enhance trade and investment, and optimise the business environment. At a time when China has been emphasising the liberalisation of the economic and trade atmosphere in the world, and at a time when the US has become fa more self-protective than ever before, any free trade agreement between Beijing, Tokyo and Seoul would likely become a challenge to the US economic influence in Northeast Asia.

Most importantly, any free trade agreement between China, Japan and South Korea will likely be beneficial to the liberalization of the economy and society in North Korea. In this connection, China’s role as a middleman will remain crucial, especially as South Korea expects China to play a more active and assertive role in convincing and influencing North Korea toward the directions of denuclearization and economic liberalisation.

In conclusion, economic pragmatism prevails in the trilateral economic summit between China, Japan, and South Korea. Although China has different political positions and interests compared with Japan and South Korea, the summit was productive, healthy, and constructive, as they all focused on the need to deepen economic cooperation and human interactions – a precondition for peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia. Most importantly, their intention of deepening and accelerating the discussion of a free trade agreement is a significant move – a direction of persistent economic pragmatism amid geopolitical tensions and a shrewd move in the liberalisation of Northeast Asian regional political economy that will perhaps hopefully and slowly open up North Korea and propel Pyongyang to the path of further economic liberalisation, if not necessarily denuclearization.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

Judging from the remarks made by the newly sworn-in Taiwan leader William Lai Ching-te on May 20, he touched on the political red lines of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), thereby leading to not only the severe criticisms from mainland authorities but also a two-day military exercise conducted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The ongoing cross-strait tensions remain to be observed carefully, partly because the PLA military exercise sent important warning signals and partly because Taiwan’s legislative politics are pointing in the direction of more political turbulence – signs that will question whether the mainland’s anti-secession law would eventually be invoked in cross-strait relations and politics.

The inaugural speech made by William Lai, who was sworn in as the 16^th “president” of Taiwan carried several characteristics that dangerously touched on the political red lines of the mainland.

His speech first emphasised Taiwan’s third rotation of political parties in power in 2024, with the first rotation taking place in 1996, when Taiwan had the first directly elected president. Yet Lai boasted that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) broke the so-called “illusionary spell” of changing the party in power after eight years of its governance. What he meant was that the DPP succeeded in continuing to govern Taiwan even after eight years of Tsai Ing-wen’s DPP leadership. In a sense, Lai was provocative to the mainland, which has been seeing the DPP regime as not only ignoring the 1992 consensus but also being far more pro-US than the Kuomintang and ignoring the Taiwan model of “one country, two systems.”

Lai then stressed Taiwan as not just “democratic” but also “a bright spot in the world of democracies,” adding that the island is the first Asian “state” allowing for same-sex marriage and that it succeeded in using “democracy” against the onslaught of COVID-19 and its variants.

His boast of Western-style democracy, as opposed to “Chinese democracy” that has been emphasised in the mainland, and his exaggeration of how Taiwan succeeded in repelling the attacks from COVID-19 became another provocative thorn to the mainland.

Lai turned to Taiwan’s strategic positioning in the “first chain of islands,” explicitly saying that Taiwan belongs to a strategic area under the US military protective umbrella—again, a huge provocation to the mainland authorities. Even worse, Lai stressed that the international “consensus” is that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is an “indispensable factor” in global security—a remark putting Taiwan under the rubric of “internationalisation” as opposed to the mainland’s emphasis that the Taiwan issue should not be “internationalised.”

Lai swiftly turned to the US legislation on the provision of military support for Taiwan—again, a clear provocation to the mainland side. He appealed to the PRC for “stopping literary attacks and military intimidation” and “shouldering the global responsibility together with Taiwan” – a double-edged sword that criticised the mainland on the one hand and elevated Taiwan’s status on par with the mainland globally on the other. This move of touching on, and perhaps exceeding, the mainland’s political red lines means that it is not surprising to witness the two-day military exercise of the PLA shortly after Lai delivered his speech.

The rest of Lai’s speech was about how the mainland side should “respect the choice of the Taiwan people,” how the mainland should “replace dialogue with confrontation” (while the mainland has been saying Taiwan should abandon confrontation by accepting the 1992 consensus), and how the mainland and Taiwan can and will become co-prosperous through allowing mainland students to study in Taiwan and through the allowance of “bilateral tourism.” Yet, the PRC has long maintained that the acceptance of the 1992 consensus as a precondition for the relaxation of mutual human exchange and interactions.

Even worse, Lai talked about Taiwan’s attempt at entering the CPTPP and its “united” efforts of protecting “sovereignty” with “non-subservient” relations between the island and the mainland – again a clear provocation to the mainland’s political bottom line.

Some observers have pointed to the fact that William Lam used the term Taiwan 79 times, the Republic of China (ROC) 9 times, and the ROC on Taiwan 3 times, while utilising the name, China, to refer to the mainland 7 times.

The mainland’s State Council Taiwan Affairs Office immediately criticised Lai as “a worker of Taiwan independence,” while Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated that the one-China principle remains the key one stabilizing the future directions of cross-strait relations.

The US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken congratulated William Lai for becoming the Taiwan leader, and he even appealed to the Congress to extend its “invitation” to Lai and deputy Hsiao Bi-khim to visit Washington – a remark provoking the Chinese Foreign Ministry to issue a rebuttal at once, saying that the US side “seriously violating the one-China principle” and the three Sino-US communiques on Taiwan. The Chinese Foreign Ministry added that the Blinken remarks “sent seriously wrong signals” to the Taiwan separatists.

The verbal exchanges between the US side and China clearly demonstrated that Washington has backed up Taiwan’s efforts at “internationalisation” and that the mainland Chinese authorities have regarded such joint US-Taiwan moves as politically unacceptable from the perspective of megaphone diplomacy.

Three days after Lai delivered his speech, the PLA conducted a military exercise, namely Joint Sword-2024A, surrounding the island of Taiwan, mobilising the navy, the air force, and the rocket force. The Eastern Theatre Command led the military exercise in the Taiwan Strait, including Taiwan’s northern, southern, and eastern parts, the Mazu island, Wuqiu, and Dongyin.

For the first time in the mainland’s military exercises, Taiwan’s outlying islands were included. The locations this time were different from the locations of the PLA’s live-fire drills in August 2022, following Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. Altogether, these locations of the mainland military exercises constitute a broad geo-military chain encircling Taiwan, meaning that the mainland military has the capability to impose an economic blockade easily on Taiwan and that it will have the ability to “take back” Taiwan strategically. As Zhang Chi, a professor at the National Defence University in Beijing, said that the PLA could “occupy main passages” and that “there is no longer a so-called blind spot” for PLA strikes from the eastern part of Taiwan. The implication is that Taiwan’s eastern logistical supply routes can be easily blocked by the mainland military.

In response to the mainland military exercise, the Taiwan presidential office expressed its regret, and the US Indo-Pacific Command deputy commander Stephen Sklenka regarded such exercise as “expected.” He appealed to the neighbours of Taiwan to “condemn” the mainland exercise.

Some mainland military strategists observed that the PLA military exercise had three characteristics: (1) the mainland marine police vessels went into the Taiwan waters while the mainland warships and fighter airplanes went near Taiwan to “squeeze” the Taiwan military defence space; (2) the PLA could encircle Taiwan’s outlying islands in the west and demonstrate its striking capability in the eastern part of Taiwan; and (3) the PLA could damage the northern Taiwanese military targets, blockade the naval outlet of Kaohsiung, and cut the external (air and water) supply lines of Taiwan’s Hualien.

The Eastern Theatre Command released a map and posters of six PLA weapons that were deployed in the military exercise, namely J-20 and J-16 fighter aircraft, Type 052D destroyer, Type 071 amphibious transport dock, a Dongfeng series ballistic missile, and PHL-16 Multiple Rocket Launch System (MRLS). A video was released, showing that frigate CNS Nantong was participating in the military drills.

Interestingly, the Eastern Theatre Command issued 3D virtual animations, showing that the PLA missiles could hit three places in Taiwan, namely Taipei, Kaohsiung, and Hualien – a gesture pointing to the ability of the mainland missiles to strike at these Taiwan targets.

In Hualien, ten F16 fighter aircrafts were on high alert with their weapons ready to deal with any possible emergency. At the same time, the US aircraft carrier USS Ronald Regan (CVN-76) was operating in the Philippine Sea when China launched the two-day military exercise encircling Taiwan. The US Navy also conducted bilateral military operations with the Royal Netherlands Navy in the South China Sea – a gesture perhaps coincidentally in response to the Chinese military exercise. The US and Dutch operations involved combat ship USS Mobile (LCS-26), dry cargo ship USNS Wally Schirra (T-AKE-8) and Royal Netherlands Navy frigate HNLMS Tromp (F803).

Amid cross-strait tensions, Taiwan’s legislative politics have gone increasingly contentious. The Kuomintang and the People Party attempted to amend a legislation to allow legislators to summon private individuals and government officials to face legislators’ questions and to penalise them for any “contempt of the legislature” for up to three years in prison. The DPP and critics have argued that the move “violates” the constitutional arrangements, making the legislature a place of “authoritarianism.” Thousands of demonstrators gathered outside the Legislative Assembly on May 21, a situation recalling the so-called Sunflower Movement in 2014, when a free trade agreement between the KMT and the mainland triggered a month-long occupation of the legislature by political opponents and DPP supporters.

The implication here is that Taiwan’s domestic political turbulence is now exacerbated by partisan politics and struggles within the Legislative Assembly – a situation that can be seen as potentially dangerous in cross-strait relations. According to the mainland’s anti-secession law, which was ratified in March 2005, two important provisions could provide the justifications for the PRC intervention in Taiwan’s political turbulence and chaos. Article 8 says that the mainland Chinese state shall use non-peaceful and other necessary means to deal with Taiwan under the condition of Taiwan’s separatist forces “accomplishing the fact” of such “separation,” or of a main event occurring in Taiwan that leads to its “separation” from mainland China, or of a scenario in which all the possibilities of peaceful reunification are lost. Article 9 says that the mainland Chinese state must act to protect the persons and properties of Taiwan’s civilians and foreigners for the sake of minimising their losses. The ambiguous wordings in Articles 8 and 9 can arguably provide for the PLA military intervention in Taiwan if the island has worsening internal political struggles, disturbances, and turbulences.

In conclusion, the ongoing cross-strait tensions illustrate that the highly political, rhetorical and provocative speech made by William Lai not only alienated the mainland authorities but also triggered the PLA military exercise, which unprecedentedly mobilized the marine police to go into the waters near the Taiwan outlying islands, and which demonstrated the PLA capabilities of blockading Taiwan, striking the essential targets and cutting off Taiwan’s external supply lines. Perhaps the megaphone diplomacy conducted simultaneously by the US side triggered the corresponding response from the mainland Chinese side. However, Taiwan’s ongoing internal political struggles inside and outside the Legislative Assembly are showing some signs of deterioration in the coming years, leading to a possible scenario that the 2005 Anti-Secession Law may eventually be applied by the mainland. If so, political rhetoric, megaphone diplomacy, military muscle-flexing actions, and domestic political struggles have become a new chain of political development that heightened the highly unpredictable, oscillating, and unstable cross-strait relations.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

Judging from the content of Xia Baolong’s ongoing 7-day visit to Macau from May 13 to 19, and analyzing his recent remarks on both Hong Kong and Macau, it appears that the central authorities have been adopting a proactive approach to managing the two special administrative regions, with economically and politically significant similarities.

First, the 7-day inspection study of Xia’s visit to Macau began with his tour of the Hong Kong-Macau Zhuhai Bridge and the fourth bridge linking the Macau Peninsula with Taipa Island. This visit was politically significant because, during his February 2024 visit to Hong Kong, Xia went first to inspect the international airport at Chek Lap Kok. The significant similarity between his visits to Hong Kong and Macau was that infrastructure projects and development are economically important to both Special Administrative Regions (SARs). Infrastructure projects are extremely important for the mainland to integrate the two cities into the Greater Bay Area (GBA) – a similar pattern that can also be seen in the ongoing bridge construction linking Fujian province with Kinmen in the coming years. In other words, infrastructure projects are the indispensable tool for mainland China to facilitate the process of socio-economic and political integration between Hong Kong and Macau, as well as Taiwan, and the mainland.

Second, Xia’s first day of his visit was characterised by his meeting with the core members of the Macau Executive Council, Legislative Assembly, and Judiciary. These moves were parallel to his visit to Hong Kong, where he also met the elites of the Executive Council, Legislative Council, and judiciary. In a sense, his meetings with the core political and judicial elites brought out a message in how the central authorities see the three branches of the government of Macau and Hong Kong, namely, that the three powers of executive, legislature, and judiciary are well positioned, together with an executive-led government and the phenomenon of judicial independence, whereas the executive and legislative branches are working with each other while having some degree of mutual checks and balances. It does not mean, however, that Macau and Hong Kong have a western style of separation of powers; the two cities have their own special “one country, two systems” arrangement in which the executive-led nature of the government is checked by the judiciary and the legislature, while the legislature is expected to work with the executive harmoniously instead of confrontationally.

Third, while Xia’s visit to Hong Kong met the business elites and international businesspeople, his inspection study in Macau also met the business elites and entrepreneurs. He delivered a speech to the Macau Chinese Chamber of Commerce that was significant in several aspects. He said that the central government fully supports the Chief Executive and the Macau SAG government to lead society, that Macau enjoys socio-economic stability with economic diversification, and that Macau is an international city. The message he gave was clear: Macau, as with Hong Kong, should project itself as a unique international city, utilising the advantages of the central government’s support of “one country, two systems.” After Xia’s recent visit to Hong Kong, the central government has increased the scope of mainland tourists from fifty-one cities to fifty-nine cities for the sake of boosting the economies of Macau and Hong Kong. Both Macau and Hong Kong have been suffering from a huge outpour of locals to Zhuhai and Shenzhen during weekends, and because of having more mainland tourists, it is hoped that the economies of Macau and Hong Kong can be rescued and will take a turn for the better. The good intentions of the central government are consistent in the cases of both Macau and Hong Kong.

Fourth, Xia’s visit to Macau lasted for seven days – the same situation could be seen in his last visit to Hong Kong, implying that the central authorities treat both SARs equally without perpetuating the old image of any “big Hong Kong, small Macau.” From now on, both Macau and Hong Kong are treated equally with their unique divisions of labour, with Macau focusing on its role as a “para-diplomatic” platform for mainland China to enhance its relations with Portuguese-speaking countries and countries in the European Union and Southeast Asia. Hong Kong remains an international financial and monetary centre with its global connections and common law system, playing its role as a “super-connector” in terms of economic and trade relations with other countries in the world.

Fifth, Xia’s speech delivered during his meeting with the business elites in Macau pointed to a critical issue of how the central authorities augmented the physical space of Macau. He said that when Macau was administratively returned by Portugal to China in 1999, its area was only 21.45 square kilometres, but Macau’s area has recently increased further after the central government has allowed 33.3 square kilometres of land reclamation, conferred 85 square kilometres of waters to Macau, and integrated 224.76 square kilometres of Hengqin with Macau. As a result, Macau’s physical space has expanded tremendously, creating more space for socio-economic development—an unprecedented experiment, even unrivalled in Hong Kong.

Sixth, Xia pointed to the autonomy of Macau, which has trade relations with some 120 countries, and enjoys visa-free entry for its residents to 145 countries and places. In a sense, both Macau and Hong Kong enjoy some degree of external autonomy allowed by the central authorities in Beijing—another distinctive feature of the “one country, two systems” in the two SAPRs.

Seventh, Xia paid attention to the youths in both Macau and Hong Kong, appealing to them to integrate with the mainland, develop their patriotic sentiment, and help the SARs develop innovation and technology. Xia’s visits to the University of Macau and the Macau University of Science and Technology were significant, as the two universities have risen prominently in international ranking and research productivity.

Eighth, Xia’s visit to the Macau New Neighbourhood in Hengqin was accompanied by his inspection to women associations, kaifong associations, labour unions, overseas Chinese associations, and the Macau Medical Centre of Beijing Union Medical College Hospital. All these visits were carefully arranged, illustrating the profound sense of the central authorities interest in improving the livelihood and well-being of the Macau people at the grassroots level. His visit to Hong Kong was also characterised by visits to the grassroot-level residents, demonstrating the emphasis of the central authorities on the basic needs of ordinary citizens. If capitalism in Macau and Hong Kong persists, it has to be benign and take into consideration the protection of the interests of lower-income citizens.

Ninth, Xia’s remarks that the central government supports what the Macau Chief Executive and SAR government have done are signalling that it backs up Ho Iat Seng, if he wishes, to run for the Chief Executive election in October. The timing of Xia’s visit to Macau was remarkably interesting, just before the election of the members of the Election Committee in August and prior to the decision of Ho Iat Seng to run in the Chief Executive election or not. Regardless of the final decision of Ho, Xia’s visit and remarks appeared to inject a strong element of confidence into Ho, if he decides to run for another term.

Tenth, Xia’s comments on Macau’s development appear to be more positive than his recent comments on Hong Kong. During a recent meeting in Beijing between Xia and Kevin Yeung, the Hong Kong Secretary for Culture, Sports and Tourism, the former appealed to the latter for making every place in Hong Kong SAR a tourist spot. This comment reflected Xia’s concern about Hong Kong’s ways of managing tourism. The mega-sports events, as recently emphasised by the Hong Kong authorities, have turned out to encounter public criticisms. Xia’s comment on the need for Hong Kong to make every place in the city a tourist spot was an implicit criticism of the ways in which Hong Kong tourist authorities have been managing tourism – a remark that should prompt them to reflect self-critically and innovatively. Xia’s meetings with some Hong Kong secretaries in Beijing, and his visits to Macau, also point to the proactive way central authorities are now managing the development of Hong Kong and Hong Kong – a reflection of the center’s “comprehensive jurisdiction” over the two SARs.

In conclusion, Xia’s visit to Macau had significant similarities with his previous visit to Hong Kong, demonstrating how the Beijing authorities have been adopting central pro-activity on the development of both Macau and Hong Kong. Such central proactivity embraces inspection study visits, open comments, public remarks on the two cities, and direct and explicit policy advice given to the high-level officials of Macau and Hong Kong. Xia’s comments on Macau also paved the way for Ho Iat Seng – if he is willing – to run for the second term in the upcoming Chief Executive election in Macau. The two SARs are portrayed as unique in their models of “one country, two systems,” with Hong Kong being an international financial and monetary centre and Macau as an international tourism hub where deeper economic integration with Hengqin is fostered and where obvious economic diversification from its previously over-reliance on casino-propelled capitalism is accelerated. The two SARs are expected to look after the interests and well-being of residents at the grassroots level, while their three branches of government are characterised by the executive-led nature of the administration and accompanied by judicial independence and harmonious partnerships between the executive and the legislature. Infrastructure projects and development remain the pillar of socio-economic integration between Macau and Hong Kong on the one hand and the mainland on the other, while the cultures of the East meeting the West are retained as a unique feature of the “one country, two systems” in the two capitalist enclaves.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

The visit of the Chinese President Xi Jinping to France, Serbia and Hungary could be seen as a new move by China to implement its foreign policy of pushing the world to multipolarity rather than a unipolar world under the US dominance and hegemony. Nevertheless, the current world arguably remains unipolar as the US military spending is the top among all countries. The drive to multipolarity will likely propel the world toward uncertainties and instability unless diplomacy is extensively deployed to minimize the ideological differences and mutual misperceptions among various countries.

In September 2023, when the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Moscow, Wang said that China and Russia adhered to independent foreign policies and that they do not target third parties. Wang added that both countries should uphold “genuine multilateralism,” promote “multipolarity” in the world, and improve global governance in a more fair and equitable way (Global Times, September 19, 2023). He elaborated that, in the face of unilateralism, hegemonism and confrontational blocs, both China and Russia should show their roles as “major powers” with international obligations.

Obviously, Wang was referring to the US hegemony and the US-led allies in the world, emphasizing how China and Russia can and will be major powers in the multipolar world with at least three main powers balancing each other and leading the world.

On December 27 and 28, 2023, the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs was held in Beijing, according to an article by the Chinese Ambassador to Kenya, Zhou Pingjian (see the website of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, www.mfa.gov.cn, January 5, 2024). He said that President Xi had delivered a speech in the conference, and that the president mentioned the need for China to build a community with a shared future for the mankind in the era of turbulence and transformation. Most importantly, an equal and a multipolar world would bring about mutual progress, stability, peace, and democracy in international politics.

In January 2024, the People’s Daily published a speech delivered by the Chinese President Xi Jinping on multipolarity (Xinhua, January 19, 2024). The article referred to President Xi’s speech in 2017 in Switzerland, emphasizing the importance of being tolerant in the process of economic globalization, the significance of China’s Belt and Road Initiative that encourages socio-economic, cultural and technological exchanges among countries at all levels, and the necessity of creating a multipolar world where “countries, regardless of their size, strength, rich or poor, should be fair members of the society with equal rights to participate in decision making and to implement their obligations.”

As a country in the Global South, China advocates the need for all developing nations to share their destiny, to protect their interests and to have representative roles and voice in global affairs. What China advocates, according to President Xi, is a fair and multipolar world in which “hegemonism and authoritarian politics are opposed” while the “democratization of international relations” is propelled forward.

In February 2024, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met the French Foreign Minister Stephane Sejourne during the Munich Security Conference, and he said that both countries should join hands to build a multipolar world, apart from the need to strengthen strategic dialogue, mutual cooperation and people-to-people exchange (China Daily, February 18, 2024).

During the most recent trip of President Xi to France on May 7, he said that both China and France should avoid the resurgence of a new Cold War while strengthening cooperation at all levels, including climate change, Artificial Intelligence governance, monetary and financial reforms, the Middle East crises, green development, biodiversity and ocean governance, and agricultural development. Some twenty agreements were reached between China and France.

When President Xi met the French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, he appealed to the need for China and Europe to contribute to peace and security in a world that is moving toward multipolarity. President Xi also refuted the argument that China had “excessive industrial capacity” – an implication that the US had produced such a “misperception” in the world and Europe. 

Given France’s traditionally independent foreign policy, China clearly hopes to woo the support of France away from the US-led alliance, while conducting united front work on other more independent countries like Serbia and Hungary to make the European Union more “independent” of the influence from US and its allies.

President Xi’s trip to Serbia had important symbolic and substantial significance, diplomatically speaking. Symbolically, Serbia was a country where NATO bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, but President Xi this time deliberately skipped the visit to the site of the 1999 NATO bombing. If Chinese politics attach great importance to the question of face, President Xi’s move was to give face to NATO without stimulating the psyche of the US and its allies – a gesture of goodwill and Chinese generosity even though many Western countries see China as a “threat.”

Serbia was historically symbolic of the successful resistance and guerrilla war against fascism, for its former Yugoslavia under Tito was characterized by socialism and non-alignment movement – a historical development comparable to Communist China where its guerillas succeeded in resisting the Japanese imperial forces. Ideologically speaking, Serbia and China had much in common in their historical experiences. The six-point agreement reached between China and Serbia during President Xi’s visit – free trade, Serbia’s 2027 EXPO collaboration with China, Serbian exports to China, scientific exchanges, youth exchanges, and aviation cooperation as well as air links – is a breakthrough in Sino-Serbian relations.

During President Xi’s last stop in Hungary, he met Prime Minister Viktor Orban who is reputable for his tough stance on the NATO and the European Union, although Hungary is a member of both organizations. Clearly, President Xi’s visit to Hungary was both symbolic and substantial, symbolic of the fact that Hungary adopts a relatively independent foreign policy and substantial in that both China and Hungary reach eighteen agreements.

In December 2023, Hungary announced that China’s BYD would open its first European Electronic Vehicles (EVs) production factory in the southern region – a move that marked the important inroads made by BYD in China’s automobile development. Unlike the European Union that imposes duties on EVs from China, Hungary is far more receptive to the Chinese EVs. Interestingly, top executives at BMW and Volkswagen warned against EU imposition of duties on Chinese EVs, because they said the move would be detrimental to automakers that import cars made in China (Reuters, May 8, 2024).

Overall, China’s diplomatic quest for multipolarity has a major motive. It aims at countering the US hegemony at a time when the US and its allies are not only seeing China as a real “military” and “economic” threat, but also regarding China’s ally, namely Russia, as a country that must be either “contained” or “checked.” A new Cold War mentality does persist in the world, and as such, creating a multipolar world carries the ideology of resisting hegemonism and generating a world of socialist equality characterized by “the common destiny of the mankind.” 

The Chinese diplomacy of building up a multipolar world is characterized by building up bilateral and multilateral relations with various countries, including Russia and the Global South, to check the US hegemonism. The Belt and Road Initiative has become a means by which China pursues the diplomacy of multipolarity, trying to achieve a win-win situation in terms of socio-economic and technological development.

However, the current world is still dominated by the US, militarily speaking. The US military spending tops all the countries in the world, followed by China. Even though the Chinese military has been improving its hardware and increasing its spending, their capabilities remain relatively untested because the People’s Liberation Army has not fought a war since the Sino-Vietnamese war in 1979. The increases in military expenditure alone cannot easily China up to the superpower status as with the US, from a critical perspective.

Although US succession politics have been adopting democratic mechanisms and showing contentious tendencies, as shown in Donald Trump’s political emergence and recent resurgence, succession politics in China remains to be characterized by a high degree of uncertainties. Indeed, China’s economy and infrastructure development have been expanding tremendously. Still, it is debatable whether the world at present is already multipolar. If the current world remains unipolar dominated by the US militarily, then the Chinese drive toward a multipolar world is likely generating more uncertainties and challenges to the international world.

The drive toward multipolarity means, as the Chinese have officially argued, the “democratization of international relations.” Such democratization means that the US is finding it more difficult than before to control and shape the foreign policies of many countries in the world, like the current situation in which anti-US sentiment is running high among many countries in the Global South, especially in view of the US support of Israel in the Middle East crises. “Democratization” in international relations also means that more countries in the world are challenging the US and its allies, while forming coalitions among themselves, thereby propelling the world toward the path of more uncertainties, instability, and tensions. 

Democratization of international relation is fostering a strong sense of the perception of the “China threat,” because the Chinese actions are seen as a menace to some countries. The recent tensions between China and the Philippines over the islands in the South China Sea is a good example showing this perception. While the Philippines has been drifting closer to the US than ever before, its nationalist stance over the sovereignty dispute is pitting Manila against Beijing dangerously. From a critical perspective, the ruling elites in the Philippines have failed to conduct a risk assessment of a possible conflict with China, for the sizable Filipino workers in the South China region, including Hong Kong and Macau, would be affected as they are now remitting their earnings back to their relatives in the Philippines. In other words, any military conflict with China over the islands in the South China Sea would likely bring about unanticipated and immense economic costs to the Philippines.

A multipolar world is also mixing up internal political development with external foreign policies in a cyclical manner. While the US is internally pluralistic and democratic but externally hegemonic, China is domestic paternalistic but externally more “democratic,” as Beijing has emphasized the “democratization” of international relations.

The contradictions between domestic and external policies between China and the US are deepening their perceptions and misperceptions, mutual distrust, political antagonism, ideological confrontations, and cross-border interactions. The US support of Taiwan is seen by China as politically unacceptable, while Washington and its allies see Taiwan as a democracy whose security, survival and stability must be defended. The recent US criticism of China’s handling of Hong Kong has also been regarded by Beijing as an interference with its domestic affairs. If domestic politics and external foreign policies are increasingly intertwined in the multipolar world, then international relations will increasingly be controversial and vulnerable to confrontations and conflicts.

In conclusion, China’s recent quest for a multipolar world can be interpreted as a sign of its socialist and egalitarian drive toward the creation of a fair world without hegemonism and unilateralism, but a world characterized by peace, security, order, prosperity, and multilateralism. Yet, the democratization of international relations has already challenged the economic, military, ideo-political interests of the US and its allies, thereby creating a backlash of reactive alliance-building and a deepening “misperception” of “the China threat.” Despite the good intention of creating a world of peace, security and stability, theoretically and practically the democratization of international relations is generating more political uncertainties, more economic and territorial disputes, and more vulnerabilities to military conflicts in the world, mainly because the intertwined nature of domestic political development and foreign policies is increasingly prominent, ideologically contentious, economically conflict-ridden and diplomatically demanding. Perhaps only diplomatic dialogue and finesse constitute an indispensable ingredient that can and will bring about calmness, rationality, stability, and peace in the world of ceaseless power struggles among various countries.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

The four-day and 19^th Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) was held in the city of Qingdao in China’s Shandong province on April 21, 2024, with the participation of some 180 naval representatives from 29 countries; nevertheless, the symposium appeared to have limitations due to the profound distrust and mutual perceptions of military threats among some of the countries concerned.

The WPNS was founded in 1988 and currently there are 23 member states and 7 observer states. The last forum was held in Japan’s Yokohama in 2022.

The 19^th WPNS aimed at narrowing difference of opinions on maritime issues, establishing a mechanism of global maritime governance and attempting to resolve maritime issues and disputes among countries concerned through dialogue and friendly consultation. The event this time was kicked off by an opening speech from the vice chairman of the Chinese Central Military Commission, Zhang Youxia. Zhang said that the Chinese armed forces actively participated in the international cooperation of maritime security and that China would continue to play a positive role in international military collaboration.

He also remarked: “We should resolutely abandon the Cold War mentality, join hands to create peace and stability, bridge differences through dialogue and consultation, jointly discuss and establish rules for governance, and push maritime security governance to a new level with practical results (Global Times, April 22, 2024).” Zhang added that China would not make troubles and would not be afraid of dealing with troubles, because the Chinese armed forces would resolutely safeguard China’s national unity and interests.

The biennial meeting carried the theme of “Oceans with a Shared Future,” and it was held in China the second time after it had hosted the event in 2014. The naval delegates discussed the Global Security Initiative and maritime peace and order based on maritime security cooperation, the observance on international law, and the improvement of global maritime governance. It was reported that the symposium also discussed how countries would avoid the possibility of clashes of drones on the seas, while updating the rules and regulations governing maritime accidents. The rules and regulations on maritime accidents were approved by the symposium ten years ago and they were regarded as applicable by the ASEAN in 2016 to deal with any accident in the South China Seas.

The US Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Stephen Koehler attended the event, together with other delegates from Australia, France, India, Britain, Russia, Japan, South Korea, Cambodia, Chile, Indonesia and Pakistan. According to the Global Times, the media were eager to interview the US delegates, who however did not answer any questions. The Russian naval commander Alexander Moiseyev also attended the symposium, according to Taiwan’s United Daily News (April 22, 2024)

On the same day of the WPNS opening ceremony, the US and the Philippines conducted their annual Balikatan or “shoulder to shoulder” military exercise in the Philippines, projecting an image and a perception that they saw the Chinese naval moves in the Asia-Pacific region as a “threat.”

Furthermore, the delegates from the Philippines were absent in the Qingdao WPNS symposium – a political gesture of displeasure over the disputes with China about the sovereignty of islands and reefs in the South China Sea. The recent confrontation between the Chinese maritime vessels and the Philippine boats in the South China Sea, including the usage of water cannons by the Chinese side and the continuous moves from the Philippine side, has worsened the Sino-Philippines relations. As such, the absence of the Philippines in the WPNS symposium, together with the silence of US delegates in face of media questions, perhaps pointed to the two countries’ displeasure with the Chinese naval moves in the South China Sea. Perhaps fortunately, talks between the Chinese and US naval chiefs have resumed under the principle of military-to-military communications after the San Francisco meeting between President Xi Jinping and President Joe Biden.

The Chinese side saw the recent moves of Philippine boats near the disputed reefs in South China Sea as a deviation from a tacit consensus between the Chinese government and the Philippines administration under the former President Rodrigo Duterte, who was more pro-Beijing and less pro-US than the current President Romualdez Marcos Jr. In fact, the fluctuating political and diplomatic orientation of the Philippines government under varying presidents has become a pivotal factor shaping the military and naval relations between the Philippines and China. The challenge is how the two countries can and will manage their opinion differences and sovereignty disputes over the reefs in the South China Sea in a diplomatic, skillful, and peaceful manner.

General Zhang Youxia’s opening speech on April 22 appealed to the abandonment of the “Cold War mentality” – a remark directed at the US and its allies without naming the superpower. Zhang’s comment that China would take “firm countermeasures against unreasonable provocations” appeared to be a warning to any country making such moves in South China Sea.

If the symposium represents military diplomacy of the countries involved, it does have limitations due to profound distrust and mutual perceptions of military threats among some of the countries.

This year’s WPNS coincided with the 75^th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army Navy, which was holding public commemorative events at a time when the symposium was held. The commemorative events were staged in major naval ports including Qingdao, Dalian, Yantai, Shanghai, Xiamen, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, Haikou and Sanya. It has been anticipated that the Chinese naval fleet would perhaps become the world’s “largest” one by 2035 – a move that conformed to the plan of making the PLA to become “a world class” force by 2027, which would reach the 100 anniversaries of the founding of the PLA (United Daily News, April 22, 2024).”

About ten days after the symposium, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin went to Oahu in Honolulu to meet his counterparts from Australia, Japan and the Philippines. He said that the talks would continue their “historical progress” on how to deepen defense and security ties among the US allies amid the perception of “the China threat.” Such a perception was articulated by Admiral John C. Aquilino, who was the head of the US Indo-Pacific Command and who told the Senate on March 21, 2024, that the Chinese military actions were “becoming more belligerent [and] their rhetoric is clearer (Air & Space Forces Magazine, March 21, 2024).” The new head of the Indo-Pacific Command, Sam Paparo, succeeded Aquilino on May 4 when Austin presided over the handover ceremony. Austin said that China “continues to engage in increasingly coercive behavior and we can see that across the Taiwan Strait, in the East and South China Seas, among the Pacific Island countries along the line of actual control with India and more (Hawaii News Now, May 4, 2024).” He even went so far as to say that China is “the only country with both the will and increasingly the capacity to dominate the Indo-Pacific and to reshape the global order to suit its autocratic vision (Hawaii News Now, May 4, 2024).” Undoubtedly, the Chinese side must disagree with his views as reported above.

From an objective and analytical perspective, Austin’s remarks, together with Zhang’s comments in his opening speech of the WPNS, are a testimony to the profound distrust and mutual perceptions of military threats between the US and China respectively.

In conclusion, the WPNS represented the military diplomacy conducted by member countries involved, but it has severe limitations due to the profound distrust and mutual perceptions of military threats among some countries, including the US, China, the Philippines and many others. Having said that, the symposium at least symbolized the willingness among the countries concerned to sit down and share their views, hoping to resolve their maritime issues and perhaps disputes through a long but difficult process of dialogue and trust-building. Some of the issues that were discussed in the symposium, such as the updating of the rules and regulations on maritime accidents, are militarily and practically important, for they involve how naval vessels and aerial equipment like drones may avoid clashes and mutual disturbances – issues that are conducive to the avoidance of maritime accidents, the necessity of international cooperation, and the maintenance of maritime peace and security, thereby minimizing the possibilities of military misunderstandings and miscalculations.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

The three-day visit of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken to China from April 24 to April 26 and his meetings with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and President Xi Jinping demonstrated the emergence of a new Sino-US diplomacy of managing their divergent views over a multiplicity of issues, ranging from issues of “low-level” politics that can reach consensus to issues of “high-level politics” that necessitate reiterations of their positions rather than a search for immediate solutions.

Blinken’s visit to China was originally handled by the Chinese side in a low-key manner, but his eventual meetings with President Xi Jinping demonstrated a unique Chinese way of managing his visit in an increasingly politically important manner as time passed from April 24 to April 26—an implication that Beijing handles its relations with Washington from an approach of relative coolness to one of increasing warmness. On April 24, when Blinken arrived in Shanghai, he was received at the airport by the Shanghai city’s foreign affairs office director, unlike Blinken’s last visit to China, when he was greeted by an official dealing with American affairs in the Foreign Office. It looked as if the official nomenklatura of the Chinese official greeting him this time when he stepped down from the plane was comparatively lower than his last visit—perhaps an implicit message that Sino-US relations deteriorated from June 2023 to the present. Such a deterioration of Sino-US relations could also be seen in the remarks of Wang Yi to Blinken on April 26, when Wang commented that “the negative factors shaping Sino-US relations are still ascending and aggregating.”

Most interestingly, during the meeting with Blinken, President Xi Jinping was sitting in the middle of the long table, whereas the American delegation led by Blinken sat on his right-hand side, with Blinken listening and speaking to Xi, and both were shown standing side by side in an official photo. The CCTV news also showed that Xi and Blinken shook hands for one second this time, unlike the two seconds last time when Blinken visited China in June 2023. From the perspective of political symbolism, the phenomenon of President Xi sitting in the middle refers to the position of China as a host, with the president’s status naturally much higher than that of the US Secretary of State. From another perspective, China remains a self-confident country without any need to, unlike the weak Qing dynasty in Chinese history under the onslaught of foreign imperialism, “kowtow” to any foreign power. Instead, China, under the leadership of Xi remains not only self-confident but also insistent on its principles on foreign relations.

As such, President Xi Jinping’s remarks to Blinken were politically important. He said that both China and the US should be partners rather than competitors. Both countries, Xi said, should make mutual achievements instead of harming each other, and both countries should also trust their words and take actions to have fruitful results rather than saying one thing but doing another matter at the same time. Xi’s comments here were direct criticisms of US foreign policy towards China, saying that the US should not treat China as a competitor but as a cooperative partner. The comments on the US action as not conforming to its words implicitly refer to the US foreign policy on not only Taiwan – as Wang Yi repeated that Taiwan remains a red line that the US should not cross—but also trade matters in which the US has recently taken action to struggle with China. 

Interestingly, President Xi spoke in a relatively serious tone and at a at a slow pace, as shown in the TV news, implying perhaps an indication that the top Chinese leader was voicing his heartfelt views and giving his solemn advice to the top US diplomat on the topic of Sino-US relations. 

Wang Yi, during his meeting with Blinken, explicitly said that the Chinese people’s developmental rights should not be exploited, and that Chinese technology should not be “suppressed.” Wang argued that on trade issues, both countries should have fair competition rather than suppression and containment from the other side. Moreover, he hoped that the US side should stop “cooking up” the “fake story” of China’s “excessive industrial capacity”—an i indirect and unnamed criticism of Janet Yellen’s emphasis on Beijing’s “excessive industrial capacity” during her recent visit to China. Wang also urged the US side to repeal the “illegal” sanctions imposed by the US on Chinese enterprises and to stop levying tariffs on Chinese goods. 

On April 18, US President Joe Biden called for the existing tariff rate on Chinese steel and aluminium to be tripled as the US Trade Representative’s office announced the launch of another Section 301 investigation into China’s maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors. The investigation was a response to a petition by five US national labour unions accusing China of utilising “unfair, non-market policies and practices” to dominate the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors. During a visit to the swing state of Pennsylvania, Biden told a group of steelworkers that the Chinese are “not competing” but “cheating (South China Morning Post, April 22, 2024, p. A1).” Wang Yi’s comments on the US tariffs could be seen as a reaction to the US move to enhance the tariff rate on Chinese steel and aluminium.

On the matter of Taiwan, Wang Yi’s remarks were politically very explicit. He emphasised that while Taiwan is a politically red line that the US side should not cross, the US should stop arming Taiwan and the US should support China’s peaceful reunification. If President Xi mentioned to President Joe Biden the US action of arming Taiwan in the San Francisco meeting, then what Wang Yi said during his meeting with Blinken was not only a reiteration of the Chinese position, but also an implication that, if mainland China and Taiwan may have any political dialogue in the future, the prospects of US arms sales to Taiwan will likely be a matter of negotiation that will necessitate US consideration and Beijing-Washington discussions.

What perhaps stimulated the Chinese side shortly before the Blinken visit to China was that hours before Blinken landed in Shanghai, President Biden signed a bipartisan bill that included billions of dollars in defence aid for Taiwan. The US weapons supply to Taiwan remains a thorn in US-China relations, but from Washington’s perspective, it is necessary for Taiwan to “deter” the Chinese military threat.

Wang Yi’s comments on US foreign policy towards Asia were noteworthy. He remarked that the US side should abandon the policy of creating “small circles” in the Asia-Pacific region, that the US should not force other countries in the region to take sides, and that the US should not station and deploy medium-range missiles in Asia. 

Wang’s remarks above showed that China is unhappy with the US military moves in strengthening its alliance in the Asia-Pacific region, including the recent news that Japan is going to join the AUKUS, a trilateral security partnership for the Indo-Pacific region between Australia, the UK, and the US that was established in September 2021. Canada is also considering the enhancement of its submarines in response to the activities from China and Russia in the North Pole. On April 24, Chinese Defence Ministry spokesman Wu Qian said that China paid attention to all these moves, expressed its grave concern, and opposed any move to create bloc confrontation and splittist tendencies. Wu also said that the Asia-Pacific region should not become a geopolitical rivalry centre and that the actions of the US, UK, and Australia are challenging the peace and stability of Asia. Hence, Wang Yi’s remarks to Blinken could be seen as a reiteration of the comments made by Wu Qian.

According to Yonhap News Agency, the US is considering the addition of South Korea, Canada, and New Zealand as the new partners to ANKUS plus Japan. If so, a technological and military alliance led by the US will consolidate its alliance in the Asia-Pacific region, apart from a recent report saying that the US is going to deploy and station medium range missiles in Luzon of the Philippines. The Sino-Philippine disputes over the islands and reefs in South China Sea have already propelled the military alliance between Manila and Washington, and between Manila and Tokyo, making Beijing feel that the US together with Japan’s support are enhancing their military “containment” policy toward China, although the US side has consistently denied it adopts any “containment” approach.

Indeed, the geopolitical and military tensions in Asia are rising. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has recently inspected the tests for a new rocket that could be used to attack Seoul in South Korea and that could assist Russia in its war against Ukraine. The 240-millimeter multiple rocket launcher has an estimated range of 40 kilometres and 60 kilometres. If so, it is natural that the US and its allies have been enhancing their military cooperation, cooperation, and preparedness, especially Japan which is worrying about the North Korean military capabilities and whose rearmament is rapid with the explicit US support. Despite all these military moves, the Chinese and American sides have engaged each other with dialogue in the 19^th Western Pacific Naval Symposium in Qingdao on April 23 in which the Chinese side appealed to 22 member states and 7 observer states to enhance communications, increase cooperation, promote development, and protect naval safety and ocean well-being (Oriental Daily, April 25, 2024, p. A17). 

The Blinken visit to China does have some achievements in managing divergence between Washington and Beijing. Both sides reached a five-point consensus. First, both sides continue to implement the directives from the chief executives of the two countries to stabilise and develop Sino-US relations based on the consensus from the San Francisco meeting. Second, both sides agree to maintain high-level interactions and talks at various levels of the government, and to continue to utilise diplomatic, economic, monetary, and commercial mechanisms. Third, both sides agree to adopt Artificial Intelligence in their first government-to-government meeting and to propel the development of Sino-US dialogue on Asia-Pacific affairs, ocean affairs, and the discussions between their embassies. The Sino-US working group against narcotics will hold a high-level meeting, and the US side will welcome Chinese climate change envoy Liu Zhenmin to visit the US. Fourth, both sides will expand the exchange of people in the humanities and educational sectors, welcoming the arrival of more exchange students and organising a high-level Sino-US tourist dialogue in the city of Sian in May. Fifth, both sides will send envoys to enhance their communications over the hot spots internationally so that mutual consultation will persist.

The five-point consensus above shows how the US and China manage the ideological, military, and political divergence in a diplomatic manner. By dealing with issues of low-level politics, such as anti-narcotics, climate change, and educational and personnel exchanges, Sino-US relations can be improved at least slightly than ever before. Moreover, continuous dialogue over a whole range of issues, including the contentious hot spots, will be conducive to the management of not only divergence but also the possibilities of sudden conflicts and military crises. As Antony Blinken told Xi Jinping during their meeting, both sides can minimise misperceptions, miscalculations, and misunderstandings through face-to-face meetings at the high level—perhaps a move setting a precedent for the ongoing US-China relations regardless of whether Donald Trump may return to presidential power in the upcoming US presidential elections. 

Blinken also brought up some issues of US concern during his meetings with the Chinese side, including the concern about Chinese logistical supplies to the Russian military infrastructure, and the question of so-called Chinese “intervention” in US elections. Perhaps the two issues above could not be expected to achieve any significant and immediate breakthrough. Nevertheless, Blinken wisely brought with him officials who could communicate with their Chinese counterparts on issues that can improve US-China relations at the operational level. Todd Robinson, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and Nathaniel Fick, ambassador-at-large for cyberspace, were among the officials accompanying Blinken’s visit.

In conclusion, the Blinken visit to China and his talks with Wang Yi and President Xi showed that both the US and China have been managing their divergence through face-to-face dialogue and meetings. This new diplomacy of managing divergence carries the characteristics of (1) separating the issues of “low-level politics” from those of “high-level politics,” (2) dealing with the practical issues of anti-narcotics, climate change, personnel, and student exchanges in a more in-depth and productive way, (3) reiterating their positions on issues of “high-level politics” in formal meetings, and (4) coming up with the five-point consensus on how to manage their divergence for the sake of minimising misperceptions, misunderstandings, and miscalculations. As such, both China and the US are trying their best to control their divergence and minimise crises and conflicts in a proactive and productive way. If so, there are grounds for cautiousness and political optimism amidst all the geopolitical tensions, military muscle-flexing activities and alliance-building activities in the Asia-Pacific region.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

The 11-day mainland journey of the former Kuomintang President Ma Ying-jeou, who eventually met Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing on April 11, had important cultural and political implications for cross-strait relations shortly before the swearing-in ceremony of the new Taiwan leader William Lai on May 20.

Ma’s visit in April 2024 was meticulously planned and carefully orchestrated one year after his first mainland 12-day visit in March 2023. On April 1, 2024, Ma arrived at Shenzhen and was greeted by Pan Xianzhang, a vice director of the mainland’s State Council Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO). On the same night, Ma attended a dinner hosted by TAO director Song Tao – an indication that the mainland side treated his visit as of high importance. Song remarked that the comrades of the two straits are Chinese who must insist on the principles of supporting the 1992 consensus (both sides accept that there is only one China with its meaning up to their interpretations), opposing “Taiwan independence” and rejecting foreign intervention. Furthermore, Song added that the two straits should promote not only cooperation and exchange in various areas but also the culture and welfare of the people. He stressed the importance of propelling the process of reunification and the renaissance of the Chinese nation – similar messages that later President Xi reiterated in the apex of Ma’s visit to the mainland on April 11.

Ma and his delegation, including many young Taiwan people, were arranged to visit technological giants like DJI Technology, Tencent and BYD and historical sites, like the former residence of Sun Yat-sen, the Whampoa Military Academy, a museum commemorating the second Sino-Japanese war, and the Great Wall. On April 4, Ma and his entourage, after visiting Zhongshan, Zhuhai and Guangzhou, went to attend a large-scale and impressive ceremony of honouring Huangdi, or Yellow Emperor, in Shaanxi province. Ma was accompanied by Song Tao and the host in the ceremony referred to Ma as the former chairman of the Chinese Nationalist Party – a formal and political respect conferred upon him. After the ceremony, Ma and his delegation visited the Ma Yuan Memorial Temple, Ma Yuan Tomb, Famen Temple, Xian City Wall, Emperor Qinshihuang’s Mausoleum Site Museum, the Xian branch of China National Archives of Publications and Culture, and the Shaanxi History Museum.

If political symbolism embraces the historical meanings of the sites of cultural visits, Ma’s visit to the various cultural and historical places in the mainland represented a strong and powerful appeal to cultural affinity and union across the two straits. These cultural visits preceded the highlight of Ma’s visit – his meeting with Xi in Beijing.

His meeting with the Chinese Communist Party’s General Secretary Xi Jinping, as reported in the mainland media, was an apex of Ma’s visit. General Secretary Xi’s remarks were summed up in five points. First, Xi said that the comrades across the two straits are Chinese, and as such, there is no grudge that cannot be resolved. Xi added that both sides can discuss all kinds of issues and that no force can separate the two sides. Second, according to Xi, systemic differences cannot change the objective reality that the two straits belong to one country and one nation. Third, Xi remarked that the Chinese nation has a common belief that the territory cannot be separated, that it cannot be chaotic, that its nationality cannot be divided, and that its civilization cannot be terminated. Fourth, the comrades from the two straits are belonging to one family, and therefore they should have frequent and much closer interactions as with the situation of relatives. Fifth, Xi hoped that the young people across the two straits should learn from each other, become friends and partners with similar mindset in their historical path of walking and running together in which their torch will be received with the youthful force of realising the Chinese renaissance (Wen Wei Po, April 11, 2024, p. A4).

Ma responded to Xi’s remarks in a “diplomatic” tone, although he did not have an official capacity. He said: “I sincerely hope that both sides can respect the values and ways of life of their peoples.” To Ma, given the recent tensions between the two straits that triggered a sense of insecurity among some people in Taiwan, both sides should have “the wisdom to handle their disputes peacefully.” Otherwise, any conflict would become “unbearable to the Chinese nation.” Ma’s anti-conflict message was conveyed quite effectively to the mainland side, while his visits focused on cultural affinity and oneness. Ma at one point referred to Taiwan as the Republic of China in the slip of his tongue (Ming Pao, April 11, 2024, p. A14).

The cultural and political implications of the Ma visit are significant.

First, both Ma and Xi emphasised cultural oneness, with the implication that both sides can and should consider forming a cultural union at some stage in the future, even if political differences may linger on both sides of the political leadership. The theme of cultural oneness ran through Ma’s visit from April 1 to 12 – a theme that was also emphasised by the mainland officials during their meetings with Ma and his delegation.

If the mainland side’s White Paper on the Taiwan Question (2022) mentioned a stage-by-stage process of negotiation with the Taiwan side in the future, the formation of a Chinese cultural union can arguably be considered by both sides, regardless of whether the political differences across the two straits can be narrowed, minimised, and solved eventually.

Second, the exchange of youth is a main theme of Ma’s visit this time. Following the visit of Ma and his delegation to the mainland, it is reported in Taiwan that Hung Hsiu-chu, the former vice chairwoman of the Kuomintang, will lead a large delegation of Taiwan youth to the mainland in August.

Youth exchange can and will indeed foster deeper understanding not only among the young people of the two straits, but also the Taiwan people’s appreciation of mainland China’s profound socio-economic and technological transformations. Culturally speaking, the identity of those Taiwan youths who interact more with the mainlanders will hopefully develop their stronger Chinese cultural identity, as with the mainland youth. The shared common cultural identity will hopefully in the long run maintain the historical bonding of the two straits.

However, from the perspective of the Taiwan critics of the Ma visit, Ma and his delegation fell into the “united front” umbrella of the mainland side – a criticism that reflected perhaps more on the resistance of some Taiwan people to closer interactions and integration with the mainland than the political “vulnerability” of Ma and his delegates.

Identity politics matter in the interactions between the two straits. The shared Chinese cultural identity and the Taiwan identity are not in conflict with each other.  Both identities can arguably coexist instead of viewing them simplistically as a zero-sum game, as some Taiwan people with a very strong localist and Taiwanese identity see it. Localism has become so strong in Taiwan that some Taiwanese, perhaps like the core and diehard supportive of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), see themselves more as Taiwanese rather than as Chinese. Those supporters of the Kuomintang, however, tend to be less localist and more Chinese culturalist, having more cultural and perhaps emotional linkages with the mainland.

Third, the role of Ma Ying-jeou as the most influential political middleman has become prominent since his visit to the mainland in April. Regardless of the localist critics seeing him as being pro-mainland, his appeal to the mainland side for peaceful relations across the two straits is of utmost importance. If people-to-people interactions are of utmost importance in bridging the communication gap and narrowing the political differences between the two straits, Ma Ying-jeou is standing out as the most influential intermediary between the mainland and Taiwan.

In the event of any crisis across the Taiwan Strait, Ma Ying-jeou will be well positioned to act as a problem-solver, go-between and mediator between the Taiwan side and the mainland. In the event of a less tense relationship between the two straits, Ma will also be able to bring the ideas of closer socio-cultural and economic integration and political talks to the mainland side, or vice versa. His political role cannot be underestimated.

Fourth, during General Secretary Xi’s meeting with Ma, the former emphasised the undesirability of foreign intervention in Taiwan affairs – a point that was also stressed by President Xi Jinping in his most recent phone meeting with US President Joe Biden. The question of foreign intervention remains a thorny issue between China and the US. Interestingly, during the Kuomintang (KMT) vice chairman Andrew Hsia’s visit to the US on April 13, he told the US legislators that the KMT wants to show affinity towards the US, pursue friendship with Japan and maintain peaceful relations with China (Taipei Times, April 14, 2024). Hsia’s visit to the US, together with Ma’s visit to the mainland, appeared to project an image that the blue camp remains the most influential intermediary in the mainland-Taiwan-US triangular relations. If the mainland rejects any US intervention in the question of Taiwan’s future, then the KMT and its former president Ma Ying-jeou have the potential to become a key political player bridging the communication gap between Beijing and Washington.

Politically and ideologically speaking, the DPP tends to be more far pro-US, far more pro-Japanese and far less pro-mainland than the KMT. The KMT’s ideology tends to be undoubtedly more acceptable to the mainland. If the KMT ideology is politically acceptable to the mainland, the blue camp in Taiwan politics becomes increasingly influential in cross-strait relations.

If the provision of weapons from the US to Taiwan is an indispensable part of the “deterrence” strategy to protect Taiwan vis-à-vis the mainland, such provision in terms of timing and scope would quite likely become a bargaining topic in the event of any dialogue between the two straits. It was reported that President Xi Jinping brought up the issue of US provision of military weapons to Taiwan in his phone talks with President Biden. As such, it is likely that the KMT core leaders, such as Andrew Hsia and former leader Ma Ying-jeou, would perhaps be the important but neglected middlemen bringing the mainland ideas of how to reduce “foreign military intervention” to the US side, especially in the event of a stage-by-stage process of dialogue between the mainland and the Taiwan sides in the future.

However, in the foreseeable future, given the US Congress has already voted a bill in support of military packages to the Asia-Pacific region, including Taiwan, the supply of US weapons to Taiwan will remain the “deterrence” strategy bolstering Taiwan’s military defensive capability.

Fifth, the second Ma-Xi meeting came at a time just about one month before the swearing-in ceremony of president-elect William Lai in Taiwan. Lai has been criticised by the mainland as a “separatist” and it remains to be seen how he and his officials will moderate their tone and come up with a win-win solution with the mainland. If the DPP remains defiant toward the 1992 consensus in the short run, cross-strait relations will remain rocky. However, if the DPP leadership cherishes the importance of the blue camp, such as the KMT and Ma Ying-jeou, as the intermediary across the two straits, the tense relations in rhetoric would perhaps be accompanied by a silent process of dialogue indirectly through the influential middlemen.

In conclusion, Ma Ying-jeou’s visit to the mainland in April was a politically significant event, pointing to the prospect of a cultural union between the two straits in a stage-by-stage process of possible dialogue and negotiation, the likelihood of acting as a neglected but influential intermediary between the mainland-Taiwan-US sides, together with other KMT core leaders such as Andrew Hsia, and the importance of accelerating the depth and breadth of youth exchange across the two sides. Having said that, political obstacles to a more cordial relationship between the mainland and Taiwan side persist, especially as the anti-mainland DPP remains in presidential power even though the pro-mainland KMT has controlled a slight majority of seats in the Legislative Yuan. It can be anticipated that Taiwan politics will be internally riddled with constant executive-legislative struggles and partisan debates in which the mainland factor and the US role will be entangled together in a far more contentious manner than ever before. Only time will tell us whether a breakthrough in mainland-Taiwan relations will perhaps be made by more effective people-to-people interactions led by the blue camp, the KMT leaders and the former president Ma Ying-jeou.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

The most recent moves involving the Reciprocal Access Agreement between the Philippines and Japan, the joint military exercise of US-Japan-Philippines in South China Sea, the joint naval and air patrol of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the South China Sea, the US plan to station a new missile system in Asia, the expansion of AUKUS (a trilateral security partnership composed of Australia, the UK, and the US), and the US-Japan-Philippines Trilateral Security Summit in Washington have all pointed to the increasing geopolitical tensions in the Asia-Pacific region. All these military muscle-flexing activities are very worrying signs that may undermine the peace and stability of Asia, including the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Korean Peninsula.

First, Japan and the Philippines, on April 11, reached the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), in which the Philippine forces will visit Japan for training and joint exercises, and vice versa. This is a landmark military agreement for both countries, cementing their bilateral military relations after Japan signed a similar agreement with Australia in 2022 and with the United Kingdom in 2023. Although the Japanese constitution after the Second World War stated that there should not be armed forces to be stationed in overseas countries, Japan in 2009 sent its Self-Defence Force (SDF) to Djibouti in Africa for the sake of curbing pirates—an unprecedented action followed by the Kishida government’s updating and approval of Japan’s national security strategy, national defence strategy, and defence buildup programme in December 2022. These three documents approved in 2022 could be seen as a turning point in Japan’s defence policy, which turned from the previous principle of pacifism to perhaps the tenet of assertive self-defence and active deterrence. In recent years, Japan has increased its military and defence budget to deter its perceived military threats, including North Korea and China.

The Philippines Ambassador to the US, Jose Manuel Romualdez, said on April 10 that the Japanese SDF, US forces, and the Philippine force would regularly conduct naval drills, adding that both the US and Japan are the closest allies of the Philippines. Given the recent and ongoing disputes between the Philippines and China over some of the islands in the South China Sea, Romualdez’s remarks can be interpreted as the Philippine perception of the so-called “China threat” that, according to Manila, is “real.”

In recent months, the Chinese coastguard vessels have used water cannons against the Philippine boats that attempted to provide supplies to the marines on the Sierra Madre, a Second World War-era ship that was marooned by the Philippines in 1999 and that carried the Philippine flag. The rusty and wrecked ship was a symbol of the territorial claims made by the Philippines, but it remains a thorn in the eyes of the Chinese military. It was reported that China in 1995 seized the Mischief Reef, an action that promoted the Philippines to run the Sierra Madre aground at the Second Thomas Shaol, with the locations of both islands less than 200 nautical miles from Palwan, which is an exclusive economic zone of the Philippines.

Second, on April 7, the US, Australia, Japan, and the Philippines conducted naval drills together for the first time in the Philippine exclusive economic zone, involving the US combat ship USS mobile (LCS-26), the Australian frigate HMAS Warramunga (FFH152), the Philippine frigate BRP Antonia Luna (FF151), and the Japanese guided-missile destroyer JS Akebono (DD108). The content of the drills included anti-submarine training and naval patrol. This joint military exercise claimed to uphold “the freedom of navigation and overflight” and to “strengthen support and international cooperation to support a free and open Indo-Pacific.” The joint statement of the four nations added that they “reaffirm the position regarding the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Award as a final and legally binding decision on the parties to the dispute.” Indeed, China rejected the decision of the tribunal, but the joint statement appeared to target at China at least implicitly.

Third, as such, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducted its joint naval and air patrol on April 7 in the South China Sea, declaring that it “grasped all the military organisations and activities that stir up the situation and hot spots in the South Sea (Ming Pao, April 8, 2024).” The Liberation Army Daily said that the Philippines pulled other external countries into the affairs of the South Sea, that it created troubles, and that China has shown a great deal of “kind intentions and restraint,” but “this does not mean that the situation will be spoiled and tolerated endlessly.” Clearly, the Chinese side formally warned about the military drills that involved the four nations.

Just three days before the naval drills conducted by the US, Australia, Japan, and the Philippines, the US Navy held a swearing-in ceremony for the new commander of the US Pacific Fleet, an event that invited the Taiwan naval commander Tang Hua to attend. He was welcomed by US Indo-Pacific Command Commander John C. Aquilino. Aquilino said in his address to Sydney’s Lowy Institute on April 9 that China’s actions against the Philippines, especially in Second Thomas Shaol, were “dangerous, illegal, and they are destabilising the region (Reuters, April 9, 2024).” He even added that China’s action could be seen in other places and that it is “trying to gain territorial space unilaterally through force.” The remarks made by Aquilino could be seen as the US military’s perception of China.

Fourth, on April 8, it was reported that US Army Pacific Commander General Charles Flynn revealed in South Korea the deployment of a new missile launch system in the Asia-Pacific region, a move that appeared to aim at North Korea and China. The Chinese Foreign Ministry responded by saying that China does not compete with other nations in military power and that it pursues a defensive national defence policy. However, the US deployment of its missile system, including the use of the Standard Missile 6 interceptor and the maritime-strike Tomahawk, in Asia is a testimony to Washington’s perception of the military threats from North Korea and China.

Fifth, on April 10, it was reported that AUKUS – a trilateral security partnership between Australia, United Kingdom (UK) and US – will likely be expanded to embrace Canada and Japan. Given that the Five Eyes include Canada, US, UK, Australia and New Zealand, the possible expansion of AUKUS to include Japan and Canada into its umbrella means the consolidation of the two security organizations. AUKUS has conducted its Pillar One programme, in which Australia is supported to acquire conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines as soon as possible. In March 2023, the three nations announced an “optimal pathway” to achieving nuclear-powered submarine capability while setting “the highest non-proliferation standard.” In Pillar Two, the three nations aim to protect sensitive technologies and cooperate in the areas of quantum, Artificial Intelligence, and autonomy, hypersonics and counter-hypersonics, electronic warfare, undersea warfare, and cybersecurity networks. The expansion of AUKUS to embrace Canada and Japan will naturally heighten the geopolitical tensions in the Asia-Pacific region, although it vows to maintain “the highest non-proliferation standard.”

Sixth, the first trilateral US-Japan-Philippines Summit was held in Washington on April 11, during which President Joe Biden, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. met and came up with seventy agreements, mostly on security and defence affairs. The 1960 US-Japan Security Treaty was upgraded by having Joint Operation Command in 2025, strengthening mutual coordination, reforming the command structure and content. President Biden told Kishida and Marcos that the US defence commitment to Japan and the Philippines are “ironclad.” The Summit also reached an agreement to set up the Luzon Economic Corridor – a move that was interpreted by the international media as countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Without mentioning China in name, the Summit has been widely interpreted as a move by the three nations to share military technology, form a military and security pact, and to improve their military and security communication and coordination. President Marcos is far more pro-US than his predecessor Rodrigo Duterte, whose relations with China were more cordial – an indication that the Philippine President’s political orientation toward US and China is the most important shaper affecting and oscillating the military-security relations between Manila, Washington, and Beijing.

China has reacted to the Summit negatively: its Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said Beijing “firmly opposes the relevant countries manipulating bloc politics, and firmly opposed any behaviour that provokes or lays plans for opposition and hurts other countries’ strategic security and interests.”

Amid the heightening tensions in the Asia-Pacific region, however, a positive tone of Sino-Indian relations was heard when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi emphasized the importance of both sides to improve bilateral relations through diplomatic dialogue. He said: “It is my belief that we need to urgently address the prolonged situation on our borders so that the abnormality in our bilateral interactions can be put behind us.” Diplomats from both India and China convened the 29^th meeting in Beijing in March 2024, agreeing with the principle that both sides must maintain diplomatic and military communications and stick to their spirit of discussions. Just a week prior to the Indian elections, Modi’s emphasis on peace may appeal to the Indian voters for their support of his party. Hopefully, both India and China will persist in their search for construction solutions amid an increasingly anti-China climate in India, where some politicians and mass media appear to be very hawkish and negative towards China.

Still, the security relations between China and the Philippines remain rocky. In April 2023, Manila Times reported that the Chinese side prepared some solutions to solve the territorial disputes over the islands in South China Sea, but the Philippine side refused to consider further as some proposed solutions ran counter to the sovereignty interest of the Philippines. However, it is hoped that both sides can avoid the controversial “high politics” issues, notably territorial disputes, but instead focusing on economic pragmatism and cultural, educational, social exchange and tourism. Otherwise, any overemphasis on nationalism would likely propel the two nations toward a scenario of endless but time-consuming territorial disputes and unnecessary military conflicts.

During the increasing geopolitical tensions in Asia, the relations between China and North Korea are bound to be consolidated. Zhao Leji, the chairman of the Chinese National People’s Congress, visited Pyongyang on a three-day visit on April 12, strengthening the bilateral relations between Beijing and Pyongyang while preparing for a possible meeting later this year between President Xi Jinping and North Korean counterpart Kim Jong-un. If so, the recent and ongoing consolidation of the US-led security alliance is perhaps leading to a kneejerk reaction from China and North Korea.

In conclusion, the most recent and ongoing developments of the military drills and security pacts between the US, Philippines, Japan, and other US allies have already heightened geopolitical tensions to an unprecedented degree, causing uneasiness and uncomfortable responses from China. The recent phone dialogue between President Joe Biden and President Xi Jinping appeared to be suddenly shrouded with dark clouds and uncertain future, especially in the face of the forthcoming US presidential election. In the study and analysis of geopolitics, the most important problems remain mutual perceptions and corresponding reactions. If China has already been perceived as a security and military “threat,” together with its neighbour North Korea, the ideologically driven security alliance led by the US is arguably a natural response. If China and North Korea are firmly perceived as military and security threats, then the recent and ongoing military and security responses from the US-led allies will likely lead to a corresponding response from Beijing and Pyongyang in the form of consolidating the Beijing-Pyongyang relations, thereby propelling the Asia-Pacific region to a highly militarily unstable, geopolitically uncertain, and very challenging security situation in the coming years.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

The presidential diplomacy of reengaging the other side and repositioning their stance was a hallmark of Xi Jinping’s 2-hour phone discussions with Joe Biden on April 2 amid ongoing Sino-US tensions over economic, political, and military affairs. Such reengagement and repositioning remain the enduring characteristics of Sino-US relations since the San Francisco meeting in last November 2023.

Unlike the Donald Trump administration which engaged in a fierce ideological and trade war with China, the Joe Biden government has since January 2021 attempted to look for opportunities of reengaging the People’ Republic of China (PRC). The most recent telephone dialogue between President Joe Biden and President Xi Jinping took place at a politically significant period during which the upcoming US presidential election will be held seven months later. Furthermore, the “presidential” inauguration of the new Taiwan leader, William Lai Ching-te, will be held on May 20. While the PRC government will be expected to react to what Lai will say in his inaugural speech, the Biden administration made its position clear on the telephone dialogue with the Xi Jinping side on a whole range of issues.

According to news report, the US maintains its “one-China policy,” does not support “Taiwan independence,” does not seek “the new Cold War,” does not intend to change the Chinese system, does not seek to oppose China through the consolidation of its alliances, does not intend to have conflicts with China, does not seek to curb China’s development, and does not seek to decouple or delink with China – a posture with one certainty and seven “NOs.” 

President Xi Jinping reiterated three positions from the Chinese side, namely seeing a peaceful stance as valuable, seeing stability as of utmost importance, and seeing trust as the foundation of Sino-US relations. In terms of peace, the Chinese side maintains the principle of no conflict, no confrontation as the bottom line, and persistence in elevating the Sino-US relations. Regarding stability, China adopts the position of not disrupting, not provoking, not stepping over the boundary of the other side, thereby maintaining the overall stable relations with the US. In terms of trust-building as the basis, China utilizes actions to realize its promises, turning the visions of the San Francisco into realities.

President Xi Jinping emphasized that the strategic understanding of China and the US is “the first button” that should be fixed by both sides – meaning that Beijing and Washington must avoid confrontation, must have mutual respect, must persist in the stable, healthy, and sustainable path rather than returning to the old road. 

Clearly, both sides reiterated their previous stance in a more refreshing and emphatical manner, utilizing the San Francisco consensus as the basis to tackle issues of “low politics,” such as climate change, narcotics control and people-to-people exchange.

The Xi-Biden telephone talks went through the ideological differences of both sides, but indeed without any breakthrough. The Chinese side, as before, emphasized that the red line over Taiwan must not be crossed and that the US has heightened the risks of Sino-US relations by suppressing China’s economic, technological and trade development. 

At the same time, the US side stressed the importance of stability and peace across the Taiwan Strait, emphasized the importance of the “freedom of navigation” in South China Sea, expressed its concern about the Chinese support of the Russian military-industrial complex, the “unfair trade policy and non-market economic practices” of China, and indicated that Washington would avoid a scenario in which the US technology would be utilized to “weaken the American national security.” The Biden administration reiterated its stance over the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, implying perhaps China would be expected to play an active role in reining in the militaristic behaviour of North Korea.

In response to the US concerns, the Chinese side reiterated in the telephone meeting and at the Foreign Ministry’s press briefing afterwards that China has its “indisputable sovereignty” over the related islands and nearby waters in the South China Sea, and that Washington should not intervene in the affairs between Beijing and Manila. China, according to Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin on April 3, is willing to exchange with the US over human rights issues, which however should not be used as an excuse to interfere with the Chinese internal affairs – a position referring to the US side’s concern about “human rights” condition in China and Hong Kong.

In a sense, all the issues discussed above were more about mutual posturing rather than a search for constructive solutions, but clearly the Biden government’s positioning aimed at paving the way for two talks to be followed soon – one on trade and the other on trust-building and dialogue over military issues.

Immediately after their dialogue on April 2, both sides have reengaged each other in two fronts – US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen’s visit to China and she met Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng on trade issues, and the meetings in Hawaii of the Sino-US Military Maritime Consultative Agreement Working Group with the US side represented by officers from the Indo-Pacific Command, Pacific Fleet and Pacific Air Forces over issues like airspace and maritime operations. 

As expected, Yellen has articulated the US concerns about China’s so-called “industrial overcapacity” with Chinese exports that affect the interests of the American workers and industries. Yellen complained about “unfair industrial practices” in China, telling He Lifeng that China’s state subsidies to its green energy, electric vehicles, and electric batteries were “excessive,” leading to a “flood” of the related Chinese products in the US and world markets where the competitiveness of many industries were “weakened.” 

At the same time, the US commerce official Marisa Lago initiated a ministerial-level meeting with the Chinese commerce’s vice-minister Wang Shouwen to discuss tariffs and market access issues. The US is going to use tariffs to protect its industries over the “flood” of Chinese products in its market, but both sides attempt to bargain and extract a satisfactory deal with the other on the negotiating table. 

The US concern about China’s “industrial overcapacity” was simultaneously raised by its trade representative Katherine Tai during her trip to Belgium where she told the EU representatives on April 4 that the US and EU should collaborate in resisting the Chinese “overproduction” and “exports” of steel, aluminium, solar panels, and electric vehicles.

Apart from the trade tensions between the US and China, both sides have been engaging each other through face-to-face dialogue over military issues in Honolulu, Hawaii. The military dialogue in Hawaii on April 3 and 4 was politically significant, as Colonel Ian Francis of the Indo-Pacific Command said the US “will continue to operate safely and professionally in the Indo-Pacific whatever international law allows, and we take this responsibility seriously.” He added that “open, direct, and clear communications” with the officers of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) “is of utmost importance to avoid accidents and miscommunication.” Recently, the US has criticized the Chinese side for “coercive and risky operational behaviour” because the Chinese fighter jets were seen as “discharging chaff and shooting flares” when they approached the American fighter aircraft at high speed.

Objectively speaking, the military dialogue between both sides can minimize differences, enhance mutual understandings, and hopefully will reduce the possibility of unnecessary airspace accidents. China suspended military communications with the US shortly after the provocative visit by former US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan in August 2022. The resumption of formal military dialogue in Hawaii can be seen as an important step in mutual trust-building and their enhanced communications.

Still, militarily speaking, trust-building in Sino-US military relations is by no means an easy task, given the necessity of encountering numerous challenges ahead. The Chinese Foreign Ministry on April 4 appealed to the US military to “terminate” the military exchange, links, and “collusion” with the Taiwan side. It is reported that Taiwan’s naval chief Tang Hua will visit the US from April 8 to April 10 to attend a Sea-Air-Space conference at Washington, and that he will likely meet the US chief of naval operations, Admiral Lisa Franchetti.

Tang’s visit to the US will take place before the Taiwan’s military exercise in April and July. Some Taiwan observers have indicated that Taiwan would not participate formally in the US military exercise in the Pacific, but it will likely join as an observer. Still, such a move would very likely be seen as “provocative” by the mainland Chinese side.

In the past, some senior Taiwanese military officers visited the US to attend defence-related conferences, such as the visit of navy chief Lee Hsi-ming in 2015 and deputy defence minister Hsu Yen-pu in 2023. 

This time, according to Reuters, Tang Hua’s visit is expected to fall under the US Joint Island Defence Concept, which refers to the coordination between Washington, Tokyo, and Taipei to counter or resist the PLA within the so-called “first island chain” – a strategic chain of islands connecting Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Borneo. The concept reflects the way in which the US has been adopting military deterrence against the perceived Chinese military expansion and threat in the Pacific Ocean.

Perhaps the Tang visit to the US should not be overstated by the mass media, especially as Kinmen on April 2 suspended a naval military exercise as a goodwill gesture of avoiding any provocation to the mainland Chinese side on the day when Biden engaged his telephone diplomacy with the Chinese president. 

Militarily speaking, the US, Japan and the Philippines are planning to enhance their joint military exercises in the Pacific Ocean, while simultaneously building up their internet infrastructure to present any internet attack from China, Russia and North Korea – moves that appear to reflect a hidden new “Cold War” even though the Biden side said in the telephone dialogue with the Chinese side on April 2 that the US does not seek any “new Cold War.”

Furthermore, Kurt Campbell, the US Deputy Secretary of State, said on April 3 in Washington that the AUKUS (Australia-United Kingdom-United States) has a submarine blueprint that can and will help “curb” any moves by mainland China on Taiwan (Oriental Daily, April 5, 2024, p. A14). Given the nature of AUKUS as a trilateral security organization with the aim of promoting peace, security, and defence against perceived threats to the international order and system, Campbell’s remarks were politically and militarily significant.

Recently, the US opposed the moves by China to rename 30 places along the 3,000 km disputed Himalayan border between India and China, or the so-called “Line of Actual Control.” China sees some places in the Indian-administered Arunachal Pradesh state, which Beijing refers to as the Zangnan and part of the Tibet autonomous region, as Chinese territory – a position disputed by the Indian side. After a military skirmish between street-level soldiers from the Indian and Chinese side – an event leading to the deaths of reportedly 20 Indian and four Chinese military officers – the Indian and Chinese militaries held 21 rounds of talks. But recently, the Indian side has appeared to build up its military forces and infrastructure along the border with China, raising the anxieties and prospects of a sudden military conflict. If the US suddenly sides with India over the latter’s border dispute with China, there will be severe limitations in the improvement and reengagement of US-China relations.

All the ongoing moves made by China and the US, and the American allies, have perhaps demonstrated that, after the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991, the unipolar world led by the superpower US has increasingly encountered the perception of “the China threat,” which to many countries and their leaders appear to be a real one. As such, the rise of China, especially its economic development, trade expansion and military modernization, has really challenged the unipolar world led and dominated by the US. The trade war between China and the US under the former Donald Trump administration was a testimony to the perceived Chinese economic threat. Although the Joe Biden administration has reengaged China assertively, the trade war persists. Militarily speaking, China is seen as a perceived threat by the US, but the reengagement process has begun in Hawaii when military officers from both sides sat down to enhance their communication and understanding.

In conclusion, the content of the Xi-Biden telephone talks was mostly a reiteration of the well-known positions from both sides, but they paved the way for the ensuing discussions among other officials over trade and military affairs. In a sense, the Xi-Biden telephone diplomacy was not only an attempt at reengagement from both sides, but also a warm-up session leading to in-depth discussions over trade disputes and military-related issues. Hence, even if trust-building needs a persistent and regular telephone diplomacy involving the presidents of both countries, mutual dialogue and communication can and will hopefully minimize misunderstandings. Still, the context of the Xi-Biden talks is challenging, given the ongoing US-China military competition and rivalries. The contextual difficulties have been compounded by how the US deals with China’s neighbours, including not only the contentious issue and future of Taiwan but also their relations with Japan, North Korea, the Philippines, and India. Limitations to a more cordial Sino-US relationship persist, but the San Francisco meeting in November 2023 did play a crucial role in building up an indispensable element of trust between the US and China in their very long, difficult and uncertain path of friendship ahead.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

On March 26, 2024, an intermediate-level court in Hubei province’s Huangshi city in China delivered an important judgement on Chen Xuyuan, the former president of the Chinese Football Association, sentencing him to life imprisonment for accepting bribes that amounted to 81 million yuan and charging him for “seriously undermining the fair competition and industrial ecology of the football area.” The court added that, due to Chen’s willingness to reveal the facts about his bribery activities, to unveil the illegal acts of others, and to return the illegal proceeds, the court’s verdict was already “lenient.”

Chen admitted his guilt in the court and bowed ninety degrees to the public for ten seconds, saying that he hoped football fans could forgive him. However, a lot of netizens in China did not really forgive him, adding in their comments on the social media that Chen should have been given “death penalty” – a reflection of the profound anger of many netizens.

Chen was born in Shanghai in 1956 and worked as a dock worker in Shanghai’s port authority in 1973. In 2005, he was promoted as a chief executive officer of the Shanggang Conglomerate in 2005, succeeding in buying into the ownership of the Shanghai Dongya (East Asia) Football Club in 2013. Within six years, he succeeded in turning the club into a forceful team that could be elevated to become the Chinese Super League’s champion. In 2019, Chen was appointed as a convenor of the preparatory committee of the Chinese Football Association (CFA). Later, he was elected as the president of the CFA, becoming the first professional Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in the CFA with a non-sports background. Chen’s position could be regarded as the first professional CEO in the history of Chinese football.

Chen advocated the idea of fighting against the “golden dollar football,” meaning that he was keen to combat the injection of tens of billions of dollars into the modernization of Chinese football. At the same time, he supported the idea of helping foreign players to be naturalized as Chinese players with Chinese citizenship – a controversial move at that time.  Most importantly, Chen decided to recruit Li Tie, a former mid-fielder of Everton, to be the Chinese national football coach. 

Li Tie was the Chinese national football coach from January 2020 to December 2021, but he was accused of giving and taking extensive bribes even long before he became the national coach. Li acknowledged in the court that he had arranged bribes to be paid for the sake of securing the head coach position. Moreover, Li admitted that he had participated in various match-fixing activities, and that he accepted more than 77 million yuan in bribes from 2017 to 2021 when he was working as a coach for the Wuhan Zall club. 

The Chinese state broadcaster CCTV in January 2024 had interviewed Li Tie, who said he had paid 421,000 yuan in bribes to become a national coach. Li said in the TV program: “I’m very sorry, I should have kept my head to the ground and followed the right path. There were certain things that at the time were common practices in football.”

The Central Discipline Inspection Committee (CDIC) in November 2022 began an extensive investigation into football corruption, leading to the downfall of not only Chen Xuyuan but also five other top officials directly involved in the football field. These five executives included Yu Hongchen, the former chairman of the China Athletic Association, who was sentenced to 13 years for accepting 22 million from 13 football clubs in 13 years; Chen Yongliang, a deputy secretary of the CFA and minister of national team management, who was sentenced to 14 years of imprisonment for accepting 19 million yuan bribes from 20 clubs in 7 years; Dong Zheng, former general manager of the Chinese Super League, who was sentenced to 8 years of imprisonment for accepting 22 million yuan bribes from 23 clubs in 7 years; Liu Lei, a former director of the Wuhan Sports Center, who was sentenced to two and a half years of imprisonment for accepting 520,000 yuan bribes; and Wang Dengfeng, former vice president of the CFA, who was sentenced to 17 years for accepting 9.6 million bribes and illegally occupying public properties amounting to 46 million yuan in 6 years.

When Yu Hongchen heard that he was sentenced to 13 years in the court, he broke down in tears. His case was serious because one incident involved Yu’s manipulation in helping a Tianjin conglomerate to change its name in registration and to retain its position in the Super League. Even worse, Yu accepted bribes to help ten clubs arrange specific referees whose decisions were then biased in favor of these clubs. Clearly, Yu was deeply enmeshed in taking bribes and arranging “black” referees to make decisions in favor of those clubs which bribed him – a key middleman in the process of football corruption and match-fixing.

The case of Chen Yongliang was also a serious one because, according to the court description, he acted as “elderly” official, who helped alleviate the penalties imposed onto clubs and footballers, and who arranged some players to be selected as national team players. The court pointed to him as a person paying bribes of 900,000 yuan to Yu Hongchen for the sake of arranging his clients to be appointed to various influential committee positions of the CFA. Clearly, the usage of bribery to favor clients became a means by which Chen inserted them into the CFA’s influential committee memberships.

Dong Zheng was found to accept bribes in favor of the clubs’ match-scheduling, ticket arrangements, stadium inspection, the alleviation of penalties against logistical supplies, and the management of agents who represented players. His corruption pointed to extensive bribery pervading the entire football management practices. In 2018, Dong was accused of accepting a bank card with 1-million-yuan deposit, but he told the briber that such payment was “inconvenient.” As a result, the briber gave him cash of 1 million yuan. To avoid being detected, Dong let someone manage the one million yuan.

Liu Lei was found guilty of accepting bribes in exchange of his decisions on the football stadium’s repair and renewal work. It was alleged that from 2018 to 2022, Liu leaked out information on the tendering of construction and renewal projects so that six enterprises were apparently favored in the process of acquiring the tenders.

All these cases of football corruption illustrate some important characteristics.

First, the Chinese football corruption from 2019 to the end of 2022 was perhaps only a tip of the iceberg in the sense that syndicate corruption became emergent and was quickly entrenched in the football arena. If former president Chen and former vice president Wang were involved, as with other higher-tanking football executives, the entire CFA requires not only a much closer scrutiny from the CDIC, but its executive leaders also require anti-corruption education constantly and regularly to prevent corruption from reemerging in Chinese football.

Second, the choice of Chen Xuyuan was a wrong and a disastrous one because he rose up as a businessman with a rapid record of success in the football field. Indeed, in an era of rapid development, the Chinese sports officials and ministers at the top might want to achieve quick results in football development, especially since the Chinese President, Xi Jinping, was a football fan. Nevertheless, the desire to modernize Chinese football quickly was one thing, the selection of a proper person to lead the CFA was another. The choice of businessman Chen Xuyuan was arguably a poor judgement because football modernization and development were not just attributable to large capital investment; rather, ethical considerations were and are of paramount importance. Chen’s selection of Li Tie as the national head coach was another testimony showing the absence of ethics in the Chinese football development from 2020 to 2021.

Third, other cases of corruption, ranging from Chen Yongliang to Dong Zheng, from Yu Hongchen to Liu Lei, demonstrated the need for an extensive clean-up action in the CFA. The choice of “black” referees, the neglect of ethical and proper management practices, and the arbitrary action of utilizing personal rule rather than following any “rule of law” in the Chinese football circle were a testimony to the disgraceful actions that must be stopped, punished and deterred. With the arrest and imprisonment of the “gang” of seven – Chen Yongyuan, Li Tie, Yu Hongchen, Chen Yongliang, Dong Zhen, Liu Lei and Wang Dengfeng – football corruption has been terminated temporarily and its offenders have been punished. In fact, in April 2023, the deputy director of the General Administration of Sport of China (GAS), Du Zhaocai, was dismissed from his vice-ministerial position for alleged corruption. Disturbingly, Du was also the party secretary of the CFA. Clearly, syndicate corruption grew within the CFA for some years. The challenges are to instill the sense of ethics into the psyche of all CFA executives and to deter them, including officials, referees and managers, from stepping onto the corruption pathway again.

Fourth, whistleblowers must be encouraged in the process of fighting football corruption in China. On March 28, the reformed CFA vows to reward 2,000 yuan to 20,000 yuan to those whistleblowers who reveal football corruption activities, including match-fixing, football gambling and black refereeing. This incentive is not restricted to professional football but also amateur one, including the Chinese Super League, the Chinese Championship League and the youth league. Moreover, citizens who are at or over 65 years old are welcome to apply to CFA as representatives of supervision, working together with the Discipline Inspection Committee members at the municipal level for two years for the sake of enforcing the implementation of ethics in Chinese football management and operation. These volunteers who act as supervisors will also educate all those who work in the professional and amateur football arena on the importance of oversight and clean governance, collecting public opinion on football development and gathering public views for the government authorities. It remains to be seen such oversight and supervision will really work in the ongoing combat against football corruption.

Fifth, the conflicts of interest guidelines must be worked out by the CFA together with the inputs and advice from the Central Discipline Inspection Committee. Judging from the activities of the football corruption syndicate in the CFA, all the executives of football clubs need to avoid their conflicts of interests and roles if they are selected or appointed or elected to the committees under CFA. Declaration of conflicts of interests and the avoidance of attending committee meetings that involved the discussions of their own clubs will be necessary for the modernization of football development and the combat against football corruption. Without a strong sense of potential conflicts of interests and roles, and without extensive guidelines to prevent conflicts of interests, the leaders and representatives of football clubs would not be able to make impartial decisions defending the general interest of Chinese football development.

In conclusion, with the downfall of the football corruption syndicate led by Chen Xuyuan, the prospects of Chinese football modernization and development remain cautiously optimistic; nevertheless, such optimism is based on the assumptions that the Central Discipline Inspection Committee must regularly scrutinize the CFA work and operation through its dispatch of inspection teams, that the CFA leaders must act like ethical entrepreneurs rather than unethical businesspeople, that football corruption actors must be disclosed and punished severely, that whistleblowers must be encouraged and incentivized, and that the conflicts of interests guidelines must be adopted and implemented to inculcate a much stronger sense of ethics into the psyche of not only CFA leaders, but also coaches, players, referees and managers at all levels. Otherwise, the combat against football corruption and the drive to modernize Chinese football will likely remain a long and difficult path in the years to come.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

The recent visit of the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, to New Zealand and Australia, has important implications for China’s relations with not only the two countries but also the international relations of the Asia-Pacific region.

On March 18, Wang Yi met New Zealand’s Minister for Trade Todd McClay in Wellington. Wang said that both countries adhered to the principles of mutual respect and inclusiveness, focusing on cooperation and benefiting the people. Moreover, China, according to Wang, is keen to work with New Zealand on their upgraded Free Trade Agreement and to negotiate over the list of trade services. Wang added that both sides should safeguard free trade, oppose unilateralism and protectionism in the name of “de-risking,” and continue to open the world economy.

In response, Todd McClay said that both countries had fruitful results in bilateral cooperation and that New Zealand is keen to work with China cooperatively in the areas of trade, personnel exchanges. Furthermore, New Zealand is upholding the principles of free trade and to resist protectionism and unilateralism.

On March 20, Wang Yi held the seventh China-Australia Foreign and Strategic Dialogue with Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong in Canberra. Wang remarked that when President Xi Jinping met Prime Minister Anthony Albanese in November 2022, both sides reached consensus on the need to accelerate the improvement of bilateral relations. Wang added that both countries had ups and downs in their bilateral relations, but China never intervenes in Australia’s domestic affairs. On China’s sovereignty, dignity and security concerns, according to Wang, Beijing hopes that Canberra would respect them.

Wang also said that both sides should pursue a win-win situation, seeking common ground and shelving their differences. Almost 80 percent of Australia’s trade surplus comes from China, Wang added, and as such, the protection and advancement of common interests should be the priorities of both sides. Finally, Wang commented that China pursues an independent foreign policy without targeting at any third country. 

Wang Yi also met the business and strategic elites in Canberra, thanking them for promoting friendship and trade. He elaborated that China attached great importance to maintaining peace, promoting talks that lead to peace, and contributing to peace and stability in the world. China also strives for “democracy” in international relations, opposes “unilateralism” and “bullying acts,” opens its door to the outside world, and fosters an environment governed by the market, law and the international standards. Australians are welcome to visit China, according to Wang. He appealed to both sides to cooperate more closely in the areas of trade, finance, education, health. climate change, and scientific research.

Wang Yi’s visit to New Zealand and Australia had political significance.

First and foremost, his visit took place at a time when the perception of “the China threat” remains deep-rooted among the psyche of some strategic elites in New Zealand and Australia, Wang Yi’s remarks and reiteration on China as a peaceful country attaching importance to bilateral cooperation, world stability and the international standards and law aimed at pacifying such fears of the “Chinese threat.” The cooperation between the police in China and that in the Solomon Islands has recently raised the eyebrows of Australia and New Zealand. Furthermore, China’s disputes with the Philippines over the sovereignty of Scarborough Shoal have already alarmed some countries. Objectively speaking, the western perception of the “China threat” is not going to fade away easily unless China exercises even more caution in its marine police and naval activities. Under the context of the prevalence of “the China threat” perception among some strategic elites in New Zealand and Australia, Wang Yi’s visit was politically significant, trying his best to calm down their fears.

Second, Wang Yi’s’ visit occurred at a time before the upcoming US presidential elections. With concerns about the possibility of Donald Trump’s return to presidential power, some strategic elites in different countries are perhaps preparing for a scenario in which the US will likely return to a more isolationist, more protectionist and highly erratic and unpredictable stance. Although continuities rather than changes would perhaps characterize US foreign policy toward the Asia-Pacific region even though Donald Trump would perhaps return to presidential power, Wang Yi’s visit coincided with the hidden concerns about the uncertain and fluctuating US foreign policy in the psyche of perhaps some strategic and diplomatic elites in New Zealand and Australia. In short, Wang Yi’s visits to New Zealand and Australia were timely and strategic, perhaps striking a chord with some concerns about possible shift in US foreign policy. When Wang mentioned China’s opposition to protectionism, it could perhaps be a position increasingly shared by those concerned about Trumpism in US foreign-policy implementation.

Third, just prior to Wang Yi’s visit, Australia made a gesture of goodwill by suspending trade remedy measures against Chinese wind towers when these measures would expire on April 16, 2024. The Australian gesture was a smart one, from a diplomatic perspective, because Penny Wong tactically raised the issue of human rights record during her meeting with Wang Yi, including the suspended death sentence on Australian writer Yang Hengjun, and the circumstances in Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong. Indeed, Wang Yi had already appealed to foreign countries, including Australia, not to interfere with China’s domestic affairs, which cover Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong. Still, Wong spoke to Wang frankly about “Australians detained in China,” a priority issue that reflected Australia’s desire that China would deal with the Yang case perhaps leniently and diplomatically. Penny Wong said in a press conference that Australia raised “our serious concern about unsafe conduct at sea, our desire for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and in our region (The Guardian, March 19, 2024).” If assertive Chinese nationalism has characterized China’s foreign policy since the leadership of Foreign Minister Wang Yi, such assertive nationalism could perhaps be also seen in the Australian side, especially Penny Wong’s content of discussion with Wang.

Fourth, if differences in political and ideological values mark the Sino-Australian relations, the same phenomenon can be seen in the Sino-New Zealand relations. During the meeting with Wang Yi on March 18, New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters raised his concerns about “human rights, the situation in Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong, and the increased tensions in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait (Reuters, March 18, 2024).” Both New Zealand and Australia coincidentally or deliberately raised similar issues. As a traditionally low-profile member of the Five Eyes alliance, New Zealand usually voices its concerns to China in a silent manner – perhaps it could also be seen in Wang Yi’s visit to New Zealand.

Fifth, as New Zealand and Australia have raised their concerns about the Taiwan Strait, it can be said that they are now observing how mainland China will cope with the new government of Taiwan under the leadership of William Lai after May 20, 2024. Such concerns have also been expressed by strategic and diplomatic elites of different countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom. As such, Wang Yi’s emphasis on China as a peaceful country during his visit to New Zealand and Australia while appealing to foreign countries to respect China’s sovereignty and domestic affairs was a kind of preemptive remarks against such foreign concerns. Still, as long as Beijing-Taipei relations remain volatile and unstable, the question of Taiwan’s political future will become a constant concern among the US allies in the Asia-Pacific region, including New Zealand and Australia.

In conclusion, Wang Yi’s visits to New Zealand and Australia were politically and diplomatically significant. The visits came at a time when the “China threat” perception remains deep-rooted among the US allies, when some strategic elites in the two countries cast doubts on whether the US foreign policy would change again with the prospects of Donald Trump’s possible return to presidential power, when Australia made a goodwill gesture in the hope of a possible reciprocal move from China over the case of Yang Hengjun, when the clashes of ideological values remain prominent between China on the one hand and New Zealand and Australia on the other hand, and when the question of Taiwan’s political future remains a concern in the psyche of the New Zealand and Australian leadership. Obviously, Wang Yi’s visits could achieve the objective of enhancing dialogue, communications and cooperation with the two countries, but such success appears to encounter tremendous obstacles for further breakthrough mainly due to profound ideological and political differences.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

After the legislative and presidential elections in Taiwan, the Kuomintang (KMT) has been undergoing internal transformations and dealing with external politics dynamically.

In early March, the KMT renamed its Huang Fu-hsing branch of the “veterans service working committee.” The branch was established in July 1956 by the late Chaing Ching-kuo, at that time a minister of the Veteran Affairs Commission, to mobilise the military personnel’s support of the KMT. Its membership declined from an apex of 200,000 members to only 80,000. The restructuring move aimed at eliminating any tendency of “a party within a party.”

Moreover, the KMT Central Standing Committee (CSC) has recently selected 27 members, but the party constitution says that the maximum number of CSC should be somewhere between 35 and 40, and that 29 CSC members should be elected. When the election of the CSC was called in late January 2024, there were 30 members registering for the election. However, three of the 30 candidates failed to complete their registration details, leaving 27 members competing for 29 positions. This meant that all the 27 candidates were easily elected, showing the lack of interest of party members to run in the CSC election. Critics of the current party structure, including some younger “blue” scholars, pointed out the absence of “intra-party democracy” within the KMT, where the CSC, according to their views, lacks substantial powers and whose members shoulder “heavy responsibilities,” such as organising donation campaigns and even paying for their transportation costs to attend the meetings of the party centre.

Critics have also argued that the KMT is internally “undemocratic” even compared with the other two large political parties in Taiwan, namely the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). The DPP’s Central Standing Committee has coopted the directly elected county mayors, elected municipal councillors, and representatives of the directly elected members of the Legislative Assembly, thereby providing a necessary institutional linkage between the party headquarters and the elected party members at different levels of the political institutions. Currently, among the 17 members of the DPP’s CSC, 11 are directly elected politicians.

Nine progressive members of the KMT formed a group named “Open Party Laboratory,” indicating that while the KMT’s CSC had 27 members during the last term of office, 10 of them were directly elected politicians. Nonetheless, in 2024, only one out of the 27-member CSC in the KMT is directly elected. The result is that, according to the Young Turks, the KMT headquarters tends to be “detached” from the directly elected politicians. In February 2024, the progressive group advocated that the directly elected mayors and the parliamentary leaders should be coopted as ex-officio members of the KMT’s CSC; nevertheless, its view was not heeded seriously by the party centre and leadership.

In terms of the participation of KMT members in voting for their CSC members, their participation rate is comparatively lower than the past. Overall, there were 1,968 representatives eligible to vote for the CSC members, but only 1,263 members registered to vote as some did not pay for their party membership fees. The KMT claimed that 79.33 percent of its representatives in the party congress voted for CSC members. However, critics said that the voter turnout was much lower than 79.33 percent, namely 50.91, because those who did not pay their party membership fees should be included in the calculation. Regardless of how the voting turnout was tabulated, critics said that the 79 percent turnout was lower than the 90 percent turnout in the past.

The problem of the KMT’s internal organisation was that, according to critics, the Ma Ying-jeou leadership diluted the influence of the KMT’s CSC by trying to “avoid” the party headquarters to interfering with party policies. Party policies were decided by a core group of KMT heavyweights and elders inside and outside the Legislative Yuan. Many party heavyweights and elderly leaders did not want to run in the CSC elections. It is reported that the current CSC does not really have a say on the candidates running for the 2026 and 2028 local elections because the party elders and elected politicians tend to have a more influential voice.

In the 1920s, The KMT adopted the Leninist style of leadership and the principle of “democratic centralism,” making its CSC quite powerful with a respectable status. At that time, the KMT Central Committee (CC) members elected the CSC members, enhancing the CC-CSC linkage. However, with the passage of time, the KMT revamped the CSC election method by empowering the party representatives to vote for CSC members in the party congress. Although some CSC members come from the Central Committee, the current CSC lacks sufficient legitimacy because some of the elected CSC members were those who gained relatively fewer votes in legislative elections.

As early as November 2018, KMT party member Lu Shiow-yen, who was elected as Taichung mayor at that time, advocated that the directly elected KMT mayors should become ex-officio members of the CSC for the sake of enhancing the CSC representativeness. In response to Lu’s suggestion, the KMT party chair Wu Den-yih invited 15 elected KMT mayors to sit in the CSC as observers without the power to initiate motions and to veto party policies – a symbolic move that did not really strengthen the institutional linkage between the party headquarters and the elected KMT politicians.

Interestingly, when the DPP was formed, it imitated the organisational structure and arrangements of the KMT. The DPP party chair is directly elected by all party members through the “one member one vote” system, but the CSC members are elected by the Central Committee members. The DPP’s internal politics are characterised by factional politics and rivalries, as with the case of the KMT. However, the way in which the DPP’s CSC is elected is more Leninist and traditional, with a direct linkage between Central Committee members and CSC members, unlike the KMT whose reform has weakened the direct CSC-CC connections. Most importantly, so long as the CSC coopts directly elected county mayors and representatives of the elected legislators (11 out of 17 DPP CSC are now directly elected politicians), the connections between elected politicians and the party headquarters are much closer in the DPP than the KMT arrangements.

Compounding the lack of legitimacy on the part of some KMT’s CSC members was that it attracts a particular faction to become dominant, such as the current Eric Chu faction whose members now have an influential voice in the CSC. This is not surprising, as the KMT CSC in the past was also shaped by factional politics. However, given the fact that the previous KMT party leaders and elders, such as Ma Ying-jeou, have traditionally maintained an influential say in the party’s direction, ranging from the support of Hou You-yi as the candidate for the 2024 presidential elections to the abortive attempt at forming an alliance with the Taiwan People’s Party, any factional control of the CSC will have to encounter other factions, including the faction composed of directly elected politicians and the one comprised of the party elders and former leaders. As such, the future reforms within the KMT’s CSC will deserve our attention and observation. It remains to be seen whether Eric Chu, the current party chair, would perhaps initiate a move to revise the party constitution and to strengthen the institutional linkage between the CSC and elected politicians after the May 2025 party chair election.

While the KMT’s internal reform remains an unresolved issue, its elected president of the Legislative Yuan, Han Kuo-yu, has been dealing with legislative politics with some controversies. He supported his party member Fu Kun-chi in the legislature to initiate two bills, one on the high-speed railway surrounding the island of Taiwan and the other on an extension of highway number 6 in Hualien city. The DPP criticised Han for “violating” the principle of neutrality as specified in the Legislative Yuan’s standing order, but strictly speaking, the standing order does not mention clearly whether the president is disallowed to sign his or her name to second or support a bill in the legislature. During a house meeting in the Legislative Yuan on March 15, Han Kuo-yu grasped the opportunity of the absence of DPP members, asking legislators three times whether they had opinions on the bills during the first reading. No DPP member was present, and Han ended the meeting with the two bills passing through the first stage. Of course, DPP members would likely give the KMT members a hard time in the committee process and second reading, but the way in which Han handled the KMT-initiated bills demonstrated a political tug-of-war between the KMT and the DPP in Taiwan’s new legislative politics.

To counter the KMT influence in the legislature, outgoing Taiwan leader Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP met Ko Wen-je of the People’s Party on March 15 at her “presidential” residence. This was the first time that Tsai met Ko six years after they had met in 2018, when the DPP tried to negotiate with Ko who at that time was an incumbent Taipei mayor running for another term. That meeting in 2018 failed to achieve any consensus, but Ko won with a narrow margin of votes by beating Ting Shou-chung of the KMT and Pasuya Yao Wen-chih of the DPP.  

After the legislative elections in early 2024, the DPP clearly attempts to woo the TPP into its umbrella of cooperation and consensus, trying to establish a so-called “party communication platform.” The KMT criticised Tsai’s move as putting up a “political show.” Given that the TPP is holding eight seats and can become a kingmaker in any bills and motions, its bargaining power naturally attracts the attention of the DPP and KMT.

Finally, the KMT has been conducting its external politics by sending vice-chairman Andrew Hsia on March 14 for a seven-day visit to the mainland. Hsia is visiting the cities of Chongqing, Chengdu, Jinan, and Qingdao, meeting Taiwanese businesspeople and “friends.” He emphasised the importance of accepting the 1992 consensus and engaging in dialogue with the mainland. As a former director of the Mainland Affairs Council under the Ma Ying-jeou leadership in Taiwan, Hsia can perhaps be regarded as one of the bridges between the mainland and Taiwan at a time when the ruling authorities in Taiwan refuse to accept the 1992 consensus.

In conclusion, shortly after the KMT’s impressive performance in the 2024 legislative elections in Taiwan, its internal reforms have become the spotlight of some Young Turks within the party; its legislative politics are increasingly prominent in a legislature where the People’s Party is going to be a kingmaker in deciding the fate of bills and motions; and its external politics with the mainland are going to be an area that deserves further observations. Although the KMT is an opposition force in Taiwan’s domestic politics, its future reforms, legislative rivalries with the DPP and possible coalition politics with the People’s Party, and its external relations with the mainland will become a crucial indicator of not only Taiwan’s political development but also the dynamic relations between Taiwan and the mainland.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

Judging from the most recent remarks made by senior Chinese authorities of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and the National People’s Congress (NPC), their socio-political and economic implications for Hong Kong and Macau are tremendous. 

First and foremost, Wang Huning, the chairman of the CPPCC and a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, met the Hong Kong and Macau members of the CPPCC on March 8 and he expressed four expectations: (1) resolutely implementing the “one country, two systems” and integrating Hong Kong and Macau into the developmental blueprint of the Chinese nation; (2) Hong Kong and Macau developing the economy collectively and unitedly, especially as Hong Kong is undergoing a process of transition from “governance to prosperity;” (3) resolving the livelihood issues including employment, housing, elderly case and public health as well as the wellbeing of youth; and (4) CPPCC members actively explaining the advantages of “one country, two systems” to outsiders and the world, especially in face of the attempts by some outsiders to “blacken” the image of “one country, two systems.” 

Some Hong Kong and Macau members of the CPPCC said that Wang emphasized the leadership of Party General Secretary Xi Jinping in the formulation of new ideas, new thinking, and new strategies of “one country, two systems” in Hong Kong and Macau, with the ultimate objectives of maintaining long-term prosperity and development. Wang urged the Hong Kong and Macau CPPCC members to have “firm confidence” on both the Chinese nation and the development of Hong Kong and Macau, implementing the spirit of the 20^th Party Congress. As such, Wang added, Hong Kong and Macau can and will play their unique functions in the process of propelling the renaissance of the Chinese nation. The Hong Kong and Macau members of the CPPCC are expected to play the key roles of “supporting, implementing, defending” the “one country, two systems,” and to do more in the aspects of resolutely protecting national security, unitedly promoting the development of the two cities, realistically solving the problems of the people’s livelihood, and coherently gathering the consensus in society.

Second, Ding Xuexiang, the leader of the Central Leading Group on Hong Kong and Macau, made several important points in his remarks on Hong Kong and Macau on March 6 during a meeting with CPPCC members from the two special administrative regions. Ding’s comments on Hong Kong and Macau focused on three aspects: (1) Hong Kong needs to maintain its open door to the outside world while playing the role of a “super-connector” and a cooperative actor integrating with the Greater Bay Area through the Northern Metropolis: (2) national security remains the basic foundation of the “one country, two systems” in Hong Kong and Macau while the central government fully supports Hong Kong’s enactment of Article 23 of the Basic Law; (3) the governments of the two special administrative regions must solve the issues of the people’s livelihood, with Hong Kong having the need to avoid “daily politicization” and to focus on the improvement of the wellbeing of ordinary people, while Macau must persist in economic diversification and in its already good work in patriotic education.

Third, Premier Li Qiang’s government report touched on the development of Hong Kong and Macau. He commented that the central government supports Beijing, Tianjin, the Yangtze Delta, and the Greater Bay Area to develop their strengths and potentiality for the sake of propelling high-quality productive forces. At the same time, Hong Kong and Macau must accurately and resolutely implement the “one country, two systems,” the principles of “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong” and “Macau people ruling Macau,” and the two places must realize the tenet of “patriotic people” ruling Hong Kong and Macau. Both special administrative regions, according to Li Qiang’s report, must develop their economy and improve the livelihood issues, utilizing their own comparative advantages to actively participate in the construction of the Greater Bay Area and in the national developmental plan of China, thereby ensuring the long-term prosperity of Hong Kong and Macau.

Fourth, the spokesperson of the NPC session, Lou Qianjian, remarked on March 5 that the central government fully supports the Hong Kong government to legislate on Article 23 of the Basic Law, adding that Article 23 has “converging” aspects with the national security law and other existing Hong Kong law, thereby constructing a “perfect national security law system” of protecting China’s national security and ensuring Hong Kong’s long-term stability and safety. Lou also commented that Hong Kong under the “one country, two systems” has unique advantages, including its “perseverance, vitality, potential and special role” in developing the function of “double circulation” under China’s national strategic development. As such, Hong Kong can and will play a pivotal role in being a high-quality platform opening the door to the outside world.

Fifth, Foreign Minister Wang Yi on March 7 talked about Taiwan, saying that those people in the international world who support Taiwan’s separatists would burn themselves and swallow their own bitter pills. Wang quoted the remarks of President Xi Jinping on March 6 that China has expectations on those patriotic people inside and outside Taiwan as they can and will become a united front propelling the process of reunification. Wang Yi also commented that the recent Taiwan elections were only a local election within China, and that the election results cannot change the basic fact that Taiwan is a part of mainland China. Moreover, the election results cannot change the historical trend that Taiwan will certainly return to the motherland. Wang said that all Chinese descendants must support nationalism and support peace and reunification. 

During a meeting with the CPPCC women session on March 6, President Xi Jinping said that the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang should expand its work further to those patriotic people inside and outside Taiwan for the sake of propelling the reunification process and work. Xi also added that cross-strait science, agricultural development, arts and humanities, and youth development should enhance and deepen exchange, cooperation, and integrative process.

Putting together the remarks made by Wang Huning, Ding Xuexiang, Li Qiang, Wang Yi and President Xi Jinping, the socio-economic and political significance for Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan is prominent.

First, the remarks of Wang Huning, Ding Xuexiang and Li Qiang showed the commonalities of emphasizing the paramount importance of protecting the central government’s national security in both Hong Kong and Macau, and the primacy of accelerating the socio-economic integration of Hong Kong and Macau into not only the Greater Bay Area but also the national strategic plan. Li Qiang’s comment on the central government’s support of Beijing, Tianjin, the Yangtze Delta, and the Greater Bay Area development means that both Hong Kong and Macau have already been incorporated in the macro-level regional economic development of mainland China.

As such, the faster integration of Hong Kong and Macau into the Greater Bay Area is a must. This was why Macau’s economic diversification, especially its development of the cooperation zone with Hengqin, is now regarded as a policy priority. Similarly, the Hong Kong government must accelerate the construction work and developmental plans of the Northern Metropolis. Deeper territorial integration between Hong Kong and Shenzhen on the one hand and between Macau and Hengqin on the other hand will likely be a matter of time, in the form of perhaps using the “first” and “second” lines of customs perhaps as movable “borders” in the dynamic process of cross-boundary transformations.

Second, the central authorities have stressed the importance of depoliticization in Hong Kong and the imperative of improving the people’s livelihood in the two cities. This mentality, from a Marxist analytical perspective, reflects how the central authorities see the superstructure (ideas, institutions, law, education) of Hong Kong and Macau: the superstructure of Hong Kong must be reformed, especially, as Lou said publicly, the imperative of enacting the Article 23 legislation so that there is and will be a comprehensive “national security legal system” protective of China’s national security. While Ding Xuexiang praised Macau’s patriotic education, Hong Kong’s patriotic education must persist in its current process of deepening reforms. Institutionally, Hong Kong’s new Legislative Council elections and District Council elections were already held for the sake of achieving the objective of patriotic people ruling Hong Kong. While the legal and institutional as well as education superstructure of Hong Kong necessitated reforms, Macau’s superstructure witnessed minor adjustment in the form of amending the content of the national security legislation which had long been enacted in 2009.

Third, while the superstructure of the two places necessitated reforms, the economic base of both Hong Kong and Macau are consolidated further. With the central government’s strong support, the Greater Bay Area presents a new window of opportunities for both cities to develop their information technology, utilizing the strengths of the mainland to develop its economy and strategic industries (tourism and information technology in Hong Kong, gaming industry and cultural tourism in Macau). Ding Xuexiang’s comment on Hong Kong as a “super-connector” was an important remark pointing to how central authorities see Hong Kong as a new window for China’s new phase of economic modernization. In other words, Hong Kong can, as Lou Qianjian says, still be an open-door platform for China to deepen the nation’s economic development through the attraction of foreign investment and businesses. If “double circulation” refers to not only the stimulation of domestic consumption but also external trade and interactions, then Hong Kong is now repositioned as China’s new window of accelerating domestic consumption in the Greater Bay Area and of outreaching to other countries through China’s Belt and Road scheme. Macau, on the other hand, is China’s important platform and magnet attracting the investment and businesses from Portuguese-speaking countries. In short, the economic base of both Hong Kong and Macau is fully utilized, and its potential is to be fully maximized in the stage of Chinese renaissance.

Fourth, perhaps the most interesting remarks about Taiwan came from President Xi Jinping, who emphasized the expansion of patriotic work and the deepening of cross-strait exchanges in science, arts and humanities, agriculture, and youth development. Given that Fujian has already established a special district enhancing its integration work with Taiwan, it can be anticipated that socio-cultural integration with Taiwan may proceed much faster than conventional wisdom assumes. The obstacle comes from the ruling authorities in Taiwan, as implied by Wang Yi and as evidenced in the most recent tragedy of the capsized fishing boat in which two mainland fishermen died near Kinmen. From the mainland official perspective, the Taiwan side must apologize to the family members of the two victims, but so far, an impasse persists. Moreover, the mainland authorities appear to adopt a wait-and-see attitude toward the remarks made by William Lai during his forthcoming inauguration as the next president of Taiwan, as commented by Li Yihu, a mainland Taiwan expert from Peking University’s Institute for Global Cooperation and Understanding, on March 8.

In conclusion, analysing the important remarks made by the central authorities on Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, we can identify the new strategic repositioning of both Hong Kong and Macau in the current process of developing the Chinese national renaissance. In accordance with the spirit of the 20^th Party Congress, Hong Kong and Macau are expected to fully protect the central government’s national security. As such, Hong Kong is now accelerating the process of legislating on Article 23 of the Basic Law – an essential process of constructing a comprehensive national security legal regime for the special administrative region. Hong Kong is playing the role of a “super-connector” facilitating the “dual circulation” in China and contributing to the regional political economy of development along the Beijing-Tianjin-Yangtze Delta-Greater Bay Area axis. On the other hand, Macau is expected to accelerate its economic diversification by using Hengqin and the related cooperation zone as not only its expanding physical space but also a launching pad for new industries away from its traditional heavy reliance on casino capitalism. Yet, both Hong Kong and Macau are expected to be more “socialist” than before, dealing with the people’s livelihood in a far more effective manner while depoliticizing the two cities as much as possible. The CPPCC and NPC sessions in March 2024 have already revealed the central government’s strategic repositioning of Hong Kong and Macau while adopting a wait-and-see attitude toward the Taiwan authorities, even though the mainland is keen to expand the patriotic front to broaden and deepen cross-strait interactions in the areas of arts, humanities, science, agricultural and youth development.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

The budget speech delivered by Hong Kong’s Financial Secretary Paul Chan has revealed that the Hong Kong government has been retaining its incremental style of reforms in dealing with its financial budget from 2024 to 2025. Most significantly, the budget was announced just a day after the visit of Xia Baolong to Hong Kong for his inspection study. Putting the two events together, the budget has tremendous political significance for the special administrative region.

The entire thrust of the budget is to control government expenditure and to increase government revenue by other means, notably the adjustment of fees and tax items based on the principle of “affordable users pay.” In 2024-2025, the total government revenue is going to be HK$633 billion and the total government expenditure is HK$776.9 billion. The forecast consolidated deficit in 2024-2025 is going to be HK$48.1 billion, with fiscal reserves forecast to be HK$685.1 billion by the end of March 2025. From 2025-2026 to 2028-2029, consolidated surpluses are anticipated, with fiscal reserves estimated at HK$832.2 billion by the end of March 2029.

The forecast consolidated deficit in 2024-2025 is going to be HK$48.1 billion, with fiscal reserves forecast to be HK$685.1 billion by the end of March 2025. From 2025-2026 to 2028-2029, consolidated surpluses are anticipated, with fiscal reserves estimated at HK$832.2 billion by the end of March 2029.

The fiscal consolidation program of the Hong Kong government adopts three principles: (1) the achievement of fiscal balance gradually and the maintenance of fiscal reserves at a prudent level; (2) the focus on expenditure cut, with some revenue increases included pragmatically; and (3) the allocation of resources for the provision and improvement of public services for the sake of taking care of the people’s needs.

In terms of controlling government expenditure, the civil service establishment is maintained at zero growth. The recurrent government expenditure is reduced by one percent in 2026-2027. The operation of the public transport fare concession scheme for the elderly and eligible persons with disabilities, namely HK$2 scheme, and the public transport fare subsidy scheme will be reviewed, but the government has no intention of cancelling these schemes.

For the capital works projects, the principle of cost effectiveness is adopted. They are adjusted in accordance with priorities and urgency. Work projects that are at the mature planning stage, such as the infrastructure works for the Northern Metropolis, are going forward as planned. But work projects that are currently at the preliminary planning stage have their implementation schedule adjusted.

Most importantly, the government proposes a two-tiered standard rates regime for salaries tax and tax under personal assessment, affecting only taxpayers with over HK$5 million net income and whose tax payable is calculated at the standard rate. Taxpayers on progressive rates will not be affected.

The two-tiered standard rates regime means that those people with net income above HK$5 million will have 16 percent tax rates – a very moderate increase. For those people with net income HK$5 million or below, the tax rates remain at 15 percent. Clearly, the reform is slightly progressive but very moderate.

The hotel accommodation tax is going to be three percent starting from January 1, 2025. Moreover, the government introduces a progressive rating system for domestic properties, affecting domestic properties with rateable value of over HK$550,000 only. For an annual rateable value of HK$550,000 or below, the rates percentage charges of five percent remain unchanged, covering 98 percent of the private residential flats. For annual rateable value of HK$550,001 to HK$800,000, the next rates percentage charges will be eight percent, affecting about 1.1 percent of the private residential flats. For annual rateable value above HK$800,000, the rates percentage charges will be 12 percent, affecting 0.8 percent of private residential flats. Overall, the adjustment in the rates percentage charges adopts a slightly progressive system in accordance with the increase in annual rateable value of domestic tenements.

While the government strives to increase its revenue through new measures, it is keen to maintain public confidence in the property market by cancelling the special stamp duty, buyers’ stamp duty and the new residential stamp duty for residential properties with immediate effect. This move has also made concessions to those groups lobbying the government for the cancellation of all these duties so that the property market can and will hopefully remain prosperous.

In the short run, the cancellation of various stamp duties will likely have a stimulating effect on the property market, where property buyers, including mainlanders, may be incentivized to buy properties; however, some observers have predicted that the property market would likely be hard-pressed to cool down and even drop, especially as the global and regional economy is far less optimistic than the predictions made by those with vested interests.

Overall, Paul Chan’s budget adopts the traditional budgetary principle of incremental reforms, demonstrating a conservative philosophy of public finance. Yet, this incremental conservatism has appeared to get the full support of the central authorities, especially as Xia Baolong, the director of the Hong Kong Macau Affairs Office, ended his 7-day visit on February 28, 2024.

Xia’s visit was politically important. His visit aimed at implementing the spirit of the speech delivered by President Xi Jinping in December 2023, when he met Hong Kong Chief Executive John Lee during the duty visit and report to Beijing. The President had previously emphasized the importance of Hong Kong changing “from chaos to governance, and from governance to prosperity.” Coming to Hong Kong toward the end of a one-month consultation period of Article 23 of the Basic Law, Xia’s visit appeared to achieve multiple objectives: (1) to implement the spirit of ensuring a smooth transition from governance to prosperity; (2) to listen to public views on the consultative document on Article 23 of the Basic Law (his meetings with lawyers and barristers); (3) to listen to the Hong Kong government on how it deals with the transition from “governance to prosperity;” and (4) to gather public views and to report to the central leadership prior to the forthcoming National People’s Congress meeting, where the mainland government’s report must touch on the development of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR).

Judging from the places of visits by Xia Baolong, the central government attaches great importance to Hong Kong as an aviation hub (the first day of Xia’s visit to the international airport), an arbitration center for the Belt and Road scheme (his second day visit to the preparatory office of the international mediation center), and an international monetary and financial center (his meeting with the elites of the monetary and financial industries and with the businesspeople. 

Furthermore, Xia’s meetings with the chairpersons and members of District Councils, the ordinary people in Shum Shui Po community center, the youth, the patriotic social groups and the media professionals showed that the central authorities attach immense importance to the livelihood issues and aspects of Hong Kong. Xia’s appeal to the people of Hong Kong to support the policies of the Hong Kong government was an important move that attempts to win the hearts and minds of the public, galvanizing their support just prior to the delivery of Paul Chan’s budget speech. As such, the budget content has acquired the full support of the central authorities in Beijing.

Xia also met the members of the Executive and Legislative Councils. During the meetings, he expressed the central government’s concern about Hong Kong’s economic development and livelihood issues, injecting his confidence over the future of Hong Kong. In a sense, Xia’s visit represented a rebuttal to some foreign critics who had lashed out at Hong Kong’s economic future. If the central authorities fully back up Hong Kong and have confidence in the HKSAR’s future, the ruling elites in Hong Kong, as Xia said, should feel confident in their policies toward the city’s economic development and livelihood improvement.

In conclusion, Paul Chan’s budget has been characterized by the traditional budgetary principle of incrementalism, meaning that any adjustment and reforms made to the budget are bound to be incremental, gradual and piecemeal. As such, the budget content is in line with the tenet of incremental changes; however, some reform elements are a small step toward a progressive tax regime, such as the higher tax rate for those net income exceeding HK$5 million and the progressive rating system for domestic properties. If any progressive tax and rating system can be seen as, broadly speaking, “socialist,” then the budget content is unprecedented. It is a good move in line with what the central authorities expect, namely Hong Kong’s tax regime can move slightly toward a more “socialist” system than ever before. Judging from the way in which Xia Baolong visited various places and met the people from a wide spectrum of the society, the budget is surely welcome by the central authorities, who expect the people of Hong Kong to support the local government’s policies and measures. After all, Hong Kong is expected and required to do a better job in its important transition period “from governance to prosperity,” especially in the twin areas of economy and the people’s livelihood.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

Recent developments have revealed how the Mainland Red Cross, the Strait Exchange Foundation from Taiwan, and the Taiwan Mainland Affairs Council have been dealing with the aftermath of a mainland boat’s tragedy, which led to the deaths of two mainland fishermen off the coast of Kinmen on February 14. The politics involved in such communications will be analysed in this article.

On February 16, the Taiwan side’s Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) – a semi-official organization set up by the Taiwan government to deal with technical and business matters with the mainland – wrote a letter to the mainland’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) and arranged the relatives of the mainland fishermen to go to Kinmen to handle the matters concerned. 

On February 17, the spokesperson of the mainland’s State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, Zhu Fenglin, said that, from the ancient times, there have been no “prohibited waters” around Kinmen, and as such, the Taiwan side had to shoulder the responsibility of the deaths of the two mainland fishermen. At the same time, the Fujian marine police remarked that it will enhance its ability to implement law and order on the waters to protect the order and to safeguard the lives and properties of the mainland fishermen. 

Zhu also remarked that the incident involving the deaths of the two mainland fishermen was “malicious.” In response to Zhu’s remarks, the Taiwan side’s Mainland Affairs Council said that the mainland fishing vessels “cannot” enter the “restricted Taiwan waters, and that the Taiwan marine inspection vessels needed to protect the “normal order on Taiwan waters.”

On February 18, Zhu Fenglin commented that the mainland marine police would take inspection action on the waters of Xiamen and Kinmen as a part of normalization – an action that would be resolutely supported by the Taiwan Affairs Office. Her remarks meant that there will be action taken by the mainland marine police to patrol on the waters of Xiamen and Kinmen.

On February 19, four marine police vessels from mainland China were appearing in the waters of Xiamen and Kinmen, and they surrounded the northern, southern, and southeastern parts of Kinmen. On the same day, the spokesperson of the mainland Taiwan Affairs Office, Zhu Fenglin, repeated that after the incident of “Taiwan side rudely treating the mainland fishermen,” the mainland side decided to send the Quanzhou Red Cross to accompany the family members of the victims to go to Kinmen. Zhu remarked that the Taiwan side should facilitate and arrange the mainlanders’ visit for the sake of “avoiding further harm to the sentiments of the comrades of the two straits.”

On the same day, the Kinmen Fishing Association made a declaration: (1) due to the sensitivity in cross-strait relations, Taiwan’s fishermen should not cross the boundaries to engage in illegal fishing while protecting their own personal safety; (2) if the Taiwan fishermen encounter any marine dispute or any sudden inspection by the mainland official vessels, then they can call the Taiwan Fishing Association or the Taiwan Marine Inspection authorities.

The Taiwan Defence Ministry simultaneously announced on February 19 that within the 24 hours, there were seven airplanes from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) flying near the Taiwan airspace, while seven mainland PLA warships had movements. Objectively speaking, the sudden announcement seemed to make the cross-strait atmosphere tense, but perhaps the movement of mainland fighter airplanes and warships was coincidental.

On February 19, a Taiwan ferry running across Kinmen and Xiamen suddenly saw mainland marine police boarding the ferry and conducting inspection. On the next day, Taiwan news reported that mainland marine police vessels again went into “Kinmen waters.” 

The action of the mainland marine police in conducting inspection on the Taiwan ferry on February 19 fit into what Zhu Fenglin mentioned on February 18 that mainland marine police would take inspection action as a sort of “normalization” activities. 

In response, the Taiwan Mainland Affairs Council criticized such mainland marine police’s activity for “hurting the sentiment of the people from two sides.” The Taiwan Transport Department and Marine Port Bureau publicly said that, if Taiwan vessels meet mainland marine police’s inspection action, they could refuse stopping their vessels and should return to Taiwan quickly – an announcement that led to criticisms from some Taiwan commentators, who believed that the Taiwan government “kicked the ball” to the Taiwan citizens to solve the problems rather than taking action to tackle the issue itself.

Although the Taiwan transport and marine authorities might make public remarks that were not conducive to the resolution of cross-strait relations over the “prohibited” waters, the Taiwan Defence Ministry said that it would not intervene in such mainland marine police’s inspections of Taiwan vessels – a wise move that defused any crisis and prevented any unnecessary escalation of tensions across the two straits.

On February 20, Quanzhou Red Cross adviser Li Chaohui led six relatives of the mainland fishermen to visit and arrive Kinmen. Li said that their visit aimed at “comprehending the facts, helping the relatives of the victims to manage post-death matters, and bringing back two survivors to the mainland.”

Li also brought his colleagues from the Quanzhou Red Cross and a mainland lawyer to visit Kinmen. He added that the Taiwan side should not object to the mainland delegation’s basic request of finding out the facts of why two mainland fishermen died.

On February 20, two survived mainland fishermen were arranged to return to the mainland from Kinmen. However, when the Mainland Affairs Council staff showed a document to request the Mainland Red Cross to sign on it as an affirmation of “repatriating mainland personnel,” the mainland side refused to do so. In response, the Taiwan Marine Inspection authorities said that the mainlanders would still be sent back to the mainland even though the mainland Red Cross refused to sign the document concerned.

On February 21, the mainland survivors returned to Xiamen, and they complained that the Taiwan side treated them “cruelly,” and that the Taiwan Marine Inspection vessel actually clashed with the mainland boat on the afternoon of February 14. In response to the remarks of the mainland surviving fishermen, Zhu Fenglin said that the mainland side called for the Taiwan side to reveal the facts, penalize any persons responsible for the incident, and explain the situation to the victims of the mainland fishermen.

At the same time, the Taiwan news reports revealed that the Taiwan Marine Inspection vessel did not carry any video camera when it chased the mainland fishing boat on February 14 – a situation confirmed by the Kinmen prosecution department. Although an officer on the Taiwan Marine Inspection vessel reportedly held a video-camera, his balance was affected by the vessel’s fast movement and by the tragedy that occurred in a short duration of five minutes. As such, there were difficulties in collecting the evidence of the incident. Such explanation naturally aroused criticisms, both from the mainland and Taiwan.

What complicated the matter was that the Taiwan Marine Inspection admitted that there were clashes between the Taiwan Marine Inspection vessel and the mainland fishing boat.

On the night of February 21, Zhu Fenglin from the mainland’s Taiwan Affairs Office said that the Taiwan side should not hide the facts and that it should reveal the facts, penalize the persons responsible for the deaths of the mainland fishermen, handle the requests of the family members of the two mainland victims, and apologize to the family members of the victims.

On February 22, the Taiwan Marine Inspection held a press conference, explaining to the media that the inspection vessel CP1051 belonged to a small one under ten tons, meaning that the vessel did not need to have video-camera in accordance with the law and regulations. However, to avoid similar events in the future, such vessel type will be installed with video-cameras in the future. The department’s explanation was quite defensive, and it could not deal with the criticisms that its CP1051 vessel clashed with the mainland fishing boat.

The way in which the official Taiwan authorities managed the video cameras was criticized by the opposition Kuomintang (KMT). One KMT member and legislator, Chen Yu-jen, said that the Taiwan marine officers were equipped with cameras, but since some of the cameras were made in mainland China, these cameras were not used.

It is not clear that, from all the news reports, on whether any individual officer on CP1051 carried a video camera that could capture the “clashes” between the Taiwan marine inspection vessel and the mainland fishing boat.

However, from the communications between the two sides, the tragedy remains politically significant.

First, both sides rely on the Red Cross to communicate with each other. On February 23, the mainland Red Cross at Jinjiang city led a delegation to visit Kinmen again to have closed-door discussions with the Taiwan side. The family members of the two mainland victims requested an apology from the Taiwan Marine Inspection, but both sides had no consensus. Although both sides had disagreement, what is most interesting in this event is that both sides, including the Red Cross from the mainland and Taiwan, agree to disagree. As such, mutual communications are pragmatic moves at the operational level, regardless of political differences at the higher level.

The mutual communications between the Red Cross of the two sides could be traced back to September 12, 1990, when both sides discussed in Kinmen on how to oversee the transfer of criminal suspects from Taiwan and the mainland. Their discussions led to the Kinmen agreement by adopting the principle of “looking at the facts positively, constructing mutual trust, laying down disputes, and striving for a win-win situation.” This principle has been interestingly revived since the mainland boat tragedy on February 14 – a positive and healthy sign in cross-strait relations even though the ruling parties from both sides are at loggerheads at the level of high politics. But at the level of low politics and practical tragedy, both sides must sit down at least unofficially or semi-officially to communicate over a satisfactory solution to all stakeholders.

Second, the communications between the Taiwan SEF and the mainland’s ARATS – the former writing a letter to the latter, and then the exchange between the Red Cross from both sides — triggered discussions. The letter written by the SEF to ARATS was significant as both sides dealt with pragmatic issues at the operational level.

Third, judging from the personnel participating in the talks in Kinmen, the mainland delegation had members with semi-official status, namely Li Chaohui who is also the director of the Taiwan-Hong Kong-Macau Office in Quanzhou city. If the Red Cross is under the political leadership and supervision of the mainland government, its leading officials, like Jinjiang Red Cross secretary Chao Yongshan, appeared to have semi-official status. The meeting between the two sides on February 23 was politically significant, because the Taiwan side embraced officials from the Marine Inspection, Mainland Affairs Council and the SEF (see Liberty Times, February 24, 2024, in 海巡與中方代表 閉門會談無共識 – 政治 – 自由時報電子報 (ltn.com.tw)). As such, it can be said that the meeting in Kinmen on February 23 has been unprecedented since the deterioration of the cross-strait relations after the assumption of office of Tsai Ing-wen as Taiwan president in May 2016.

In conclusion, the most important unintended and political consequence of the mainland boat’s tragedy off the coast of Kinmen on February 14 is to trigger the discussions between the two sides – both mainland and Taiwan – at the pragmatic and operational level in the interest of the mainland survivors and victims. While the Red Cross from both sides have been involved in mutual communications and dialogues, the semi-official and official authorities from both sides have also been involved in varying degrees, including the mainland side which involve semi-official organizations and personnel with semi-official capacity. On the other hand, the Taiwan side has actually involved the semi-official Strait Exchange Foundation and the official authorities from the Marine Inspection and Mainland Affairs Council. Both sides have demonstrated a high degree of pragmatism, tolerance, and willingness to discuss amid the difficulties of reaching a consensus. If so, cross-strait relations remain cautiously optimistic. We will have to observe how both sides will reach a resolution satisfactory to the family members of the mainland victims in the coming days and weeks.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

A recent tragedy involving the death of two mainland fishermen in an unnamed mainland fishing vessel off the coast of Kinmen is politically significant, for the incident has highlighted how the Taiwan and mainland sides are managing it with implications for cross-strait relations in the coming years.

The Taiwan coastguard chased the mainland fishing boat on February 14 when the unnamed vessel entered the so-called “prohibited” waters off the coast of Kinmen. According to the Taiwanese coastguard version of the story, the mainlanders on board of the fishing boat ignored the Taiwan side’s request for inspection and they speeded up, leading to the capsize of the boat. Four fishermen fell into the waters and two of them died. It was reported that the dead fishermen were from the Sichuan province, while the two alive fishermen came from Chongqing and Guizhou. The two survivors, according to news reports, were “emotional” and could not understand the Min Nan (Hokkien) dialect.

There was a rumour saying that the four fishermen were smugglers trying to reach the Taiwan territory, but the Taiwan official side remarked that human smuggling usually did not utilize such a route.

The Kinmen Red Cross suggested that the two dead mainlanders can be managed quickly by treating the incident as “a marine disaster.” But the Taiwan authorities said that the incident would be managed in accordance with proper procedures. This means that, traditionally, mainland fishermen who crossed the “boundaries” have been inspected by the Taiwan coastguard, which then submits the case to the Kinmen prosecution authority after which the mainlanders can be detained in prison between three to five months and not longer than one year.

The mainland Chinese side reacted strongly to the incident. Zhu Fenglian, a spokesperson of mainland China’s Taiwan Affairs Office, said that the Chinese side expressed its sorrow and sent its condolences to the families of the dead, and that the incident was “hostile” and “hurt the sentiment of the compatriots on both sides of the strait.” Zhu added that the mainland side has traditionally aided the Taiwanese fishermen who sought logistical supplies and security.

In response to the mainland remarks, the Taiwan side’s Mainland Affairs Council said that the Taiwanese coastguard managed the tragedy properly because the fishing boat had no name, no shipping license, and no registered port.

According to the Taiwan coastguard statistics, there were 9,100 mainland fishing vessels which allegedly had to be “expelled” from the Taiwan waters from July 2016 to November 2023. An official of the Mainland Affairs Council added that whenever a mainland fishing boat “intrudes” into the “prohibited zone” for 0.86 nautical miles, then a Taiwanese coastguard vessel must take action to stop or pursue it.

Objectively speaking, it is disputable whether there is a “prohibited” maritime zone near the Kinmen island, especially as the relations between the Taiwan and mainland sides have deteriorated since the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) came to presidential power in May 2016.

In recent years, more mainland vessels have entered the nearby waters surrounding Taiwan, some of them extracting sand from the ocean floor, some engaging in fishing, and some reportedly even releasing garbage that, according to the Taiwan side, had to be tackled. The Mainland Affairs Council has stated that the “intrusion” of mainland fishing vessels into the Taiwan waters has “seriously undermined the interests and livelihood of the Taiwan fishermen and residents in the coastal regions.” 

Chiu Tai-san, the minister of the Mainland Affairs Council of the Taiwan government, said that both the Taiwan and mainland sides “maintain a certain degree of contact” while his side will investigate fully and inform the other side later.

His remarks appeared to be quite skilful and courteous toward the mainland side.

Chen Fu-hai, the magistrate at the Kinmen county and an “independent” politician without any party affiliation, expressed his regret over the tragedy. He instructed his deputy magistrate in Kinmen to provide care and administrative assistance to the survivors. On February 15, Chen Fu-hai appealed to both sides of the strait to adopt a “benevolent” attitude toward “a rational, peaceful and pragmatic dialogue” over the livelihood and activities of the fishermen from Taiwan and the mainland. He gave an example of the cooperation between the Kimen Fishing Products Experimental Institute and the Xiamen Oceanic Developmental Bureau on how to distribute fish seeds with a view to achieving a win-win situation for the fishing industry from both sides. Chen concluded that the Kinmen county is willing to play a pioneer role in bridging the communication gap between the two sides of the strait.

The Kinmen officials on the morning of February 15 visited the Kinmen fishermen, asking them to exercise restraint and adopt a low profile in their action for the sake of preventing any unnecessary conflict or dispute.

Chen Yu-jen, a Kuomintang (KMT) member of the Legislative Assembly representing the Kinmen county, said that Kinmen and Xiamen are separated by a short distance of waters and that both sides need “wisdom” to solve the problem.

In recent weeks, cross-strait relations have become sour as the DPP terminated the Taiwan tours to visit the mainland, while the mainland side was criticized for changing a flight path of M503 route that is close to the “median line” in the Taiwan strait. Mainland China does not recognize the existence of this “median line,” according to observers, especially as mainland warplanes have been flying over it recently. However, the mainland’s Taiwan Affairs Office responded by saying that the M503 route is for civil aviation and that the path change aims at alleviating congestion and protecting safety in the related airspace and routes.

The dispute over airspace has been accompanied by more incidents surrounding the “expulsion” of more mainland fishing vessels by the Taiwan coastguard since mid-2023. On July 12, 2023, the Taiwan coastguard arrested three mainland fishermen for “trespassing” the Kinmen waters to catch fish. Five days later, the coastguard detained twelve mainland fishermen for “illegally” catching fish off the coast of Penghu. On September 29, 2023, another mainland fishing vessel went to the northwest coast off Taiwan’s Hsinchu, where seventeen fishermen were detained and sent to Taipei for investigation. On November 9, 2023, the Taiwan coastguard detained thirteen mainland fishermen in a vessel that caught almost 250 kilograms of fish off the coast of the Taichung port. Two days later, six mainland fishermen were detained off the coast of Kinmen where they “illegally” caught fish. On January 12, 2024, six mainland fishermen were detained in a mainland fishing vessel where they caught 150 kilograms of fish off the coast of Penghu. 

Clearly, the two sides of the Taiwan strait need to manage the activities of mainland fishermen in a productive and constructive way in the coming months and years.

According to Article 42 of the Implementation Details of the Relations of the People between the Taiwan region and Mainland region,^[1] the mainland vessels which enter the Taiwan region’s “restricted” or “prohibited” waters without permission can be “expelled” and inspected. Article 42 (4) even states that if the mainland vessels refuse to stop or resist to being detained, the Taiwan side’s coastguard may warn and “shoot” after warnings without effectiveness. 

If so, the Taiwan side has the authority and discretion to deal with the mainland fishing vessels that allegedly “intrude” into Taiwan’s waters. Ironically, any careless or arbitrary exercise of the authority empowered by Article 42 (4) can and will plunge cross-strait relations into a sudden crisis.

In March 2015, the Taiwan Legislative Assembly amended the Implementation Details and increased the fines on those mainland vessels “illegally entering” Taiwan waters from NT$500,000 to over NT$1 million but not more than NT$10 million – a tough penalty that was interestingly and ironically passed by a legislature dominated by KMT legislators.

Perhaps the crux of the problem for the most recent fishing tragedy is whether the mainland side recognizes those waters belonging to the Taiwan side. Since cross-strait relations have deteriorated after the DPP came to presidential power in May 2016, both sides have been dealing with fishing incidents in a low-profile and yet manageable way, unlike the most recent tragedy that unfortunately led to the deaths of two mainland fishermen. This rare and unprecedented incident calls for both sides to consider an effective mechanism in dealing with it.

This mechanism can be managed or mediated by the Red Cross from both sides. Since Red Cross belongs to a non-governmental organization, the suggestion from the Taiwan Red Cross for the Taiwan authorities to treat the most recent tragedy as a “maritime disaster” can be a way out of the current impasse. The authorities of the Red Cross from both sides can also function as the mediators, channelling the findings and views from the official Taiwan side to the mainland official side.

Perhaps a long-term implication for both sides to discuss issues of relatively “low-level politics,” such as fishing disputes, tourism, and student exchanges, can be conducted through non-governmental organizations and interest groups. These organizations and groups can and will channel the views from the two sides more conveniently and effectively, serving as a useful conduit to tackle cross-strait relations in a peaceful, harmonious, and constructive way.

If livelihood issues belong to low-level politics, cross-strait relations can perhaps focus on the nuts and bolts of such matters in the short run and medium term, thereby warming mutual relations without touching upon any issue of “high politics.”

Another important implication of the ongoing incident is that the Kinmen county, including its magistrate and non-governmental bodies, is keen to act as a bridge between the Taiwan and mainland sides. As such, Kinmen can and will likely be the place for further experimentation with mutual dialogue at a non-governmental level.

In conclusion, the most recent tragedy involving the death of two mainland fishermen off the coast of Kinmen has opened the door to the increasingly vital role of non-governmental organizations, like the Red Cross, in bridging the communication gap between the two sides of the Taiwan strait. At a time when the governmental communications of both sides have already been hampered by high-level politics, the role of non-governmental organizations, interest groups and individuals is yet playing a crucial intermediary that will likely have potentially stabilizing, constructive, productive, and peaceful impacts on cross-strait relations. Moreover, Kinmen as a place close to Xiamen can and will play a critical role in non-governmental dialogue and new experiments that will bridge the communication gap between the two sides. As such, groups and individuals at a non-governmental level, especially in Kinmen, can and should be encouraged to exchange their views and dialogue over livelihood issues at the level of “low politics” in the coming months and years.

^[1] For details, see https://db.lawbank.com.tw/FLAW/FLAWQRY03.aspx?lno=42-44&lsid=FL016529&_gl=1*1fq92kz*_ga*MzMzNTE4NTY5LjE3MDc5NzIyMjk.*_ga_92YN8QGDF5*MTcwNzk3MjIyOC4xLjAuMTcwNzk3MjIyOC42MC4wLjA, access date: February 16, 2024.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

The Year of the Dragon in 2024 is opening the door for us to witness new challenges for the economic prosperity, social equity, and political governance of both the Hong Kong and Macau Special Administrative Regions (SARs). This article is going to evaluate the challenges of socio-economic governance in the two cities.

First, while Macau has envisaged a return of revenues in the casino and gaming industry, Hong Kong has been suffering from a vast number of Hongkongers who have been spending a lot in the neighbouring regions of Shenzhen and the Greater Bay Area (GBA). Since the end of Covid-19 and its variants, Macau has seen a steady return of tourists from the mainland, and they have been sustaining the development of the casino and gaming industry in a positive way. On the contrary, Hong Kong’s economy has been suffering from an outpour of local people to the GBA and their spending there while more shops in the local districts have been closed – a testimony to the challenges to the economic prosperity of Hong Kong.

Hong Kong has recently tried to boost its economy through mega-sports event and tourism, notably the Inter Miami’s visit to Hong Kong with its football legend Lionel Messi. Yet, Messi’s absence in the football match on the grounds of his health was a blow to not only the football fans who packed the Hong Kong Football Stadium, but also a factor triggering the anger of some mainland netizens, especially as Messi later appeared in Miami’s football match in Japan. Although Inter Miami eventually apologized for Messi’s absence in the Hong Kong football exhibition match, and even though the organizer Tatler Asia announced an offer of 50 percent refund to football fans who watched the match and expected Messi to play at least for some minutes, the entire mega-sport event ended in a public relations fiasco with bitter lessons to be learnt from all sides, including the government authorities responsible for sponsoring the event.

The saga has raised a more serious question to the Hong Kong authorities. If mega-sport events are used to revive Hong Kong’s economy through tourism and the spending of local fans, will such mega-sports events sustainable eventually? Or are they only temporary measures that cannot revive the gradually declining economy of Hong Kong.

Since the gradual relocation of Hong Kong’s manufacturing industry to the mainland in the 1990s, the Hong Kong SAR has been lacking a strong industrial base. The recent migration of tens of thousands of Hong Kong people out of Hong Kong to other parts of the world, notably UK, has deprived the territory of its wealthy and affluent middle class. Coupled with the outpouring of the members of the existing middle-lower classes to the GBA on the weekends and holidays, the HKSAR is facing a crisis in its local economy. The property market has also witnessed a drop in property prices, but the vested interest groups and individuals are lobbying the government to prop up the property sector. Hong Kong is now stuck in a dilemma: on the one hand, socio-economic integration with the GBA is seeing the outflow of middle-class consumers and lower-class spenders out of Hong Kong, with the unintended consequence of hurting the local tertiary sector’s businesses; on the other hand, the property market’s prices are declining and yet the vested interest groups and individuals are asking the government to maintain property prices at still a high level that doing business in Hong Kong is increasingly difficult and unattractive to local people and foreign businesspeople. In short, the HKSAR economy is stepping into cul-de-sac calling for urgent solutions.

Such solutions are bound to be different from Macau, where the economy has been traditionally propelled by the casino and gaming sector and where its cultural and historical sites have been maintained well to attract mainland, Hong Kong, and overseas tourists. The solutions to Hong Kong’s economic quagmire are, firstly, making the tertiary sector much better and more attractive in delivering quality services and, secondly, reviving cultural and historical tourism, which demands the government and tourism-related authorities to be stronger in visionary leadership more effective in policy formulation and implementation.

Unlike Macau where historical sites and cultural heritage sites have traditionally been well maintained and publicized, curiously the Hong Kong tourism authorities have been quite weak in their historical and cultural understanding of Hong Kong. Although the recent policy address delivered by John Lee mentioned the prospects of building up historical and cultural museums in Hong Kong that will emphasize the city’s historical role in the Second World War, still many existing historical sites in the city have been left unrepaired, unnoticed, and unused by the tourism authorities. The Hong Kong tourism authorities must study the history and cultural heritage of Hong Kong in a far more extensive and intensive way as a precondition for them to ponder how to stimulate mainland and overseas tourists to visit a variety of historical and cultural sites in the future.

Curiously, some small tourist groups in Hong Kong led by individuals knowledgeable about historical and cultural sites in Hong Kong have been taking a leading role in bringing foreign tourists to visit these places. Yet, as the tourism authorities lack in-depth knowledge on the local history of Hong Kong, historical and cultural tourism in the HKSAR remains far more underdeveloped than its counterpart in Macau, where the tourism authorities have successfully created apps, attractive websites, detailed brochures on all the large and small historical-cultural spots in the city. In fact, cruise tourism can and should be forged between Hong Kong and Macau as well as the GBA cities, but so far there has been no coordinated attempt and visionary leadership in making cruise tourism a signature event in regional tourism.

However, Macau’s economic diversification is still slow, a process that can and should be accelerated by better governmental publicity work, stronger mobilization of interest groups and individuals to visit Hengqin, and stronger liaison work with the Zhuhai Hengqin authorities in managing the Macau neighbourhood residence and expanding the Macau residential district further to become a real powerhouse for Macau’s increasing physical and economic space in the coming years. Macau must accelerate the process of building up securities and bond centres in Hengqin alongside with the construction of a Chinese medicine hub, a technological and innovation hub and the convention and exhibition centres. One way for the Macau government to speed up its economic diversification through the Guangdong-Macau In-Depth Cooperation Zone in Hengqin is to mobilize all the local universities in Macau to build up their new campuses in Hengqin more quickly – a condition that demands immediate planning, swift policy formulation and effective policy implementation.

From the perspective of maintaining social stability, both Macau and Hong Kong are consolidating their national security through the amended national security law in Macau, the imposition of the national security law in Hong Kong in mid-2020, and the forthcoming smooth passage of Article 23 of the Basic Law in the HKSAR.

The challenge to social stability is how to enhance social equity through the provision and delivery of social welfare to the poor and the needy. In this aspect, Macau performs much better than Hong Kong as Macau offers a variety of social welfare measures to help the poor and the needy. Hong Kong, however, remains problematic. The recent delay in imposing a charge on the garbage waste from April to August 2024 has attracted public criticisms, notably the charge is like a tax being imposed on the poor and the needy who see it as a financial burden. The governmental authorities responsible for the waste charge collection have underestimated the comprehensive impacts of such charge on the society and the lower classes, especially the poor who are still living in cage homes and sub-divided units.

If social inequity was regarded by some people as one of the causes leading to the 2019 turbulence, then the improvement in social welfare should be high on the policy agenda of the HKSAR government. Yet, the HKSAR government is confronted with budget deficit. In the coming years, when the members of the public are expecting the government to play a more interventionist role in the provision of social welfare, and yet the government is trying to avoid such interventionist approach, the challenge to social stability would be increasingly acute, especially if the economy may suddenly turn worse given the unstable geopolitical situation in the world and in Northeast Asia, where the relations between North Korea on the one hand and South Korea, Japan and the US on the other hand are increasingly tense. Even if the relations between mainland China and Taiwan are and will be both manageable and peaceful, any fluctuations in the global and regional economy toward a downturn would perhaps plunge the social stability of Hong Kong into an unexpected crisis in the coming years.

There are solutions to the financial predicament of the Hong Kong government, including an increase in taxes on the rich and the affluent, like inheritance tax, property transfer tax, and taxes on luxurious products. Yet, taxing the rich and the affluent will give rise to resistance and opposition from the members of upper and middle classes. Recently, a political party has suggested the need for departure tax to the government. Such a departure tax, however, would affect the Hongkongers who travel into the GBA frequently. In short, the politics of taxation will be increasingly sensitive and class-based in the HKSAR in the coming years.

In Macau, taxes are high on the casino concessionaries, with 40 percent of them going to the treasuries of the government. This approach is socialist amid casino capitalism, but it is effective so long as the casino and gaming industry is prosperous. Still, a government depending on its revenues on casino revenues needs to consider a contingency plan, especially as the infrastructure development in Macau-Hengqin region will demand more investment and as the aging population of Macau will demand more subsidies and more social welfare from the government.

The provision of more public housing units remains a big challenge to the Hong Kong government, even though the central authorities and leaders in Beijing expect it to be more effective in addressing the people’s livelihood. The long waiting time for residents who apply for public housing units must be reduced further and more land must be found to build up more units for them at a faster pace. The housing markets of Hong Kong have to be reformed in a more effective way. At present, the upper-class properties are highly expensive; the middle-tiered properties are stuck with still high prices that cannot be easily affordable to ordinary income-earners; the lower-class housing units are generally insufficient in supply although their demands are huge. The housing officials and bureaucrats of Hong Kong must humbly ponder more effective solutions to address the imbalances in the three classes of properties, instead of utilizing the market as an easy justification for either incrementalism or inaction.

Ideologically speaking, the ruling philosophy of Macau is far more socialist and welfarist than that of Hong Kong. The HKSAR has already abandoned its relatively laissez-faire or non-interventionist approach in dealing with the society and economy, but arguably it should be more interventionist and more effective in dealing with the supply and provision of public housing units, much bolder and visionary in reconsidering the current tax system, and more insightful and forceful in handling historical and cultural tourism. Otherwise, the socio-economic outlook of the HKSAR remains optimistic but challenging. Hong Kong is only partially and selectively interventionist in its governing philosophy, and yet such philosophy is increasingly outdated in an era of social and political culture that demands more effective governmental intervention.

In conclusion, from the perspective of governance, both Macau and Hong Kong are and will be politically and socially stable, but any economic downturn due to geopolitical conflict may plunge the two cities into a sudden economic crisis. The challenge of Macau is to enhance its governance, including the need for much clearer timeline in all public work and construction projects, the necessity of pushing forward the integration plan with Hengqin, the need to mobilize local universities to open their new campuses in the Macau-Hengqin region, and the necessity of devising a contingency socio-economic plan in case of any global and regional economic shock.

Hong Kong, however, encounters more challenges as it is stuck in a dilemma of maintaining the status quo in the property sector and dealing with a declining economy, especially as the middle-lower classes are now flocking to spend in the GBA rather than staying in the territory during the weekends and holidays. As such, it is quite urgent for the Hong Kong authorities to ponder a variety of measures to stimulate the economy, including the rapid development of historical and cultural tourism that demands a more radical thinking and urgent learning of the tourism-related authorities, the consideration of long-term tax reforms that would have income redistributive effects, and the more forceful supply and swifter provision of public housing units to deal with the plight of the poor and the needy. Both Macau and Hong Kong must do a better job in their governance – a demand that has been made known by the ruling authorities in Beijing especially since the 20^th Party Congress.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

The Liaison Office Directors of Hong Kong and Macau, Zheng Yanxiong and Zheng Xincong, delivered their speeches for the Hong Kong and Macau special administrative regions for the forthcoming Chinese New Year in 2024, on January 30 and February 1, respectively. This article examines the content of their speeches and discusses the areas of improvement expected for the governments of Hong Kong and Macau.

Zheng Yanxiong’s speech began with a statement on the year 2023, which marked an inception of the implementation of the spirit of China’s 20^th Party Congress, where Xi Jinping was re-elected with full votes as not only the president but also the chair of the central military commission. Zheng stressed the achievements of the Chinese spaceship Shenzhou and of the Chinese economy, while the third international forum of the Belt and Road Initiatives was held in Beijing with tremendous success. The Asian Games in Hangzhou was another highlight, demonstrating the success and self-confidence of the Chinese style of modernization, according to Zheng.

Zheng then shifted to the development of Hong Kong in 2023, saying that President Xi responded to the letter of Hong Kong students from the Pui Kiu Secondary School and that he injected a strong and youthful element to Hong Kong. This meant that China’s assertive and strong leadership provided he necessary support to the John Lee administration, which brought about economic vitality after the end of Covid-19 and its variants, and which bid farewell to the socio-political chaos in Hong Kong. Zheng said that Hong Kong bade farewell to “the puzzling thought of hyperpoliticization” through the completion of the District Council elections and the realization of the “patriots” ruling Hong Kong. Over one hundred items related to the development of the Greater Bay Area were implemented, including other measures stimulating the people’s livelihood and the migration of a large batch of talents to Hong Kong.

Zheng’s speech emphasized how Hong Kong has been benefiting from its strong motherland, China, and he added that Hong Kong should persist in developing international contacts and implementing the national plan with more confidence, less pro-status quo and conservative mindset, more assertive energies and less “ridiculous theories.” 

He clearly asks the people of Hong Kong to keep adapting to its integration with the motherland, to think proactively, to act assertively and to avoid unnecessary arguments.

He then shifted to the appeal to Hong Kong to deal with the “important cases” concerning national security and to complete the legislation on Article 23 of the Basic Law, because development and security are two sides of the same coin. With national security entrenched, the people of Hong Kong can have their safe residence and prosperous development. As such, the Hong Kong people must abide by the law, protect the city’s vitality and diversity so that people can innovate their business, workers can continue with their jobs, investors can earn money from their investment, and then Hong Kong will be able to expand its glamor and glitter. 

According to Zheng, in the process of transforming the process from “governance to prosperity,” Hong Kong can develop its “lion rock spirit,” attach importance to social harmony and group cohesion, maintain the people’s historical self-confidence and activeness, shoulder the honour of becoming the descendants of the dragon, develop forcefully the patriotic attitude toward Hong Kong, and seek to shape the city as a cultural city with arts and cultural exchange, international innovative ability, and cultural enterprises.

What Zheng implied in his speech was that Hong Kong should develop its cultural industry further in the coming years by utilizing its cultural historical heritage where the film industry, pop songs and fictional works had their glorious years in the past.

Finally, Zheng appealed to all the ethnic groups in Hong Kong to build up the city further, elevating the standards of governance, promoting economic development, and solving the problems in the people’s livelihood and their worries. The Liaison Office, according to Zheng, is a “super-liaison officer” resolutely implementing the “one country, two systems” and fully supporting the John Lee government.

Coincidentally, the speech delivered by Zheng Xincong on Macau began with an equally strong emphasis on China’s successful development in the year 2023, during which the 20^th Party Congress was a main event showing the recovery of the Chinese economy. As with Zheng Yanxiong, Zheng Xincong emphasized China’s achievements in various aspects, including its high-quality development, national innovative ability in new energy vehicles and sustainability, green development, the success in Asian Games, the summit between China and Central Asian countries, the holding of the Summit of the Belt and Road Initiatives, and the great success of China’s diplomacy through making more international friends and through the construction of the “common destiny for the humankind.”

Zheng Xincong then shifted to the year 2023 as one in which Macau witnessed economic recovery, development, and national security. The national security law of Macau was amended, while national security could achieve social and national cohesion. The Macau electoral system was improved; the Hengqin-Guangdong-Macau In-Depth Cooperation Zone had its policy measures being implemented. Macau’s unemployment rate was low, its minimum wage was raised and adjusted; housing policies were implemented; and the Island Hospital went into operation. The Macau people donated money to the victims of the earthquake in Gansu province, showing the vitality and advantages of Macau’s “one country, two systems.”

Zheng added that President Xi wrote a letter to the teachers and students at the Macau University of Science and Technology in their efforts at studying the development of the Chinese satellite. President Xi also praised the work of Macau chief executive Ho Iat Seng. In the process of China’s national renaissance, the role and advantages of Macau can and will be fully utilized, Zheng said.

As with Zheng Yanxiong, Zheng Xincong laid their emphasis on the need for the protection of national security without which development would be impossible, let alone the people’s livelihood. The Macau Liaison Office Director alerted Macau to accelerate the promotion of Macau’s suitable economic diversification with the determination of dealing with problems so that the city will have high-quality development.

The last paragraph of Zheng Xincong’s speech urged Macau to accelerate the promotion of economic diversification, to actively converge with what the Chinese nation needs, to fully develop Macau’s advantages, to develop high-quality development in the Belt and Road Initiatives, to forcefully promote the construction of the Hengqin-Guangdong-Macau deep cooperation, and to elevate the sense of wellbeing and safety of the people of Macau.

Comparatively speaking, Zheng Yanxiong’s speech attached to political correctness in a way even much stronger than Zheng Xincong. The former heaped praise on the motherland’s development to an extent that was quite prominent. 

Most interestingly, both pointed to the inadequacies of Hong Kong and Macau. Zheng Yanxiong appealed to the people of Hong Kong to pay more thoughts on how to develop Hong Kong’s cultural industry, and to change their conservative and pro-status quo thinking. Zheng Xincong asked the people of Macau to accelerate the process of integrating with the Hengqin area and promoting economic diversification. Both also expected the governments of Hong Kong and Macau to develop their self-confidence and governing capability.

In fact, the need to improve the standards of governance was mentioned by President Xi Jinping in his speech that covered Hong Kong and Macau during the 20^th Party Congress. With the inception of a one-month consultative period on the content of Article 23 of the Basic Law on January 31, it was understandable why Zheng Yanxiong in his speech had mentioned the legislation on Article 23. Given the rapidly changing political and “patriotic” atmosphere in Hong Kong, the members of the public must support the legislation on Article 23.

However, the standards of governance in Hong Kong remains to be improved. A recent proposal of levying a charge on rubbish waste is a kind of tax affecting all citizens of Hong Kong – a proposal that sparked public concerns and criticisms, especially as the lower-class citizens will be affected by such a rubbish tax. The government has postponed the implementation of waste charges from April to August, but more public discussion and more comprehensive governmental planning are necessary.

Another gap in the governance of Hong Kong is the provision and waiting time of public housing units. The provision has increased, but it still falls short of the huge demand, while the waiting time remains quite long.

If the people’s livelihood is a matter of central government’s concern about Hong Kong, the Hong Kong ruling authorities must do more to tackle such livelihood issues, including even rubbish levy and the inadequate provision and the long waiting time of public housing units. Currently, it is understandable that the governmental priority is focusing on the passage of Article 23 of the Basic Law in the Legislative Council – a matter of time that should not distract its attention from other livelihood issues.

On the development of Hong Kong’s cultural industries, Zheng Yanxiong did not specify the concrete solutions but left them to the cultural professionals. Given the fact that Hong Kong has implemented patriotic, history and national education, the construction of new historical museums can easily galvanize on the strong Chinese cultural and historical heritage so that cultural-historical tourism will be developed along the line that has been adopted and implemented well in Macau. Hong Kong’s tourism authorities have also failed to appreciate the historical and cultural sites in the city, with many of these sites during wartime lacking renovation, repair, and publicity work. 

In Macau, the government’s handling of economic diversification is perhaps also one of the key performance indicators of the Liaison Office Director Zheng Xincong.  More work needs to be done. Apart from the need to publicize all kinds of official documents and related policy measures on the Hengqin-Guangdong-Macau In-Depth Cooperation Zone, more Macau people must be encouraged and even mobilized to visit Hengqin so that the cooperation zone will have its construction and development accelerated. The joint committee between Macau and Zhuhai in dealing with the zone should ideally issue regular reports easily accessible to the mass media so that the members of the Macau public know the zone’s development regularly and rapidly.

Indeed, the standards of governance in Macau need to improve further. The timeline of public work projects needs to be spelt out more openly so that they can and will be completed on schedule. Without concrete timeline being specified, the cooperation zone’s development cannot be easily accelerated. Stronger governmental leadership and coordination will have to be demonstrated in Macau’s governance in the coming years.

In conclusion, the speeches delivered by Zheng Yanxiong and Zheng Xincong had significant similarities and differences. Their similarities embraced a high degree of political correctness, the emphasis on China’s advantages to the development and integration of both Hong Kong and Macau, and the need for elevating the standards of local governance. Their different content was shown in the emphases on the need for new thinking in the governance and adaptation of Hong Kong, the need to develop the cultural industry in Hong Kong, and the necessity of accelerating the process of integrating with Hengqin. While the forthcoming legislation on Article 23 of the Basic law will certainly be approved by the Legislative Council, other livelihood-related policies, notably public housing and even the rubbish waste charges, can and should be managed in a more assertive and effective manner. In the case of Macau, its government needs to work more communicatively and closely with Zhuhai on the development of the cooperation zone, accompanied by much better publicity work in the Macau community and by much clearer timelines of various developmental projects in both Macau and the cooperation zone.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

Little research has been conducted on the issues articulated by the Macau members of mainland’s Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) meetings at the provincial and municipal levels. This article aims to fill in the gap in the existing reports and analyses, showing the categories of issues raised by the Macau delegates in mainland’s political institutions with important implications for their political participation in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

On January 18, Guangzhou city’s CPPCC 14^th meeting ended; it received a total of 852 motions from members in which 16 motions were raised by 13 Macau members. These motions included how Macau’s financial services could be expanded to Guangzhou; how the two cities could cooperate in the areas of arts and cultural enterprises; how the two places could groom architectural talents to build up the Nansha region; how to improve the social integration of Macau people into the Greater Bay Area (GBA); how to help the Macau people working in the GBA; how to make the two cities become a joint Chinese medicine hub; how to shape the GBA into a capital for world food products; how to enhance the cultural interactions among youth; how to build up an innovative education model; and and how to generate a historical and cultural platform for the overseas Chinese (Macau Daily News, January 18, 2024).

On 22 January 22, the Guangdong provincial CPPCC meeting was convened in Guangzhou. There were four Macau members of the CPPCC executive committee and twenty-five other members (Macau Daily News, 23 January 2024). Of the 29 Macau members, three of them were awarded certificates praising the content of their bills. The three bills were concerned about how to improve the policy and its related services for the Macau vehicles that are allowed to cross into the mainland (specifically the mainland can and will identify the Macau vehicle licenses easily), how to make Macau and Yangjiang work together to promote tourist development, and how to integrate Macau better into the GBA.

Other Macau members articulated various issues. These included the promotion of investment opportunities in Guangdong through the platform of Macau and Zhuhai; the need to enhance Macau as a place of product monitoring and manufacturing so as to help Portuguese-speaking companies to enter the mainland market for the first time; the need for better management of the two lines in Hengqin’s integrative process with Macau; the necessity of accelerating the construction of services for the new Macau residential district in Hengqin; and the promotion of youth from Guangdong and Macau to engage in trainee exchange, study activities and innovative business development.

Some Macau representatives proposed the ideas of making cruise tourism flourish through connecting Macau with other scenic spots in Guangdong; utilizing mainland’s national sports events to embrace the active participation of both Macau and Hong Kong; allowing foreign businesspeople to enter mainland China for 6 days with visa exemption to stimulate tourism and cross-border businesses; and taking advantage of the intangible cultural heritage sites in Guangdong and Macau to promote schools and youth exchange. 

One Macau delegate suggested that Guangdong and Macau should cooperate to set up a new museum to promote cross-boundary exhibitions and arts and cultural alliances. Another delegate raised the need for Hengqin, Qianhai and Nansha to cooperate and to use the advantages of Macau and Hong Kong to acquire trade certification from outside countries, while forging closer relations with the Macau Trade Development Council to promote trade and services liberalization in the GBA. There was also a Macau representative proposing the idea of setting up a “station” that will provide comprehensive services for schools and youth groups in Macau, Hong Kong and the GBA to interact, find employment information and to attract Macau and Hong Kong youth to work in the GBA. Similarly, “one dragon services” should be ideally provided by another “station” or Internet platform for the residents in Macau, Hong Kong and GBA to find more information for payment, cross-border immigration details, leisure, tourism, identity document applications, document certification, social welfare services, public health services and employment information.

The authorities of the Guangdong CPPCC did respond to the issues raised by the delegates from Macau and Hong Kong. On January 23, the Guangdong provincial governor Wang Weizhong delivered his report and said that Guangdong in 2024 would manage the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau Bridge in a better way to facilitate not only the vehicles from Macau and Hong Kong to go into the mainland, but also the automobiles from the mainland to go southward into Macau and Hong Kong (Jornal San Wa Ou, January 24, 2024). Lin Keqing, the chairman of the Guangdong CPPCC Committee, praised the members from Macau and Hong Kong for putting forward concrete proposals and constructive suggestions to promote high-quality development of the GBA and the integration of Macau and Hong Kong into the GBA (TDM Macau, January 23, 2024).

On 22 January, the Hainan CPPCC meeting convened, including the participation of seven Macau delegates two of which were members of the executive committee. The meeting lasted for four days, and the Macau representatives raised issues on how Hainan and Macau can help their enterprises in mutual investment, and how the two places can promote cultural, economic, and social cooperation (Macau Daily News, January 24, 2024).

At the same time, the Beijing CPPCC meeting was convened. The Macau delegates put forward several bills for discussion, including how to promote high-quality development in investing in Beijing city (the details of how to relax the requirements for people to invest in funds less than 100 million yuan); how to facilitate the provision of legal services of law firms jointly from Beijing, Hong Kong and Macau; and how to enhance the ability of the fire services from Macau and Beijing to deal with sudden natural disasters through mutual visits, training, exercises and study (Macau Daily News, January 24, 2024).

Simultaneously, nine Macau representatives participated in the Nanjing CPPCC meeting on January 23^rd. They raised issues such as how to enhance the cooperation between Lianyun Gang’s port authorities and the Macau port authorities, how to provide more support for trade with the Portuguese-speaking countries, how to deepen the food product cooperation between the two cities, how to promote the Chinese white wine into the international market, and how to utilize Macau as a platform for the enhancement of talents exchange and economic and trade interactions with Nanjing. One Macau representative put forward a motion on the enhancement of talent, product, and student exchanges, suggesting that Nanjing and Macau should form alliances in fostering cultural, tourist, youth, academic, art and business sectors so that a win-win situation would be achieved.

In the Shanghai CPPCC meeting on January 23, nine Macau delegates signed a joint initiative to propose a bill on the establishment of international digital exchange platform for the sake of promoting Shanghai’s digital economic development. The bill aimed at promoting the cross-boundary digital data mobility and protecting digital security in data usage. It can facilitate the work of the Renminbi offshore exchange centre by enhancing the ability to attract digital data outside Shanghai, to assess the quality of data assessment, and to improve the accuracy of pricing and transactions.

On January 24, the Fujian CPPCC meeting convened, and Macau delegates actively participated in discussions. One Macau representative said that Fujian and Macau should cooperate more closely in Chinese medicine development, including the opening of Chinese medicine clinic, the establishment of study centres in producing Chinese herbal medicine and assessing its quality, the grooming of Chinese medical practitioners and experts, and the internationalization of Chinese medicine through closer collaboration and through the usage of Macau as a platform to promote Chinese medicine to Southeast Asia and Portuguese-speaking countries.

At the same time, other Macau members attended the CPPCC meetings in Guangzhou city, Qinghai city, Hunan province, Shanghai city, Nanchang city, Tianjin city, Anhui province, Guangxi Zhuang autonomous region, Shanxi province, Jiangxi province, and Zhejiang province.

Judging from the active political participation of the Macau delegates in the mainland’s CPPCC meetings in the past three weeks, it is politically significant.

First, their active participation is a testimony to the deeper socio-economic and political integration of Macau into its motherland, China. Many members raised the issue of Macau as a platform for mainland cities and provinces to be more internationalized in their trade and economic relations. As such, the belief that Macau remains a “window” for some mainland cities and provinces to reach out to the international community, especially the Portuguese-speaking countries, is deep-rooted in the psyche of some Macau representatives.

Second, the issues they raised in CPPCC meetings cover five major areas: (1) how to use Macau as a platform for further internationalization, as mentioned above; (2) how to engage in closer collaboration and exchanges between the Macau people and mainlanders, especially among the youth, businesspeople and professionals (such as Chinese medicine practitioners and experts); (3) how to promote mutual cooperation in stimulating the growth in the service industry, arts, culture and tourism; (4) the need for a common platform and Internet services for the people of Macau and mainlanders in the GBA; and (5) how to improve the cross-boundary governance between Macau and the mainland provinces and cities concerned. A minority of Macau representatives went deep into the discussion of how to improve mainland’s governance, like the case of Shanghai’s digital data development.

Third, CPPCC members are of consultative nature and the implementation of their ideas will depend much on (1) the mutual dialogue of the governing authorities of Macau and their mainland counterparts, (2) the discussion between the economic and social elites of Macau and their counterparts in the mainland; and (3) the follow-up actions from the mainland authorities concerned. In terms of the follow-up actions from the mainland authorities, they take note of the views of the Macau delegates and prioritize their ideas based on importance and feasibility. In the last few weeks, the Guangdong and Fujian authorities have openly admitted the importance of the ideas raised by the Macau delegates, especially in the context of the GBA integration. This is a good sign of governmental responsiveness from the provincial authorities.

In recent years, there have been active dialogue and cooperation among the business, cultural, youth and professional groups between Macau and their counterparts in the mainland. Yet, in terms of the cooperation between Macau authorities and their mainland counterparts, it remains perhaps a challenging issue because cross-boundary governmental cooperation will need considerable political will, constant communication, persistent coordination work, and far-sighted vision as well as stronger leadership at the middle and top levels. 

Fourth, if the political participation of Macau delegates is an indicator of the identity of political actors, their active involvement in the mainland’s CPPCC meetings has demonstrated their blend of national and local identities in a unique and productive way. Their Chinese national identity has been exhibited in the ways in which they articulated all kinds of economic, social, and cultural issues related to the relationship between the mainland and Macau, and pertinent to how mainland governance can be improved and perfected further. Their local identity has remained anchored solidly in Macau, which has been regarded as an essential gateway for mainland provinces and cities to deepen the process of modernization, integration, and internationalization.

In conclusion, the active political participation of Macau members in the mainland’s CPPCC meetings is socially, economically, and politically significant. The deeper integration of the society, economy, and polity of Macau into the mainland has already begun with their harmonious political discourse and assertive initiatives in various CPPCC meetings. The responses from mainland authorities to their broad and rich ideas have been positive, embracing Macau as a unique city in South China that can and will contribute to the co-governance of mainland provinces and cities as well as special administrative regions. While the ideas of the Macau members were comprehensive, innovative, practical, and impressive, it remains a challenge to how these rich ideas can and will be taken on board by the governing elites concerned, and how these initiatives will really and gradually be translated into experiments and practices. Regardless of the outcome of their active political participation, their mix of national Chinese and local Macau identity is undoubtedly unique and constructive in the ongoing and deepening process of socio-economic and political integration between Macau and the mainland in the years to come.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

Little research has been conducted to integrate the recent findings on the attitude of members of the public in Hong Kong and Macau toward the Greater Bay Area (GBA). This article aims at filling the gap in the existing reports and studies in the GBA and making concrete suggestions on how better understanding of the GBA can and will be fostered.

The Institute of Hong Kong and Asia Pacific Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) conducted a survey between the end of November and early December 2022. The survey found that 79 percent of the respondents would not go to work and reside in the GBA – an increase of 25 percent compared with a similar question in the 2021 survey. Those respondents who said that they would go to work and reside in the GBA amounted to only 10.1 percent in late 2022 – a decrease of 21 percent from 2021. The 2022 survey also asked the respondents whether they would encourage the young people of Hong Kong to develop their career in the GBA cities, but 62.7 percent of them said that they would not encourage the youth to develop their career there, and only 4.2 percent replied that they would do so depending on the conditions.

Clearly, the survey data in 2022 were not pointing to a promising direction of the GBA development, if the focus were on whether the people would go to work and reside there, and whether the youth would be encouraged to do so.

However, the 2022 survey findings showed some positive aspects. Thirty-four percent of the respondents believed that the GBA blueprint provided developmental opportunities for Hong Kong, 20.6 percent said it could not provide development chances, and 36 percent replied to half-half opportunities. The result was slightly in favor of Hong Kong’s development, but there were doubts in the minds of the respondents.

When asked about how the GBA plan would facilitate Hong Kong’s development, Table 1 below sums up the findings, which show that almost 40 percent of the respondents agreed that the GBA can and will help Hong Kong’s financial and monetary development, while slightly more respondents believed that the GBA can and will facilitate Hong Kong’s transport and logistics. Interestingly, a smaller percentage (35.9 percent in 2022) perceived the GBA as beneficial to Hong Kong’s innovation and technology.

Judging from these findings by the end of 2022, there was a gap in the public perception of GBA and the GBA’s potential contributions to Hong Kong. Given the fact that the GBA, especially Shenzhen, has been developing technology and innovative industries rapidly, it must provide the knowledge and expertise in Hong Kong’s innovation and technological development. As such, the government of Hong Kong and the related innovation and technological sectors should educate the members of the public more on the GBA.

Table 1: The extent of agreement with the idea that the GBA plan facilitates Hong Kong’s industrial development.

When asked whether Hong Kong would benefit from the GBA blueprint, in November 2022 only 22.1 percent of the respondents said that there would be more benefits, 15.3 percent replied that there would be more negative impacts on Hong Kong, 49.2 percent said half beneficial and half disadvantageous to Hong Kong, and 13.4 percent did not know. Hence, the results were mixed with doubtful attitudes toward the GBA integration with Hong Kong, while a minority perceived the city’s integration with the GBA as having negative impacts. Again, while most respondents adopted a wait-and-see attitude, the public knowledge of the GBA was superficial.

When asked about whether Hong Kong people have a developmental edge in the GBA cities, the November 2022 findings showed that only 22.5 percent of the respondents perceived a “fairly big edge” in the GBA, 3.9 replied with a “very big edge,” 37.2 believed in a “very small edge,” 20.7 said there would be “no developmental edge,” and 15.8 percent did not know. Therefore, about 58 percent believed that there would be either a small developmental edge or no edge at all, reducing their incentives to work and reside in the GBA indeed.

The survey findings of the CUHK Institute of Hong Kong and Asia Pacific Studies appeared to have similar findings with that of the Hong Kong Public Opinion Center (POC). The POC conducted an online survey on public attitudes toward the GBA from April 2021 to April 2022, the findings of which were released in late April 2022. The POC found that among the 5,671 respondents over 12 years old, 51 percent were reluctant to reside in the GBA, 26 percent were willing to do so, and 20 percent said they were half-hearted in residing in the GBA. Eighty-seven percent of those who perceived themselves as “supporters of the democrats” were unwilling to reside in the GBA, compared with 32 percent of those who perceived themselves as “supporters of the pro-establishment” forces. The CUHK data even showed 79 percent of the respondents in November 2022 were reluctant to work and reside in the GBA.

Hence, the two findings showed that most Hong Kong people were unwilling to move to work and reside in the GBA – a reflection of their ingrained habit of residing in Hong Kong and reluctant to relocate to work and live in the mainland easily.

However, young people tend to be more willing to move to work and reside in the GBA. From December 2021 to January 2022, the Hong Kong Guangdong Youth Federation conducted a survey of 1,000 respondents aged between 15 and 39 years old. The survey found that 35 percent of the respondents agreed with and strongly agreed with the GBA blueprint. Moreover, in the age group of 35 to 39 years old 48 percent of the respondents were interested in developing their career in the GBA.

Interestingly, 80 percent of the respondents hoped that jobs in the GBA would have at least HK$20,000 per month. Among the factors shaping their selection of jobs in the GBA, the salary level is the foremost concern, followed by the prospects of the company and their promotion prospects. Seventy-nine percent of the respondents learnt about the plan of youth employment in the GBA, but only 43 percent of them were interested in this employment scheme while 46 percent were uninterested.

The Guangdong Youth Federation suggested 28 measures for the Hong Kong government to improve its implementation of Hong Kong’s deeper integration with the GBA, including the relaxation of youth requirements to apply for the GBA employment scheme to include those university graduates within five years, the extension of government subsidies from on year to two years and a half, the expansion of the duties and responsibilities of the GBA development office, and the setting up of the Hong Kong style of residence in the GBA so as to facilitate more young people to move into the GBA to work and reside there (HK01, August 30, 2022). 

In May 2022, the Hong Kong Federation of Youth Group published a report in which the skills set of those Hong Kong people who want to work and reside in the GBA were mentioned (see The Study Abstract of the Competitiveness of Employment of Hong Kong Youth in the Greater Bay Area, May 2022). The five skills are professional competence (professional knowledge, conduct, sincerity and integrity), innovative ability (digital ability and self-study ability), language ability (Putonghua and English), openness (cross-cultural ability, sustainable development thinking and international horizon), and being a team player (emotional wisdom, communicative ability, flexibility and agility). All these skills are essential to those Hong Kong people who wish to migrate to the GBA, working and residing there.

Unfortunately, the skills set mentioned above are unclear to many Hong Kong people, whose doubts on the GBA and their own adaptative ability as well as competitiveness are natural.

In August 2022, Our Hong Kong Foundation published a report on how mainland talents would be absorbed into Hong Kong and how they can and will be assisted in their adaptation to Hong Kong’s life. With the implementation of the import of global talents scheme in Hong Kong, and with the entry of more mainland talents into the Hong Kong special administrative region, it seems that the society of Hong Kong takes it for granted that they can and will adapt to Hong Kong life much easier.

Surprisingly, in Macau there is a lack of public opinion surveys on the attitude of young people toward the GBA. In May 2023, a Macau interest group, namely Macau Economic and Livelihood Alliance, conducted a survey on the attitude of 1,040 youths toward the GBA and found that 71 percent of them were uninterested in developing their career in Zhuhai, while 60 percent of them did not know that Zhuhai had a scheme assisting the Macau youth to develop their career there (Exmoo News, May 25, 2023 and Jornal San Wa Ou, May 23, 2023). Moreover, 30 percent of the respondents were unfamiliar with Zhuhai’s transport and environment. 

Interestingly, the three disciplinary knowledge of the respondents included business management, education and literature – a reflection of the selection of the sample. Those respondents who wanted to develop their career in Zhuhai wanted to find jobs in sports, recreational industry, education and monetary and financial sectors. As with the Hong Kong respondents in the CUHK survey, the Macau respondents believed that several factors are decisive in influencing whether they will work and reside in the mainland: namely the salary level, the work environment, and the developmental and promotion opportunities. While the Hong Kong respondents expected HK$20,000 salary per month, as mentioned before, the Macau respondents hoped for at least Renminbi 12,000 and 20,000 or above.

The Macau Economic and Livelihood Alliance suggested that the Macau government should provide more information to the Macau people on the mainland employment scheme, that it should consider the possibility of creating jobs that can retain and attract Macau youths, that it considers lower the cross-border transportation costs, and that it may discuss with mainland enterprises to provide accommodation for Macau youths who work and reside in the mainland.

In Hong Kong and Macau, the government now has a scheme for the young people to find jobs, reside and work in the GBA. However, such a scheme lacks sufficient publicity. Nor can it reach various levels of society. 

The dilemma is that while integration with the GBA is expected to be accelerated, such integration can lead to the lack of talents in the two cities. Hence, the two cities have also embraced the import of global talents, mostly from the mainland and including those from the GBA. The challenges for the governments of Hong Kong and Macau are twofold: on the one hand they need to provide more information and publicity work for the youths to consider working and residing in the mainland, but on the other hand they must retain local talents and attract mainland talents.

The migration of talents, from Hong Kong and Macau to the mainland, and from the mainland to both cities, needs to deal with various burning issues: (1) publicity and educative work on the local Hong Kong and Macau people, especially the youths whose knowledge of the GBA is certainly partial and inadequate; (2) the coordination with mainland cities and enterprises on how they can hire Hong Kong and Macau people with subsidies given by the governments of the two special administrative regions; (3) the need to retain local Hong Kong and Macau talents who may have to be assisted further through cheaper cross-border transportation costs for them to perhaps commute more easily; (4) the need to work with mainland cities and enterprises to provide accommodation for Hong Kong and Macau youths to work in the mainland; and (5) the necessity of helping mainland talents to adapt to the life of Hong Kong and Macau more easily so that their potential and expertise can and will be maximized to the fullest extent.

From an educative perspective, universities in both Hong Kong and Macau have very few programs in understanding the Greater Bay Area in a much deeper way, disciplinarily or multi-disciplinarily. In the past, China studies were popular in Hong Kong and Macau universities. Interestingly, with the rapid development of the GBA, such focus is ironically lacking in Hong Kong and Macau universities. At best, local secondary school students have more chances to visit schools and sites in the GBA than ever before, thanks to the emphasis on national education in Hong Kong and Macau. Still, visits to mainland historical and cultural sites and schools do not mean that students have a deeper understanding of the GBA.

In conclusion, it is hoped that more think tanks, research organizations and interest groups in Hong Kong and Macau can and will conduct more research on the public attitudes toward the GBA. Moreover, it is imperative for the governments of both Hong Kong and Macau to do more in terms of education and publicity work on the mainland employment scheme, with appropriate subsidies so that locals can be encouraged to experience their work and career development in the mainland, creating a win-win scenario in which integration with the GBA is not seen as a simplistic zero-sum game. Research grants offered by governmental organizations and semi-governmental organizations should consider more grants and subsidies for researchers, educational institutions and interest groups to conduct all kinds of research related to the GBA and its integration with Hong Kong and Macau, especially in the areas of innovation and technology, transport and logistics, and financial and monetary sectors. Other areas like cultural and historical tourism, the hotel and hospitality industry, and sustainable development should also be fostered and encouraged in terms of research, organizational networking and the maximization of individual potential. Much remains to be done by not only the governments of Hong Kong and Macau, but also the research organizations, funding agencies, interest groups and youth organizations in the two cities.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

With the victory of William Lai, the presidential candidate of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan’s presidential election on January 13, cross-strait relations in the coming years will likely have crises and opportunities.

As of 9 pm on January 13, William Lai of the DPP acquired 5.57 million votes (40.06 percent of the total votes), defeating Hou Yu-ih of the Kuomintang (KMT or Nationalist Party) who captured 4.65 million votes (33.49 percent) and Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) (26.45 percent). The DPP succeeds in retaining the position of presidency after eight years of DPP presidency led by Tsai Ing-wen.

This presidential election was arguably decided once Ko’s TPP failed to reach a consensus with the KMT led by Hou to form a coalition team in November 2023 to compete with the DPP in this presidential election. 

Although Ko is a charismatic leader capturing a lot of support from the young voters in Taiwan, including some voters who tend to be “light green,” his TPP subordinates appeared to be the major obstacle to the coalition idea floated by the KMT in October and November 2023. The Ko team was eager to evaluate its strength and to become the emerging third party in Taiwan’s domestic politics.

At the time of writing, it is unclear how many seats will be occupied by the three parties in the 113-seat Legislative Yuan. But it is reported at 10:30 pm on January 13 that the KMT can grasp 52 seats, DPP gets 51 seats, independents occupy 2 seats, and the TPP can capture 8 seats.

If so, the DPP cannot capture a majority, namely fifty-seven seats, then the KMT and the TPP may be able to, theoretically and practically, form a loose coalition to block DPP bills and to initiate bills that would perhaps reignite closer economic relations with mainland China. 

The scenario of a DPP minority in the Legislative Assembly would perhaps plunge the Taiwan political arena into chaos, because the TPP would likely be a kingmaker in legislative politics. 

Interestingly, just one day before the Taiwan elections, the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken met Liu Jianchao, the minister of the International Liaison Office of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), in Washington. Obviously, the US made an important political move expressing its concern about tensions across the Taiwan Strait, hoping that such dialogue would defuse any military crisis and conflicts between the mainland and Taiwan. Liu also met Yoko Kamikawa, the Japanese Foreign Minister as Japan is one of the strongest supporters of the Taiwan regime.

Blinken and Liu discussed a full range of issues, including areas of potential cooperation and differences, such as anti-narcotics collaboration, military-to-military communication, the Americans who are detained in China, Ukraine, North Korea, the Middle East, and peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The agenda items were broad, but the timing of the meeting was politically significant – one day prior to the Taiwan elections as a signal that the US attaches immense importance to the peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. This move was politically significant and unprecedented in Taiwan’s electoral history.

Before the Taiwan elections, the mainland media heavily criticized William Lai and his DPP. DPP’s vice presidential candidate Hsiao Bi-khim, who was a Taiwan representative to Washington, is also seen as politically provocative and unacceptable by the mainland media, especially as her open remarks on cross-strait relations have been traditionally outspoken and critical. 

If cross-strait relations will have to be more peaceful, it remains to be seen how William Lai and Hsiao Bi-khim may moderate their remarks in such a way as to avoid provoking the mainland.

During the election campaign, the KMT argued that electing the DPP to the president position would be tantamount to endangering the security of Taiwan and bringing conflicts with the mainland. This message was quite strong, but still most voters have expressed their support of William Lai. The way in which the KMT pressured the DPP under Lai during the election campaign may have the intended or unintended consequence of reining in the DPP position and rhetoric after the presidential election. In other words, William Lai and Hsiao Bi-khim may have to learn to be more tactful, if not “diplomatic,” in their open remarks on mainland China and cross-strait relations.

Although the KMT and TPP are defeated, both Hou Yu-ih and Ko Wen-je’s remarks in the election campaign were covered in the mainland Chinese social media, especially their comments critical of the DPP. As such, it is likely that while both will be under the united front umbrella of the mainland, they can and will likely play the role of intermediaries acceptable to the mainland authorities.

The role of intermediaries has been traditionally critical to maintaining the peace and stability in cross-strait relations. They have traditionally included some businesspeople, core and former leaders of the KMT (like Ma Ying-jeou), and intellectuals. It is hoped that these intermediaries will continue to be the bridge narrowing the communication gap between the Taiwan people and the mainland on the one hand, and between the DPP authorities and the mainland authorities on the other.

The crux of the problem in cross-strait relations is that while the mainland side insists that the Taiwan authorities must accept the 1992 consensus as a condition for a full-scale resumption of other socio-economic interactions, including tourism and trade, the Taiwan regime has refused to accept this consensus under the DPP administration. William Lai would likely maintain this DPP legacy and therefore an impasse in cross-strait relations will likely continue.

Another problem is that most Taiwan people are uninterested in the “one country, two systems,” although the mainland side in the August 2022 White Paper on Taiwan has mentioned the Taiwan model of “one country, two systems” with concrete benefits to Taiwan in the future, including its participation in international organizations, external relations, economic development, and foreign missions stationed in the island. The challenge for the mainland think-tank members is how to make the Taiwan model of “one country, two systems” far more attractive to the people of Taiwan. The late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping used the “one country, two systems” model for China to reunify Hong Kong and Macau in the short run and then Taiwan in the long run, but this model has become unattractive to many Taiwan people, including Hou Yu-ih of the KMT and Ko Wen-je of the NPP during this 2024 presidential election. 

A neglected element in the August 2022 White Paper published by mainland China on Taiwan is that, for the first time in a mainland document, it mentioned the possibility of a stage-by-stage process of dialogue and negotiation. This was unprecedented. Combining with the role of intermediaries, the stage-by-stage dialogue, if not negotiation, can and should be explored further. 

So far, the US side has not produced any concrete proposal to deal with the possible dialogue between the mainland and Taiwan sides; after all, the mainland believes that the Taiwan matter is its domestic affair and there should be no “foreign intervention.”

Given the US failure to mediate between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China (CPC), notably the mission led by George Marshall, in 1946, Washington does have a potential role in mediating the relations between the ruling parties across the Taiwan Strait. The problem is, 78 years after the failure of the Marshall mission, the KMT in Taiwan is no longer the ruling party and it is likely to be a permanent opposition, while the ruling DPP position remains politically unacceptable to the CPC.

Another interesting difference between the Marshall mission and the current situation is that, while the US sales of weapons and ammunition were suspended between July 1946 and May 1947, the current US-Taiwan relations is marked by the need for Washington to provide weapons and ammunition to Taiwan for the sake of deterring the mainland military threat – an issue that was reportedly raised by President Xi Jinping during his meeting with President Joe Biden in San Francisco in November 2023. 

The incumbent DPP government in Taiwan is likely to continue its policy of deterrence toward the mainland – an issue that would sour cross-strait relations, but this issue may be a bargaining one in case of any cross-strait negotiations in the future, with or without the US involvement.

In conclusion, the victory of the DPP in the Taiwan presidential election must bring about a persistent deadlock in cross-strait relations. If the opposition KMT and TPP produce proposed bills and initiatives that would enhance the economic relations across the Taiwan Strait, it remains to be seen how the DPP legislators would tackle such a move. Deadlock and fierce arguments in Taiwan’s executive-legislative relations would perhaps be seen, especially as the KMT and TPP are likely combined to capture a majority of seats in the legislature. This scenario in Taiwan politics is perhaps unprecedented and its political system is moving toward a mixed presidential-parliamentary system in which different parties capture the position of the president and the majority of the parliament. If political deadlock occurs in Taiwan’s executive-legislative relations, the mainland may adopt a wait-and-see attitude, with the unintended consequence of minimizing the possibility of conflicts in cross-strait relations.

Most importantly, if the US has the potential and capability to rein in the DPP leadership, the new DPP president and vice-president may have to learn to moderate their open remarks on the mainland and cross-strait relations. Rhetorical attacks and confrontations would not bring about a comfortable environment in cross-strait relations. In the final analysis, the role of intermediaries will remain extremely important in narrowing the communication gap and minimizing misperceptions and misunderstanding in cross-strait relations. As such, the results of the Taiwan presidential and legislative election in January 2024 are opening a new door for us to observe the dynamics of cross-strait relations very carefully.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

The military situation in the Korean peninsula has suddenly deteriorated after a series of remarks made by the North Korean and South Korean leaders and a range of military exercises from the South Korean and the US, followed by North Korean artillery action. Military deterrence on both sides of the Korean peninsula has led to real military muscle-flexing, plunging the relations between North Korea and South Korea into an unprecedented military crisis five years after the September 2018 inter-Korean summit when both sides were committed to achieving a Korean peninsula free from nuclear weapons.

The current crisis could be trace back to a series of remarks made by the political leaders of both North Korea and South Korea, followed by military exercises and actions – an ominous sign that may bring about either military accidents or conflicts in 2024.

On January 1, 2024, South Korean president Yoon Suk Yeol remarked that South Korea and the US would finish strengthening a defence position that would “completely block” the North Korean missile threat, and that the Seoul-Washington alliance will achieve “genuine and permanent peace” based on military strength. In July 2023, both friendly capitalistic countries formed a Nuclear Consultative Group with the US commitment to protecting South Korea with a nuclear arsenal. This group held its second meeting on December 16, after which a statement was released by the US saying that Washington would have a swift and decisive response if there is any North Korean attack against South Korea.

Military relations between South and North Korea became challenging in 2023, when Pyongyang stepped up its military armament and as Kim Jong Un visited Russia and expressed his appreciation with the Russian advanced military weaponry. At the same time, North Korea and South Korea have enhanced their military surveillance along the border. 

In November 2023, North Korea fired its first spy satellite into the orbit, providing the necessary glimpse of South Korea’s military capabilities, sites, and targets. South Korea remarked that such a satellite launch violated a UN Security Council resolution prohibiting Pyongyang to utilize ballistic missile technology. By December 2023, the Korean Central News Agency reported that North Korea would strengthen the spy satellite programs by having three additional satellites in 2024. Furthermore, it would consolidate its nuclear arsenal and military drones. The military race over space would aim at giving North Korea an edge over South Korea – a move that explained why South Korea and the US had to respond by strengthening their nuclear weapon cooperation.

The entire year of 2023 witnessed the continuous military push from North Korea, which launched inter-continental ballistic missiles tests, like the long-range and sold-fuelled Hwasong-18 missile, and which deployed more military weapons, including a nuclear missile submarine, aircraft carriers and large air bombers.

Kim Jong-Un delivered an important speech on December 27, 2023 during the 8^th Central Committee meeting of the Workers’ Party, saying that both North Korea and North Korea are reaching the stage of becoming hostile countries, and that North Korea’s nuclear war “deterrent” would not hesitate to take action if Seoul and Wahington adopt a military confrontation with Pyongyang – an important remark pointing to Kim’s tendency to change from military “deterrence” to a concrete action of flexing its military muscle further if South Korea and the US were to conduct military exercises. 

Kim remarked that the South Korean and US side regarded North Korea as “the main enemy,” that both countries sought to promote regime “collapse” of Pyongyang, and that they tried to unify the north through a process of “absorption.” In response to the Washington-Seoul alliance, Kim added that Pyongyang would expand its strategic cooperation with “anti-imperialist independent” countries, implying Russia which has been provided with North Korean weapons in its Ukrainian war.

What was alarming about Kim’s speech was that he mentioned the need for “militant tasks for the People’s Army and he munitions industry, nuclear weapons and civil defence sectors to further accelerate the war preparations.”

Kim’s speech was an important one as he pointed to the danger of an armed confrontation in the Korean peninsula as a “fast” phenomenon “becoming a reality.” His comment was made in response to the escalated protective actions from both South Korea and the US – a strengthened cooperative attempt that made Kim to mention the North Korean necessity of “sharpening the treasured sword” to protect itself. 

His speech content was released by the North Korean side on January 1, 2024, to time in the North Korean military artillery reactions on January 5 to the military exercise between South Korea and US scheduled to be held for a week starting from December 29, 2023.

The rhetorical escalation of Kim was matched by a corresponding phenomenon from his South Korean counterpart, President Yoon, who on December 28 “urge you to immediately and firmly crush the enemy’s will for a provocation on the spot.” 

Even though North Korea has been suffering from food shortage even after the end of Covid-19 and its variants, its military-first policy has remained unchanged, and its militarization efforts were maximized and accelerated throughout 2023.

While Kim and his think tank and military generals perceived the North Korean militarization as an effective “deterrent” against the alliance formed by the US and South Korea, the Washington-Seoul side have been determined to consolidate their “deterrence” against the North Korean threat. Mutual perceptions of military threats have therefore propelled both sides to flex their military muscles.

On December 29, 2023, South Korea and the US began a week-long firing drill near the North Korean border. The South Korean side said that the joint military exercise aimed at testing and enhancing military combat readiness simulating any enemy aggression. The joint military exercise involved 110 large combat weapons, including the South Korean tanks, anti-aircraft artillery, US aircrafts and armoured vehicles. The South Korean navy was also involved, embracing anti-submarine manoeuvres in the waters in the east, west and the south, and mobilizing destroyers, frigates, and corvettes.

South Korea and the US also increased the scope and intensity of their joint military exercises in 2023 as a response to the escalating military preparations on the Pyongyang side. In other words, every escalated military preparation from each of the two sides – North Korea on the one hand and South Korea and US on the other hand – triggered kneejerk reaction from the other side, thereby escalating military tensions further and cyclically.

On the morning of January 5, 2024, North Korea fired two hundred rounds of artillery into the waters near the western sea border with South Korea, especially the South Korean islands, namely Baengnyeong and Yeonpyeong islands. In response, the South Korean government appealed to the residents in the islands to hide in their shelters. Baengnyeong island has 5,000 residents and Yeonpyeong has 2,000 citizens.

 In 2010, the North Korean artillery fire reached the island of Yeonpyeong, killing two marines and two civilians, injuring fifteen other soldiers and two civilians. At that time, the North Korean side put the blame on the South Korean side, saying that the attack was a response to a South Korean artillery drill in the waters near Yeonpyeong.

The artillery on the morning of January 5, 2024 fell north of the northern limit line, which was a disputed border drawn up by the UN by the end of the Korean war in 1953. The North Korean artillery fire and its reach matched Kim’s remarks as implying that both North Korea and South Korea are approaching the stage of becoming belligerent states. 

South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said the North Korean artillery fire was a provocative act that “threatens peace and heighten tensions on the Korean peninsula.”

In response, the South Korean military held its maritime shooting exercise on the afternoon of Friday, illustrating its kneejerk reaction cyclically.

However, such a cycle of military responses from both sides would lead to tremendous dangers of triggering any military accidents and even conflicts in the year 2024.

The Figure below illustrates a matrix in the military relations between South Korea and North Korea. With both sides holding firm militarily, a military crisis has already emerged with the possibility of leading to accidents or conflicts. If both sides back down, the situation would return to the status quo and stability. If either side backs down, the other side is seen as being a dominant and victorious military player – not a good sign leading to the status quo.

Note: I design this figure after reading Frank C. Zagare, The Dynamics of Deterrence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 15.

Kim’s speech on December 27, which was reported by the Korean Central News Agency on December 31, had interesting ideas that implicitly pointed to the possibility of dialogue between North Korea and South Korea in the future.

For the first time in his speech, Kim mentioned that the two Korean sides would not be able to reunite and that both sides are no longer the same nation. However, he said that the South Korean side insists on one system unification based on “absorption” and “system.” What he implied significantly is that unless both North Korea and South Korea adopt a system of two systems – two different political, social, economic, and military systems – they would not be able to reunite. Kim also remarked that North Korea insists on unification based on “one nation, one country and two systems.” If so, what he meant is that North Korea and South Korea would have the chance of discussing unification based on “one Korean nation, one country (name unclear and up to negotiations) and two different systems.”

If this interpretation above is accurate, Kim alludes to the possibility of using a special Korean version of “one country, one nation, two systems” to deal with the political future of two Koreas.

The idea of using “one country, two systems” to discuss the future of the two Korean sides is not new as the South Korean authorities in the past did toy with this idea (at one time it was reported that a few officials were sent to Hong Kong to study the concept and implementation of “one country, two systems”), but Kim this time adds the concept of “one nation.” 

Eventually, both the South Korean and North Korean sides, if their relations become more stable and cordial, should explore this innovative and potentially breakthrough formula of “one country, one nation and two systems” so that reunification of the two Koreas would become a realistic possibility.

The current crisis in the Korean peninsula also presents the opportunities for calmness and dialogue, if both sides consider the question of peace as an urgent priority. Both sides need to scale down their military activities in response to the other side. Otherwise, military accidents and/or conflicts may suddenly erupt.

In conclusion, the rhetorical escalations of Kim Jong Un and Yoon Suk Yeol have matched the increase in flexing the military muscles of both North Korea and South Korea, respectively. The current situation is entering a crisis in which both sides must defuse. The hardline stance of North Korea may have an unintended consequence of shaping the presidential election result of South Korea in 2027, especially at a time when Yoon’s popularity and his ruling People Power Party will be put to a vote by the South Koreans. From now to 2027, however, there is a realistic danger of escalating muscle-flexing activities into a real military conflict. Both sides have already hardened their position verbally and militarily. Deterrence from both sides have led to increases in military muscle-flexing, which is now plunging the Korean peninsula into a crisis of military management.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China
 

The most recent leadership reshuffle of the leadership of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has important implications for its development in the short run, including its reform and redirection.

On December 29, 2023, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (SCNPC) held its seventh meeting that approved the appointment of 62-year-old Dong Jun as the Defence Minister, two months after the sudden removal of his predecessor Li Shangfu. Dong was the former head of the PLA navy and is not on the list of US sanctions, implying that he would be able to interact with the US counterpart directly at a time when the Chinese and US militaries are enhancing their communication through the hotline liaison mechanism.

Although Li Shangfu’s removal was not explained by the mainland media, he might be involved in corruption scandal, especially as Li was dealing with the strategic and logistics supply and the procurement of military weapons from 2013 to 2017. 

Li’s removal coincidentally came at a time when the mainland emphasized the need for a strong military with its improved capability amid modernization – a theme also stressed by the remarks of the chairperson of the Central Military Commission, the Communist Party of China (CPC) General Secretary Xi Jinping.

The SCNPC on December 29 also announced that nine PLA representatives were all removed from their representative positions in the national legislature. They were Lu Hong, Li Yuchao, Li Chuanguang, Zhou Yaning, Zhang Zhenzhong; Zhang Yulin, Rao Wenmin, Ju Xinchun, and Ding Laihang.

Lu Hong was a member of the Rocket Force; Li Yuchao was a commander of the Rocket Force; Li Chuanguang was a deputy commander of the Rocket Force; Zhou was a commander of the Rocket Force; Zhang Zhenzhong was a deputy commander of the Rocket Force and a chief of the joint staff department of the Central Military Commission; Zhang Yulin was a deputy director of the General Armament Department; Rao Wenmin was a member of the Equipment Development Department; Ju was a commander of the Southern Theatre navy command; and Ding Laihang was a commander of the Air Force.

Judging from the spread of these removed officers, which ranged from Rocket Force to Air Force, and from General Armament Department to Equipment Development Department, it was likely that they were involved in corruption concerning procurement, equipment, and armament of the Rocket Force.

Two of the nine removed officials were of high-ranking generals: they were Zhou Yaning, general of the PLA and commander of the Rocket Force from 2017 to 2022 and, since October 2017, a member of the Central Committee of the CPC. In December 2015, Zhou was appointed as the first batch of new leaders of the Rocket Force, In August 2017, he became the Force’s commander.

Another general was Li Yuchao, a commander of the Rocket Force. Born in 1962, Li was a deputy chief-of-staff of the Second Artillery Force in 2008. In 2012, he became a deputy principal of the Second Artillery Engineering University. Four years later, he was promoted as a commander of the Rocket Force’s 55^th base. In January 2022, Li was promoted further to be the commander of the Rocket Force.

It was reported that Zhou Yaning, Li Yuchao and Rocket Force’s deputy commander Liu Guangbin in July 2023 were investigated by the officials of the Central Military Commission’s Discipline Inspection Committee and the Military Commission’s Audit Department. 

The removal of the PLA officials coincided with a report on December 27, 2023, when the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) decided to remove three high-ranking officials of the military-industrial complex. They were Liu Shiquan (the chair of the Board of China North Industries Group Corporation), Wu Yansheng (board member of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation), and Wang Changqing (an executive member of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation). Since the companies dealt with weapons production at a time when Li Shangfu led the PLA’s procurement department, there were grounds for believing that these top three executives of the military-industrial complex were enmeshed in corruption activities.

It was reported that on December 19, 2023, the party organizations affiliated with the related Chinese aerospace industrial complex were required to hold meetings to study the directive issued by CPC General Secretary Xi Jinping, who mentioned as early as August 2018 that the PLA had to obey the directives of the CPC, that the military must insist on the need to build up a clean party, that the military must be strong and modernized, and that military officers must uphold the principles of being good cadres in observing strict discipline and combatting corruption. During the party construction meeting of the Central Military Commission in August 2018, Xi Jinping said that the military must implement stricter party governance, must obey the party, must construct a first-class military force, and must insist on the centralized and unified leadership of the CPC. The military forces, according to Xi, must be loyal to the party, must implement the system of the division of labour and responsibilities under the unified leadership of the CPC, and must perfect the mechanism of the party-led military (see http://www.crntt.hk, August 20, 2018). 

Obviously, the anti-corruption drive has been deepening since Xi’s important speech in August 2018. Furthermore, in March 2021, the Central Military Commission released its revised regulations on the work of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission in the armed forces, regulations that were implemented in April immediately. The revised regulations pointed to the need for improving the party conduct and discipline in the PLA, the emphasis on the party’s political building work, and the necessity of combatting corruption within the military force.

If anti-corruption has remained persistent in the PLA, it is not surprising that the PLA has recently witnessed a series of removal of high-ranking officers and that the military-industrial complex has also followed a similar pattern.

On December 25, 2023, the Central Military Commission held a promotion ceremony in Beijing where seven high-ranking officers were promoted as generals – a promotion that was regarded as the most extensive one in China since 1988. Of those who were promoted, two of them deserve our attention. They were Hu Zhongming, a submarine expert being promoted as the PLA navy commander, and Wang Wenquan, a political commissar of the Eastern Theatre Command being promoted as an admiral. The 62-year-old PLA navy commander Dong Jun was not mentioned on December 25, but he was later promoted five days later as the Defence Minister. 

The fact that these three high-ranking commanders of the PLA navy were promoted simultaneously has important implications for the reform and redirection of the PLA. 

First, with the purge of those PLA commanders who were reportedly involved in corruption activities, the Central Military Commission leadership appears to attach immense importance to the navy commanders to take on the PLA leadership positions.

Second, it implies that, with the ongoing territorial disputes between China and the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, the promotion of three navy commanders as mentioned above point to China’s priority in dealing with territorial disputes in the South China Sea region.

Third, if the new Defence Minister Dong Jun is by no means on the US sanction list, then his communication with the counterpart in the US side would be facilitated – a situation coinciding with the emphasis on military-to-military commission during the recent meeting between President Xi Jinping and President Joe Biden in San Francisco in mid-November.

Fourth, as Taiwan’s presidential election appears to point to a victory of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) led by William Lai, the relations between the mainland and Taiwan will be quite challenging in the coming years, unless the DPP would really alter its anti-mainland stance. The Kuomintang side led by Hou You-yi has publicly appealed to William Lai to abandon the DPP’s pro-independence position. Unless the DPP, as the mainland side has maintained, changes drastically to accept the 1992 consensus, mainland-Taiwan relations would very likely be a flashpoint that would trigger the need for the mainland navy to respond to the domestic development of the island province. 

During the Nancy Pelosi visit to Taiwan in August 2022, the PLA conducted air-naval live-fire drills in six areas surrounding the island. If the navy occupies a pivotal role in any emergency response to Taiwan’s development, it is not surprising that the PLA navy commanders are now taking on the key leadership role of the Chinese military.

On December 24, 2023, the Taiwan defence ministry announced that the PLA fighter airplanes and warships had movements in the peripheral aerial regions and waters, including an air balloon (Oriental Daily, December 24, 2023). The movement of the PLA air force and navy in Taiwan’s nearby airspace and waters has become a normal phenomenon. The challenge for the mainland and Taiwan sides is to prevent the occurrence of military accidents, including their air force and navies.

In conclusion, the removal of some high-level PLA commanders in the mainland is not a surprising phenomenon, which is attributable to the persistence of the anti-corruption campaign within the military and the military-industrial complex. The reforms of the PLA embrace not only the consolidation of the CPC leadership but also its internal anti-corruption drive for the sake of building up a strong military in the ongoing process of military modernization. The purge of several Rocket Force commanders who were involved in corruption points to the need for a stronger leadership in the Rocket Force. It is noteworthy that the PLA leadership is pointing to a new direction: the navy commanders are now playing a crucial role in the new PLA leadership, especially considering the territorial disputes between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea and in face of the sensitivities of Taiwan’s political development. With the rejuvenation of the PLA leadership, China’s vision of having a strong military under the party leadership has already been fulfilled. If so, it remains to be seen how the PLA will continue to fully protect the sovereignty, development, and national security interest of the PRC.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

Since the establishment of the Hong Kong and Macau Special Administrative Regions, the Chief Executives of Hong Kong and Macau have annually visited the central authorities in Beijing and submitted their duty report to the top leaders; nevertheless, the most recent visits by Hong Kong Chief Executive John Lee and Macau Chief Executive Ho Iat Seng to Beijing in December 2023 revealed some significant continuities and changes that altogether are establishing the constitutional practices, and perhaps later convention, of their duty report submitted to the Central Government in Beijing.

On December 18, when John Lee reported to President Xi Jinping on his work, the mainland officials sitting on the left hand side of the middle position of the President were of very high level, including Premier Li Qiang, the Central Secretariat party-secretary and Central Office director Cai Qi, Vice Premier and convenor of the Communist Party of China (CCP) Central Hong Kong and Macau Work Leading Small Group Ding Xuexiang, United Front Department minister Shi Taifeng, and Political and Legal Affairs Commission secretary Chen Wenqing. Sitting on the right-hand side of the President were Hong Kong Chief Executive John Lee, Hong Kong and Macau Office (HKMAO) director Xia Baolong, HKMAO deputy director Zhou Ji, HKMAO deputy director and Liaison Office director Zheng Yanxiong, and Hong Kong Chief Executive Office director Carol Yip Man Kuen. 

What is interesting in this set-up was that the mainland side was filled with top officials, including the Premier, Central Office director, convenor of the leading small group on Hong Kong and Macau, united front work minister, and political and legal affairs director. This meant that the central government attached immense importance to Hong Kong and Macau affairs, as the same line-up and sitting arrangement could be seen in the duty report made by Macau Chief Executive Ho Iat Seng.

Furthermore, the elevation of the Premier to accompany the President to meet the two Chief Executives from Hong Kong and Macau was unprecedented. In the past, the Hong Kong and Macau Chief Executives tended to meet the Premier separately from the President. This time, the co-attendance of the President and the Premier had two important messages: the accountability of the Hong Kong and Macau Chief Executives to the whole batch of Chinese leadership in Beijing could now be formalized and institutionalized. This set-up could also save the time of the Premier in meeting the Chief Executives from Hong Kong and Macau separately. 

Another significant indication is that accompanying the Chief Executive of Hong Kong and Macau were, firstly the HKMAO director, secondly the HKMAO deputy director, thirdly the Liaison Office director, and finally the Chief Executive Office director. In the case of Ho Iat Seng’s meeting with President Xi, the mainland side had the same line-up and seating arrangement, while the right-hand side of the President included firstly Ho Iat Seng, secondly Xia Baolong, thirdly Zhou Ji, fourthly Liaison Office director Zheng Xincong, and finally Chief Executive Office director Hoi Lai Fong. What is noteworthy that only the directors of the Chief Executive Office from Hong Kong and Macau attended the meeting as secretaries and both sat beside the Liaison Office director – a kind of institutionalization of the accountability of the Chief Executive to the central authorities in Beijing and an accountability mechanism mentioned in the Basic Law and currently practiced in full swing during the December 2023 duty visit.

Both John Lee and Ho Iat Seng were praised by President Xi, who affirmed their work positively – a significant move pointing to how the central leadership supports the work of the two Chief Executives. Another interesting point is that John Lee presented one report that, according to him, talked about the work and achievements of the Hong Kong government and the forthcoming work about the legislation on Article 23 of the Basic Law. Ho Iat Seng was seen in the television as submitting two reports to President Xi, one report on Macau and the other on its economic diversification plan. President Xi praised Ho’s good work, including the affirmation of the Macau government’s amendment of the national security law, the legislation concerning Chief Executive election and the Legislative Council election, the consolidation of management over the gaming industry, the economic diversification plan, the promotion of the construction work on the Hengqin-Macau Cooperation Zone, the expansion of Macau’s external relations, and the economic recovery and societal stability of Macau.

Ho’s praise by the President was so prominent that, immediately after his return to Macau, he was asked by the mass media on whether he would run for the Chief Executive election. Although Ho did not give a firm answer immediately, his chance of running for the forthcoming Chief Executive election in Macau would likely be high.

John Lee’s report to the President covered the consolidation of national security work, the District Council election and how Hong Kong dealt with post-Covid economic recovery. President Xi, according to the State Council press release on December 19, highly praised the Chief Executive, saying that he led the HKSAR government in not only shouldering the responsibilities and delivering good results, but also restoring order and maintaining Hong Kong’s distinctive status and advantages.

President Xi was seen to shake hands with both John Lee and Ho Iat Seng in two separate photos – an indication that the central authorities highly lauded their performance. 

Another interesting observation from the seating arrangement this time is that Xia Baolong, the HKMAO director, and his deputy Zhou Ji as well as the Liaison Office directors of both Hong Kong and Macau were sitting together with the two Chief Executive while facing the top five leaders of the central leadership – Li Qiang, Cai Qi, Ding Xuexiang, Shi Taifeng and Chen Wenqing. 

This arrangement is politically significant because it means that the HKMAO and the Liaison Office chiefs are directly accountable to the central leadership of the CPC. In a sense, while the HKMAO and the Liaison Office chiefs are assisting the Chief Executives of both Hong Kong and Macau in terms of governance, they are simultaneously accountable to the central CPC leadership – an indication that the Party’s authority has been strengthened and institutionalized in the recent revamp of the HKMAO, which has been reorganized as the Hong Kong and Macau Work Office under the Central Committee of the CPC (see commentary on November 5, 2023, in OPINION – The new structure of HKMWO and its political implications | Macau Business).

In retrospect, when the concept of the central government’s “comprehensive jurisdiction” over Hong Kong was first mentioned in mid-2014, very few people understood what it meant. Nine years later, however, Beijing’s “comprehensive jurisdiction” over Hong Kong and Macau is now realized through various mechanisms: firstly the enactment and implementation of the national security law in Hong Kong, the amendment of the national security law in Macau, the revamp of the electoral system for the Chief Executive and Legislative Councils in both Hong Kong and Macau, the reorganization of the District Council election in Hong Kong, the most recent publication of the Master Plan on Macau’s economic diversification by the State Council’s State Planning and Reform Commission, the implementation of the Hengqin-Macau Cooperation Zone, and the economic integration of both Hong Kong and Macau into the Greater Bay Area. All these measures have been taken to realize the central government’s “comprehensive jurisdiction” over Hong Kong and Macau, bringing about the socio-political stability and economic prosperity of the two cities and realizing the uniqueness of the “one country, two systems.”

The key to realize Beijing’s “comprehensive jurisdiction” over Hong Kong and Macau is to ensure that the “patriots” can and will govern the two cities. As such, electoral systems in the two places were reformed so that the “patriotic” elites can enter the political system and govern with confidence and stability. This was why Xia Baolong, the HKMAO director, delivered a speech on December 22 in the meeting of the Hong Kong and Macau Study Association in front of a group of newly elected and appointed District Councils members in Hong Kong. Xia appealed to the elected and appointed members of District Councils the need to maintain solidarity, and to the civil servants the necessity of sticking to patriotism. 

What was interesting in Hong Kong’s development was that, three days after the District Council election on December 10, the government’s Civil Service Bureau published a consultative document on the Civil Service Code, covering the oath-taking and declaration requirement of civil servants, their core values and standard of conduct, and their relationship with the political appointment system. The draft Civil Service Code tends to emphasize the importance of national security in the psyche of civil servants, who are also expected to be responsive to the needs of the citizens and society and to be enthusiastic in the delivery of public services.

In fact, Xia’s message on December 22 was clear: the people of Hong Kong from all walks of life, including elected and appointed office-bearers and civil servants, have to be united, to protect national security, and to support the central government’s “comprehensive jurisdiction” over Hong Kong for the sake of contributing to the success of “one country, two systems.”

In conclusion, the duty visits and reports made by the Chief Executives of Hong Kong and Macau to Beijing on December 18, 2023, could be regarded as a new chapter in the relationships between the two special administrative regions and the central government in Beijing. The annual visit and its related reports as well as the seating arrangements fully realized Beijing’s “comprehensive jurisdiction” over Hong Kong and Macau. The duty visit and report are the necessary and important mechanisms through which the Chief Executives of both Hong Kong and Macau are held accountable to Beijing in accordance with the requirement of the Basic Law of Hong Kong and Macau. The seating arrangements illustrated the proper etiquette and formal reporting mechanism through which the CPC leadership oversees the work of the two Chief Executives, the two governments of Hong Kong and Macau, the HKMAO and the Liaison Office directors who are appointed to deal with the affairs of both Hong Kong and Macau. In the study of law and politics, legal scholars have advanced the concept of constitutional convention to refer to a series of constitutional practices adopted for a sustained period. If so, the duty visit and reports made by the Hong Kong and Macau Chief Executives to Beijing on December 2023 were politically and constitutionally very significant, because these are relatively new constitutional practices that, if persisting in the years to come, will become the constitutional convention between the Hong Kong and Macau Special Administrative Regions on the one hand and the central government in Beijing on the other hand.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

The first new District Council elections in Hong Kong were held on December 10, 2023, after the revamp of its composition and electoral methods. Overall, the elections could be seen as a success as the patriotic camp mobilized many of its supporters to vote on the voting day; nevertheless, there were considerable areas that calls for further improvements in the future.

First, the voting turnout was 27.54 percent with 1.19 million voters – a satisfactory result demonstrating a full-scale mobilization of the pro-establishment forces. The voting patterns showed the morning time from 9:30 am to 11.30 am had almost 3 percent voter turnout every hour, but the voter turnout gradually declined from 11.30 am onwards until 4.30 am – a period in which each hour witnessed about 2 percent of the voter turnout. The last few voting hours from 5.30 pm to 12 pm envisaged between one and two percent of the voter turnout. Overall, the voting patterns demonstrated the success of full-scale mobilization during the morning, but the late afternoon and nighttime witnessed a declining interest in voting.

Compared with the voter turnout of 30 percent in the December 2021 Legislative Council elections in which 1.3 million voters went to the polling stations, the voter turnout in the 2023 District Council elections was a success with a figure approaching the 2021 mobilization.

Second, if we analyse the election results by dividing the pro-establishment forces into four groupings – the long-time patriotic camp composed of the Democratic Alliance for Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB) and Federation of Trade Unions (FTU); the moderate patriotic camp comprising the Liberal Party (LP), Business Professionals Alliance (BPA), the New People’s Party (NPP), Professional Power (PP), and the Federation of Hong Kong and Kowloon Labor Unions (FHKKLU); the new patriotic camp including the Path of Democracy (PoD), Hong Kong New Direction (HKND) and the Bauhinia Party (BP); and the non-party independents – the overall results could be seen in the following Table.

The Table above shows that while the DAB is the largest political group in the new District Councils, the FTU is trailing behind – a robust performance of the long-time patriotic camp. The moderate patriotic camp performed satisfactorily, including the LP which got eight seats in all the elected, district committees and appointed seats (1.7 percent), the BPA which got twenty-four seats in total (5.1 percent), and the NPP which acquired twenty-five seats in total (5.3 percent). The Professional Power (PP) captured one seat, and the pro-Beijing Federation of Hong Kong and Kowloon Labor Unions (FHKKLU) grasped only three seats – weak moderate patriotic groups. The new patriotic groups performed quite poorly, with PoD having one member appointed, Bauhinia Party (BP) without any elected or appointed member but it was founded with much media spotlight. The Bauhinia Party remains to be localized as its mainland-born leaders have not yet adapted to active participation in local electoral politics. 

However, the non-party affiliated independents became the largest fragment in District Councils, having 217 members and occupying 46.2 percent of the seats. Given that the pro-government independents could secure enough nominations to participate in the elections, they are obviously the patriots contributing to the work of District Councils.

The DAB and FTU chairs, Gary Chan and Ng Chau-pei, said in the media well before the elections that the two groups did not coordinate among themselves. It looked as if the pro-Beijing groups were encouraged to compete among themselves, while the moderate patriotic groups could nominate members to compete with the long-time patriotic groups. As such, the 2023 District Council elections witnessed a fragmentation of the patriotic forces – perhaps a deliberate ploy adopted by the mainland Chinese officials responsible for Hong Kong matters for the sake of creating a degree of pluralism within the patriotic camp.

Second, immediately after the elections, the Liaison Office, the Commissioner’s Office of China’s Foreign Ministry in Hong Kong, and the Hong Kong Macau Affairs Office congratulated the District Council election as a success. This was understandable because, from the perspective of the central authorities, the elections represented an important event that not only guaranteed the success of the “patriots” governing Hong Kong but also laid a solid social and political foundation for the city’s economic prosperity and stability. Most importantly, the screening of the candidates ensured that those “anti-China” Hong Kong people were excluded from participation in the District Council elections, unlike the situation in 2019 when many of them were successfully directly elected.

Third, the ways in which the formerly pro-democracy candidates were excluded from being nominated in this 2023 District Council elections implied that they would have to change their political orientations to have a better chance of being nominated in future district elections. Several members of the Democratic Party (DP) failed to get nominations to run in the District Council elections. While the pro-Beijing official media did not reveal the reasons, it carried unofficial commentaries pointing to the “political unacceptability” of the DP’s platform and stance, for the party in the past criticized the national security law and new electoral system, including the Legislative Council elections in December 2021. If so, the DP may have to rethink whether its party platform would have to be revised in the future so that its members would stand a much better chance of being nominated.

Fourth, the power of nomination of candidates in the 2023 District Council elections was vested in the hands of the members of the three committees – Area Committees, Fight Crime Committees, and Fire Prevention Committees. Members of these three committees were influential and powerful; they could nominate candidates, they could vote for candidates running in the District Committees section, and they could get nominations from other members of the three committees if any of them might be interested in electoral participation. Before the elections, some members of the pro-democracy and other groups complained that the details of the members of three committees were not easily publicly accessible. The government authorities replied that if candidates wished to contact members of the three committees, it could be a conduit. Overall, it remains to be seen how the government would make the contact methods, like emails, of the members of three committees more easily accessible in future district elections. 

In the 2023 District Council elections, it was reported that 87 percent (409) of the District Council members came from the members of the three committees, including seventy-five directly elected members, 147 members elected from the three committees, 111 appointed by the government, and thirteen members who are ex-officio members (rural committee members). If so, members of the three committees are politically far more influential and powerful than any other group. 

It is understandable that, in the new era of Hong Kong politics, they are expected to be the gatekeepers of the political system; nevertheless, the government may have to ensure that conflicts of role and interest will be best avoided or minimized in the future. For instance, appointed members of District Councils would ideally come from sectors other than the three committees, especially ethnic minorities. There are only two members of ethnic minorities being appointed as District Council members after the elections – a number that appears to be far less than the composition of ethnic minorities in the population of Hong Kong.

Fifth, the computer glitch on the night of the election day led to the extension of voting hours from 10.30 pm to 12 pm – a situation that led to Chief Executive John Lee to demand a report from the electoral authorities within three months. It seemed that the database of voters was overcentralized in such a way that the cloud computing problem affected all the six hundred voting stations. If the database was decentralized and reorganized in accordance with the voting list in each of some six hundred voting stations, such sudden extension of voting hours might have been avoided. It was embarrassing, if not controversial, that voting hours were suddenly extended because of the computer problem. Indeed, rehearsals of voting should in the future embrace crisis management scenarios if electoral administration is expected to be smooth.

Sixth, the government organized a carnival on the night of December 9 to boost the voter turnout. However, the content of the carnival could have been more concrete by emphasizing the size of different constituencies in direct elections, the number of candidates in each constituency, and their platform. Many voters got confused with the size of their constituencies, the number of candidates, and their platform. In the past, election forums were held in District Council elections so that voters understood the candidates, their platform, and their party background in a much deeper manner. This time, only one pro-government organization held election forums, but the government itself did not hold any forum in the various townhalls of different districts. More work remains to be done if the government and its electoral authorities expect voluntary participation of voters.

Overall, the District Council elections in Hong Kong on December 10, 2023, could be regarded as a success, as the official media and mainland perspectives have declared. However, there were considerable areas of further improvement, including electoral administration, crisis management in the voting process, the lack of election forums for deeper debate among candidates and groups, and the “excessive” power of the members of the three committees. The dilemma is how to balance the gatekeeping role of the members of three committees and to minimize their potential conflict of roles. Moreover, if some candidates were excluded from being nominated, a much clearer message could have been conveyed to them rather than leaving the nomination matter ambiguous, unlike ironically the much clearer position of some unofficial commentaries of pro-Beijing media. The results of the elections, however, are clear: the long-time patriotic camp composed of the DAB and FTU constitutes the dominant force in Hong Kong’s local elections, while the moderate pro-government camp is trailing behind, with the new patriotic force performing quite poorly. Still, most of the District Council members remain non-party affiliated independents. It remains to be seen how the new District Council members will bring issues related to transport and environment and other district affairs to the attention of local-level officials, who are and will be expected to be responsive in the new era of Hong Kong-style democracy.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

Henry Kissinger’s statecraft in managing President Nixon’s visit to China in February 1972 and, most significantly, his realism and flexibility in drafting the Shanghai Communique have far-reaching implications for the future of US-China relations over the question of the future of Taiwan.

Henry Kissinger’s White House Years (London: Phoenix Press, 1979) delineated his way of reaching rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at a time after the Sino-Soviet conflict and split. The episode began in 1970 when the former Soviet Union built up its military along the border with China, which wanted to reduce the number of its adversaries and to acquire, in the words of Kissinger, “another counterweight to Soviet pressure.” 

As such, it was ripe time for the US to probe whether Beijing would be willing to establish relations with Washington. Kissinger wrote: “What the Chinese wanted was not vacuous benevolence, or even the practical steps that had been the essence of the previous dialogue, such as recognition, US membership, claims, exchanges (p. 685).” Kissinger knew that the US could provide a “positive asset” to China from the perspective of reaching a balance of power in international politics. Indeed, the US grasped an excellent opportunity in the Sino-Soviet split to conduct its “triangular diplomacy.” 

Reading Kissinger’s memoir, what was striking was the way in which he examined the PRC position through a variety of instruments, including (1) a very careful reading of China’s official mouthpiece, namely the People’s Daily, (2) an analysis of the editorial stance of Pravda, the Soviet mouthpiece, (3) the decoding of remarks made by the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai who spoke to foreign diplomats and leaders on Beijing’s views toward Washington, and, most significantly, (4) the utilization of third countries (including France, Romania and Pakistan) in trying to receive from and send signals to the Chinese side. 

The most significant signal that Kissinger sent to China was one through the US Ambassador to Poland, Walter Stoessel, who sent a message to the PRC side by saying that the US “would be prepared to consider sending a representative to Peking for direct discussions with your officials or receiving a representative from your government in Washington for more thorough exploration of any of the subjects (p. 687).”

In the international politics of diplomacy, signals are received by the target state, but it takes time not only for the other side to respond, but also for the third party to convey such response back to the country which initiated such signals.

In the case of Kissinger’s preparation of normalizing the US relations with China, he was an extremely patient statesman, utilizing the Pakistani channel to reply on President Yahya Khan who helped convey the US message to China, namely “a Sino-American rapprochement as essential.” In December 1970, President Yahya Khan brought back to the US side a very crucial Chinese message from Premier Zhou, who said: “In order to discuss the subject of the vacation of the Chinese territories called Taiwan, a special envoy of President Nixon will be most welcome in Peking (p. 701).” This message from Premier Zhou could be regarded as a path-breaking one opening the door to Kissinger’s secret mission to China later.

In early 1971, the PRC side sent another message to the third country, Romania, whose Vice Premier Gheorghe Radulescu told the US side that the Chinese had received the US message, that Taiwan was “one outstanding issue,” and that a special envoy from the US would be welcome.

Interestingly, the US side used President Nixon’s second Foreign Policy Report in February 1971 as another signal to indicate the American desire to improve relations with China. For the first time, the Foreign Policy Report referred to China as the PRC.

In April 1971, during the World Table Tennis Championship in Nagoya, Japan, an American table tennis athlete approached the Chinese team captain and offered the latter a T-shirt as a gift. In return, the Chinese captain accepted and returned a Chinese handkerchief to the American athlete – a gesture of goodwill from both sides.

On April 6, 1971, the Chinese side invited the American table tennis team to visit China – another important signal sent to the US side unofficially. The American side accepted the invitation, opening the door to more formal and diplomatic interactions from both sides.

Kissinger wrote in his memoir: “In many ways the weeks following the Ping-Pong diplomacy were the most maddening of the entire tortuous process. Only the President and I understood the fill implications of Zhou Enlai’s move because we alone were aware of all the communications between Peking and Washington (p. 711).” Kissinger added in his memoir that other US officials, especially those in the State Department, tended to resist drastic policy change toward China – a bureaucratic lethargy that Kissinger himself had to bypass.

In January 1971, President Yahya again conveyed Zhou Enlai’s message of welcoming the visit of a US envoy to President Nixon. Zhou said explicitly that the US must “withdraw all its armed forces from China’s Taiwan and Taiwan Straits area (p. 714).” Most importantly, Zhou added that “a solution to this crucial question can be found only through direct discussions between high-level responsible persons of the two countries (p. 714).” At that juncture, President Nixon grasped the excellent opportunity and decided to send Kissinger to China.

Kissinger embarked on his important trip to China in July 1971 after he visited Pakistan. He spent seventeen hours of talks with Zhou Enlai during the visit, including the negotiation over the content of the Shanghai Communique.

On July 15, 1971, President Nixon announced that Premier Zhou and Kissinger, Nixon’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, had already held talks in Peking from July 9 to 11, 1971, that Premier Zhou had extended an invitation to the US President to visit China at a date before May 1972, and that the US President accepted such invitation. 

During Nixon’s visit to China from February 21 to 28, 1972, Kissinger worked extremely hard to draft the Shanghai Communique for the sake of reaching a consensus with the Chinese side. At one time, Zhou Enlai was reportedly unhappy with the draft and the Chinese side produced its version of the draft. Pondering the Chinese draft cautiously, Kissinger accepted that the Communique could contain a statement expressing the different opinions of both sides – an approach of agreeing to disagree. A counter-draft was prepared by the Kissinger side and eventually a breakthrough was made.

The Shanghai Communique was a path-breaking document that outlined the consensus of both the US and Chinese sides on the question of Taiwan. The document said:

“The US acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The US Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all US forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.”

Kissinger’s statecraft in the entire process of normalizing the US-China relations can be summed up in the following way: he was a patient, flexible, realistic, resilient, and skilful diplomat who relied on signals, namely sending messages to the Chinese side, and receiving messages from them. 

The content of the Shanghai Communique showed that he skilfully looked to the ultimate objective of “the withdrawal of all the US forces and military installations from Taiwan,” but in the meantime “it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.” The progressive reduction of US forces and its military installations would have to be contingent upon the diminishing nature of the tension in the area – an ingenious long-term solution.

Kissinger’s statecraft has far-reaching implications for the future development of US-China relations over Taiwan.

First, in light of the strong likelihood that William Lai of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) will very likely be the next president of Taiwan, mainly due to its popularity and also due to the split between the Kuomintang and the People’s Party, the US side may have to rely on Kissinger’s utilization of signals and third countries to manage Washington’s relations with Beijing over the question of the future of Taiwan. The use of signals and third countries as conduits of sending and receiving messages will likely be the diplomatic finesse that US and China would have to deploy in case both sides’ relations may deteriorate due to the problem of Taiwan’s development.

Second, Kissinger’s realism and realpolitik were a product of the years in which the Sino-Soviet spilt presented a golden opportunity for the US to enter into the picture of triangular diplomacy between the US, China and Soviet Union, reaching an equilibrium in the international politics of the balance of power. Nevertheless, in the current state of international politics in which China and Russia are standing on one ideological side versus the perceived “hegemonic” US side, the relations between Washington and Beijing remain rocky even though the recent meeting between President Joe Biden and President Xi Jinping in the APEC summit sought to repair US-China relations. 

In other words, Kissinger’s realpolitik slightly tilted in favour of China would unlikely be repeated easily in the short run.

Third, if President Xi in the recent APEC summit told President Biden that Taiwan was the most dangerous issue in Sino-US relations, that China preferred peaceful reunification, that the use of force could be utilized under some conditions, and that the US provision of weapons to Taiwan is an obstacle to Sino-US relations, then the Chinese side appears to be interested in the mid-term solutions to the Taiwan question.

The Shanghai Communique drafted by Kissinger and the Chinese side looked to the long-term solution, namely the progressive reduction of the US forces and its military installations that would depend on the diminishing tensions in the area concerned. 

From the reports on the Xi-Biden meeting, the PRC side is eager to settle the Taiwan issue much earlier, preferably by peaceful means, but it does not exclude the possibility of using force.

As such, if the US side is interested in the Kissinger school of thought and if Washington’s China experts learn from Kissinger’s statecraft, the utilization of signals and third countries as conduits to send messages and to receive messages will likely be pivotal in the development of US-China relations over Taiwan’s future.

If the PRC’s White Paper on Taiwan in August 2022 mentioned a stage-by-stage approach to dealing with Taiwan’s future integration with the mainland, then perhaps such an approach will open the door to a bargaining process, which will however demand both sides to be flexible, patient and resilient as with how Kissinger dealt with his secret mission to China and the resultant President Nixon’s visit to Peking.

In conclusion, the late Henry Kissinger’s statecraft was composed of the important ingredients of trying to reach an equilibrium amid the international politics of the balance of power, and attempting to forge a consensus with China through flexibility, patience, the utilization of signals, the intense decoding of messages from the target state, and most importantly, the reliance on third countries to send messages and receive messages. If Kissinger’s diplomatic finesse and tools can have lessons for US-China relations, then the China experts in Washington and the US experts in Beijing may have to learn the practicality and operational modes from the Kissinger school of realism in international politics and diplomacy.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

On December 1, 2023, Chinese Foreign Minister and Politburo member Wang Yi visited Vietnam and met the Vietnamese President Vo Van Thuong, trying to ensure Sino-Vietnamese cooperation in all economic areas and to enhance bilateral relations in the aspects of promoting peace and mutual development. Wang Yi’s visit is politically important because it symbolizes not only China’s diplomacy of forging socialist brotherhood with Vietnam but also the necessary preparatory work for President Xi Jinping’s forthcoming visit to Vietnam.

Vietnam and China held the 15^th meeting of the Steering Committee for Bilateral Cooperation in the Vietnamese capital of Hanoi on December 1, during which Wang Yi and the Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Tran Luu Quang jointly convened the meeting.

Wang said that 2023 is the year marking the 15^th anniversary of the establishment of the comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership between China and Vietnam. Under this partnership, both sides have developed closer cooperation and their socialist causes have entered an important stage.

Wang remarked that, in face of a world filled with changes and chaos, China and Vietnam should stay firm to their original aspirations by remaining united, steadfastly following the path of peace, cooperation and development, and promoting human progress and boosting the strength of socialism.

He added that both sides should retain high-level communications, consolidate cooperation in the areas of national defence and public security, and build a stable logistic supply chain system. Moreover, Wang remarked that both countries should work together to safeguard international justice, peace, and multilateralism. 

Finally, Wang expressed his hope that both sides would follow their high-level consensus by managing differences through friendly dialogue and consultation, deepening maritime cooperation, and safeguarding “hard-won pace and stability” in the South China Sea.

In response, Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Tran Luu Quang said that, as “a comrade and brother,” Vietnam supports China in protecting regional and world peace and stability. He remarked that both sides have maintained close high-level dialogue, deepened political trust, and made progress in the areas of trade, investment, transport, science and technology, agriculture, environmental protection, tourism, and education.

Quang also pointed to the need for both countries to effectively manage differences and work toward the consultative process of formulating a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea so that peace and cooperation will be ascertained.

China is Vietnam’s largest trading partner after the Covid era, investing US$1.3 billion in 233 projects in the country during the first six months of 2023. Overall, China has now 3,791 projects in Vietnam, amounting to US$25 billion. In 2022, bilateral trade turnover between the two countries reached US$175.6 billion, with Vietnamese exports fetching up to US$57.7 billion, according to the data of the Vietnam customs.

China became Vietnam’s largest importer of agricultural, forestry and aquaculture products in the first ten months of 2023. Chinese investment in Vietnam has recently focused on digital economy and green growth, reaching a memorandum of understanding on the promotion of trade and development under the framework of Two Corridors, One Belt as a part of the Belt and Road Initiative.

Officials of both countries have discussed how some projects could improve their cooperation to meet their expectations, especially the slow speed of some projects conducted with the aid from China.

In July 2023, Wang Yi met the Vietnamese Foreign Minister Bui Thanh Son in Jakarta. Both sides at that time affirmed the need to cooperate closely in trade and investment, especially the eastern line of the Trans-Asian Railway, China’s willingness to import more Vietnamese goods, and the Chinese support of Vietnam to participate in the China-ASEAN Expo and China International Import Expo.

Obviously, both sides are eager to deepen economic and all other areas of cooperation while putting down their differences in territorial issues, especially their territorial claims in the South China Sea. 

In March 2021, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry complained that Chinese vessels at the Whitsun Reef, which Hanoi calls Da Ba Dau, had “infringed on its sovereignty.” China said it has historical sovereignty over some of the waterways, but its neighbours and the US have argued that the Chinese claims had no basis in international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to which China is a signatory. 

Wang Yi in April 2021 made a phone call to his counterpart Bui Thanh Son, saying that both countries stuck to the leadership of the communist parties and to their socialist cause, and that both sides belonged to a community with a shared future of strategic significance. 

Again, the appeal to ideological commonality and solidarity served as a valuable tool for both sides to keep calm heads despite their differences in territorial claims.

In fact, China has been working with Vietnam to minimize their territorial differences by holding joint patrols between their navies and coast guards in the Gulf of Tonkin in November and December 2023.

As early as September 2021, Wang Yi told the Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Pham Binh Minh that the two countries must cherish their “hard-won peace and stability” in the South China Sea and that both must resist the intervention of “extraterritorial forces.” Wang’s frequent reference to “hard-won peace and stability” was a hallmark in his meetings with the Vietnamese leaders, while the call for fending off external intervention appealed to Vietnam to be vigilant of the “instigation” from external forces.

During the apex of Covid-19 in 2021, China donated 5.7 million doses of Covid-19 vaccines to Vietnam – a gesture of goodwill to win the hearts and minds of socialist brother Vietnam.

In May 2020 Wang Yi and Vietnamese Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh co-chaired a ceremony to mark the 20^th anniversary of the signing of the Vietnam-China Land Border Treaty at Mong Cai International Border Gate in the northern province of Quang Ninh – an event that marked the good neighbouring relations and harmonious borderland management between the two countries. The treaty had been signed in 1999 after many years of border negotiations and demarcations from both sides under the principles of equality, mutual respect, and valid concern over each other’s interests on the basis of legal framework and international law.

China has had strong ties with Vietnam since they established diplomatic relations in 1950. Despite the Sino-Vietnamese war of 1979, both sides have returned to economic pragmatism since then and have been making great efforts at improving relations steadily and successfully.

Wang Yi’s trip to Vietnam is regarded as a preparatory move for President Xi Jinping’s visit to Vietnam between December 14 and 16, 2023. 

The Vietnamese Communist Party’s General Secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong, had visited Beijing on October 31, 2022. President Xi at that time met him, introducing to Trong the gist of the 20^th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, praising Vietnam’s achievements in socialist construction, and appealing to both sides to develop socialism as “the correct political direction” amid turbulence in international transformation.

In response, Trong affirmed the need for both countries to enhance mutual cooperation, ensured the continuation of Vietnam’s “one China policy,” and said Vietnam would not form any military alliance to use force against another country. The cordial relations between Vietnam and China were reaffirmed.

In recent years, Vietnam has elevated its relations with the US to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” level, just like the situation with China, India, Russia, South Korea, and Japan. 

While South Korea has appeared to diversify its relations and minimize its economic dependence on China by shifting its investment and trade relations with Vietnam, Japan has been traditionally a close trade and economic partner of Vietnam. 

Witnessing the American, South Korean, and Japanese enhancement of their economic relations with Vietnam, China has sensed the necessity of cementing Beijing’s bilateral relations with Hanoi to check and balance the enhanced US-South Korea-Japan relations with Vietnam.

It can be anticipated that President Xi’s visit to Vietnam will enhance Sino-Vietnamese ties in all aspects, including the stability of the logistic supply chain, the creation of a favourable environment for Chinese investment in Vietnam, greater cooperation in e-commerce and digital economy, research and development in science and technology, educational and cultural exchanges, green development and climate change cooperation, the protection of water resources along the Lancang-Mekong River, and cross-border tourism. Most importantly, President Xi will likely reiterate the socialist brotherhood of the two countries in their mutual development, cooperation and peaceful relations.

Wang Yi’s recent stress on the mutual acceleration in the consultation over the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea and on the need to make the South China Sea a sea of peace and cooperation can be seen as the strongest indication that Beijing is eager to achieve regional peace and dialogue with Vietnam over territorial issues and claims. Interestingly, the response from Wang’s counterpart, Bui Thanh Son, was that the Vietnamese side was willing to support the building of a community with a shared future for humankind – a socialist tone that shares much in common with China’s constant emphasis on the need to reach the common destiny of the humankind.

As such, the appeal to ideological affinity and solidarity has become a crucial and common theme in the consolidation of Sino-Vietnamese relations, despite their differences in territorial claims. Both sides are pragmatic enough to explore how to strengthen all other areas of cooperation, culturally, economically, technologically, environmentally, and educationally.

In conclusion, Wang Y’s visit to Vietnam is a crucial one pointing to the continuous improvement of Sino-Vietnamese relations in the realm of economic, technological, infrastructural, educational, environmental, and cultural cooperation. Despite their differences in some territorial claims, the Chinese and Vietnamese leaders have pragmatically put them aside and utilized the ideological commonality of socialist brotherhood to minimize, dilute and manage their territorial differences, while propelling their bilateral relations to a new height. As such, economic pragmatism and ideological brotherhood are the prevailing characteristics and the defining dual features of Sino-Vietnamese relations. An apex in Sino-Vietnamese relations can undoubtedly be expected later when the Chinese President Xin Jinping will visit Vietnam.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

On November 21, 2023, the government authorities in Northern Myanmar returned 31,000 ethnic Chinese, who were suspected of being involved in orchestrating and participating in cross-border telecommunication fraud, to the officers of criminal investigation bureau under the Ministry of Public Security of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) – an event that marked the largest number of alleged suspects being extradited from Myanmar to China perhaps in the history of the combat against cross-border crime.

Among the 31,000 returned suspects, there were allegedly sixty-three syndicate organizers and 1,531 persons who were under the arrest warrants. After the recent outbreak of ethnic conflicts and war in Northern Myanmar, a total of 20,000 to 30,000 ethnic Chinese returned to the PRC.

In early November 2023, the PRC government officially announced that arrest warrants were issued to four allegedly masterminds of the telecom fraud, including Myin Shaw Chang (Ming Xuechang in Chinese), Ming Guoping, Ming Julan and Ming Zhenzhen. Ming Xuechang committed suicide on November 16^th for fear of being punished by the Chinese authorities. It was reported in a mainland website that after the arrest warrants were issued, the Ming family, including Mye’s son Ming Guoping (a man also named Ming Xiaoping born in Myanmar and a village militia captain in Shan state and Kokang special economic zone), daughter Ming Julan (born in Yunan in 1981), and granddaughter Ming Zhenzhen (born in Yunan in 1996), had an intense discussion. According to the mainland Chinese news, Ming Xuechang called a military general in Myanmar for help, saying that he had already paid the latter a huge sum of money. However, the general replied that due to the fact that on October 20^th, the Ming clique, which was one of the five cliques that engaged in telecom fraud cheating many mainland Chinese to work for cybercrime groups in Northern Myanmar, killed a group of 60 Chinese nationals who attempted to escape from a telecom scam base in Crouching Tiger Compound under the control of Ming Xuechang. Among the killed Chinese nationals, there were four undercover police agents from the PRC. As such, the PRC side exerted pressure on the Myanmar government to deal with the telecom fraud syndicates effectively. The military general whom Ming Xuechang contacted for assistance, according to the mainland news reports, criticized Ming and his associates for creating a huge trouble. Ming and his family members were arranged to get on a plane, but before Ming went on board, he was “told” to “commit suicide” so that his family members would be safe and handed back to the PRC side. On November 16^th, Ming Guoping, Ming Julan and Ming Zhenzhen were arrested by the Myanmar authorities and they were extradited back to the mainland police side.

It must be noted that the Ming syndicate was only the fifth clique active in Northern Myanmar. The other four cliques that involved the ethnic Chinese included the Bai Xuoqian family (Bai Xuoqian was also named Bai Suocheng and he was born in Kokang in 1950 and he led the Union Solidarity and Development Party in Kokang), the Wei Chaoren family (Wei was born in Jiangxi and became once chief-of-staff of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army or MNDAA, but later he withdrew and his daughter Wei Rong’s Hanley Group was involved in property, hotel, jewelry and even telecom scam businesses), the Liu Guoxi family (Liu was born in Yunan and died in 2020, but his family members were involved in the mining, gambling and hotel business), and the Liu Chengxiang family (Liu’s Fully Light Group was active in the Shan state and Liu became a “successful” businessman). 

All these families had their ethnic Chinese and Kokang origins, but the Bai, Wei and Liu Guoxi groups rebelled against their leader Pheung Kya-shin (Peng Jiasheng), who was the chairperson of the Kokang special region in Myanmar and the leader of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army. Born in 1931 in Kokang and died in 2022, Pheung learnt military affairs and tactics from another ethnic Chinese chief of Kokang, Edward Yang Kyein Tsai. Pheung emerged in Kokang province as a leader of the Communist Party of Burma from 1969 to 1989, when he established his MNDAA. Pheung and his subordinates were criticized for being involved in trafficking in heroin in the 1970s and 1980s. In August 2009, Pheung suffered from his political decline as his subordinates like Bai Xuocheng, Wei Chaoren, Liu Guoxi, and Liu Chengxiang not only challenged his power but also began to side with the military junta. Pheung was regarded as a drug lord, but his decline in the 1990s and 2000s has recently been reversed by his son Peng Deren and deputy Yan Winzhong. The MNDAA under Peng Deren has picked up some weapons in a forest, fighting all its way into Laukaing and constituting a serious threat to the three of the four families that originally rebelled against Pheung Kya-shin, except for the Liu Chengxiang family which had not really turned against the old Pheung. 

On October 27, 2023, the MNDAA began to fight against the telecom fraud organizations, including the Bai family group, whose leader Bai Xuoqian and his family members died during the collapse of their helicopter, which was shot down by the MNDAA.

The entire power struggle within the ethnic Kokang groups had important implications for Myanmar politics in general and Sino-Myanmar relations in particular.

First, ethnic Kokang politics were fierce and violent. The power struggles among the big families shaped the development of intra-ethnic rivalries in the Kokang and Shan regions.

Second, the MNDAA in Kokang has almost 8,000 militias and, most importantly, their “sudden” discovery of weapons, including 120 rockets and some Ukrainian weapons, appeared to be a surprising event. But it was reported in a Macau Chinese newspaper that the MNDAA invited some retired weapons manufacturers and technicians to visit Kokang so that its weaponry could be improved further. Furthermore, the MNDAA had drones that helped its struggles against not only the rival family groups but also the Myanmar military.

Third, China has succeeded in lobbying the Myanmar government to curb the influence of the syndicates and families that were involved in telecommunication fraud, which in recent years have been cheating many ignorant Chinese citizens to work in Northern Myanmar’s telecom scam organizations. Some mainland Chinese were easily deceived and made to believe that they could make easy profits by working in Myanmar. While education of ordinary citizens in mainland China has been made through media publicity, still some of them have been the easy victims of telecom fraud syndicates. The dismantling of the families and syndicates involved in telecom fraud can and will hopefully improve the situation of cross-border crime. In fact, on October 31, the Minister of the PRC Public Security, Wang Xiaohong, paid a visit to the Myanmar military high command and general Min Aung Hlaing, expressing the Chinese desire to work with the Myanmar military regime to curb cross-border criminal activities. Wang’s visit was followed by another visit by the PRC Foreign Ministry’s assistant minister Nong Rong on November 3, making four requests: (1) the persistence in the combat against cross-border crime; (2) the joint efforts at improving the governance of the border regions; (3) the support of Myanmar to deal with disputes within the constitutional and legal framework; and (4) the need for Myanmar to assist China in the process of maintaining border stability. 

The two visits by Chinese officials represented a two-pronged strategy – one by the police and the other through diplomatic channel – of controlling and eliminating the telecommunication fraud syndicates in Northern Myanmar. 

Another interesting interpretation was that the mainland official visits aimed at achieving not just the pacification of the telecom fraud syndicates but also the Myanmar authorities’ skillful handling of the MNDAA, which this time acted like an auxiliary force in support of the purge of the telecom fraud organizations.

Fourth, even though Myanmar is governed by the military junta, its territorial outreach encounters limitations in Norther Myanmar where ethnic groups and rebels are quite autonomous and active. Apart from the rebel groups in the northern regions, Western Myanmar also witnesses the Chin National Front, which is composed of the Christian Chin minority, and which signed a ceasefire with the government in 2015. In the Rakhine state in Western Myanmar, the Arakan Army is another rebel group against the military junta in late October, leading to a curfew. Therefore, in view of the persistence of rebels in different parts of Myanmar, the military regime appears to be strong on the surface but fragile underneath – a situation that might explain the rapidity in which the Myanmar police moved quickly against the telecom fraud syndicates and returned 31,000 ethnic Chinese back to the PRC.

In conclusion, the recent control over telecom fraud in Northern Myanmar has demonstrated not only the interplay between ethnic Kokang politics, where power struggles have involved several ethnic Chinese family groups, and the military regime, but also the determination of the PRC government and the Myanmar authorities to deal with cross-border crime. Ethnic politics in the Kokang region have embraced the power struggles among big family groups, their entanglement with both legitimate and illegitimate businesses, and their complex relations with some corrupt officials at the local level and perhaps some influential protectors at the central level too. Their protective “umbrella,” however, quickly collapsed after the death of four mainland Chinese undercover police. China’s combat against cross-border telecom fraud was ascertained after the two-pronged strategy of utilizing the police visit and diplomatic pressure was adopted. However, it remains to be seen how ethnic Kokang politics will evolve and whether the MNDAA will perhaps play both a delicate actor of controlling telecom fraud groups detrimental to China and a dynamic force acquiring some limited degree of autonomy from the central military authorities in Myanmar.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

Considering the remarks made by Chinese President Xi Jinping in the Xi-Biden Summit in San Francisco on November 15, and given the Sino-US consensus on the resumption military-to-military communication, the Summit has immediate implications for Taiwan’s political future in the coming years.

First, Chinese President Xi Jinping went into details about China’s principles and position on the question of Taiwan. He says that the Taiwan question is ultimately the most important and the most sensitive one in Sino-US relations.

China attaches great importance to the US active expression of its position on Taiwan during the Bali meeting between President Xi and President Biden in November 2022, during which the US side reiterated that its one-China policy did not change, and that the world has an interest in maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

Most significantly, President Xi on November 15 said that “the US should in concrete action demonstrate its expression of not supporting Taiwan independence.” Moreover, the US “should stop arming Taiwan and should support China’s peaceful reunification.” President Xi added that “China will be reunified, and such reunification will be inevitable.”

It was the first time that a top Chinese President made such remarks in an unprecedented way in front of his US counterpart.

The implications are obvious: China is very eager to settle the question of Taiwan peacefully and Beijing sees the US armament of Taiwan is an obstacle to the peaceful resolution of Taiwan’s political future – a position held by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) consistently.

Xi’s remarks implied that China would perhaps like to settle the question of Taiwan in his lifetime.

In response to Xi’s Taiwan position, President Joe Biden reiterated the American five-point stance in Bali: (1) the US does not seek a new Cold War; (2) the US does not seek to change the Chinese system; (3) the US does not seek to oppose China through the consolidation of its allies; (4) the US does not support Taiwan independence; and (5) the US has no intention of having conflicts with China.

Furthermore, the US supports the one-China policy and welcome departments at all levels to start dialogue sincerely and openly to enhance understanding,avoid misunderstanding, and control diverging views.

The media reported that President Xi in the meeting with Biden denied that China had a plan to “take back” Taiwan in the year 2027 or 2035, although some US military officers had made such claims.

An important consensus reached by both sides on November 15 was the agreement to resume military-to-military communications. Clearly, both sides are keen to avoid sudden military accidents, conflicts and confrontations over the issue of Taiwan, especially as the US military airplanes often flied near the Chinese counterpart, or vice versa. The navies of both sides must also avoid unnecessary accidents or conflicts in the Taiwan Strait.

Still, it remains to be seen how both China and the US manage their military-to-military communication at all levels, ranging from the commanding to the operational levels. If crisis takes place at the operational level, it must go up to the commanding level for crisis resolution immediately – a hierarchical process that will demand prompt decision and immediate response to defuse any military accident or conflict.

As such, the control over any crisis will depend on the hierarchical communications from the operational to the commanding level of both the Chinese and American sides, and then on the horizontal communications between the commanding echelon of both sides.

The US strategy in this San Francisco Summit was effective: focusing on matters that could reach easier consensus first, notably the control over narcotics – an issue to which the Chinese side must agree. Other easier issues include educational exchange of more US students to visit China, which also attaches importance to people-to-people exchange.

Yet, the Summit stopped short of how both sides will make use of people-to-people exchange to explore the solutions to Taiwan’s political future.

The PRC’s White Paper on Taiwan, a document released in August 2022, harped on the theme of utilizing the Taiwan model of “one country, two systems” to deal with the island’s political future. The document mentioned the possibility of adopting a stage-by-stage process of resolving the Taiwan issue. So far, none of the American think tanks has appeared to notice this proposal of adopting a stage-by-stage process of negotiations.

As such, the ball is arguably on the US court to make use of its rich political think tanks to discuss how a stage-by-stage process will help defuse the Taiwan crisis and how such process will facilitate a give-and-take bargaining in which one issue will be exchanged for a concession from the other side.

President Xi’s remark on the need for the US side to stop rearming Taiwan was a strong one, implying that the US military support of Taiwan is and will be an ultimate obstacle to the peaceful resolution of the island’s political future. Therefore, the US side must ponder deeply how to facilitate the mainland side and the Taiwan counterpart to explore a variety of political solutions.

Objectively speaking, many Taiwan people have rejected the “one country, two systems” model, even though the PRC side has reiterated that it is the Taiwan model of “one country, two systems,” meaning that Taiwan will have international space of participating in international organizations by using the name “Chinese Taipei.” Moreover, the White Paper in August 2022 explicitly said that foreign countries will be allowed to set up their consulates or official or quasi-official institutions in Taiwan – a kind of status quo that will persist in the future.

The crux of the problem in Sino-US relations over Taiwan is that there is a lack of options attractive to most Taiwan people. The blue camp in Taiwan led by the Kuomintang (KMT) does favor and support reunification with mainland China – a position that has been criticized and rejected by the more localist and radical Democratic Progressive Party. 

Even worse, there is a lack of consensus between the blue camp and the white camp. At the time of writing, the KMT led by Eric Chu and Ma Ying-jeou is keen to form an alliance with the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) led by Ko Wen-je. The most recent reports in Taiwan have pointed to the reluctance of the People’s Party leaders to accept how the KMT proposes to statistically calculate the results of the polls conducted on the Hou You-yi ticket with Ko Wen-je.

The TPP leaders have argued that if a standard deviation of 3 percent rather than 6 percent is calculated, the Ko-Hou ticket is as strong as with the Hou-Ko ticket. Who is the presidential candidate coming first becomes a bone of contention, showing that Taiwan politics is basically egoistic, interest-based and partisan-struggling. 

There are two scenarios in Taiwan’s presidential elections in January 2024: (1) the DPP led by William Lai would win because of the failure of the KMT and the TPP to form a coalition, or (2) the KMT-TPP coalition would capture the presidential seat for the first time in Taiwan’s presidential election.

A third scenario may be emerging if the KMT-TPP coalition cannot be formed at the presidential election level: namely the presidency would be captured by the DPP, but the Legislative Assembly would see an alliance between the KMT and TPP to block the bills and policies initiated by the DPP.

This scenario would bring about deadlock in the Legislative Assembly, leading to immobilism that would not be conducive to any proposed solution for Taiwan’s political future.

Hence, Taiwan’s domestic political development will shape the outcome of any proposed solution for the island’s political future, even though China and the US may produce an agreed resolution.

At present, the US government is adopting a hardline attitude toward the defense of Taiwan, unlike General George Marshall who in 1946 and 1947 failed to reach a solution between the KMT and the Communist Party of China (CPC), and who were later criticized by General Douglas MacArthur for abandoning the armament of the KMT forces in favor of the CPC military. George Marshall did try to mediate between the KMT and CPC, but he failed. The withdrawal of the US military support of Chiang Kai-shek doomed the KMT failure in defending the entire mainland from 1947 to 1949.

Today, we witness a rising China where its internal politics are paternalistic and whose foreign policy is ironically more liberal with the socialist vision of achieving “a common destiny for the mankind.” Yet, the US ideology of internal pluralism and external self-protectionism/hegemonism with the old doctrine of “manifest destiny” in promoting the universal values of Western “democracy” is in direct conflicts with the PRC ideology of harping on the “Chinese-style modernization and democracy.”As such, arming Taiwan is inevitable and demanding the US to stop rearming the island seems to be a bridge too far.

Therefore, an intermediary solution conducive to peace in the Taiwan Strait is a matter for the US think tanks to consider, including the likelihood of how to make the Taiwan model of “one country, two systems” far more attractive to most people of Taiwan.

The stage-by-stage process proposed for the first time in China’s White Paper on Taiwan can be delineated further. In the first stage, for instance, the Taiwan side will have to accept the 1992 consensus in exchange for the mainland action of, say, allowing far more mainland Chinese to visit the island as tourists than ever before. Other items can be exchanged further, like the formal recognition of the mainland’s possession of Taiwan territory in exchange for the mainland side’s abandonment of the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue.

Whatever the items of exchange in the process of negotiations, the US would likely be an actor that would be consulted by the Taiwan regime, especially if the DPP government is in power. 

Another problem is that whatever solution proposed by the mainland Chinese side would be put in the Legislative Assembly for a vote. If the legislature is dominated by the DPP, such a solution will be rejected. If it is dominated by the KMT-PP coalition, the passage of a peaceful solution would be rejected by the DPP.

In all these scenarios, what would be the proper role of the US? Maintaining neutrality? How would China react to the US position in the process of negotiating Taiwan’s political future. Should a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) be used between the mainland and Taiwan instead of putting any proposed solution to the Taiwan Legislative Assembly for a vote? Yet, such a MoU would likely be criticized as lacking the people’s mandate.

Despite the difficult paths ahead, the short-term solution is to enhance the people-to-people exchange between mainland China and Taiwan, and between China and the US. Such exchanges, especially at the level of think tanks that would involve more academics, would hopefully bring about the necessary collective wisdom to resolve Taiwan’s political future.

In conclusion, it is time for the US side to ponder how its rich think tanks can and will consider various modified versions of the PRC’s Taiwan model of “one country, two systems.” Asking the US to stop rearming Taiwan seems to be a bridge too far, butit does imply that the American academics and officials will have to ponder solutions conducive to the peaceful resolutions of Taiwan’s political future.

Gone were the years of George Marshall whose failure to broker a deal between the KMT and CPC in 1946 and early 1947 had far-reaching repercussions until today. The current complete reversal of George Marshall’s policy toward the KMT, which is no longer a ruling party in Taiwan, means the continuous rearmament of the DPP regime – a position that must incur the anger of the PRC.

As such, exploring intermediary solutions along the line of the Taiwan model of “one country, two systems” and, most importantly, the stage-by-stage process of negotiation, if such negotiation comes, will be the feasible steps forward in the coming years – a task that arguably should provoke US think tanks to ponder seriously.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

The recent remarks made by Vice-Premier He Lifeng on the central government’s support of Hong Kong to retain its hallmark of internationalization and its role of capital mobility, and the recent comments by Zhuhai party-secretary Chen Yong that Zhuhai on Macau’s economic diversification and business cooperation with Portuguese-speaking countries have pointed to the new economic repositioning of the Hong Kong and Macau special administrative regions, respectively.

During the Summit of the Global Financial Leaders’ Investment Summit on November 7, China’s Vice-Premier He Lifeng made several important points on the economic role of Hong Kong. He said that Hong Kong should strengthen its financial infrastructure to increase its level of influence. By financial infrastructure, he refers to (1) the need for Hong Kong to promote cross-border trade and investment with the support of Beijing, (2) the necessity of Hong Kong to open up the financial and monetary markets further as an experiment, (3) the persistence in improving the financial connecting mechanisms between the mainland and Hong Kong capital, (4) the consolidation of Hong Kong as an offshore Renminbi  exchange platform, (5) the trend of strengthening the city as an international wealth fund and asset management centre, (6) the strategy of building up Hong Kong as a financial technology hub and green financial centre, and (7) the function of elevating Hong Kong’s status as an international financial centre.

Secondly, He Lifeng pointed to Hong Kong’s need to expand its international business networks and friendship for the sake of consolidating its financial and monetary status. Furthermore, Hong Kong should actively participate in regional cooperation and interact with the financial and monetary world through its expansion into the ASEAN market and the Middle East market.

Third, He Lifeng remarked that Hong Kong should adapt to the changes in the international and regional markets through its active participation in the construction of the Greater Bay Area, through its deepening integration with the nation, and through its further participation in China’s national development and modernization.

He’s remarks are significant for Hong Kong’s emerging economic repositioning of Hong Kong. Basically, he delineated the two-pronged strategy adopted by China to enhance and reshape Hong Kong’s economic position: relying on the “heartland” of China, to borrow from the geopolitical term of Halford MacKinder, in Hong Kong’s economic integration with the Greater Bay Area, and expanding Hong Kong’s external economic relations under Beijing’s approval and support to the ASEAN and Middle East markets. In short, the two-pronged strategy of relying on and penetrating the mainland Chinese “heartland” and of enhancing Hong Kong’s external economic collaborations under China’s Belt and Road initiative.

On November 10, the Zhuhai city’s party-secretary Chen Yong visited Macau and met Chief Executive Ho Iat-seng. Chen Yong made comments that are, coincidentally speaking, pointing to the emerging economic repositioning of Macau.

Chen Yong said that Zhuhai and Macau had a long history of citizen interactions, and that Zhuhai from now on is going to play a crucial role to “accompany” Macau’s process of developing economic diversification “suitably” through the In-depth Cooperation Zone in Hengqin. He also added that Zhuhai is providing convenience to the life and work of the people of Macau. With the acceleration of the construction of the Macau-Zhuhai cooperation items, Chen said, the region’s development will have radiative impacts on the western regions of Guangdong. According to Chen, Zhuhai hopes that it will strengthen the cooperation with Portuguese-speaking countries through Macau as a centre, a platform and as a base, and that both Zhuhai and Macau will develop together.

Although He Lifeng is a central-level high-ranking official and although Chen Yong is a local-level party-secretary, their remarks can be taken together as a reflection of how the mainland’s central government and local government perceive the necessity of both Hong Kong and Macau to reposition themselves economically and strategically.

From MacKinder’s geopolitical perspective, Hong Kong’s deeper economic integration and interaction with the Greater Bay Area can be seen as a central government’s plan of utilizing the traditional strength of Hong Kong as a window to absorb more foreign investment and trade into the “heartland.” It is a new push from the central government for Hong Kong to enhance its role as a financial and monetary centre, while attracting more investment and trade from other countries, like those in ASEAN and the Middle East, to the mainland. The recent visits by Chief Executive John Lee and his business delegation to the Middle East and Southeast Asia could be seen as moves strongly supported by Beijing.

Most importantly, Beijing’s recent White Paper on the Belt and Road Initiative has already named Hong Kong’s role as an arbitration centre. In other words, geopolitically speaking, the central government has tried to make use of Hong Kong’s common law system to establish the city as an arbitration hub for international businesses. 

In fact, the Hong Kong authorities have expressed their interest in joining RCEP, a move that has already acquired the support of the central government in Beijing. While Hong Kong’s participation in RCEP will take time, its intention and Beijing’s support again demonstrate the geopolitical and geoeconomic calculations: Hong Kong has to strengthen its role as a super-connector for its motherland – a super-connector whose idea stemmed from the C. Y. Leung administration but whose content has not yet been fully concretized until the current John Lee government.

The remarks made by Chen Yong illustrates how the mainland authorities view the emerging economic role of Macau. The White Paper on the Belt and Road Initiative in October 2023 has pointed to the explicit role of Macau as a platform to strengthen China’s relations with the Portuguese-speaking countries. Macau since October 2003 has been playing this significant role through the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries. 

Recent media reports have pointed to the economic benefits reaped by Portugal in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, unlike Italy which has withdrawn from the Belt and Road scheme due to the Italian perception of lacking concrete economic benefits. Given the long-standing harmonious diplomatic and economic relations between Portugal and China, it can be anticipated that Macau’s role as a platform for Beijing to enhance its economic relations with Portuguese-speaking countries will continue to expand.

Chen Yong’s comment on how the Zhuhai-Macau cooperation can and will benefit western Guangdong also illustrates China’s national development strategy of utilizing the well-developed regions to stimulate the development of less well-off regions, domestically. 

Interestingly, Chen’s remarks came after the Macau government’s publication of its economic diversification plan – a document published in August 2023 after 13 rounds of consultation with the public from June to July.

The economic diversification plan published by the Macau government covers five principal areas: comprehensive tourism and leisure industry, the industry of Chinese medicine and public health products, the modern financial and monetary industry, the high-tech industry and the elevation of traditional industries, and the convention and exhibition industry together with the development of cultural and sports industry. 

The plan does implement what the central government has asked Macau to do, namely “suitable” economic diversification. However, from a critical perspective, the diversification plan lacks concrete key performance indicators. Out of twenty-seven indicators of the five areas of industrial diversification, thirteen have concrete statistical figures by the year 2028, mostly in the areas of high-tech development and convention/exhibition/sports/cultural industries. If half of the indicators lack performance targets, it would be easy for the Macau administration to claim achievements by 2028 – perhaps ironically a reflection of the word “suitably” as the central authorities might have assumed that some degree of economic diversification would serve the objective eventually.

The most ambiguous area of the diversification plan is how higher education institutions in Macau help the city’s economic repositioning and deepening integration with Hengqin. The plan mentions 44,052 students in Macau’s higher education institutions in 2022, but it says by 2028 “the number of students will be suitably increased.” From a critical perspective, workforce planning and local training will be necessary to gear up Macau’s new economic repositioning, apart from its reliance on the import of talents, including obviously mainland talents. 

From an appreciative perspective, the diversification plan did mention the necessity of expanding higher education programs related to high-tech industries from 24 in 2022 to 40 in 2028. 

Overall, it remains to be seen how the Macau authorities readjust their targets, if such targets exist, from time to time in response to the market demands and industrial needs.

Recently, Fujian has already enhanced its communication and interactions with not only Kinmen in Taiwan but also Macau – a trend pointing to the increasing role of Fujian province in the mainland’s attempt at enhancing economic integration with Taiwan. In view of this geoeconomic shift, Macau has a role to play in the process of Fujian’s economic interactions with Taiwan. Specifically, given that a sizeable percentage of Macau residents have Fujianese ancestry, Macau can and should enhance its economic relations with Fujian. Horizontally and geographically, Macau can forge closer economic relations with Fujian in the east while utilizing the physical space in Zhuhai’s Hengqin to achieve the objective of “suitable” economic diversification.

In conclusion, Halford MacKinder’s heartland theory can be applied to our deeper understanding of the emerging new economic repositioning of Hong Kong and Macau. Hong Kong has to fully utilize the mainland heartland by deepening its economic integration with the Greater Bay Area, while enhancing its role as a super-connector through the consolidation of external economic relations under China’s Belt and Road Initiative, especially ASEAN and the Middle East. Hong Kong’s role as an economic super-connector is geopolitically important. Amid continuous Sino-US power politics, Hong Kong’s economic space can be fully expanded through its deeper integration with the mainland while utilizing its motherland’s Belt and Road initiative to enhance external economic relations and reap concrete economic benefits through various China-led forums and through the city’s participation in more international organizations. Macau, on the other hand, has already gained its motherland’s dedicated support to use Hengqin, a very small part of the gigantic heartland, to achieve the objective of “suitable” economic diversification. At the same time, Macau will continue to play the role of a connector between China and the Portuguese-speaking countries, but it can and will have the potential to expand its economic relations with Fujian which is increasingly playing a crucial role in the mainland’s economic integration with Taiwan in the coming years. If the economic repositioning of both Hong Kong and Macau is now clear, the next challenge is how both cities will achieve the national plans and objectives.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

The reorganization of the Hong Kong Macau Work Office (HKMWO) under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) has been completed in late October 2023 by listing on its website not only the duties but also the responsibilities of ten bureaus. This article delineates the HKMWO’s new structure and examines its important implications for the central government’s policies toward Hong Kong and Macau special administrative regions.

The website of the HKMWO lists the following duties.

First, it implements the principles of “one country, two systems,” “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong,” and “Macau people ruling Macau,” their high degree of autonomy, the governance of Hong Kong and Macau in accordance with the law, the implementation of the Chinese constitution and the Basic Law of Hong Kong and Macau, “the patriots ruling Hong Kong and Macau,” the protection of the nation’s sovereignty, security and developmental interest, and the promotion of the long-term prosperity and stability of Hong Kong and Macau.

Second, it strengthens the unified planning and coordination, the supervision over implementation, the organization of study and surveys on important questions, and the issuance of policy suggestions.

Third, it organizes studies and makes suggestions on draft law, statutes and legislation relating to Hong Kong and Macau, and submits proposals on the implementation of important law and on related legal questions pertinent to Hong Kong and Macau.

Fourth, it supports the chief executives and the governments of the special administrative regions to implement policies in accordance with the law, and to promote the construction and perfection of the system and mechanisms related to the Chinese constitution and the Basic Law.

Fifth, it studies and makes proposals on the perfection of the accountability of the chief executives to the central government, the improvement of the approval system and mechanism on the appointment and removal of chief executives and principal officials.

Sixth, it coordinates the study of relevant departments on the support and development of Hong Kong and Macau’s economy, on the protection of the people’s livelihood and on other related policy measures.

Seventh, it organizes the implementation of the legal system and of protecting national security in the special administrative regions.

Eighth, it coordinates the propaganda work of Hong Kong and Macau and manages in accordance with law the media organizations, stations and reporters who are from Hong Kong and Macau and who are based in the mainland.

Ninth, it helps the special administrative regions to strengthen not only the education on the Chinese constitution, the Basic Law, and the national security law, but also national education, Chinese history, Chinese cultural spirits and the consolidation of the national consciousness and patriotic spirit of the societies of Hong Kong and Macau.

Tenth, it is responsible for the official interactions and work relations between the mainland and the chief executives and the governments of the special administrative regions, coordinates and promotes the cooperation between relevant departments in the mainland and Hong Kong and Macau, directs and manages the official affairs between the mainland and Hong Kong and Macau, and makes suggestions and provides assistance to the mainland organs that are stationed in Hong Kong and Macau.

Numbers 2, 3, 5, 6 and 8 have been mentioned by some Hong Kong media as the “new” duties delineated by the HKMWO.

Analytically speaking, the ten duties are aimed at realizing the central government’s “comprehensive jurisdiction” over Hong Kong and Macau. When the term “comprehensive jurisdiction” first appeared in the 2014 White Paper on the implementation of the Basic Law in Hong Kong, very few people understood what this concept really meant. 

However, the concept of “comprehensive jurisdiction” can be interpreted as how China as the sovereign state of the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau has been exercising its sovereignty over the two cities particularly since the promulgation of the national security law in Hong Kong in late June 2020, and since the recent amendment of the national security law of Macau in May 2023 (the Macau national security law was enacted in 2009). The protection of national security of the central government is now embedded in duties numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 9. 

Duty number 9 focuses on the educational aspects of Hong Kong and Macau, which are expected and required to strengthen national education, national security education, Chinese history education, and Chinese cultural education. Education reform is seen as necessary to instil a much stronger sense of Chinese consciousness among the citizens of Hong Kong and Macau. In a sense, the educational reforms in Hong Kong since 2020 have been aiming at strengthening the national and cultural identity of the Hong Kong people.

Duties numbers 4, 5 and 6 are closely intertwined, firstly supporting the chief executives and governments of the two special administrative regions, secondly enhancing their accountability (including principal officials) to the central government, and thirdly consolidating the work on the promotion of economic prosperity and the people’s livelihood. These three duties are extremely important to the central government, especially in view of the chaos in Hong Kong during the latter half of 2019 and in view of the sluggishness of Macau in diversifying its economy away from its heavy dependence on the casino-driven and gaming-driven economy.

Duty number 8 is unique in the sense that the central government enhances publicity and propaganda work on the media organizations, stations and personnel from Hong Kong and Macau, pointing to stronger supervision and coordination work than ever before.

There are eight bureaus within the HKMWO in dealing with Hong Kong and Macau. A secretariat is dealing with minutes of meetings, documents, security issues, visits, and financial matters. Bureau 1 is responsible for implementing the central government’s policies on Hong Kong and Macau. Bureau 2 is dealing with the official interactions and collaboration in the political areas between the mainland and Hong Kong/Macau. Bureau 3 is coping with the official interactions and collaboration in the economic areas between the mainland and Hong Kong/Macau. Bureau 4 is focusing on the cultural, education and youth interactions between the mainland and Hong Kong/Macau. Bureau 5 is coping with public health, nationality affairs religions, labour and social service interactions between the mainland and Hong Kong/Macau. Bureau 6 is focusing on the coordination work with the two special administrative regions on the protection of national security. Bureau 7 is dealing with the publicity, propaganda work and liaison work on Hong Kong and Macau reporters and media organizations stationed in the mainland. Bureau 8 is specifically responsible for the drafting of law and legislation and judicial areas relating to the interactions between the mainland and Hong Kong/Macau.

From an organizational perspective, the restructuring of these bureaus and the delineations of their duties and responsibilities can help the implementation of the duties of the HKMWO effectively. As such, the restructuring of the HKMWO, including the recent move of bringing it directly under the Party, aims at strengthening the Party supervision, direction, and leadership of the HKMWO. Most importantly, the Party-state structures are now organizationally interwoven, making the Party-state’s policies on Hong Kong and Macau more effective in their implementation, review, improvement, and perfection. The concept of “comprehensive jurisdiction” is now fully realized and finalized through not only the interlocking relations between the Party and the HKMWO, but also the internal restructuring and reforms of the HKMWO.

In conclusion, the restructuring of the HKMWO can be seen as the realization of how the central government in Beijing enhances its “comprehensive jurisdiction” or sovereignty over Hong Kong and Macau. It can also be interpreted as the final stage of making the Party-state’s policies over Hong Kong and Macau, especially after mid-2020, far more effective in their implementation and reforms. It also makes the central authorities’ supervision over the chief executives and their governments of the two special administrative regions far more effective, while enhancing the accountability of the chief executives and their principal officials as well as the two governments to the central Party-state.

The reorganization and reclarification of the duties of the HKMWO are now very clear: while national security cuts through the essential duties of the Party-led HKMWO, the two special administrative regions are required to deal with national security education, national education, Chinese history education, Chinese cultural education, economic prosperity, and the people’s livelihood in a far more organized, coherent and effective manner than ever before. Similarly, the delineation of the duties of the eight bureaus within the HKMWO aim at making the implementation of the principles of “one country, two systems,” “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong,” “Macau people ruling Macau” and the patriots ruling the two special administrative regions far more effective than before. As such, the most recent restructuring of the HKMWO can be regarded as the finalization of the long process of realizing Beijing’s “comprehensive jurisdiction” over Hong Kong and Macau.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

The sudden passing away of the late Chinese Premier Li Keqiang on the morning of October 27 has important legacies for China’s development in the coming years mainly due to his pragmatism and partly because of his political moderation that has made him coexist with other top Chinese leaders harmoniously for ten years during his premiership.

Born on July 1, 1955 in the province of Anhui, Li Keqiang joined the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1976. In 1982 he became a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League (CYL) and also a party secretary of the CYL at Peking University. In 1993, he rose up the political ladder and became a member of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People’s Congress, while simultaneously he was chosen as the Dean of the Chinese Youth Political Academy and the first secretary of the CYL Central Secretariat – a rising political star pointing to a rosy career in the future.  In 1997, Li became a Fifteenth Central Committee member of the CPC. One year later, he became an acting governor of the Henan province and a deputy party-secretary of the CPC in Henan province. In 2002, Li was promoted to be the Henan province party-secretary and governor. Two years later, he was sent to Liaoning province to be the party-secretary. From 2007 to 2022, Li became a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CPC. From 2008 to 2013, Li was promoted as the State Council as Deputy Premier. Between 2013 and 2023 he became the Premier until March 2023 when he stepped down.

Li Keqiang’s greatest contribution to China during his premiership years was the maintenance of a high degree of growth, a relatively high level of employment, and most importantly the ability to resist the encroachment of Covid-19 during the difficult years from early 2020 to early 2023. His annual government report could be described as comprehensive in all policy areas, covering the strategies of economic development, sustainability, anti-poverty, public health, agricultural development, food safety, jobs creation, education reform, housing supply, elderly care, internal consumption, external trade relations, industrial development, the support of small and medium enterprises, information and technology, and the necessary government intervention in China’s socio-economic development. 

Most impressively, he headed the small group dealing with Covid-19 in the difficult years from early 2020 to early 2023, dispatching deputy premier Liu Yandong to tackle the eruption of Covid-19 in Wuhan and later other cities. Overall, the State Department under Li’s leadership demonstrated competent and effective administration over its jurisdictional areas, helping China maintain rapid growth and stable socio-economic development in the past decade.

Li Keqiang’s macro-level regulation and skillful as well as timely intervention in the economy of China were his hallmarks of premiership from 2013 to early 2023, emphasizing the importance of streamlining the government bureaucracy through his reorganization of various ministries, the insistence in clean governance, and the implementation of the Belt and Road initiatives. Li was not a premier who adopted a very high-profile approach to emphasizing his successes. However, he could be seen as a very pragmatic premier attaching immense importance to policy implementation and achievements. In this aspect, Li stood out as perhaps the most pragmatic and yet low-key premier in the past decade. He stood out as a highly competent, pragmatic, clean and yet low-profile premier who answered questions from the media frankly and openly.

Li’s pragmatism could be seen in his remarks to the media in March 2023 before he stepped down in Beijing. He admitted that Covid-19 brought about tremendous challenges to the Chinese government, and that “We do things not from the perspective of doing so easily. We do things without avoiding difficulties and we implement policies without avoiding dangers. We try our very best.” Li added: “We walk in large paths, we treat citizens as the basis, we do things beneficial to the tianxia (society). Our policy directions are made for the expectations of the people.” Finally, he said that if there were gaps between what the government did and what the public expected, his government was aware of them.

Clearly, Li Keqiang’s pragmatism was characterized by his emphasis on doing things in a moderate and appropriate way, implementing policies in a direction acceptable to the public, and understanding the weaknesses of the government in any expectation gap with citizens – a practical, moderate and humble approach to dealing with governance in China, unlike the state media and propaganda which naturally exaggerates the government leadership’s achievements from time to time.

Exactly because of his pragmatism, China adopted the policy of dual circulation in the Covid-19 period during which domestic consumption was the emphasis of the government. Through the boosting of domestic consumption, China could deal with the difficulties in the decline in exports and imports during the Covid years. At the same time, the external relations of China were stimulated by its entry into the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership – another important contribution of Li Keqiang although Chinese foreign policy in the past decade showed a pattern of dual leadership under the directions of both the president and the premier.

During the Covid years, when businesses went down, Li Keqiang adopted a pragmatic approach to advocating and supporting the street stalls in various cities. Although the state media and propaganda later criticized the emergence of street stalls, Li’s pragmatism could be seen. His open-minded approach to supporting street stalls was comparable to the recent Hong Kong government’s practical attempt at stimulating night markets to revive the local economy of Hong Kong where almost tens of thousands of people flocked to Shenzhen during weekends and where the local businesses have been deeply affected even after the Covid-19 era.

Holding a PhD in economics, Li Keqiang’s economic achievements in Henan and Liaoning led to his promotion to be the premier. In Liaoning, he told foreign media three main indicators in the province’s economic development in 2007: banks loans in the long term, railroad investment, and industrial electricity usage. These three indicators were clearly the key performance indices of how to achieve high growth rates in Liaoning province, boosting local employment and business environment.

Unlike the official state media and propaganda which naturally tend to paint a rosy picture rather than reporting on negative aspects, Li Keqiang was down-to-earth in his public remarks. In 2020, he said that there were 600 million people who belonged to the middle and lower ranked salaried citizens each receiving a monthly income of 1,000 yuan only. Such remarks were reflective of the pragmatic characteristic of Li, while the state media and propaganda tended to be far more ideological in their official portrayal of China’s real situation.

On social justice issues, Li Keqiang showed that he is a resolute socialist expressing his anger at child abduction cases and showing his determination of achieving relatively balanced development in the economy and society, especially in the aspect of poverty alleviation as emphasized annually in his government report. He also understood the difficulties of China in achieving high growth rate, saying in 2020 that the larger the economic entity is, the more difficulties it encounters to achieve high growth rate, like a person climbing up a mountain at the top.

In the past decade, party cadres groomed by the CYL were not particularly favored in the process of promotion to the top leadership of the CPC, like former premier Hu Chunhua, a protégé of the former President Hu Jintao. Li Keqiang’s successor was not Hu Chunhua, but Li Qiang who was a former secretary serving Zhejiang’s party secretary Xi Jinping in the year 2004. Li Keqiang adopted a relaxed attitude toward who would succeed him in March 2023, letting President Xi Jinping make the proper decision. Unlike the foreign media which tended to overstate the so-called contradictions between Le Keqiang and Xi Jinping in the past decade, Li’s official remarks, especially his annual report delivered to the National People’s Congress during his premiership, often emphasized “the CPC under the core leadership of comrade Xi Jinping” – an essential feature that was constantly neglected by the foreign and Hong Kong media.

Li Keqiang adopted a consistently pragmatic attitude toward the development of Hong Kong and Macau. After Hong Kong was undermined by the 2019 turbulence, he told the former Chief Executive Carrie Lam in December 2019 that Hong Kong would have to get out of its difficulties. Without putting any blame on any side of the political struggles in Hong Kong during the latter half of 2019, Li Keqiang emphasized the quest for solutions – another hallmark of his pragmatism. Similarly, Li did not criticize Macau’s reliance on casino capitalism, but instead he stressed the importance of maintaining and achieving social stability and economic prosperity of Macau.

From a Marxist perspective, Li Keqiang remained a dedicated Marxist-Leninist, Marxist in the sense of achieving social equity and justice and adopting a really Chinese path of economic modernization, and Leninist in the sense that he emphasized the leadership of the CPC in China’s development. Li was also a positivist who looked at things and matters in a positive manner. Sadly, he passed away due to sudden heart attack. Li Keqiang could also be regarded as highly Dengist, similar to Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatism that a cat is a good one no matter whether its color is white or black – a far less ideological approach to dealing with China’s development. Le Keqiang also attached high importance in the acceleration of economic productive forces, to borrow Marx’s term, in China, seeing economic growth as the key to drive successes. At the same time, Li was a very moderate, reasonable, and frank pragmatist who openly admitted China’s governance gaps.

In conclusion, Li Keqiang’s legacy as a highly educated economist, a highly competent premier, a really pragmatic Marxist-Leninist-Dengist, and a low-profile and diligent CPC leader and premier will be remembered in the history of the People’s Republic of China. His political moderation and harmonious coexistence and successful collaboration with other top CPC leaders have been neglected by many outside observers. Li’s pragmatism with less ideological overtone stood out as his political hallmark in the past decade. Exactly because of his tremendous achievements, it was reported that many citizens in Shanghai outpoured their sentiments by putting wreaths of flowers on the roads where his body was transferred back from the hospital to the Shanghai airport on the morning of October 27. It remains to be seen how the official mourning will be managed, but it can be anticipated that many citizens of China will surely remember him as a highly respectable, successful, competent and pragmatic premier whom they love forever.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

The predicament of the former Chairman of China Evergrande Group, Xu Jiayin (or Hui Ka Yan in Cantonese), who was put under “residential surveillance” in September 2023, signaled not only the fall of the red capitalist after years of his prominent emergence, but also tremendous loopholes in the management of Chinese real estate market, the banking-business relations, and the incomplete reforms embedded in the mixed socialist-capitalistic economy of China.

Evergrande announced in late September that Xu was subject to “mandatory measures” and that the Hengda Real Estate was under investigation. Later, Evergrande’s former chief executive Xia Haijun and former financial officer Pan Darong were detained in an investigation of its financial operations.

The rise and fall of Xu Jiayin deserve our attention and deeper analyses because of his “red capitalist” nature in a socialist regime.

Xu was born in Henan province in 1958 during which the Maoists launched the Great Leap Forward Movement. Losing his mother at the age of eight months, Xu was raised by his hardworking father and grandmother. After his graduation at the Wuhan Iron and Steel Institute in 1982, he worked in a steel company as a technician until 1992. Then he went to try his fortune in Shenzhen, a fast-growing special economic zone in Deng Xiaoping’s reformist China. Supported by his superior, Xu originally worked as a salesperson in a property company, accumulated some capital and gradually developed his own property business in the city of Guangzhou. 

In 1996, Xu founded Evergrande originally with only eight employees and borrowed loans from banks, expanding his business empire quickly. In 1997, Xu’s housing project Jinbi Garden was his first investment paving the way for his future success. In 2008, Xu was elected a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, becoming one of the elites giving advice to the mainland government. In 2009, the rapidly expanding Evergrande succeeded in raising US$9 billion in the Hong Kong stock market listing, opening the door to his closer networking with some rich Hong Kong businesspeople. 

Some mainland netizens portrayed Xu as having good guanxi (personal connections) with a few Hong Kong tycoons, who invested in Xu’s business empire during its expansion and amid the initial period of his financial difficulties. In 2012, when he attended a party conference, Xu was seen as wearing a golden buckled belt – a sign of how a “red capitalist” rose quickly in the Chinese politico-economic arena. His business empire invested in football modernization; the Guangzhou Evergrande football club impressively won eight Chinese Super League titles and two Asian Champions Leagues between 2011 and 2017. In 2017, Xu was regarded as one of the wealthiest people in Asia with an estimated US$42.5 billion. At its peak, Evergrande had some 1,300 projects in 280 cities.

In 2020, the central government in Beijing brought in tighter rules to limit the amount of money owed by large real estate developers. The “three red lines” emerged: developers must cap their ratio of liability to asset to 70 percent, limit their ratio of net debt to equity to 100 percent, and acquire more cash than short-term debts. Banks were ordered not to lend to land developers who crossed the three red lines. In the wake of these tight measures, the financial troubles of Xu’s company came to surface. In May 2023, the Evergrande Group said that its overdue debt, unpaid bills and payments amounted to RMB 900 billion. Evergrande’s stock market valuation began to shrink, and Xu’s fortune plunged considerably.

At a time when Xu’s fortunes dipped, his loyalty to the ruling regime remained unquestionable. On July 1, 2021, during the one hundred anniversaries of the Communist Party of China, Xu was an official guest celebrating the event and saying that “all those things possessed by me and Evergrande came from the Party, the state and the society.” 

Before his “residential surveillance” by the police, Xu tried to rescue the financial situation of his company, which was undergoing a restructuring plan that would offload assets to avoid defaulting its huge debt of US$300 billion. In 2021, Xu promised to accelerate the construction and completion of pre-sale properties. After 100 citizens protested at Evergrande’s headquarters in September 2021 to demand the repayment of loans and financial products, the company attempted to address their grievances through compensation. Objectively speaking, Evergrande during Xu’s last phase of his leadership attempted to address its debt and managerial problems. Yet, the remedial action appeared to be too late. As of mid-October 2023, it was reported that about 800,000 of 1.2 million pre-sold properties were not yet completed.

In August 2023, Evergrande filed for bankruptcy protection in the US – a move referred to the restructuring process in Hong Kong, the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands. However, this move prompted some critics in the mainland to question in social media in September whether the company’s debt would perhaps be “transferred” back to the mainland. Public distrust of Xu and his company became obvious in the mainland social media in late September and early October 2023.

Xu’s “residential surveillance” was coincidentally followed by the mainland detention of a bank executive for their alleged involvement in giving out illegal loans. Liu Liange, the chair of the Bank of China from 2019 to 2023, was facing corruption charges and he resigned from his position in March 2023. 

In mid-September 2023, several employees working in the wealth management unit of the Evergrande Group were placed under criminal investigation in Shenzhen. According to the mainland media, the Evergrande Financial Wealth Management Company was established in 2015 as a wholly owned subsidiary of the Evergrande Group. On the other hand, Evergrande Life Assurance Company was taken over by the state-backed Hai Gang Life, according to a notice issued by the National Administration of Financial Regulation.

The fall of Xu and the financial difficulties of Evergrande showed that, first, amid the development China’s mixed economy, the socialist style of governmental intervention remains decisive and interventionist in controlling the behavior and performance of red capitalists and their enterprises. Xu’s development was a typical example of how China has been determined to crack down on excessive borrowing by any land developer, the alleged abuse of power in the banking industry’s offer of excessive loans, and any maladministration within Evergrande’s wealth management.

Furthermore, the pre-sold properties that were adopted by Xu and his company associates showed tremendous gaps. A lot of properties failed to be completed, but home buyers paid their installments with the expectation that their apartment units would be finished. Mainland media, especially self-made videos uploaded onto various platforms, were unprecedentedly critical of Xu, saying that he and his subordinates developed an “unacceptable” practices of not only continuing to borrow loans from banks to acquire more housing projects in third and fourth tiered mainland cities, but also contracting out to contractors which however failed complete the construction projects on schedule. The internal supervision over building contractors appeared to be lax, while Evergrande’s business empire was overstretched to other areas, including the automobile industry and sports – a bridge too far for an overambitious real estate corporation where internal mismanagement in wealth, reinvestment and contracting-out projects became acute.

Compounding the problems of overborrowing and overexpansion was Xu’s increasingly luxurious lifestyle. The mainland social media and netizens pointed to his dancing troupe in Guangzhou and private jet and yachts. Mainland videos showed Xu’s public remarks about his difficult childhood and teenager years when he relied on potato starch and salt water for his living, but the rapidly rising red capitalist became gradually imbued with “bourgeois” lifestyle. 

However, Xu showed his humanistic side; he was a philanthropist donating money to the poor and the needy in the Guizhou province. In 2018, Xu returned to his home village where he handed out money, rice and cooking oil to each household. His socialist instinct was not fading amid the dialectical process of being “corrupted” spiritually by the increasingly “bourgeois” society and environment.

Another problem that emerged in the downfall of Xu was the symbiotic relations between the local governments and land developers in third and fourth tiered cities. From a rational choice perspective, local governments in small cities had a personal stake in boosting land and housing projects through their connections with land developers. Local officials and party cadres wanted promotion and self-enrichment by cultivating close relations with the red capitalists. If so, Xu’s company investment in various cities became a win-win scenario provided that such housing and property projects would be completed. Yet, the mismanagement in supervising the completion of housing projects turned out to be highly risky, putting the interests of home buyers at stake. A large real estate that could not deliver its products and promises to citizens could potentially undermine the social and economic aspects of national security in China. As commentator Hu Xijin wrote in Global Times on September 29: “I strongly hope and believe that the actions taken by various regions to ensure the delivery of housing projects will not be affected by Xu’s personal fate. Minimizing the losses for homebuyers should be the primary consideration in handling the Evergrande case.” 

Some mainland media claimed that Xu and his wife Ding Yumei adopted “technical divorce.” Whether it was true or not, many netizens in the mainland were critical of how Xu oversaw his company’s investment and how he “enriched” himself at the expense of public interest. Critics pointed to the dividends continually received by the top executives of Xu’s company while its clients suffered from the indefinite delay in the completion of housing and property projects.

The fall of Xu and the financial and managerial problems associated with Evergrande raised a serious question about the effectiveness of auditing in China’s real estate market. A healthy company must have external and internal auditing, which serves as an essential checks and balance mechanism for good corporate governance. A neglected lesson for China is how the auditing process and requirements for all private corporations, especially land developers, can be reformed and enforced annually and rigorously. A chief economist of Evergrande, Ren Zeping, joined the company in 2017, but he complained that any internal call for the need to reduce debt ratio was criticized in his meetings with top executives – an indication that corporate governance within Evergrande lacked sufficient and healthy checks and balances.

In the final analysis, the mixed economy of China remains partial in its reforms, including the long overdue supervision over the relations between state-owned banks and land developers, the excessive loans offered by banks, the internal mismanagement and overstretched expansion of any land developer into other areas that could easily be undermined as a result of chain reactions (like the incomplete Guangzhou football stadium that was eventually taken over by the mainland government). 

In conclusion, the fall of Xu Jiayin as a red capitalist loyal to the ruling regime in China have tremendous social, economic and political implications. China’s mixed economy remains to be reformed; the central authorities have identified serious loopholes in regulating the relations between banks and land developers and controlling the amount of bank loans offered to the red capitalists in the real estate market. Any overstretched and mismanaged real estate enterprise, like Evergrande, could have serious ramifications on the society and economy. Disgruntled clients’ protests outside the Evergrande headquarters in September 2021 could be interpreted as a potential action endangering social stability. Maladministration within Evergrande in dealing with wealth management, investment and project completion became the problems that must be addressed quickly to appease public anger. The socialist regime in the mainland has a fast-developing mixed economy in which the capitalistic and marketized aspects have clearly “corrupted” the relations between the executives of the banking industry and the elites of the real estate market, while the socialist aspects have demanded immediate and effective governmental controls over corporate misgovernance, which can have detrimental impacts on the mainland’s social and economic security.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

On October 10, 2023, the State Council’s Information Office published a White Paper on “The Construction of One Belt One Road: The Important Implementation of the Common Destiny and Entity for the Humankind,” a document that delineates the vision, mission and ideology of China’s foreign policy since Septembere 2013, when the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) first talked about an idea of building up the 21^st century path of maritime silk road.

The document is composed of several sections: (1) an introduction asserting that the Belt and Road initiative stemmed from China and its belonging to the world; (2) the policy’s principles, ideas, objectives and vision; (3) the multidimensional nature of interactions and communications in the aspects of policies, facilities, trade, capital flow, people’s attitude and new cooperative areas: and (4) the positive elements injected into world peace through practical benefits, economic globalization, global governance, and civilizational force and integration.

The introduction argues the ancient China opened the land route of the silk road about 1,000 years ago and connected with the West through the maritime silk road. The Belt and Road initiative originated from President Xi Jinping’s discussion of how to create the common destiny for the humankind in March 2013. This advocacy gradually became a platform for the human beings to realize the common destiny for the humankind, while entrenching its roots for the sake of strengthening the understanding of the international society.

The Introduction contends that the Belt and Road policy originated from China’s belonging to the world – a claim that stemmed from the Han dynasty when military officer Zhang Qian visited the western regions. Zhang’s exploration was later followed up by Zheng He in the Ming dynasty as he went to various parts of Southeast Asia through seven maritime visits.

The Introduction turned to the role of the Communist Party of China (CPC), which maintains and insists on the path of “peaceful development,” and which is imbued with the spirit of building up the Belt and Road initiative. The Belt and Road initiative, according to the White Paper, is “a tribute to history” and a testimony to the land and sea transport for the sake of realizing “the Chinese dream” and “the world dream.”

Development, according to the White Paper, entails economic globalization in which the gap between rich and poor countries is increasingly prominent. As such, development must avoid unilateralism, protectionism and hegemonism. Economic globalization needs to overcome unbalanced development and avoid the world being controlled by a small number of countries.

The document then connects development with the Belt and Road scheme, arguing that the Belt and Road initiative is heading toward the directions of being more open, embracing, popular, balanced and toward a win-win situation. 

The White Paper contends that in face of the world multi-polarization, economic globalization and social information, the world is now characterized by deficits in peace, development, security, and governance. Regional conflicts worsen amid arms race, food security concerns, terrorism, internet security, climate change, energy crises and significant infectious disease outbreak. As a responsible developing nation in the world, China advocates the idea of building up the common destiny and entity for humankind through the Belt and Road initiative.

The principles of the Belt and Road initiative are to discuss, build and share together in the process of economic integration and development, embracing multilateralism and respecting each nation’s development standard, economic structure, legal system, and cultural tradition. To counter outside criticism that the Belt and Road initiative is a “tool” of China, the White Paper asserts that it is not the PRC’s “tool” but an action platform to promote developmental space through cooperation with various countries and through the respect for market regulations. Enterprises are the main entity of marketization while the government plays the role of constructing platforms for them and integrating comprehensively the industries concerned, capital investment, technology, and talent as well as management. The idea of Belt and Road initiative is to facilitate the process of “big circulation” inside and outside China.

The ideas of the Belt and Road initiative are to embrace openness, green colour, and clean governance so that quality development can be fostered. The White Paper rejects small circles being created ideologically and militarily by a small group of nations. Instead, the Belt and Road initiative embraces natural development, green transport and energy and finance, and anti-crime and anti-corruption work internationally. 

The objective of the Belt and Road initiative is to aim at high standard, sustainability, and the improvement of the people’s livelihood. As such, China sticks to the international rules in construction, management, procurement, and tendering process. In terms of the people’s livelihood, China advocates poverty alleviation, green development, technology-based education, public health, cross-party cooperation, and cooperation among youth, non-governmental organizations, women groups, and local governments in different continents, ranging from Asia to Africa, and from Latin America to South Pacific. 

The vision of the Belt and Road scheme is to create a path for world peace. Geopolitics should, according to the White Paper, abandons the Cold War mentality and hegemonism and respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states, while rejecting “the old path of exploitative colonialism.”

For the concrete policies emanating from the Belt and Road scheme, they include regional economic cooperation; investment agreements with various countries; and the dialogue between governments, enterprises, and social organizations. Such dialogue included the first Belt and Road forum in 2017 with the participation of 140 nations, and the second forum in 2019 with the participation of 150 nations.

Through multilateral cooperation, China has been cooperating with various partners in building up railway, ports, energy supply, monetary and financial development, taxation, environmental protection, disaster management, think tanks and mass media. Many forums were established between China and Africa, Latin America, the Pacific Islands, the Middle East, and the Arab world. Cooperation standards with various contrived were reached in areas like aviation, climate change, agricultural and food development, construction materials, electric cars, gas pipes, logistics, maritime mapping, information sharing and regional arbitration (in Hong Kong).

Economic corridors were established through China’s infrastructure contribution to the development of highways in countries like Pakistan, Hungary, Croatia, Laos, Indonesia, Mongolia, and Kazakhstan, and to the construction of natural gas pipes between the PRC and Myanmar and Central Asia. In short, infrastructure projects in various countries belong to one main contribution of China’s Belt and Road scheme.

Apart from airlines cooperation, aviation transport, ports and harbour construction, China has been enhancing its trade and investment in various countries under the Belt and Road scheme. Trade liberalization has become a norm in multilateralism in which China has joined Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and it strives to promote the participation in Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA).

In terms of monetary and financial development, China has played a key role in the establishment of the Asia Infrastructure Development Bank and the silk road fund. The silk road fund witnessed investment in seventy-five items amounting to US$20 billion. Other forms of capital investment include funds, bonds, and securities in which the Chinese securities and exchange centre has provided support for the securities centres in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Most importantly, in the areas of debt sustainability, China has exercised caution in the provision of loans by assessing the risks of debt and financial burden. 

Finally, the promotion of the people’s livelihood has broad areas encompassing cultural tourism, educational exchange, cooperation between the media and think tanks, and the formation of several types of alliances including museums, art festival, public libraries, and film and music festivals. Most interestingly, China has set up silk road scholarships, followed by similar scholarships offered by higher education institutions in Hong Kong and Macau. Scholarly exchange has been and can be fostered further to nurture experts in science and other disciplines. Other new areas of cooperation include public health, medical research, the production of vaccines, the formation of green partnership in monetary and financial development, the signing of memoranda of understanding in dealing with climate change and the establishment of low carbon demonstration zones, and the sharing of information in digital economy with various countries.

The publication of the White Paper on China’s Belt and Road scheme is socially, economically, and politically significant just a week before the PRC will host the third forum from October 17 to 18, 2023.

First, this White Paper constitutes a new Chinese foreign policy ideology of promoting its peaceful, sustainable, and multilateral socialism. Politically, China adopts a liberal and anti-hegemonic approach in its foreign policy – an ideology that runs counter to the US foreign policy of promoting its universal values of western-style democracy and civil liberties and American hegemonism. It is interesting to note that while China is internally paternalistic or authoritarian, its foreign policy is externally liberal and multilateral – a hallmark contrary to the US ideology of maintaining internal pluralism and liberalism and yet adopting an externally forceful, hegemonic and protectionist foreign policy. 

In a sense, the White Paper is a reaction to some outside criticisms that the Belt and Road was a “geopolitical” tool of China; it argues that the Belt and Road scheme is a win-win policy for not only developing countries in the world, but also other nations that do not form small circles based on their common political ideologies.

Second, the White Paper does talk about Hong Kong and Macau briefly, like Hong Kong’s role as a regional arbitration centre and the provision of scholarship for students along the Belt and Road countries to pursue studies in Hong Kong and Macau. In fact, Hong Kong and Macau can and will play more important roles in areas not mentioned explicitly by the White Paper, like in the development of monetary and financial development for Hong Kong, the development of cultural tourism in Macau, the deepening work of all kinds of work in improving the people’s livelihood in Hong Kong and Macau where both special administrative regions can and will be more assertive in their people’s “diplomacy” under the guidance and approval of the central government in Beijing, and the special role of Macau in promoting itself as a platform for China to enhance relations with not only Portugal but also other Portuguese-speaking nations. One weak area in both Hong Kong and Macau is their think tanks, which remain to be developed in a stronger way by raising capital for research, forging a tripartite partnership between government, higher education and enterprises, and interacting with think tanks in countries along the Belt and Road scheme.

Third, both Hong Kong and Macau can and will play greater role in economic cooperation with Belt and Road countries. The Hong Kong government, and the Macau government, can foster their external economic autonomy under China’s tutelage by attracting foreign investment, by activating their local enterprises to explore various investment and trade opportunities with various countries, and by promoting both cities as having the feature of good and clean governance under the sovereignty of the PRC. In other words, Hong Kong and Macau can and will have more autonomy, externally, under the special “one country, two systems” framework provided by the central authorities in Beijing.

In conclusion, the White Paper on the Belt and Road scheme is an important document with significant implications for China’s foreign policy, which is characterized by a new ideology of peaceful, sustainable, cooperative, and multilateral socialism. This new ideology reflects why the US has seen China as its rival ideologically, because the US is internally pluralistic but externally protective and hegemonic while China is externally liberal and anti-hegemonic but internally paternalistic. The clashes of the ruling ideology and foreign policy ideology between China and the US are stark and prominent. Despite these clashes of ideologies, Hong Kong, and Macau as the special administrative regions of China can and will play a more active role in enhancing their external economic autonomy, external socio-cultural and educational relations with other parts of the world along the Belt and Road scheme. As such, the governing authorities of Hong Kong and Macau, and their social and economic elites should realize that the Belt and Road scheme formulated and implemented by the central government for almost 10 years have laid down tremendous opportunities for their “one country, two systems” to flourish and proper in the coming decades.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

Judging from the latest rankings of the Federation of International Football Association (FIFA) and the performance of the men’s football in Hangzhou’s Asian Games, the modernization and reform of men’s football in the Greater China region – Mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan (Chinese Taipei) – are not only necessary but calling for the need to learn from the very successful example of Japan.

As of September 21, 2023, Japan is ranked 19^th in the world and the first in Asia; South Korea 26^th in the world and the third in Asia; China the 80^th in the world and the eleventh in Asia (after Uzbekistan); Hong Kong 148^th in the world and 28^th in Asia; Macau 185^th in the world and 39^th in Asia; and Chinese Taipei 154 in the world and 29^th in Asia.

During the 2023 Asian Games in Hangzhou, China was arranged in Group A, defeating India (5-1) and Myanmar (4-0) but was tied with Bangladesh (0-0). China defeated Qatar in the Round of 16 by 1-0 but was then defeated by South Korea by 0-2 in the quarter-final match. Some mainland Chinese fans were disappointed with the result, although the Chinese football team performed quite well but it was of a much lower level compared with the Asian football giants, notably Japan and South Korea.

The Chinese Taipei team was defeated by North Korea (0-2) and Kyrgyzstan (1-4), but it was victorious over Indonesia (1-0). Although it could not enter Round 16, the victory over Indonesia showed that the standard of Taiwan men’s football has been maintained.

The surprising case was Hong Kong. Although it was defeated twice by Uzbekistan (0-1 and 1-2), the Hong Kong team defeated Palestine by 1-0 in the Round of 16 and entered the semi-final match, during which it was defeated by Japan (0-4). In the match for the bronze medal, the Hong Kong team was defeated by Uzbekistan (0-4). Under coach Jorn Anderson, the Hong Kong team acquired the best result in the Asian Games since 1958 – a surprising outcome that demonstrated the success of combining experienced players with young ones. Indeed, thanks to the withdrawal of Syria and Afghanistan in Group C, Hong Kong could enter Round 16 easily with an ingredient of luck.

Although Macau was not present in the Hangzhou’s Asian Games football tournament, it was defeated in the recently four friendly matches against Singapore (0-1), Myanmar (0-2), Bhutan (0-1) and Cambodia (0-4).

Overall, there is a need for the modernization and reform of men’s football in mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. The four places have been suffering from a number of problems in their drive toward the modernization of football.

First, mainland China’s football development has been suffering from the impacts of Covid-19 during which many large teams were disbanded and bankrupt, notably Evergrande – a former property giant that ran into financial troubles from 2021 onwards. The bubbles of the rapid development of mainland Chinese football eventually burst after the ambitious investment of Evergrande in sports. The model of Chinese football development based on the sudden investment of individual business tycoons in the property sector turned out to be highly risky. Some footballers had their salaries unpaid; football clubs had to be closed; and the overall management of Chinese football deteriorated.

Second, the mainland Chinese football development has been undermined by poor leadership, bad management, and persistent corruption. The arrest of Li Tie, a former Chinese national football coach, for suspected bribery and corruption was a case in point. Rumours were rife that some mainland Chinese referees and players were embroiled in accepting bribes, and that some national football association’s executives had integrity problems. Unless an anti-corruption drive is accompanied by a strong ethical campaign to really clean up the mainland Chinese football circle, the prospects of modernization of men’s football in China remain problematic.

Third, Hong Kong’s football has been plagued by the lack of effective government’s policy of supervising its development and modernization. The Project Phoenix, starting from 2011, earmarked a large amount of money to develop local football, but its results remained ineffective mainly due to the insufficient focus on the training of youth teams and partly due to the problematic management of football development. In May 2023, eleven footballers of the first-division team Happy Valley were arrested for allegedly being involved in match-fixing. As with mainland China, some footballers in Hong Kong remain to be educated and improved in their ethical values and sports professionalism.

Fourth, football development in Taiwan and Macau remains amateur and their professionalization remains to be improved in all areas, ranging from youth training to the involvement of more private-sector companies to form their football teams for the sake of elevating the standards of football. 

Overall, football remains underdeveloped in mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan.

The solutions of modernizing football development in these four places should look to the successful example of Japan. Before the beginning of the J-League in Japan in 1993, Hong Kong’s men football had defeated Japan easily, but now Japan’s men football is far ahead of not only Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan but also mainland China.

The success of the Japanese football story must be appreciated in one crucial aspect: the determination and ability to train and produce a large number of young players from primary schools up to university level, where universities have strong teams and players being selected to represent the national teams. A good example is the Japanese men’s football performance in the Asian Games in Hangzhou, where it defeated Hong Kong easily with many players who represented their universities. The Japanese universities have a well-established football league – a phenomenon that should be learnt by Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan where football development is weak and where men’s and women’s football leagues at university level are absent. The underdevelopment of university-level football teams, and their disarticulation with the national football teams are the hallmark of the failure of modernization of football in mainland Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan.

Mainland Chinese universities have their football league; nevertheless, their standards are relatively low and must be improved by having better coaches and more rigorous training and stronger articulation with the national teams.

Second, the reliance of foreign coaches in mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan is one of the effective solutions of modernizing football development. Hong Kong’s men football has progressed prominently since the arrival of coach Jorn Anderson, so as Taiwan’s situation under the leadership of Gary White. In Hong Kong, the Premier League has teams, such as Kit Chee and Lee Man, relying heavily on foreign players who turned into local players after residing in the city for seven years, but this is a temporary solution of football modernization. Similarly, the Chinese Taipei team performed well partly because of the robust performance of naturalized players and footballers who have been playing in other places, notably mainland China. In Macau, the local Portuguese footballers have contributed to the performance of the men’s football team, although they constitute a minority.

Locally-born young players remain the most important pillar of development in the four places in mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. In Japan, young children at initial stages are trained rigorously with better skills and their physical fitness is strengthened by demanding sports classes and activities constantly at the primary and secondary school levels – a phenomenon lacking in the four places of Greater China.

In the recent years, mainland China has recognized the importance of youth training and development in football modernization. Its U15 team has been performing well, a phenomenon pointing to the long-term development; nevertheless, unless the skilful players are retained with their strong interest in pursuing a football career eventually, how to retain and transfer the talented young footballers to the national teams remains a challenge in the mainland.

Interestingly, in the four places of Greater China, football education is quite narrow. Unlike the United Kingdom, there are very few football programs that train students in the science and management of football at the college and university levels. Perhaps many parents have their ingrained bias that footballers cannot and will not have good career prospects – a prejudice reinforced by the underdevelopment of football education in a vicious cycle.

Ideally, colleges and universities in mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan should be encouraged and incentivized by their governments to open certificate, diploma and degree programs in football science and management. Football is not just about the skills of controlling and manoeuvring the ball; it is a very sophisticated interdisciplinary field involving science, data analytics, psychology, coaching, dietetics, management, marketing, public policies, and leadership. There is a lack of real partnership between government leadership in football development and the universities, schools, and football associations in Greater China.

Unlike Japan where football development has been propelled at all districts and prefectures, football modernization has not been penetrating various districts in the region of Greater China. Socialist China has the strongest capacity to do so, but football development in the mainland needs the strong partnership between effective football governance and ethical conduct of coaches, referees, and players – an essential factor leading to success.

Finally, unlike Japan where private-sector investment and business conglomerates are found in developing the clubs in J-League, the governments of mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan have failed to use tax incentives as the effective policy tool to stimulate big business investment in football development. China’s Evergrande investment in football, however, appeared to be stimulated more by short-term fame and glory than by tax incentives. As such, the four places should revisit their lack of effective government policies toward the modernization and reforms of football.

The J-League also has a foundation in which funds are used to assist clubs that may run into financial troubles. The self-help and solidarity nature of the J-League foundation have yet to be learnt by mainland China, where the national football association has been criticized for a lack of leadership and good governance.

In conclusion, the modernization and reforms of men’s football in mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan remain an important indicator of sports performance. Mainland China has been keen to modernize its football and reform its national football association; nevertheless, mismanagement and corruption remain to be the baffling problems hindering football modernization. In all the four places in Greater China – mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan – youth training and education remain to be developed to the full extent and they should be accompanied by the development of a competitive football league at the university level. University teams should also be provided with an articulation pathway upward to the national teams, like the case of Japan where J-League’s 30 years of development provides a useful model for mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. Apart from the necessity of making football a mass sports infiltrating every primary and secondary school in various districts, tax incentives should arguably be provided for big business investment in football development. Finally, football-related programs should be developed in primary and secondary schools, tertiary colleges, and universities so that parents and children will really understand the complexities, sophisticated knowledge, the interdisciplinary nature and diversified prospects of football development.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

The five-day visit of the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to Russia and his historical meeting with the Russian counterpart Vladimirovich Putin at a cosmodrome in Russia’s Far East on September 13 had immediate geopolitical significance for the security of Northeast Asia.

As the general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and the president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Kim Jong Un led a delegation composed of Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui, Marshals of the Korean People’s Army Ri Pyong Chol and Pak Jong Chon, Minister of National Defence Kang Sun Nam and O Su Yong as well as Pak Thaae Song, and other secretaries of the party’s Central Committee. During their meeting, Putin warmly greeted Kim and added that both countries had friendly and “comradely goodwill” relations. Putin emphasized the importance of good neighbourly relations and the need for both sides to develop the well-being and prosperity of their peoples.

In response to Putin’s remarks, Kim expressed his gratitude to the Russian side for arranging his successful visit to Russia. Moreover, he conveyed “the militant respect and warm fraternal greetings” of the people in DPRK to all the Russians, who according to Kim built up a powerful Russia and defended the “strategic interest” of their country.

According to the western media reports, Kim and Putin met for five hours during which Putin said he would help Pyongyang to develop satellites. This move was not surprising given the fact that North Korea in early 2023 failed to launch a spy satellite. 

Kim then visited different places where he expressed in public his deep interest in the Russian military and advanced technology, including warships and fighters.

Prior to Kim’s visit to Russia, the Russian defence minister Sergei Shoigu had visited North Korea in July during which Kim Jong Un showed the Russian visitors Pyongyang’s missiles program, including the Hwasong intercontinental missile.

During the Kim visit to Russia, media reports pointed to the deep interest shown by Moscow on the North Korean artillery shells and guns, especially as Russia’s war in Ukraine is dragged on with the prospects of encountering a large-scale Ukrainian military counteroffensive.

From the perspective of the balance of power, the Kim Jong Un visit to Russia and his meeting with Putin had tremendous geopolitical significance.

First, given the fact that socialist North Korea is committed to building up its twin policies of achieving Juche (self sufficiency or autonomy) and the military first, the arms deal that will very likely be finalized between North Korea and Russia will consolidate Pyongyang’s regime internally and externally. Internally, North Korea will be able to use the lucrative revenues from its arms deal with Russia to cope with its internal economic development and military build-up. Having a large stockpile of ammunition, Pyongyang grasps a golden opportunity of the stalemate in the Russo-Ukrainian war to boost its exports of military weapons, thereby strengthening its military industrial complex on the one hand and fully utilizing its arsenals to enhance economic profits on the other hand.

Although it was speculated that North Korea is keen to receive food aid from Russia, media reports have pointed to Pyongyang’s decline of the Moscow offer. If so, it means that North Korea is ideologically committed to achieving its Juche or self-sufficiency without any overreliance on its neighbours, including Russia and China.

Second, from the perspective of achieving the balance of power, Kim Jong Un’s diplomatic move that is tilted toward Russia has several implications. He shows a tendency of being less dependent on China for North Korea’s economic development and modernization. It must be noted that although he visited China in January 2019, there was no sign that North Korea is following the China model of economic modernization. Ideologically speaking, Pyongyang prefers to adopt a far more cautious approach in its economic modernization, seeing the Chinese model as perhaps too capitalistic while resisting the sanctions from the United Nations and the US in a resilient and successful manner.

Kim Jong Un’s diplomatic turn to Putin has another immediate geopolitical significance. Abandoning the dialogue with the US, unlike the honeymoon period between Pyongyang and Washington in the past when Kim met US President Donald Trump three times, Kim is now seeing Russia as North Korea’s most reliable military ally. Russia’s satellite technology can be usefully exchanged for North Korea’s artillery, from North Korea’s strategic perspective. Indeed, improving the North Korean ability to launch spy satellite will enhance its own military capability, especially in time of military conflicts in Northeast Asia. Hence, a win-win situation can be forged between Pyongyang and Moscow during the Kim visit to Russia in September 2023.

The most important impact of Kim’s visit is to utilize the Russian military and advanced technology to counter the US “imperialism.” North Korea still perceives the US as an “imperialist” country detrimental to its national security interest. As such, Pyongyang’s nuclear program aims at deterring not only the US but also other US allies, notably South Korea and Japan. 

In brief, Kim’s new diplomatic initiative targeting at a military alliance with Russia has dual purposes: checking China’s influence on North Korea on the one hand and checking the US and Washington’s allies in Northeast Asia on the other hand.

Third, given that some media reports pointed to South Korea’s military weapons being found in Ukraine, North Korea may deliberately forge a military alliance with Russia for the sake of balancing Seoul’s influence in the Russo-Ukrainian war. South Korea under President Yoon Suk-yeol has demonstrated a tendency of not only more pro-Washington but also more supportive of Japan than his predecessor Moon Jae-in. As such, Kim Jong Un’s diplomacy of shifting to the Russian military aid can also be seen as a balancing act against South Korea.

Fourth, while some analysts have pointed to the rise of a so-called “axis” between North Korea, Russia and China, they have exaggerated their unity and ignored their differences over the Ukrainian war. Beijing has demonstrated its tendency to distance itself from the Russian involvement in the Ukrainian war and its intention of acting as a potential arbitrator who can perhaps bring about dialogue and hopefully peace between Moscow and Kiev. However, the North Korean provision of artillery to support Russia in the Ukrainian war is going to make it more difficult for Beijing to do so. 

After all, Russia is keen to maintain the Ukrainian territories it occupied, such as the four republics that claimed separation from Ukraine. Interestingly, North Korea supports Russia’s decision to annex four Ukrainian region and its “sacred fight” in Ukraine. Hence, while China acts as a more neutral arbitrator in the Russo-Ukrainian war, North Korea clearly sides with Russia, meaning that the claim of an “axis” between Beijing, Pyongyang and Moscow was unconvincing without evidence.

Fifth, although the Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has expressed his interest in meeting Kim Jong Un “at any time” for the sake of achieving a world without nuclear weapons, North Korea has not yet responded positively. Media reports have pointed to meetings between North Korea and Japan in March and May over the fate of some Japanese people who were deducted by North Korea. Tokyo is deeply concerned about the flight of some 17 Japanese who were reportedly abducted to North Korea. However, if North Korea sees Japan as a historically “imperialist” country and so long as Pyongyang regards Tokyo as an indispensable element of the US-led alliance in Northeast Asia, both sides will continue to have a rocky relationship. After all, Kim Jong Un’s shift to Russia militarily has an objective of balancing the increasing strength of the Japanese military.

In conclusion, Kim Jong Un’s historical visit to Russia and his important meeting with Putin marked a watershed in North Korea’s balance-of-power strategy. Pyongyang aims at not only balancing the US “imperialism,” but also checking the influence of China on North Korea and lessening its own reliance on the Chinese economic assistance. Unintentionally, China’s attempt at being an arbitrator in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict is being hindered to some extent by North Korea’s staunch support of Russia’s involvement in the Ukrainian war. Russia is going to consolidate its occupied territories in Ukraine, while Ukraine supported by the western allies is determined to fight back. Kim’s diplomacy of shifting to rely more on the Russian military technology has the clear objective of balancing the US and Washington’s allies in Northeast Asia, notably South Korea and Japan. At a time when South Korea is moving closer to the US and Japan, it is not surprising that Pyongyang’s policy of leaning to Moscow also aims at balancing Seoul, militarily speaking, especially as South Korea has been constantly conducting joint military exercises with the US as a deterrence to its northern socialist brother. The relations between Pyongyang and Tokyo remain difficult, even though Japan has shown its interest in the denuclearization of Northeast Asia in exchange of massive economic assistance. North Korea’s historical perception of Japan as an “imperialist” country and the ongoing discussion on the plight of abducted Japanese are the thorns in Pyongyang-Tokyo relations. Overall, North Korea’s new policy of leaning to Moscow has tremendous geopolitical implications for Northeast Asian security. It remains to be seen whether the pro-Moscow military policy of North Korea will perhaps build up a pro-Russian faction within the North Korean leadership in the long run.

Recent political events in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) have shown that a prelude to the December 10^th District Council elections has already been opened, including the redrawing of  the boundaries of the geographical constituencies, the announcement of the Democratic Party (DP) on its intention to field eight candidates to run in the elections, the public appeal of the Democratic Alliance for Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB) to shorten the duration of voting on the election day, and the revelation of a guideline issued by the Home Affairs Department to prevent some members of the district-based care teams from conducting election campaign activities.

On July 11, the maps of the delineation of District Council (DC) geographical constituencies were uploaded onto the website of the Electoral Affairs Commission. Of the total 470 seats for the seventh term DCs, 179 seats will be appointed members; 176 will be returned from District Committees (Area Committees, Fight Crime Committees, Fire Prevention Committees); 27 will be returned as ex-officio members from rural committees; and 88 will be returned from geographical constituencies. Each of the 44 geographical constituencies will elect 2 DC members. The 44 geographical constituencies, according to the government’s press release on July 11, will be as follows: (1) 2 from Central and Western District; (2) 1 from Wan Chai District; (3) 3 from Eastern District; (4) 2 from Southern District; (5) 3 from Yau Tsim Mong District; (6) 2 from Sham Shui Po District; (7) 2 from Kowloon City District; (8) 2 from Wong Tai Sin; (9) 4 from Kwun Tong District; (10) 2 from Tsuen Wan District; (11) 3 from Tuen Mun District; (12) 4 from Yuen Long District; (13) 2 from North District; (14) 2 from Tai Po District; (15) 3 from Sai Kung District; (16) 4 from Sha Tin District; (17) 3 from Kwai Tsing District; and (18) 1 from Island District.

The significance of drawing these new boundaries is obvious. First, the new geographical constituencies will be much larger than the situation in the past. Second, given the fact that the constituencies are large, candidates who participate without the support of political parties and groups will likely have some difficulties in reaching out to the voters. Third, given the relatively low voting turnout of 30.2 percent (1.35 million voters) in the 2022 Legislative Council elections, it remains to be seen whether the December 2023 DC elections will be able to boost the voter turnout, particularly if some voters might emigrate and leave the HKSAR. Fourth, it remains to be seen how the pro-establishment and pro-democracy candidates will perform in some constituencies where the democrats traditionally performed well, such as Central and Western District, Sham Shui Po District, Kwun Tong District and Kwai Tsing District.

On September 20, the Democratic Party held a press conference to reveal that it would nominate eight candidates to participate in the December DC elections. However, it did not unveil their names because doing so would trigger electoral expenses prematurely well before the campaign period. Chairman Lo Kin-hei said that the eight are incumbent DC members and they will decide before October 30 on whether they will really run for the elections. In late 2021, the DP did not field any candidate to participate in the Legislative Council direct elections. 

Under the new electoral rules, candidates running for geographical constituencies will have to get the signed nominations from 50 voters and 9 nominators out of each of the three District Committees (Area Committees, Fight Crime Committees and Fire Prevention Committees). Lo Kin-hei said that DP candidates would strive to get the nominations from some “liberal” committee members, and he appealed to the government to disclose how these committee members can be contacted. However, the government said that it would not do so on the grounds of privacy. It remains to be seen how the DP candidates would acquire enough nominations from the three District Committees.

On September 23, a pro-Beijing newspaper carried a commentary criticizing the DP of seeking “foreign influence” on the HKSAR in the past, of issuing a politically provocative platform on June 30, 2022, and of “attacking” the electoral system of the HKSAR (Wen Wei Po, September 23, 2023, p. A15).

The DP tried to hold fund-raising dinner six times in the past, including July 2022, three times in February 2023, and twice in September 2023. But it failed to do so for a variety of reasons,including three restaurants declining to hold the events due to sudden repair work or other unknown factors.

It looks as if the DP’s platform on June 30, 2022, which was critical of the new political situation in the HKSAR, might alienate some authorities. If this speculation turns out to be true, it remains to be seen whether some “liberal” members of the three District Committees would be willing to nominate and support candidates from the DP.

After all, even if the DP candidates can secure sufficient nominations from the three Committees and 50 voters, it remains to be seen whether they will all be approved by the Candidates’ Eligibility Review Committee (CERC), which is chaired by the Chief Executive to vet the candidates who try to run for elections, and whose decisions will not be subject to judicial review.

However, if the DP candidates are the incumbent DC members, then they did go through the processes of the swearing-in ceremony after the promulgation of the national security law. If so, their chances of being approved by the CERC would likely be high, but their challenge is to get enough nominations in the first place.

Once the DP announces its intention of participating in the DC elections, many netizens expressed their views on the Internet, but their views were divided, ranging from being cynical of the party to supportive of its decision to become part of the establishment. Overall, a quick glance of the netizens’ responses to DP intention was that they appeared to be more politically negative than positive toward the party.

On September 19, the DAB held a press conference and it called for the electoral authorities to shorten the voting time to 10 hours between 8 am and 6 pm. It also asked the government to set up voting booths along the Hong Kong side of the border with the mainland so that those Hong Kong people who reside in and work in the mainland will be able to cast their ballots. The pro-Beijing patriotic party also calls for the government to study the possibility of implementing electronic voting and to facilitate Hong Kong residents who live in the Greater Bay Area to vote easily.

It remains to be seen whether the election authorities will accept all the recommendations made by the DAB, but surely electronic voting takes time for preparation and implementation.

On September 23, it is reported that the Home Affairs Department (HAD) has issued a guideline for the members of the district-based care teams, asking the teams to be politically neutral in public elections. The guideline says that no member of the teams should support any candidate in electoral participation, and that any member who wants to be a candidate in elections should make a written declaration to his or her teams and to the HAD. Moreover, any member of the care team who would participate in DC election must not mobilize the resources of the team concerned.

Obviously, the government is concerned about the political neutrality of some members of the care teams, which were established during the outbreak of Covid-19 to help and support the poor and the needy in 18 districts.

Some media have already revealed that many members of care teams are affiliated with pro-establishment parties and groups. If so, their political neutrality has already been questioned by the media. As such, the government’s guidelines can and will hopefully rein in the politically aspiring members, ensuring that the DC elections will witness a fair play among all the candidates.

In conclusion, recent events have pointed to the opening of a prelude to the District Council elections in December 2023. The 2019 DC elections were seen by the authorities as being captured by many elements who were anti-government and anti-mainland. The revamp and redrawing of the boundaries of the District Council elections mean that, with larger geographical constituencies, it remains to be seen whether candidates without party background can and will reach out easily to voters, not to mention the possibility of witnessing a relatively low voting turnout as with the last legislative direct elections. In short, it remains to be seen how the December 2023 DC elections will be held fairly with the element of political enthusiasm on the part of not only voters but also candidates from different political orientations. The intention of the Democratic Party to re-participate in the forthcoming District Council elections is clear. Nevertheless, its platform on June 30, 2022, appeared to be a thorn in the eyes of some people in the pro-Beijing sector. Compounding this problem is that difficulties encountered by non-establishment candidates to acquire enough nominations to get into the round of being screened by the Candidates Eligibility Review Committee. While the DAB, the DP’s political opponent, has lobbied the government to reduce the voting hours and facilitate the Hong Kong residents in the Greater Bay Area to cast their ballots, it remains to be seen whether these ideas would be accepted. Finally, the government is keen to maintain the political neutrality of the members of the care teams, which are supposed to be a neutral actor helping the poor and the needy in all districts rather than becoming a political machinery utilized by politically ambitious politicians. Overall, if the prelude to the December 2023 District Council elections has begun, the coming three months are going to witness more politically exciting developments, particularly since some political elites have already openly distributed their leaflets to ordinary citizens on the work of their affiliated groups and parties in various districts.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

On September 12, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) published an “Opinion of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and State Council on the Exploration of Cross-Strait Integration Developmental Path and the Construction of Cross-Strait Integration Demonstration Zone,” delineating a detailed blueprint of fostering socio-economic and cultural interactions and integration between the mainland and Taiwan, especially the Kinmen and Matsu region. This plan can be seen as a crucial measure taken by the PRC after the Covid-19 era and before the Taiwan presidential election in early 2024 to appeal to the Taiwanese for greater integration with the PRC, particularly the Fujian province. It has tremendous political implications for cross-strait relations.

The main points of the Opinion are as follows:

First, the channels for the Taiwan compatriots to visit the mainland are facilitated and smoothened through the construction and consolidation of logistical infrastructure projects, which will form an entity for the collection and distribution of goods and products.

If so, it is obvious why the mainland media have recently reported on the idea of suggesting at least four places in Fujian where bridges can be built to link up the PRC with Kinmen.

Second, the Taiwan students’ study in Fujian is promoted by supporting Fujian’s higher education and scientific research institutes to accept and enrol them in an enlarged manner, and by supporting Taiwan’s special enterprises and industries to participate in Fujian’s vocational schools in the form of joint stock ownership and joint management.

The implication here is that the businesspeople of Taiwan are welcome and encouraged to participate in vocational school development in mainland China, stimulating more Taiwan students to study in Fujian.

Third, the Taiwan compatriots are encouraged to find jobs and get employed in Fujian through the direct recognition of Taiwan’s occupational qualifications, the provision of allowing Taiwan lawyers to practice law in the mainland, and the development and expansion of human resources services for them through the Taiwan enterprises in Fujian.

The implication is that such a move attempts at initiating the first step of mutual recognition of occupational qualifications in the long run while enhancing the integration of Taiwan lawyers into the Fujian legal profession in the short term.

Fourth, the social participation of Taiwan compatriots will be expanded in Fujian by supporting them to partake community construction and grassroots-level management in the province, and by supporting them to join occupational, academic, and professional groups.

The implication here is that the Taiwan people are encouraged to participate in Fujian’s resident, neighbourhood, and group activities, fostering deeper social integration into the mainland.

Fifth, the social life of the Taiwan compatriots in Fujian is facilitated and promoted by repealing the need for them to register as temporary residents there, by equalizing their treatment and benefits as with the mainland residents who hold mainland identity cards, and by encouraging them to buy apartment units and houses in Fujian.

This measure aims at speeding up the social integration of more Taiwan people into Fujian province through the relaxation of their privileges, citizenship status, and benefits and the liberalization of the Fujian property market to embrace the Taiwanese.

Sixth, industrial cooperation is going to be deepened by setting up cross-strait service platform, utilizing common standards of professions and industrial research, and by exploring how to build up the assessment and recognition system for Taiwan enterprises and businesses.

Specifically, the Fujian integration zone is trying to set up industrial integration funds, to support cross-strait stock exchange centres, to encourage the participation of more Taiwanese enterprises in the mainland’s monetary and financial markets. The Taiwan fishery industry and small and medium enterprises are encouraged to develop and conduct business in Fujian. Similarly, the research institutes of Fujian and Taiwan are encouraged to develop their platform in skills and knowledge exchange, promoting digital and industrial transformation.

It remains to be seen how the Fujian’s stock market development can and will lure the Taiwan investors. Moreover, the sensitivity involved in skills and knowledge transfer will likely be a hindrance to the idea of “industrial integration,” which can perhaps be regarded as a long-term goal.

Seventh, Xiamen and Kinmen are going to be reshaped as “the same city of social life,” meaning that Xiamen is empowered to reform its interactions with Kinmen with more autonomy, that the Kinmen residents will enjoy the same residents’ benefits as with the mainlanders in Xiamen, and that both places will speed up the provision of electricity, gas, bridges and the mutual usage of the Xiamen airport. 

Moreover, Matsu residents enjoy the same residents’ benefits as with those people in Fuzhou, while the provision of electricity, water, gas, and bridges by Fuzhou to Matsu is speeded up.

The implication here is that Xiamen is used as a bridgehead to deepen socio-economic interaction and integration with Kinmen and Matsu where the Taiwan residents are treated as having the same benefits of the Fujianese.

Eighth, Fujian’s Pingtan county is going to liberalize the financial system of facilitating Taiwan investment, cross-border services, and trade, and to explore the pilot construction of a cross-strait common market. Fujian will consider opening its door to Taiwan’s information service industry and education sector.

The implications here are the study of liberalizing the financial, trade and services market in Fujian’s Pingtan, serving as a pilot study to integrate Taiwan’s service and education sectors.

Ninth, social and human interactions between Fujian and Taiwan are promoted by allowing Taiwan groups to set up their offices in Fujian, by promoting research institutes of the Xiamen University to interact with Taiwan’s think tanks, by encouraging cross-strait youth exchange and groups interaction, and by establishing Fujian-Taiwan cooperative items through the exhibition of Chinese culture to overseas visitors.

The implication here is that the educational and cultural sectors of Fujian are liberalized to facilitate socio-cultural and educational integration with Taiwan.

Overall, the Fujian integration zone has tremendous political significance, especially if this Opinion is analysed together with the State Council’s August 2022 White Paper on the Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era.

First, the Opinion can be regarded as part and parcel of “the Taiwan model of ‘one country, two systems,’” utilizing Fujian as the direct bridgehead and platform to integrate with the people and island of Taiwan socially, culturally, and economically. The August 2022 White Paper emphasized the importance of “promoting peaceful cross-strait relations and integrated development.” As such, the Opinion published on September 12, 2023, is an elaboration of the concrete plans and policy toward “integrated development.” The White Paper mentioned explicitly that China “will explore an innovative approach to integrated development and take the lead in setting up a pilot zone for integrated cross-Strait’s development in Fujian province, advancing integration through better connectivity and more preferential policies, and based on mutual trust and understanding.” In fact, the Opinion delineates all the preferential treatment of the mainland toward the Taiwan compatriots, outlining the contours and content of “integrated development” between the mainland and Taiwan.

Second, by utilizing Fujian and its Xiamen city as well as Pingtan county, the Opinion seeks to shape and change the identity of more Taiwan people. If more Taiwan people visit the mainland to study, work, reside and do business in the Fujian province, their social and cultural identity will hopefully become more Chinese, thereby generating an identity of recognizing the importance and the need for “Chinese renaissance” and Chinese “national reunification and rejuvenation” in the long run. In fact, it is quite possible that the more the Taiwan compatriots are socially and culturally integrated into the mainland, the more likely they will support Chinese national renaissance, reunification, and rejuvenation. Such silent transformations of the identity of more Taiwan people will, hopefully, shape how they would perhaps influence the way of the Taiwan government thinks about Taiwan’s integration with the mainland, especially Fujian.

Third, the idea of utilizing Fujian to target at Kinmen and Matsu as the front yard of socio-cultural and economic integration is a wise one, because if the White Paper did mention the possibility of a stage-by-stage” process of negotiation and dialogue between the mainland and Taiwan on national reunification, then obviously the islands of Kinmen and Matsu constitute the pilot points for such deeper integration and experimentation with the Taiwan model of “one country, two systems.” 

Fourth, the creation of the Fujian integration zone is parallel to how the mainland has utilized the Greater Bay Area (GBA) to integrate both Hong Kong and Macau more deeply into the mainland’s social, cultural, and economic orbits – a similar pattern pointing to the usage of zones or specially designed districts as the windows of socio-cultural, economic, and later political integration. The cases of Hong Kong and Macau have been successful ones in this process of socio-cultural, economic, and political integration, especially through the usage of infrastructure projects like the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau bridge and the High-Speed Rail. It can be anticipated that Fujian will likely link up with Kinmen and Matsu through bridges and similar High-Speed Rail. What makes the case of Taiwan’s integration with the mainland challenging is that due to the outbreak of Covid-19 in the past four years, socio-cultural and economic-human integration between the two places were terminated. It is now the ripe time to speed up socio-cultural and human integration between the mainland and Taiwan.

Fifth, the timing of the publication of this Opinion coincides with the forthcoming campaign of the 2024 Taiwan presidential elections, meaning that the initiatives from the mainland are testing how the candidates of the Taiwan presidential elections will react. Hou You-yi of the Kuomintang stated on September 15 that while China’s intention of reunifying Taiwan has not changed, Taiwan has “its own principle” in dealing with the mainland. His remark points to a more cautious reaction that avoids affiliating the KMT too closely and too quickly with the mainland’s integration plan, while buying more time for the KMT to come up with its platform on cross-strait relations. 

In short, the Opinion is going to test the responses from the KMT led by candidate Hou, the People’s Party led by Ko Wen-je, and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) led by candidate William Lai. Cross-strait relations will likely be a key party platform that will shape the ideas, decisions, and votes of many Taiwan voters in the January 2024 presidential elections.

In conclusion, the publication of the Opinion represents an elaboration of the plan of “integrated development” mentioned in the August 2022 White Paper on the Taiwan Question. The Opinion has tremendous political significance not only because it is part and parcel of the Taiwan model of “one country, two systems,” but also because it aims at promoting the identity transformation of more Taiwan people, fostering a “stage-by-stage” process of interactions and dialogue, utilizing infrastructure projects as the key united front strategy of socio-cultural and economic integration, and testing the responses of candidates of different political parties in Taiwan in the current run-up to the January 2024 presidential elections.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

The 16-hour of torrential rainstorm that straddled the night of September 7^th and the morning of 8^th not only plunged various districts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) into chaos, but also raised serious questions on what lessons the government should learn in dealing with sudden crisis management.

At 9.25 pm on September 7^th, the Observatory issued a yellow rainstorm alert. Two minutes later, the alert was changed to a red one. At 11.05 pm, black rainstorm warning was issued. 

At 12.15 am on the morning of September 8^th, the MTR Corporation announced that the line between Kwun Tong and Whampoa terminated service.

Hong Kong’s media have revealed that the Observatory sent separate warnings to government departments on the night of September 7^th, including fire services, police, and the drainage department, on the possible scope of damage incurred by the rainstorm.

Then department officials held meetings to produce their contingency plans, just like the past experiences during which typhoons attacked Hong Kong. After the midnight when 158 mm (6.2 inches) of rainfall poured into the HKSAR within an hour – a historical phenomenon since 1884 – it was reported that Chief Secretary Eric Chan met with departmental officials to prepare the mobilization of manpower and resources to cope with the crisis.

At around 1.19 am on September 8^th, the Facebook of Chief Executive John Lee asked the residents to stay in safe places and it said the government was making all the efforts to deal with the torrential rainfall.

At 5.34 am, the government announced that, due to severe weather, day and night schools would terminate their classes, while employers would deal with their work arrangements in accordance with the practices under Typhoon number 8 conditions.

The severe weather condition lasted until 12 am on September 9^th.

The rainstorm brought havoc to many districts: Temple Mall North in Wong Tai Sin was flooded with muddy water; Shau Kei Wan witnessed flooding and severe damage on its roads; the MTR station in Wong Tai Sin was badly damaged; citizens were trapped in cars many of which were stranded and damaged; at least 151 trees were fallen; 39 landslides took place; 20 schools reported their facility damage; 144 residents needed hospital treatment; 343 calls were made to the government for assistance; and at least 335 people took refuge in temporary shelters in the North district.

On September 9^th, Chief Secretary John Lee met the media, and he agreed that a review should be undertaken to see whether the warning system can be improved further.

With the benefit of hindsight, the government could have done better even though the torrential rainfall in a short period of time was regarded as once in 500 years.

First and foremost, the warning given to residents by the government was too late, unlike the situation during the Super Typhoon Saola during which the government hoisted Typhoon number 8 much earlier for citizens to have sufficient time to buy food and make precautionary measures at their homes. Indeed, the speedy movement of Saola might be a fortunate event that could minimize the damage done to the HKSAR.

However, interestingly, the torrential rainfall caused by Typhoon Haikui, which had made serious landfall in Fujian province, should have alerted the officials of Observatory much earlier. Mainland news on September 5 and 6 had already reported the severe damage incurred by Haikui as it moved south from Fujian to Guangdong. Based on proper weather intelligence-gathering and analyses, the Observatory should have alerted the government departments and residents much earlier instead of raising the yellow rainstorm alert to black one within one and half hours on the night of September 7^th. Indeed, the Observatory officials explained on the afternoon of September 8^th that it was more difficult to predict the movement of rainstorm. Critically speaking, technological predictions might be “difficult” in situation of rapid climate change, but earlier intelligence analyses of weather conditions and Haikui’s movement could increase the level of the rainstorm alert much earlier.

Second, even though the Chief Secretary coordinated the departments concerned quickly to cope with the rainstorm, the Hong Kong media have accurately pointed to the inadequacies of governmental communication with the public. Some media and critics have pointed to the need for the government to use the SMS system to alert the residents of the rainstorm situation. Yet, one official told the media that such SMS alert could have scared the residents during their sleep – a remark that could be regarded as apparently convincing but controversial. The question was what time a proper message should and could be used through SMS to alert the residents of the dangers of the rainstorm. In any case, the Emergency Monitoring and Support Centre supervised by the Security Bureau and the cross-departmental steering committee led by the Chief Secretary should perhaps study how earlier warning signals would be improved in the future, especially when climate change would very likely produce natural disaster of a similar kind through sudden rainstorm attack.

Third, it was reported that Shenzhen informed the HKSAR authorities sixteen minutes before it decided to discharge its reservoir waters, but the Hong Kong government later clarified that it had been informed 45 minutes earlier. Objectively speaking, the crisis made it difficult for the Shenzhen authorities to inform their Hong Kong counterparts earlier, but more cross-border governmental communications will be necessary to enhance mutual dialogue and mutual alert in case of sudden rainstorm attack. The torrential rainstorm caused havoc in not only Fujian, but also Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong – evidence pointing to the detrimental force of the so-called “residual rain” caused by Haikui.

A minority of Hong Kong residents raised the question on whether the Shenzhen water discharge might have exacerbated the flooding in the New Territories – a claim without evidence indeed. Interestingly, a pro-Beijing daily in the HKSAR on September 9^th criticized such a “big rumour” as irresponsible and it interviewed a weather expert who insisted that the flooding in Hong Kong had no relation with the Shenzhen water discharge. Objectively speaking, ordinary citizens were not weather experts, but it was up to the government authorities to communicate with citizens in a better and prompt manner to dispel such an unfounded rumour.

Fourth, some lawmakers have pointed to the need for the government to examine its announcement on the morning of September 8^th that employers should make their own work arrangements. While the government said that it could not “cut in one slice” by asking all employees to stop their work, trade unionists have argued that there was a “legal vacuum” by asking employees to do so. Federation of Trade Union legislator Tang Ka-piu said that there should be a legislation on the termination of work, and that employers and employees do not really know how to respond to the government’s call for them to arrange their own work under “severe weather” conditions. Other critics of the government said that it kicked the ball to employers to deal with a crisis without clear guidelines. It is controversial on whether the government should legislate on the termination of work under “severe weather” condition or whether it should just issue guidelines to do so. Currently, the government believes that employers should be given the discretion to decide work arrangements under the circumstances of Typhoon number 8.

In conclusion, the torrential rain caused by the “residual rain” of Haikui exposed the problems of crisis management in the HKSAR. Earlier weather warnings could have been made; better communications with the citizens could also have been made; more communication is also needed between the Hong Kong and Shenzhen government authorities in dealing with weather and climate change; and there is a need for review of the discretion given to employers in work arrangements under Typhoon 8 circumstances. If national security embraces how governments deal with sudden climate change conditions, then the HKSAR authorities must learn a lesson from the legacies of the sudden and heavy rainstorm that brough havoc to Hong Kong within a short period of time.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

Although the recent announcement of business tycoon Terry Guo to participate in the 2024 presidential elections in Taiwan was not surprising, his move has already damaged the unity of the non-green camp in Taiwan politics, pointing to the likely easy victory of William Lai, the candidate representing the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) especially if there would be difficulties in reaching a political compromise between Guo, Hou You-yi of the Kuomintang (KMT) and Ko Wen-je of the People’s Party.

Terry Guo in his public announcement asserted that he would like to form a broad non-green coalition to unite the voters against the DPP. However, there are several problems that he, Hou You-yi and Ko Wen-je would have to tackle if such a coalition can be realized.

First, Terry Guo and his think tank may want to use public opinion polls as a bargaining chip to propel the formation of a non-green or blue-white coalition against the green camp led by the DPP. Nevertheless, opinion polls shown in the Taiwan mass media have displayed a low rating of Guo, whose popularity is the third trailing behind Hou and Ko. 

If Guo’s popularity remains low, it would be difficult for him to reach a consensus with Hou and Ko over a cup of coffee, as he said in his press briefing.

Most importantly, a lot of netizens in Taiwan have reacted quite negatively to Guo’s participation, with some of them saying that rich businesspeople like him should support the KMT to have one candidate rather than spitting the blue camp. Others critical of Guo point to his likelihood of grasping some voters supportive of Ko Wen-je, thereby leading to a lose-lose situation in which the DPP led by William Lai would win the presidential election in January 2024 easily.

Second, it is unclear how Guo’s electoral participation will really rally the moderate voters who are neither the core supporters of the KMT nor the voters of the DPP. In other words, the moderate voters may see Guo as being too “pro-mainland” rather than seeing him as a candidate who can and would minimize the conflicts between the mainland and Taiwan. If some moderate voters see Guo as being too “dark blue,” then Guo’s participation may hurt the chance of Hou You-yi of the KMT.

Third, unless Guo wants to use his public announcement of participation in the 2024 presidential elections as a stimulus to trigger the interest of citizens and to mobilize the voters to cast their ballots, he would still have to pass the hurdle of some 280,000 voters’ signatures first to get nominated. Critics have already questioned whether some locally elected councilors in Taiwan’s municipal councils would really follow Guo. Some councilors have expressed their intention of withdrawing their support of Guo. If so, Terry Guo’s electoral participation alienates his supporters rather than galvanizing them.

Fourth, the DPP side appears to be cautious of the possibility that Guo’s participation would stimulate the rise of a non-green coalition, and, as such, it has increased vigilance while enhancing campaign efforts at mobilizing the green camp’s supporters. Under these circumstances, Terry Guo’s claim of forming a coalition and his participation have already heightened the sensitivity of the DPP and even enhanced the green camp’s chance of electoral success. The DPP think tank is by no means relaxed and Guo’s participation has already alarmed its core leaders.

There are three scenarios of Guo’s participation in Taiwan’s presidential elections in 2024.

The first is that none of the three non-green candidates – Guo, Hou and Ko – would be able to reach a consensus and the result would be an easy victory for William Lai from the DPP. This scenario would be quite likely if Guo and Ko maintain their stance without making any compromise, especially if public opinion poll results would not be able to convince any one or two of the three to opt out from electoral participation.

The second scenario is that Guo may eventually opt out due to low popularity rating, which at present seems unlikely as the coming months will be more crucial in witnessing whether any non-green candidate would opt out. Hou will certainly stand as he was nominated by the KMT, especially as Guo is seen by many critics and KMT supporters as a person “breaking his earlier promise” of not participating in the 2024 elections. Yet, if Guo opts out, Ko and Hou would still divide up the voters from the blue and white camps, competing for the support of moderate voters and thereby favoring William Lai to win the election. Current polls show that Lai’s DPP garner between 30 and 40 percent of the votes – a figure leading all the other three non-green candidates.

The third scenario is that there will be a compromise among Guo, Hou and Ko to have only one candidate representing the non-green coalition. However, this scenario will be quite difficult as Ko represents the People’s Party. Asking Ko to withdraw from the elections would be illogical and impractical. Similarly, Hou represents the KMT camp, and it is impossible to ask him to withdraw. It is therefore unclear whether Guo would persuade Hou and Ko to come together as a coalition while Guo himself withdrawing from the contest. But under a very ideal situation in which Guo, Hou and Ko would reach a consensus that only one of them would represent the non-green camp, then William Lai’s chance of victory will be undermined severely.

From the analyses above, scenarios one and two would favor William Lai of the DPP. Only scenario three would envisage Lai’s defeat. 

In conclusion, Terry Guo’s participation in the presidential elections of Taiwan in early 2024 can be seen as a traditional split within the KMT – a gloomy scenario for the emergence of a coalition or the coming of any compromise in which the three non-green candidates would select only one of them to run in the contest. Unless Guo aims at bringing about a real consensus between him, Hou and Ko, it is quite difficult to witness an easy victory of the non-green camp.

The DPP has been governing Taiwan for some years and its hardline position on cross-strait relations appears to get the support of many Taiwan voters, especially the younger generation. As such, unless Terry Guo himself opts out of the electoral contest and unless he can really bring about a compromise among the three non-green candidates, the current developments in Taiwan politics are pointing to the likelihood of the DPP victory in the 2024 presidential elections. The end of 2023 will likely be the most critical period in Taiwan’s 2024 presidential politics because, if any candidate opts out, then a glimmer of hope for the non-green camp would emerge. Still, having two candidates competing for moderate voters would likely be inadequate for the non-green camp to defeat the relatively strong and incumbent green camp.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

Judging from the remarks made by Xi Jinping, the President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), days before and during the BRICS Summit in South Africa, China’s foreign policy toward the developing states is not only strategic but also in conformity with its socialist vision of envisaging a world punctuated by multilateralism, peace, equality and the “common destiny of the humankind.”

During his visit to South Africa, President Xi met the presidents of Cuba, Ethiopia, Senegal and Bangladesh, making important comments that deserve our analyses.

First, he supported Cuba in defending its national sovereignty and opposing any external interference as well as blockade on the socialist state in Central America – a remark implicitly pointing to the role of US hegemony in the geopolitics of Central America where Cuba remains an ideological friend of the PRC. President Xi added that the PRC is willing to collaborate with Cuba’s socio-economic development amid an atmosphere of international tensions. In response to Xi’s comments, Cuban President Diaz-Canel believed that Cuba would strengthen the relations with the Communist Party of China, and that Havana appreciates Beijing’s efforts of trying to remove Cuba from the US list of “state-sponsored terrorism.”

President Xi supported Cuba to host the Group of seventy-seven developing countries in the coming September – a gesture of friendship and positive support of Cuba.

Second, President Xi told the Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed that the PRC’s model of modernization provides excellent opportunities for closer cooperation, and that the African state’s debt payments can be suspended. Xi  added that, given China’s Belt and Road initiative, the Chinese enterprises would continue to invest in Ethiopia and contribute to its economic prosperity. In fact, the bilateral trade between the PRC and Ethiopia increased to US$2.66 billion in 2021, but the debt incurred by Ethiopia to China amounted to US$13.7 billion. By suspending the debt payments, Beijing wins the hearts and minds of Addis Ababa.

Third, President Xi told Senegalese President Mackay Sall that both China and Senegal shared developmental experiences and that both sides should strengthen cooperation in the areas of agriculture, infrastructure projects, human resources construction and industrial development. Again, China shows its intention of forging close relations with more African states.

Fourth, President Xi told Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina that Beijing fully supports Bangladesh’s sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and economic development while opposing external interference. Clearly, China aims at winning the hearts and minds of Bangladesh, especially both countries have traditionally developed strong socio-economic and political relationships.

Prior and during the BRICS Summit, President Xi Jinping made comments that demonstrates how China sees the developing countries in the world.

First, he told South African President Cyril Ramaphosa that both sides should elevate their comprehensive strategic partnership to a new level, that China would import more South African goods like beef, and that the Global South and African states should have more say in global governance and institutions. Specifically, China supports the entry of the African Union to G20. Xi expressed his support of South Africa to dispatch a peace mission to Ukraine and to promote dialogue between Ukraine and Russia. 

During Xi’s stay in South Africa, the Chinese government signed a series of agreement with Pretoria, including educational cooperation, infrastructure projects, energy development, tourism growth, and digital technology. Interesting, a Confucius Institute would be built in South Africa. 

Obviously, Beijing is keen to develop not only closer economic, educational and technological collaboration with Pretoria but also cultural ties with more South Africans who will hopefully understand China in a deeper way.

Second, President Xi during the BRICS Summit talked about concrete cooperative mechanisms, including the establishment of a China-BRICS Innovation and Technology Incubation Garden. His speech was entitled “Solidarity and Coordination seek development, Taking the Responsibility to promote peace.” What President Xi emphasized was to deepen trade relations, strengthen financial cooperation, promote economic development, foster technological advancement through the Incubation Garden, and to gather scientific data to propel agricultural, ecological and sustainable development.

Clearly, China aims at forging closer cooperation with BRICS and other developing states and implementing its foreign policy of promoting a win-win situation in a world punctuated by equality, sustainable development and peace.

Third, President Xi in his speech appealed to the participation of more countries in BRICS, adding that the presence of some fifty countries in the BRICS Summit was a sign of “not siding with any camp” and “not making any confrontation” while “generating a grandiose style of peaceful development.” He added that multilateralism is the key to world peace, promoting a “multipolar world,” “the democratization of international relations,” and “the fair and reasonable direction and development of the international order.” 

The language used by President Xi is consistent with what he remarked in international institutions in the past, including terms like “multilateralism” and “not taking side with any camp.” 

But what was special in Xi’s speech in BRICS Summit was that for the first time he mentioned the need to “democratize” international relations and the establishment of a “multipolar world” – direct references to the challenges posed to the US hegemony in a world of multilateralism and politico-economic equality.

Fourth, Xi’s remarks on the need to avoid “a new Cold War” and to shun “small circles” are by no means new; nevertheless, his emphasis on the necessity of “partnership without alignment,” “win-win situation without a zero-sum game,” and the importance of creating a “common security entity” in the world reflects Xi’s socialist vision for the entire world. 

Fifth, in a very explicit way, President Xi said that China has “no gene to become a hegemon,” that Beijing has “no impetuous motive of having any big power struggle,” and that the PRC would like to “stand consistently on the correct side of history to create a big moral path of walking and a world of fairness.”

Objectively speaking, the Chineseness of Beijing’s foreign policy can be seen in his important remarks at the BRICS Summit. This Chineseness is characterized by a strong socialist tone, a vision of a peaceful and sustainable world, and a legacy of Chinese egalitarianism and modesty.

Sixth, President Xi emphasized the Chinese model of modernization would be an example for the developing countries to study and learn further. He said that China as a member of the Global South would like to promote mutual prosperity, security and cultural as well as civilizational exchange.

President Xi pointed to the role of the PRC in shouldering the responsibility of a great power that promote peaceful development amid world turbulence. As such, China is keen to build up more free trade regions in various parts of the world, opposing “decoupling” and “economic coercion.” Xi appealed to developing states to promote reforms in the international monetary system through their participation in BRICS.

By implication, China promotes de-dollarization so that the influence of the US currency in the world would perhaps be curbed by the increasing usage of the currencies of developing states in their trade and economic transactions.

With the participation of six new countries in BRICS – Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, Argentina, Ethiopia and Iran – the process of de-hegemonizing the US is given a boost although it will take a long time for the parallel process of de-dollarization to achieve any breakthrough.

In conclusion, President Xi’s remarks in South Africa and during the BRICS Summit were a testimony to how China implements its foreign policy toward the developing world. Specifically, China is keen to develop multilateralism, establish a multipolar world, promote world peace and sustainability, minimize the US hegemony through embracing more states’ participation in BRICS, “democratize international relations,” project and stress an image of a peaceful China whose great power diplomacy is by no means “aggressive,” and to promote the reform of the international economic system through an incremental approach of experimenting with de-dollarization. Beijing clearly utilizes international organizations, like BRICS, to promote its socialist vision and peaceful mission for the world. Ideological differences between China and the US on the one hand and China and the US allies on the other hand remain the most important shaper influencing Beijing’s foreign policy toward the developing states in the world.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

The Camp David Summit between US President Joe Biden, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida had important implications for not only the geopolitics of alliance-building among the US allies, but also the responses of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and how Beijing may deal with the rapid development of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa).

Biden met Yoon and Kishida in a historical summit of his retreat at Camp David, coming up with the “Camp David Principles” in which the three countries share the common objectives of strengthening trilateral security cooperation, enhancing peace and stability in the Asian peace and stability, and opposing any “unilateral attempt at changing the status quo in the waters of the Indo-Pacific region.”

The Camp David Spirit includes a statement issued by the three sides: “We affirm the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an indispensable element of security and prosperity in the international community. There is no change in our basic positions on Taiwan, and we call for a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.”

The three countries responded to their perceived threat by emphasizing the importance of mutual coordination, communication and strategic formulation. These threats include trade disputes, the missile threat from North Korea, provocations on the waters, and Internet attack. The three sides reached a “commitment to consult” with each other – a process of “institutionalization” in which the leaders of US, South Korea and Japan will hold annual summit and share military and other intelligence about North Korea. Moreover, the three countries will conduct regular military exercises. They also stand against Russia and are united behind Ukraine, according to the published Camp David Spirit.

Although the US side publicly remarked that the summit did not target at any specific country, it seems that North Korea is the main target of perceived threat, as mentioned explicitly by President Yoon.

The US side mentioned that Washington does not aim at forming any so-called “Asian NATO,” which is a worry mentioned by political observers and commentators in the PRC. 

The Deputy Assistant to the US President and Coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs, Kurt Campbell, said on August 16 that the South Korean and Japanese sides had already achieved “a breathtaking kind of diplomacy” even against the suggestions of their own counselors and advisors. He added that both Seoul and Tokyo “elevate their relationship into a new plane.” 

Campbell remarked that the Camp David Summit “is in keeping with the efforts that President Biden has taken to invest in American allies and partners, both in a traditional way, strong relations with Japan and South Korea, but also in innovative ways like the QUAD, like mustering Indo-Pacific support for Ukraine as they faced down a terrible invasion from Russia.” He elaborated further that the US is “seeking not just to lock in Japan and South Korea for the future, but the US as well, that we will continue to remain engaged, forward deployed, and present in the dominant and important region that the Indo-Pacific represents.”

Campbell’s remarks are significant in at least two aspects. First, the US is keen to build up its alliance with South Korea and Japan in its geopolitical strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. Second, South Korea and Japan appear to worry about the possibility of any change in the US foreign policy toward Asia, especially after the 2024 US Presidential election. Any drift toward US isolationism in the Donald Trump era would plunge the national security of Seoul and Tokyo into jeopardy. As such, the unprecedented Camp David Summit aimed at locking the US into the solid alliance with South Korea and Japan.

It is reported that Kishida and Biden had a private discussion on how both sides would develop a new type of supersonic missile that can and will intercept enemy missiles from North Korea, China and Russia. Their deep discussion strengthened the US-Japan alliance.

Shortly after the water cannon saga that involved the Chinese marine police vessel and the Philippines military supply boats, it is reported that US, Australia and Japan’s Defense Force would supply large military vessels to Manila. Furthermore, a joint military exercise involving the US, Australia, Japan and the Philippines would be conducted soon on August 23 – a sign that all the moves have aimed at deterring the perceived “threat” on the South Sea.

The PRC has reacted to the trilateral summit promptly. The PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin said on August 18 that all sides should stick to the principle of common security, that “real multilateralism” should be maintained, and that all sides should cope with various challenges to security. Moreover, he added that no country should seek to protect its own security at the expense of the security interests of other countries – a criticism that the US engages in bloc-building that can hurt the interests of other states. Wang elaborated that the Asia-Pacific region should not become an arena of geopolitical struggles and of forming “small circles” that exclude others, and that any camp that bring “military syndicates” into the region would be “warned and opposed” by other countries. 

The Chinese Ambassador to South Korea, Xing Haiming, elucidated that dialogue and negotiation are the only effective channel of relieving the tense situation in the Korean peninsula, and that any move of strengthening military gestures would run the risk of exacerbating the confrontations among camps. As such, he added, China opposes any move that targets or implicates it or intervenes in the PRC’s internal affairs.

It is obvious that Xing was commenting on the Camp David Spirit’s mentioning of Taiwan, which according to Beijing is the PRC’s internal affair.

The Camp David Summit had important implications geopolitically for not only the Asia-Pacific region but also the upcoming BRICS summit during which the PRC President Xi Jinping will attend.

First, the Camp David Summit is a symbol of the increasingly solid military and ideological alliance between the US, South Korea and Japan. The Camp David Spirit’s Joint Statement on August 18 explicitly used the term “alliance” to refer to the US relations with South Korea and Japan. Since President Yoon of South Korea has adopted a prominently pro-Japan position, the trilateral alliance is much stronger than ever before and has become unprecedented in the post-Covid era. 

Second, this trilateral alliance has already built up a solid military, technological and defense alliance, which is working alongside the other two US-led organizations, namely the QUAD composed of US, Japan, Australia and India, and AUKUS composed of Australia, UK and the US – a geopolitical formation that has naturally stimulated the rapid responses from China. A new Cold War is emerging in the Asia-Pacific region in which the US allies see a bloc composed of Russia, China and North Korea as a perceived military threat.

Third, it can be anticipated that alliances-building in the world is going to be accelerated. The PRC President Xi Jinping is going to attend the BRICS Summit in South Africa amid reports that forty more countries in the world would like to participate in it, including Argentina, Iran and Saudi Arabia. If BRICS represent a bloc of South-South cooperation countering the influence of the US and even advocating the use of their own currencies rather than the US currency in global economic trade and transactions, the US-led global order is now facing a tremendous challenge. In fact, in 2001, 70 percent of the global economic transactions were conducted in US currency. But now the figure is down to 59 percent. 

Although it takes a long time for the world to reduce the usage of US currency as its global economic transactions, the increasing call of some countries, including those in BRICS, to minimize the usage of US currency in global trade transactions, is signaling a currency war between the US allies and their opposing camp.

Fourth, in terms of Northeast Asian regional security, North Korea remains an enemy of the US and its allies, notably South Korea and Japan. Recent reports have pointed to the emergence of hunger and even social unrest in North Korea which was plagued by the attack of typhoon Khanun. However, North Korea remains a resilient socialist state against natural disasters and internal unrest, unlike what outside observers who had repeatedly made mistakes about its so-called “imminent collapse.” 

Any military accident between North Korea on the one hand and the US, South Korea and Japan on the other hand would be the worst-case scenario in Northeast Asian regional security. As such, an emergence of the new crisis hotline among the US, South Korea and Japan is perhaps a good move to prevent any sudden emergence of conflicts with North Korea.

Fifth, China remains a key target of the Camp David Spirit, as stated quite explicitly in the Joint Statement albeit US officials verbally denied any single target. Two issues have emerged in the psyche of Washington-Seoul-Tokyo leadership: China’s moves in South Sea and the future of Taiwan. While mutual restraint is necessary for all stakeholders laying their sovereignty claims on the islands of South Sea, the future of Taiwan is an internal affair of the PRC from Beijing’s perspective. 

The ongoing visit of the Vice President of Taiwan, William Lai, to the US has triggered the PRC’s criticisms, followed by the launch of Chinese military drills around the island republic. Here, the emergence of a crisis hotline among the US, South Korea and Japan will likely be a thorn in their relations with China, which obviously regards it as an attempt at interfering with how Beijing deals with Taipei in the future.

In conclusion, the Camp David Spirit is a testimony to a process of building up the ideological-military alliance between the US on the one hand and South Korea and Japan on the other hand. Their common ideology of capitalist democracy has solidified the military, defense and technological cooperation to an unprecedented degree. Their political stance on Ukraine and Russia is obvious. However, their relations with China are destined to be strained, especially on the Joint Statement’s comment on South Sea and Taiwan. China’s negative responses to the Camp David Summit are natural and understandable. It is likely that the PRC will utilize the expansion of BRICS membership as a counterweight to cope with the US alliance and other related US-led military organizations in the Asia-Pacific region. Although the US side asserts that the Camp David Summit does not represent any “Asian NATO,” the perception of the PRC toward the Summit is the contrary, so as how North Korea perceives the Washington-Seoul-Tokyo alliance. As such, the Asia-Pacific region is now stepping into a particularly challenging era during which all the stakeholders of peace and security will have to exercise their utmost restraint, increase their mutual understandings, and enhance dialogue and negotiations in a far more imperative and intensive way than ever before.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of dozens of books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China

The dispute between China and the Philippines over the islands in the South Sea was shown in the action of a Chinese coastguard vessel that used water cannon to prevent a Philippine military supply boat from transporting fuel, food and water to troops stationed on an old warship grounded near the Second Thomas Shoal. The incident led to the immediate diplomatic protests from the Philippines, followed by the support from the US and a rebuttal from the Chinese side. The whole incident illustrates the complex geopolitics in the territorial dispute over the islands inthe South Sea.

The Philippines government summoned the envoy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Manila to protest the Chinese coastguard action.

The PRC asserts that it has sovereignty over the submerged reef, namely Ren’ai (or Ayungin in Philippines), and that the Philippines military should remove the grounded warship from the reef region. The Philippines side has been refusing to do so.

Historically, China has claimed its sovereignty over the Second Thomas Shoal in the South Sea. Its sovereignty extends to the “nine-dash line” that covers some of the economic zones of other claimants, including Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines. During the naval conflicts between China and Vietnam in 1974, the PRC got back the Paracel Islands. In 1995, the PRC controlled the Mischief Reef, whose sovereignty was claimed by the Philippines. In 2016, an international tribunal in Hague dealt with a lawsuit launched by the Philippines and it decided that China’s “nine-dash line” and historical claims were superseded by the United Nations Convention on the Sea. But China did not recognize the rulingand said that it was a drama staged in the name of the international law with the behind-the-scenes manoeuvre of the US.

The Philippines in 1999 grounded its old warship, namely Sierra Madre, at the Second Thomas Shoal as a show of its assertion of sovereignty over the disputed waters. The Shoal is situated east of the Mischief Reef and is near the Philippine Island of Palawan.

The Philippines action of stationing some troops on Sierra Madre and providing logistical supplies to them regularly was a gesture of asserting its sovereignty.

On the other hand, the Chinese coastguard action of using water cannon to target at the Philippine military supply boat was also a gesture of asserting its sovereignty in the disputed territory.

The Chinese foreign ministry said that it exercised restraint all the time and repeated the demand for the Philippines to tow away the grounded warship, adding that the coastguard vessels targeted at Philippines ships that carried construction materials to the warship. The PRC side also added that the Filipino side had promised to remove the grounded warship. The Chinese claim of this Philippines promise was rejected by Manila, and President Marcos added that if such a promise existed, he would “rescind” it.

From the video shown in public, it seems that the water cannon did not directly hit the Philippines military supply boat. It looks like a minor incident showing both sides’ assertions of theirsovereignty over the disputed area.

It was reported that four Philippines vessels were involved in the water cannon saga, including two coastguard vessels and two chartered vessels. Moreover, there were six Chinese coastguard vessels and two Chinese fishing vessels.

However, some politicians in the Philippines appeared to react strongly. This is not surprising given the fact that the Philippine politicians are often divided into those who are more supportive of a friendly diplomacy toward China and those who are more pro-American and supportive of a hardline and nationalist policy toward Beijing. The remarks of the hardliners can be seen when Jonathan Malaya, a spokesperson of the Philippines national security council, insisted that his country would “never abandon Ayungin Shoal.”

It must be noted that former Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte adopted a more friendly relationship with the PRC, knowing the necessity of making the Philippines a more neutral actor that was sandwiched between the power politics and regional rivalry between the PRC on the one hand and the US on the other.

However, the current Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr has been adopting a more pro-US policy than Duterte. The Marcos government has given Washington access to four additional military bases under the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement in 2014, an agreement that provides for joint military training, the use of military equipment, and the construction of military facilities including storage and runways. The US has provided military aid to the Philippines. Under the Marcos regime, the US relations with the Philippines have been strengthened at the expense of a more harmonious relationship between Manila and Beijing.

The water cannon incident prompted the US defence secretary Lloyd Austin to stress the “ironclad nature of the US-Philippines alliance” during a call with the Philippine defence secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. The US side criticized the Chinese side for “threatening” regional peace and stability.

The PRC Foreign Ministry Wang Yi then criticized the US side for stirring up troubles in the South Sea and for “adding the fuel on the fire” on Sino-Philippines relations. He also criticized the US for “instigating confrontations” with China and undermining the peace and calmness in the South Sea. According to Wang, China hopes that countries in the region should be on guard over the “black hand” behind the scenes and that they should grasp the leadership right into their own hands. 

During his visit to Singapore and Malaysia, Wang Yi said that China raised to the Philippines many times on its willingness to deal with mutual opinion differences through bilateral dialogue.Moreover, China would like to work with the ASEAN on the regional rules and regulations in accordance with the international law.

On the other hand, President Marcos indicated that both the Philippines and Chinese side would discuss further on the disputed areas. He said: “The position of China, of course, is they say, ‘this is ours, so we are defending it’ and we, for our part, are saying ‘no, we own it, so we are defending it.’ So that becomes a grey area that we are discussing.”

If the Chinese and the Philippines sides are willing to sit down in the negotiating table to talk and discuss about territorial dispute over the islands on South Sea, then the water cannon saga would hopefully be tackled in a calm, wise and diplomatic manner.

The whole water cannon incident illustrates the potential flashpoint between China and its neighbours over territorial disputes in the islands of South Sea.

First, the geopolitical alliance between the US and the Philippines and other American allies has made any action taken by China to assert its sovereignty claims over the islands in South Sea extremely sensitive and politicized. Apart from the US-Philippines defence alliance, Japan has agreed to provide coastguard and military vessels to the Philippines. Japan’s expression of its political and defensive support of Taiwan, as Liberal Democratic Party vice president Taro Aso commented during his recent visit to Taipei, has also angered China. The distrust between China on the one hand and the US, the Philippines and Japan on the other hand does not appear to bode well for the future of peace in the Asia-Pacific region.

The strong relations between the US allies and the Philippines mean that Manila may have to be more careful, delicate, and subtle in Manila’s dispute with Beijing over the islands in South Sea. Any imbalance in Manila’s orientation that may be tilted toward the US side would perhaps bring about tense relations with Beijing – an imbalance that was avoided by President Duterte.

Second, China’s coastguard action may have to be more careful in its usage of water cannons. Although it is understandable that the Chinese side asserted its sovereignty over the disputed territory, any mild action on the part of its coastguard vessels could be misperceived and misinterpreted by Beijing’s Asian neighbours, some of whom cast suspicious eyes on the PRC’s military expansion and intention in South Sea.

Third, if Washington wishes to return to more harmonious relations with Beijing, its responses to a similar water cannon incident will perhaps need to be wise and to exercise more restraint in verbal comments. Indeed, in the world of international politics, neutrality is extremely difficult. But, as Wang Yi mentioned perhaps quite fairly, the remarks from the US side appeared to add fuel to the fire, fanning the flames of an accident unnecessarily. However, from another angle of balancing and containing the PRC influence, it is understandable that the US promptly criticized the Chinese coastguard action atthe Second Thomas Shoal.

Fourth, it is imperative for ASEAN to finalize, endorse and implement the code of conduct for South Sea so that any unnecessary international military conflicts in the region would be avoided. Trust-building will be necessary between China and its Asian neighbours. Instead of seeing China as a “threat,” most Asian states will hopefully embrace its rapid rise in a harmonious and win-win situation.

In conclusion, the water cannon incident appears to be a minor one, but it can be a flashpoint that draws the PRC and the Philippines into an unnecessary dispute and unwanted conflict. Neither Beijing nor Manila would like to witness any conflict, but in fact both countries have exhibited a consensus of sitting down on the negotiating table to communicate further over disputed issues. Most importantly, the water cannon incident demonstrates the complexities of geopolitics under which the US-China rivalry is complicating the relations between the Philippines and the PRC. Geopolitical rivalries between China and other US allies can also be easily seen in the water cannon saga. Under these circumstances, Manila may have to consider the virtue of the Duterte regime in balancing the US and China subtly and skilfully without tilting toward any side prominently. On the other hand, the Chinese coastguard vessels may have to be extremely cautious in exercising even more restraint in dealing with similar Philippines attempts at making gestures to demonstrate Manila’s sovereignty over the disputed waters in South Sea. Mutual restraints are and will perhaps the most important ingredient avoiding misperceptions in international politics.